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…’the object of the exercise is to find oil [ ] in commercial 
quantities and to produce it in such a way as to give 
maximum return on capital spent…’ 
 
An Introduction to Petroleum Exploration 
for Non-Geologists, by Robert Stony  
(1995). 
 
 
 
 
…’we, of course, want [private] investment partners, 
and we want them to profit, but we should also be the 
absolute owner of the land and resources’ 
 
Bolivian President Evo Morales, in an 
interview in Time, 5 June 2006. 
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Foreword 
This thesis is aimed at Australian petroleum regulators, as they continue to seek 
the best method to regulate the extraction of non-renewable resources in 
Australia.  It is purposefully aimed at the principle and policy level, to assist in 
the management of mineral and petroleum resources in Australia in the 21st 
century.  
The study of petroleum was undertaken since there was the opportunity to 
directly compare the regulation of petroleum resources in two first world 
countries, so that Australia may benefit from the experiences of Norway in the 
management of non-renewable resources.  
Whilst this thesis addresses the regulation of petroleum resources, it is intended 
that many of the recommendations are applicable to the extraction of other non-
renewable resources that occur in abundance in Australia.  
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Abstract 
The sustainable development of petroleum resources in Australia forms the 
study of this thesis. Sustainable development in this thesis is defined as 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of the future generations to meet their own needs. It encompasses three 
interconnected pillars: economic development, social development and 
environmental protection. This thesis is confined to an analysis of the 
sustainable socio-economic extraction of Australia’s offshore petroleum 
resources. In extracting petroleum resources, there is a necessity for the State 
and private oil companies to enter into a long-term relationship to be able to 
exploit these resources. This brings many challenges: political, regulatory, 
economic, commercial and technological. These challenges are discussed, 
particularly in light of the tension that occurs between the commercial 
imperatives of private oil companies to generate profit, and the socio-economic 
imperatives of the Sate to ensure sustainability for future generations.  
This thesis considers these challenges in Australia, analysing whether petroleum 
resources have been sustainably developed. Where it has identified that 
sustainable development has not yet been attained, it analyses other jurisdictions 
to determine whether lessons can be learned from these jurisdictions. In 
particular, this thesis focuses on how Norway has been able to utilise the legal 
regulatory framework to encourage sustainable socio-economic development of 
petroleum resources for the benefit of all of Norwegian society.  
Firstly, this thesis considers Australian offshore petroleum policies, identifying 
that although the focus of Australia’s petroleum policies for the last decade has 
been towards encouraging international investment, it recently has been 
expanded to encompass a policy of sustainable development. However, an 
analysis of Australia’s policy finds that it fails to encourage the maximisation of 
the value of Australian petroleum for the benefit of the Australians. The 
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commercial focus of Australia’s petroleum policy prevails, mandating 
commercial investment and strong industry control. An analysis of Norwegian 
petroleum policy demonstrates a policy built on a platform of State direction 
and control over resources to ensure that present and future Norwegians benefit 
from the conversion of Norwegian petroleum wealth to societal wealth. The 
tenets of Norwegian petroleum policy provide a number of valuable lessons for 
Australia, demonstrating the need for stronger State control in the development 
of petroleum resources, and the need for policy to focus on the development of 
resources for current and future generations.  
An analysis of the Australian petroleum legislation suggests it is a prescriptive, 
rule-based legislative framework that creates unnecessary regulatory burden, 
and generates economic and social costs. In contrast, an analysis of legislative 
frameworks from other jurisdictions, namely Norway and South Australia 
(onshore petroleum legislation), indicates that a principle-based legislative 
framework with broad enabling legislation and complementary regulations 
reduces regulatory burden, thereby encouraging sustainable development. 
Furthermore, this type of legislation encourages the State and oil companies to 
develop petroleum resources to meet the interest of the State whilst still 
realising a profit for the oil companies. This analysis also identifies the need for 
a single regulatory authority and the use of model contracts as part of the 
legislative framework in order to encourage the sustainable socio-economic 
development of Australia’s petroleum resources. 
The allocation of a petroleum licence is important for the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources in Australia. It is crucial since it not only 
identifies the best partner for the State in exploiting petroleum resources to 
ensure maximum extraction, it also establishes the relationship between the 
State as owner of the resource and the oil companies that extract the resource. It 
is through the allocation of a licence that the State has the opportunity to ensure 
that the interests of the licencees and the State are aligned as closely as possible. 
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An analysis of the methods of allocation of petroleum licences demonstrates 
that where a State seeks to gain economic return for its resource, then the use of 
the bid system is appropriate. However, where a State seeks to gain sustainable 
benefits, the bid system is inadequate. Furthermore, analysis of the Australian 
work program bidding system and the current good standing provisions 
identifies a system that undermines Australian petroleum policy objectives. The 
current process for the allocation of petroleum licences encourages neither 
certainty nor sustainable development. An analysis of the Norwegian and 
United Kingdom system of petroleum licence allocation demonstrates that the 
use of discretion in the allocation of petroleum licences is able to meet 
respective national policy objectives for each State.  
The sustainable development of petroleum resources relies on extracting as 
much petroleum as possible from a field. To determine whether sustainable 
extraction of petroleum is occurring in Australia, there is an analysis of whether 
State regulation of the rate and method of petroleum extraction is necessary in 
order to achieve sustainable development. An analysis of the Australian 
regulatory framework pertaining to field extraction and the current practices of 
oil companies in the extraction of petroleum suggests that optimal extraction is 
not occurring in many fields, and the present petroleum legislation provides 
little capacity for the State to regulate extraction. An analysis of Norwegian 
field extraction regulation, and the mandatory requirement for the development 
and use of technology to ensure the optimisation of extraction from field 
demonstrates that State regulation of petroleum extraction, particularly the 
method of extraction, has the capacity to encourage the sustainable extraction of 
petroleum.   
 
 
 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
12
 
 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
13
Abbreviations 
AIPN Association of International Petroleum Negotiators 
AMC Australian Marine Complex 
APA Award in Predefined Area 
APEA Australian Petroleum Exploration Association 
APPEA Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association 
ASR Annual Status Report 
bbl barrel (of oil) 
BNOC British National Oil Company 
BP British Petroleum 
CA  Concession Act 1917 (Norway) 
CoAG Council of Australian Governments 
CTH Commonwealth (of Australia) 
DA Designated Authority 
DMP Western Australian Department of Minerals and Petroleum 
EEA European Economic Area 
EC European Community 
ECT European Community Treaty 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
14
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EFTA European Free Trade Agreement 
EOR Enhanced Oil Recovery 
EU European Union 
FDP Field Development Plan 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFC Global Financial Crisis 
GOP Good Oilfield Practice 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
IOR Increased Oil Recovery 
JA Joint Authority 
JOA Joint Operating Agreement (Norway) 
JV Joint Venture 
JVA Joint Venture Agreement 
LCS Licencing and Concession System 
MARPOL Marine Pollution Convention 
MFJOA Model Form Joint Operating Agreement 
MPE Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
15
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
NOPSA National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority 
NPV Net Present Value 
OCSLA Outer Continental Shelf Land Act 1953 (US) 
OPAGGSA Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) 
OPAGGSR Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 
1985 (Cth) 
OSPAR Oslo Paris Convention  
PAA Petroleum Activities Act 1997 (Norway) 
PASA Petroleum Act South Australia 
PDO Plan for Development and Operation 
PIAF Performance Indicator Analysis for Fields 
PR Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway) 
PSA Production Sharing Agreement 
PSC Production Sharing Contract 
PRSA Petroleum Regulations South Australia 
PSLA Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) 
R&D Research and Development 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
16
scm standard cubic metres (of gas) 
SDFI State Direct Financial Interest 
SPREP South Pacific Regional Environment Program 
SRR Social Rate of Return  
SSLA Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) 
toe tons of oil equivalent 
TRD Technological Research and Development 
UJV Unincorporated Joint Venture 
UK  United Kingdom 
UK CS United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
UN United Nations 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USA United States of America 
WPB Work Program Bidding  
 
 
 
 © Tin unter 
 
17
a H
4
2.1  INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 94 
Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................................. 5 
FOREWORD........................................................................................................................................ 7 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................... 9 
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 13 
CONTENTS........................................................................................................................................ 17 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND THESIS PROBLEM ........................................................................ 23 
1.1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 23   
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................ 27   
1.3  M THODOLOGY AND LEGAL PROBLEMS ................................................................................. 29E  
.3.1  Mitigation of potential problems of comparing countries ............................................. 331  
1.4 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES..................................................... 49  
1.5  NORWEGIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AS BENCHMARK FOR THE EVALUATION OF 
AUSTRALIAN REGULATION .............................................................................................................. 59 
1.6  CHALLENGES IN THE EXPLOITATION OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES........................................... 62 
1.6.1 Introduction................................................................................................................... 62   
1.6.2 Economic challenges..................................................................................................... 64   
1.6.3 Commercial challenges: diverging goals of State and company................................... 74   
1.6.4 Technical challenges ..................................................................................................... 77   
1.6.5 Regulatory challenges ................................................................................................... 78   
.6.6  Challenges in exploiting petroleum resources in Australia........................................... 891  
1.7  THESIS STRUCTURE ................................................................................................................ 90 
2.  COMPARING PETROLEUM PRODUCING COUNTRIES: AUSTRALIA AND NORWAY
 9  
 © Tina Hu er 
 
18
nt
   
3.2.3  Economic and commercial challenges for participants .............................................. 173 
2.2  PETROLEUM IN AUSTRALIA AND NORWAY ............................................................................ 95 
2.2.1 Petroleum fields and production ................................................................................... 97   
.2.2  Development of petroleum regulation ......................................................................... 1002  
2.3 THE STATE AS OWNER OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES .............................................................. 104   
2.4  PETROLEUM PROPERTY RIGHTS ............................................................................................ 106 
.4.1  Alteration of legal rights ............................................................................................. 1102  
2.5  COMMONALITY OF INTERNAL SYSTEMS................................................................................ 113 
2.5.1 Law and legal structure............................................................................................... 113   
2.5.2 Welfare and social justice ........................................................................................... 117   
2.5.3 Economy and economic development.......................................................................... 122   
.5.4  Government, political systems, and policy development ............................................. 1302  
2.6  PETROLEUM POLICY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON PETROLEUM REGULATION ............................... 136 
2.6.1 Development of petroleum policy in Australia and Norway........................................ 139   
2.6.2 Current policy failures in Australia ............................................................................ 152   
2.6.3 Choices for policy change – lessons from Norway...................................................... 155   
.6.4  A new petroleum policy for Australia?........................................................................ 1622  
2.7  CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 165 
3.  STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES .................................................................. 168 
3.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 168   
3.2  LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE ROLES OF THE STATE IN PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES ...... 170 
3.2.1 The State as a regulator .............................................................................................. 171   
3.2.2 The State as a participant in petroleum activities ....................................................... 172
 © Tina Hu er 
 
19
nt
   
4.3.2  Work Program Bidding ............................................................................................... 251 
3.3  STRUCTURING LEGISLATIVE REGULATION............................................................................ 174 
3.3.1 Principles of legislative regulation: rule based or principle based? .......................... 174  
3.3.2  Challenges of a Federalist system in regulatory legislative frameworks for sustainable 
petroleum development ............................................................................................................ 176 
3.3.3 Method of regulation: rule based or principle based regulation? .............................. 180  
3.3.4  Construction of a regulatory legislative framework for sustainable resource management.
192  
3.4  A MINISTRATION OF PETROLEUM REGULATION................................................................... 203D  
3.4.1 Principle of a competent administrative authority ...................................................... 203   
3.4.2 Administration of petroleum activities in Australia and Norway ................................ 203   
.4.3  A critical analysis of Australian administration of petroleum activities ..................... 206 3
3.5  STATE REGULATION OF PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPANTS THROUGH THE PETROLEUM 
CONTRA T ..................................................................................................................................... 211C  
3.5.1 Types of petroleum contracts in Australia and Norway .............................................. 212   
3.5.2 Petroleum contracts as regulatory tools ..................................................................... 217  
3.5.3  Does State participation in petroleum activities and the JOA encourage sustainable 
evelopment? ........................................................................................................................... 225d  
3.6  CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 229 
4.  AWARD OF PETROLEUM LICENCES .............................................................................. 234 
4.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 234   
4.2  A ARD OF LICENCES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ..................................................... 236W  
.2.1  Process of award of licence......................................................................................... 2424  
4.3  A ARD OF LICENCE BY BIDDING.......................................................................................... 247W  
4.3.1 Cash bid system........................................................................................................... 247
 © Tin unter 
 
20
a H
5  
5.4  CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 408 
4.4  D CRETIONARY ALLOCATION OF PETROLEUM LICENCES..................................................... 273IS  
4.4.1 Outline and objective of the discretionary system....................................................... 273   
4.4.2 Use of the discretionary system in the North Sea ........................................................ 277   
.4.3  Discretionary allocation of petroleum licences and national petroleum objectives.... 2904  
4.5  M THOD OF ALLOCATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT .............................................. 294E  
4.5.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 294   
4.5.2 Risk and award of petroleum licences......................................................................... 295   
4.5.3 The award of petroleum licence and economic diversification ................................... 297   
.5.4  Transparency, discretion and sustainable development.............................................. 3194  
4.6 ALLOCATION OF LICENCES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BID OR DISCRETION?........... 324  
4.7  CONCLUSION: WHICH SYSTEM OF LICENCE ALLOCATION HAS THE CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT 
AUSTRALIA’S PETROLEUM POLICY OBJECTIVES?............................................................................ 328 
5.  REGULATING OF PETROLEUM EXTRACTION............................................................ 336 
5.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 336   
5.2  REGULATION OF RATE OF DEPLETION OF OIL RESOURCES..................................................... 337 
5.2.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 337   
5.2.2 State interests in regulation of the rate of depletion?.................................................. 337   
5.2.3 How can the rate of depletion be regulated? .............................................................. 350  
5.2.4  Regulation of depletion rate as tool for sustainable development of petroleum resources
356  
5.3  STATE REGULATION OF PETROLEUM EXTRACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.......... 358 
5.3.1 Why should field production be regulated by the State? ............................................. 358   
.3.2  How can field depletion be regulated for sustainable development? .......................... 371
 © Tina Hunter 
 
21
6.  SUMMARY, REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS......................................................... 411 
6.1 INTRODUCTION, HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................... 411   
6.2 SUSTAINABLE PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PETROLEUM POLICY................................... 413   
6.3 LEGISLATION AND SUSTAINABLE PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT ............................................. 417   
6.4 THE AWARD OF LICENCES AND SUSTAINABLE PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT .......................... 421  
6.5  THE IMPACT OF STATE REGULATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTION ON SUSTAINABLE PETROLEUM 
DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................................................................... 426 
6.6  CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 428 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................ 430 
 
 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
23
                                             
1.  Introduction and Thesis Problem 
1.1 Introduction 
Ownership of petroleum resources is a tremendous asset for any State, and gives 
a country great opportunities for economic, technical and social development.1 
Nevertheless, experience has shown that the management of petroleum 
resources, similar to other non-renewable natural resources,2 poses great 
challenges for a State.3 These challenges may be of technical, political, 
regulatory and economic character.4 The way the states handle these challenges 
is decisive for the ability of a State to attain sustainable development5 of the 
petroleum resources.  
As a result of the superprofit that can be obtained from petroleum activities and 
the magnitude of such operations, particularly offshore, these activities can have 
 
1 Within the confines of this thesis the State refers to the government (a self governing political entity) of a country 
that exercises effective sovereignty over its territory and its population as defined in Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/State on 12 January 2009. The term state within the 
confines of this report refers to the six individual government areas (states) of Australia (note the use of 
capitalisation). 
2 Mineral resources are non- renewable or exhaustible resources that do not regenerate, and include petroleum. See 
Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural Lecture 
for the Habilitation degree, University of Mainz, Germany, 21 June 2000 Extraction of Exhaustible Resources: 
Economic Theory http://www.mpch-mainz.mpg.de/~jesnow/MineralEcon/habil/econ/econ.htm at 14 November 
2007. 
3 Examples of these challenges can be seen in many developed and developing States, including Nigeria, 
Venezuela, and Sierra Leone. See Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Introduction: What 
is the  Problem With Natural Resources Wealth?’ in Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz 
(eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 1-2. 
4 These challenges arise since petroleum activities are a complicated activity, and are analysed in detail in section 
1.6 below. 
5 The World Commission on Environment and Development defines sustainable development as ‘development 
which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’. See Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development UN GAOR 96th Plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/Res/42/187(1987) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm at 12 December 2007.  At the heart of 
sustainability is inter-generational equity, which is defined in the Australian Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment (IGAE) as a concept where ‘the present generation should ensure the health, diversity and 
productivity of the environment are maintained or enhanced for the benefit of future generations’ Australian 
Government, Department of the Environment and Water Resources, Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment (1990) http://www.environment.gov.au/esd/national/igae/index.html at 18 November 2007. In a 
broader context, sustainable development includes the development of resources in a responsible manner for the 
optimal use of that resources, and is discussed in detail in section 1.4 below. 
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a huge impact on that State’s economy. This impact can particularly affect 
employment and long-term resources income. The State has to develop a policy 
and regulatory framework that makes it possible to integrate the petroleum 
activity in the country’s economy in a balanced and sustainable way. 
The financial and technical challenges in exploration for and production of 
petroleum, and the international character of the petroleum industry, has led to 
development of large international companies that dominate international 
petroleum activity. It is necessary, or at least desirable, for most States to allow 
private or state-owned international oil companies to participate in the activity. 
A central challenge for the State therefore is to try to reconcile the objectives of 
the State against the objectives of the international oil companies that are 
required to extract the petroleum. 
The extraction of petroleum creates numerous demands on a State, including the 
effective and sustainable extraction of the petroleum, protection of the 
environment in which petroleum extraction occurs, security for personnel, and 
protection of other uses of areas where petroleum activity occurs (for example 
fisheries). To meet these demands, States needs to establish an appropriate 
regulatory framework with legal and administrative institutions that will balance 
the demands of petroleum extraction with the sustainable development of the 
petroleum resources to ensure that future generations reap the benefit of the 
extraction of petroleum. In addition, to establish regulations with rights and 
obligations, it is necessary to create an incentive system that makes the 
participants and stakeholders manage the activity in a sound and long-term 
perspective. 
The exploitation6 of petroleum resources has economic consequences since the 
extraction of petroleum liquidates the asset, and the State can no longer realise 
 
6 Within the confines of this thesis, the term ‘exploitation’ is used to encompass all upstream activities required for 
the production of petroleum. This includes petroleum exploration, the development of a potential petroleum 
deposit, and the extraction of petroleum from the field. 
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revenue from this asset.7 Once petroleum is extracted and sold, like any other 
asset, it is permanently lost, or more precisely, transferred into financial capital. 
This creates a risk that the capital might be consumed without leaving any 
lasting values in the country. It is necessary for the State to develop a regulatory 
framework that regulates8 petroleum exploitation in a way that makes it 
possible to avoid the risk of depleting the resource and ending up in a worse 
economic and social position than prior to the discovery of the resource. 
Developing a legal regime for the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources has proved to be complicated and difficult to obtain. However, there 
are ways to improve the sustainability of petroleum development in States 
through the petroleum regulatory system.  
In this thesis I will critically analyse a number of fundamental aspects of 
Australian offshore petroleum regulation, in order to evaluate whether the 
current petroleum regulation is suited to achieving sustainable development of 
petroleum resources. In particular, I will analyse how Australian petroleum 
policy, the legislative framework,9 the award of petroleum licences10 and the 
regulation of petroleum field development have addressed the numerous 
challenges in exploiting petroleum resources to achieve optimal extraction and 
sustainable development of Australia’s petroleum resources.  
 
7 For a discussion of the economic value of petroleum see Myungan Lee, ‘Measure of the Insitu Value of 
Exhaustible Resources: An Input Distance Function’ (2006) 62 Ecological Economics 490.  
8 The term regulation can have a number of meanings, as defined in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An 
Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (2007). In its narrowest form, regulation may be seen as 
‘deliberate attempts by the State to influence socially valuable behaviour …by establishing monitoring and 
enforcing legal rules’ (p3).  At its broadest, regulation can be seen as ‘encompassing all forms of social control, 
whether intentional or not, and whether imposed by the State or other social institutions’ (p3-4). In the context of 
this thesis, petroleum regulation means the deliberate attempt of the State to establish, monitor and enforce legal 
rules relating to the exploitation of petroleum. 
9 The legislative framework includes the principal Acts, enabling Regulations, and the contractual framework 
between the participants. 
10 The term licence can be spelt either license (US and European spelling), or licence (UK and Australian spelling). 
Since this thesis is written using Australian form of referencing, by an Australian, then it shall maintain the use of 
the Australian spelling of all words, including licence. The exception to this is in footnotes, where the original 
spelling used by the author will be retained. 
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I will analyse the capacity of the current Australian petroleum regulatory 
framework to encourage the sustainable socio-economic development of 
Australia’s offshore petroleum resources,11 by critically analysing the 
Australian petroleum regulatory framework in a functional and comparative 
perspective. I will analyse how offshore petroleum resources can best be 
managed to contribute to Australia’s economic and social development by 
examining at how Australian petroleum policies and the legislative regulatory 
framework has been able to accomplish the sustainable extraction of petroleum. 
To make this critical analysis, I examine a number of petroleum functions, 
including regulatory legislative frameworks, the award of licences, and the 
regulation of petroleum production. I do not focus on a detailed evaluation of 
the rules regulating petroleum functions. Rather, the prime objective is to 
analyse the legal framework regulating the extraction12 of offshore petroleum 
resources in Australia. 
I will engage in a functional analysis of the petroleum legislative frameworks in 
Australia in order to evaluate the regulatory systems ability to contribute to a 
sustainable development of Australia’s petroleum resources. I will focus on an 
examination of the structure and function of the legislation and regulatory 
framework, rather than the detailed content of the legislation. I will compare 
and contrast the structure and function of the central elements in the Australian 
regulation and the legislative and administrative tools utilised to achieve the 
policy goals, with Norway’s regulation of petroleum activity. I will especially 
evaluate the regulation of the two countries by drawing upon examples of the 
legislation pertaining to the award of a petroleum licence and regulation of the 
extraction of petroleum in the two countries. 
 
11 It considers offshore petroleum resources, since the majority of petroleum in Australia occurs offshore. 
Commonwealth (federal) legislation regulates the offshore jurisdiction in Australia, making comparison with other 
jurisdictions possible. 
12 Extraction refers to upstream petroleum activities, where petroleum is taken from the ground and lifted to the 
wellhead ready for transport . 
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The Australian State13 acknowledges that the ownership of petroleum resources 
‘confers a responsibility to ensure that present and future generations of 
Australians derive optimal benefit from its petroleum resources.’14 This arises 
out of Australia’s recognition that State sovereignty over petroleum resources 
confers the capacity to develop its resources, which according the UN 
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,15 ‘must be 
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of 
the people of the State concerned.’16 Incorporated in the principle of sustainable 
development is the concept of deriving optimal benefit for present and future 
generations. Therefore, the Australian State accepts its responsibility to develop 
its offshore petroleum resources in a sustainable manner to ensure economic 
benefit and social development for present and future generations. Therefore, in 
this thesis I will analyse whether this can be achieved under the current 
regulatory system, and discuss alternatives that could improve the ability of 
Australia to secure the sustainable extraction of petroleum resources. 
 
1.2 Research questions and objectives 
It is my hypothesis that there are aspects of the Australian offshore petroleum 
regulatory system that are problematic in encouraging the sustainable 
development of Australia’s offshore petroleum resources.  
 
13 The Australian State is defined as the government (a self governing political entity) of Australia that exercises 
effective sovereignty over its territory and its population, with the sovereignty to develop its petroleum resources. 
Its government is know as the Commonwealth Government.  
14 The Commonwealth claims this responsibility over the development of offshore petroleum resources of the 
seabed beneath the Commonwealth’s marine jurisdiction. Department of Industry, Resources and Tourism, 
Offshore Petroleum Guidelines for a Grant of a Production Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002), 
7. 
15 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
16 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Article 1. 
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This hypothesis raises two research questions. Firstly, is the current Australian 
offshore petroleum regulatory framework effective in encouraging the sustainable 
development of Australia’s petroleum resources? Secondly, if the Australian 
regulatory framework is inadequate for sustainable development, is there a more 
effective way the Australian regulatory framework could manage the 
development of petroleum resources to encourage the sustainable development of 
these resources? 
To address this hypothesis, I have delineated the scope of this thesis, limiting it to 
a consideration of the regulation of upstream petroleum activities, namely the 
award of a petroleum licence and the regulation of the extraction of petroleum 
from a petroleum field.  
To test my hypothesis, I examine a number of fundamental legal tools17 that can 
be utilised to encourage or secure sustainable petroleum resource management, 
securing the values generated from petroleum exploitation for Australian society. 
Within the confines of this thesis it is not possible to examine all of the regulatory 
tools, therefore I have confined the scope of this thesis to four regulatory tools.  
Firstly, I analyse Australia’s offshore petroleum policy, to determine if the 
current policy is aimed toward sustainable development of petroleum resources.  
Secondly, I consider whether the current Australian offshore petroleum 
regulatory framework regime and the administrative practice are appropriate for 
the sustainable development of its petroleum resources.  
Thirdly, I consider the award of petroleum licences, analysing whether the 
method of licence allocation in Australia encourages the sustainable development 
of petroleum resources.   
 
17 This has been referred to as a ‘regulatory toolbox,’ where regulation occurs through the combination of a number 
of techniques rather than relying upon any single instrument. See Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An 
Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (2007), 9. 
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Finally, I examine whether government control over the method and timing of 
petroleum depletion is effective in the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources.  I focus on State regulation of field development, considering whether 
this regulation contributes to the sustainable development of petroleum resources 
through the control of the method and rate of petroleum production 
If this analysis identifies weaknesses in Australian regulatory framework for 
sustainable development, I consider whether there is a more effective way the 
Australian regulatory framework could manage the development of petroleum 
resources to encourage the sustainable development. To identify more 
appropriate regulatory frameworks, I will compare, contrast, and assess the 
sustainability of the Australian regulatory framework with the petroleum 
regulatory framework of especially Norway, although I will also consider the 
United Kingdom and the United States where appropriate. The analysis of other 
petroleum regulatory frameworks, and comparing the solutions to regulatory 
issues, may provide ideas for changes in Australian petroleum regulation in order 
to achieve a more sustainable extraction of the petroleum resources.  
 
1.3 Methodology and legal problems 
I do not aim to discuss in detail all legal questions in Australian petroleum 
regulation, even in the areas I focus on in this thesis. Rather, the aim is to discuss 
the function of the regulation and the possible legal tools that can be used to 
achieve a sustainable exploitation of Australian petroleum resources. This 
discussion will largely be based on a comparative analysis, using different 
models of regulation, as well as and regulation in other jurisdictions as a 
background or benchmark for the discussion. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
30
                                             
The use of comparative analysis as a legal methodology in law is well 
established.18 The historical methodological and scientific assumption of 
comparative law is that ‘only similar legal systems can be compared’.19 
Arguably, a fundamental tool in comparative analysis is functional analysis, since 
incomparables cannot usefully be compared.20 Rather, in law only legal concepts, 
principles and rules that are comparable are those that fulfil the same function.21 
It is recognised that using comparative law to study another countries legal 
style22 (the system’s history, mode of thought in legal matters, sources of law, 
and legal ideology) may make it possible to understand, appreciate and evaluate 
the country of study’s legal regime in a systematic and productive way.23 I will 
examine and compare petroleum regulatory frameworks in a number of 
jurisdictions. In particular, I will examine the Norwegian petroleum regulatory 
framework to demonstrate how regulatory tools can be utilised in regulating 
petroleum resources to encourage sustainable petroleum development.  
The Norwegian system has been selected as the main jurisdiction of comparison, 
both historically and contemporaneously, since it offers valuable insight into 
possible strategies in regulating petroleum activities for sustainable development. 
The Norwegian regulatory framework is considered one of the most successful in 
the world, but this does not mean that the Norwegian system offers a one-size-
 
18 The first International Congress of Comparative Law was held in Paris in 1900, assembling experts from Europe 
to consider this area of legal methodology. See J M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (1998), 
75. 
19 A Essin Orucu, ‘Methodology of Comparative Law’ in J M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law (1998), 442. 
20 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd ed. 1998), 34. 
21 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd ed. 1998), 34. 
22 Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (2nd ed. 1999), 29. 
23 Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (2nd ed. 1999), 29. 
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fits-all ‘model’ for petroleum regulation.24 Nor does any other regulatory 
framework. Rather, it is suggested that the Norwegian petroleum regulation is a 
successful system that encourages sustainable development throughout the value 
chain.25 In addition, Norway appears to have avoided the worst manifestations of 
the natural resource curse because of many factors.26  These include good 
governance,27 transparent and accountable bureaucracy,28 public ownership and 
management,29 cohesive and coordinated policy,30 structural reforms to address 
the growing oil sector,31 public control of oil revenue,32 and a social contract 
with strong social norms that assisted in preventing disruptive rent-seeking.33 
 
24 It is important to realise that Norway does not necessarily provide an example of the ‘best’ system of petroleum 
regulation. Rather, Norway provides an example of a successful system where petroleum resources have been 
developed for the benefit of all Norwegians, including future generations.  
25 The value chain refers to the chain of activities in the exploitation of petroleum resources by a State, and these 
are regulated by the State at each stage. The sustainability of the development of petroleum depends upon policies 
and the regulatory framework that regulates petroleum activities across the value chain. See World Bank, Using 
Extractive Industries for Sustainable Development (2008) World Bank International Oil and Gas Resources 
Management Seminar Libreville, Gabon, April 27-30, 2008, 23. 
26 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds) Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 273. 
27 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With 
and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department, 21. 
28 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With 
and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department, 22. 
29 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With 
and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department, 21. 
30 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With 
and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department, 21.  
31 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With 
and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department, 21. 
32 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With 
and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department, 22. 
33 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With 
and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department, 22. 
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To avoid the effects of natural resource curse, Norway has not only regulated 
petroleum extraction, but also regulated many other factors through fiscal policy, 
industrial policy and development, and mandatory research and education.34 
These factors are also important in avoiding natural resource curse. However, in 
this thesis, I confine my analysis to how Norway uses the legislative framework, 
the award of petroleum licences, and the regulation of petroleum extraction to 
encourage the sustainable extraction of petroleum resources, analysing whether 
these tools provide valuable lessons for sustainable development of petroleum in 
other jurisdictions. 
By using a functional approach, it is possible to compare the regulation of 
petroleum activities under the licencing and concession system in Australia and 
Norway to ascertain the capacity of each regulatory framework to engender 
sustainable development of petroleum resources. Both Australia and Norway 
have addressed the same fundamental legal question35 relating to petroleum 
regulation: how is the petroleum regulatory framework utilised to regulate 
petroleum extraction for the sustainable development of petroleum resources? 
Both jurisdictions have responded to the challenges of petroleum regulation 
primarily by using the same regulatory tools. These include a petroleum 
exploration and production licencing system, terms relating to the award of the 
petroleum licence, and a general regulatory framework for petroleum activities. 
However, each jurisdiction has applied the legal tools differently. In this thesis, I 
analyse how legal remedies have been applied to encourage sustainable 
 
34 See Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, 
Research Department, 22. 
35 The acknowledgement of a fundamental legal problem is important in comparative law. Zweigert and Kotz note 
that ‘in order for an intellectual enterprise to be considered as a comparative law enterprise, there must be specific 
comparative reflections on the problem to which the law is devoted, and this is best done by the comparatist, stating 
the essentials of the foreign law, country by country, as a basis for critical comparison, concluding the exercise with 
suggestions about the proper policy for the law to adopt, which may require him to interpret his own system. See 
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (1977), 5 in Peter de Cruz, Comparative 
Law in a Changing World (2nd ed. 1999), 8. 
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development, to determine a suitable regulatory framework for the sustainable 
development of Australian offshore petroleum resources. 
An analysis of the sustainability of Australia’s current regulatory framework is 
undertaken by assessing how these regulatory tools are used to encourage 
sustainable development in the Australian and Norwegian jurisdictions. By using 
aspects of the Norwegian legal regulatory approach to petroleum resource 
development, as a benchmark for sustainable development,36 it may be possible 
to assess the capacity of Australia’s current regulatory framework to encourage 
sustainable development of petroleum resources.  
If my analysis concludes that the Australian petroleum regulatory framework is 
less capable of sustainably developing its resources, the Norwegian experience of 
petroleum regulation using the same regulatory tools may provide Australia with 
alternatives to accomplish sustainable development of petroleum resources.  
1.3.1 Mitigation of potential problems of comparing countries 
It is recognised that there are problems inherent with a comparison of legal issues 
between different jurisdictions. In this thesis, there is a comparison of civil and 
common law jurisdictions. However, there are a number of unique features of 
petroleum regulation in general, and the Norwegian and Australian licencing and 
concession systems in particular, that mitigate the usual difficulties associated 
with comparative international law. 
Internationally recognised models for the exploitation of resources  
Different countries have developed different strategies and legal models for 
managing their petroleum resources and dividing the risks between the State and 
the oil companies. The regulation of petroleum interests is based on two 
internationally recognised natural resources licencing models that incorporate 
 
36 How Norway has sustainably developed its petroleum resources is demonstrated in section 1.5 below. 
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both national and international law. These are classified into two distinct systems: 
concessionary systems (typically the licencing and concession system), and 
contractual systems (either production sharing contracts or service contracts).37 
The fundamental difference between these two systems is the ownership of the 
produced petroleum resources.38  
The tool used by many developed States to interact with and govern the conduct 
of participating oil companies, and to maximise financial gains is the licencing 
and concession system (LCS).39 The LCS is defined as a system of petroleum 
regulation where a licence is granted over a ‘concession’ or area. That licence 
grants proprietary rights to the licence holder, which are generally also imbued as 
contractual rights between the participating parties. Unlike the production sharing 
contract, (PSC) the concession system assumes that the operating oil companies 
obtain a licence from the State at certain terms and conditions, most of which are 
fixed by legislation and some of which are negotiated case by case between the 
State and the relevant oil companies. An important characteristic of the 
concession systems is that since legislative power is a State prerogative, the State 
remains at considerable liberty to modify at any time those terms and conditions 
that are not negotiated but fixed by legislation.40 
The LCS grants specific contractual and proprietary rights to the participants who 
have been awarded petroleum licences. Although the LCS is used in many 
countries to regulate the exploitation of petroleum, the level of government 
 
37 Daniel Johnson, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts (1994), 25.  
38 It is important to note that licensing and concession system allow private ownership of mineral resources upon 
production of the resources, whilst under contractual systems, the State retains ownership of the mineral. See 
Daniel Johnson, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts (1994), 21.  
39 See Guiditta Cordero Moss, ‘Contract or Licence? Regulation of Petroleum Investment in Russia and the Role of 
Foreign Legal Advice’ (1998) 3-11 CEPMLP Internet Journal 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=28136 at 12 January 2008. 
40 Guiditta Cordero Moss, ‘Contract or Licence? Regulation of Petroleum Investment in Russia and the Role of 
Foreign Legal Advice’ (1998) 3-11 CEPMLP Internet Journal 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=28136 at 12 January 2008. 
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control over oil companies and their activities exerted by a State differs in oil 
producing States. Furthermore, there are two main recognisable systems of 
regulation in licencing and concession systems – the long established ‘North 
American’ model and the ‘North Sea’ model, developed by the UK and Norway 
when exploiting the petroleum resources in the North Sea. In this thesis, the 
countries of comparison utilise the licencing and concession system for 
petroleum exploration and production.  
The North American system refers to the regulatory model that had been 
implemented in the management of petroleum resources in the United States and 
Canada.41 Generally, the North American model of petroleum exploitation is 
typified by a minimalist approach to State intervention.42 It originated in the 
United States, and is categorised by minimal government involvement in the 
development of petroleum resources, with a preference for free market forces to 
direct the exploitation of these resources.43 In addition, this model tends to award 
petroleum licences through a bid system (both cash and work program), again 
allowing capitalist forces to influence the exploitation of petroleum.44 The State 
regulates the award of the petroleum licence as well as establishing and enforcing 
laws and regulations that protect workers and the environment.45 The private oil 
companies are given de facto control over the licence area, with companies 
retaining autonomy over issues relating to the development of petroleum 
 
41 See Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licencing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems: A MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 2. 
42 See Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
43Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industries and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and 
Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd ed. 2008), 165-8. 
44 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industries and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and 
Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd ed. 2008), 168. 
45 See Brent  F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
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resources.46 This includes field development, rates of depletion, and other issues 
relating to production.47 Usually, these licences are awarded using an auction 
bidding system. This may include either cash or work program bidding.48 This 
North American model of petroleum exploitation has been adopted by Australia 
for the exploitation of its offshore petroleum resources.  
The North Sea model was established by the licencing and concession activities 
of the United Kingdom and Norway in the exploitation of petroleum resources 
in the North Sea.49 The primary difference in this regulatory model is the high 
level of State intervention,50 as the State controls the award of petroleum 
licences through the administrative allocation of petroleum licences. Generally, 
the allocation of licences is through the use of established criteria, although 
allocation is at the discretion of the State.51 The State also exerts high levels of 
control over the development of a petroleum field for the life of the field.52  
As a consequence of these two recognisable and distinct systems of regulation of 
petroleum activities, there is a substantial traversing of the differences normally 
inherent in comparing legal systems and traditions. 
 
46 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government: Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 31. 
47 See Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licencing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems: A MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 2. 
48 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 6-7. 
49 See  Brent  F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 23. 
50 See Brent  F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8-9. 
51 Such as the requirement for objective criteria set out in s3-5, Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), and the 
criteria outlined in s10 of the Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway).  
52  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Guidelines To Plan For Development and Operation of a Petroleum Deposit 
(PDO) and Plan for Installation and Operation of Facilities for Transport and Utilisation of Petroleum (PIO), 
2000 (2000) http://www.npd.no/regelverk/r2002/frame_e.htm  at 22 March 2009. See also Øystein Noreng, The Oil 
Industry and Government: Strategy in the North Sea (1980) 32. 
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Application of international law and instruments 
UN Resolutions 
Australia and Norway both claim their sovereign right to own and develop their 
petroleum resources under UN resolution 1803.53 Furthermore, both countries 
exercise their rights over mineral and petroleum resources offshore in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone54 and the Continental Shelf,55 under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Both countries are signatories to this 
Convention.56  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
UNCLOS defines and delineates international maritime boundaries.57 The current 
UNCLOS was agreed to in 1982. At present there are 153 parties to the Treaty, 
including most oil producing nations with the exception of the United States and 
most nations in the Caspian Sea Region.58 Thus both Australia and Norway are 
signatories to UNCLOS.59 The primary functions of UNCLOS are to define 
 
53 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources. 
54 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has been defined in Art. 57 of The United Nations Convention of the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) as extending from the baseline to no more than 200nm seaward. 
55 The Continental Shelf has been defined in a 76 (1) of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea as the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond a States territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of that States land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin. Under a76 (5), the Continental 
Shelf shall not exceed 520nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
56 For a comprehensive list of all members and ratification of UNCLOS see United Nations, Chronological lists of 
ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 20 July 2009 (2009) 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%
20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea at 4 August 2009. Historically, Norway exerted its 
right to the continental Shelf in the Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Submarine 
Natural Resources, based on Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. See United Nations, 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 (1958) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 499, 311. 
57 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982.  
58 United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2007) Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, 
Accessions and Successions to the Convention and Related Agreements as at 5 March, 2007 (2007)  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%
20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea at 22 March 2007. 
59United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2007) Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, 
Accessions and Successions to the Convention and Related Agreements as at 5 March, 2007 (2007)  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%
20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea at 22 March 2007.  
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maritime borders, protect the environment, preserve freedom of navigation, and 
establish clear guidelines for businesses that depend on the sea for resources.60 It 
defines the legal status of the territorial sea, airspace over the territorial sea, as 
well as the seabed and subsoil.61 
Pursuant to the 1982 UNCLOS, all rights to resources in an area are vested in 
mankind as a whole, and all coastal States are assigned an Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and a Continental Shelf (CS).62 Under UNCLOS, the EEZ extends 
200 nautical miles (nm) seaward from the baseline,63 subject to delimitation 
where two States’ EEZ converge.64 The EEZ confers sovereign rights with 
respect to the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, living or non-living.65 
Within this EEZ, a coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to the establishment, 
construction, operation and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures, 
including the right to establish exclusive safety zones around such structures.66 
UNCLOS also confers rights over the Continental Shelf for all coastal States. The 
Continental Shelf is defined as the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that 
extend beyond the territorial sea67 through the natural prolongation of land 
territory to the outer edge of the continent or to a distance of 200nm from the 
 
60 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 284-5. 
61 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982, Art. 2. 
62 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982, Art.82. 
63United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982, Art. 57.  
64 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982, Art.74. 
65 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 285. 
66 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982, Art. 60. 
67 The Territorial sea is the first 12nm seaward from the baseline, as defined in United Nations, Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982,  Art. 3. 
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baseline, and extends at least 200nm.68 Whilst UNCLOS does not confer 
sovereign rights on the Continental Shelf, since the area and its mineral resources 
are the common heritage of mankind, it does extend exclusive jurisdiction over 
installations and operations to coastal States operating within the EEZ and 
Continental Shelf.69 Thus, the State has exclusive powers conferred under 
UNCLOS, including the exclusive right to authorise and regulate drilling for all 
purposes,70 and the responsibility for domestic implementation of rules, 
standards, and procedures agreed to in the operation of activities on the 
Continental Shelf.  
International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution (MARPOL) 
MARPOL provides an international framework for the prevention of pollution in 
the marine environment.71 It seeks to preserve the marine environment through 
the complete elimination of pollution by oil and other harmful substances and 
the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances.72 MARPOL is the 
main international Convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. It is a combination 
of two Treaties adopted in 1973 and 1978 respectively, and updated by 
amendments and annexes since the initial convention.73 
 
68 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 286; United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 
1982, Art. 76. 
69 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982, Art. 56 (1b), 60 (EEZ) and Art. 80, 
which applies Art. 60 mutatis mutandis to the Continental Shelf.  
70 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982, Art. 81. 
71 International Maritime Organisation, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL): Introduction (2009) 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#2 at 24 August 2009. 
72 MARPOL Objective (2007)  http://www.portwaste.com/services/marpol.htm at 23 October 2008. 
73 International Maritime Organisation, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL): Introduction (2009) 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#2 at 24 August 2009. 
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The Convention is regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a 
body of the United Nations.74 It sets international maritime vessel safety and 
marine pollution standards. It consists of representatives from 152 major 
maritime nations, including the United States. The IMO implements the 
MARPOL Convention. Both Norway and Australia are signatories to the 
MARPOL Convention. Therefore, both States have the same responsibilities for 
marine pollution arising from petroleum activities in offshore areas. 
Regional treaties 
The OSPAR Agreement75 is an international Instrument that governs and guides 
international cooperation for the protection of the marine environment in the 
North Atlantic. It originated from the Oslo Convention of 1972 on the Dumping 
of Waste at Sea and the 1974 Paris Convention, which governs land-based 
sources of marine pollution.76 In particular, the objective of the OSPAR Offshore 
Oil and Gas Industry Strategy77 is the prevention and elimination of marine 
pollution from offshore petroleum activities, and to restore marine environs and 
ecosystems where adverse effects have occurred.78 The OSPAR Agreement, and 
the Commission that enforces it, operates under the umbrella of customary 
international law.79 This is codified by UNCLOS, especially in Part XII and 
 
74 See www.imo.org at 12 August 2009. 
75 OSPAR is the mechanism by which fifteen Governments of the western coasts and catchments of Europe, 
together with the European Community, cooperate to protect the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic See 
www.ospar.org at 12 August 2009. 
76 OSPAR Commission, http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html at 3 April, 2007. 
Th The objective of the Commission with regard to the setting of environmental goals for the offshore oil and gas 
industry and the establishment of improved management mechanisms to achieve them is to prevent and eliminate 
pollution and take the necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects of offshore 
activities so as to safeguard human health and to conserve marine ecosystems and, when practicable, restore marine 
areas which have been adversely affected. See Summary Record OSPAR 03/17/1-E, Annex 31 at  
http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/Revised_OSPAR_Strategies_2003.pdf#nameddest=offshore_o_a
nd at 12 August 2009. 
78 OSPAR Commission, Overview (2006) http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html at 3 April, 2007. 
79 OSPAR Commission, Principles (2008) 
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=00320109000000_000000_000000 at 24 August 2009. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
41
                                             
Article 197 on the global and regional cooperation for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.80As this is a regional Treaty, it is limited 
only to North East Atlantic countries, with members including Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and Spain.81 As such, 
Australia is not a signatory to this treaty.  
A regional treaty for the protection of the marine environment exists in the 
South Pacific region: The South Pacific Regional Environment Program 
(SPREP).82 SPREP is an independent, intergovernmental agency providing 
technical assistance and advisory services to the governments of member States 
and Territories in the protection and management of their environment to ensure 
they achieve sustainable development for present and future generations.83 
SPREPs membership comprises twenty-one Pacific Island countries and 
territories, and four developed countries, including Australia. 
The objective of this intergovernmental program is to promote cooperation and 
to provide assistance in order to protect and improve the Pacific Islands 
environment, and to ensure sustainable development for present and future 
generations.84 A component of the agreement is an action plan to reduce 
 
80 OSPAR Commission, Principles (2008) 
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=00320109000000_000000_000000 at 24 August 2009. 
81 OSPAR Commission, About OSPAR (2008) 
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=00010100000000_000000_000000 at 24 August 2009. 
82 South Pacific Regional Environmental Program, Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP) (1993) http://www.sprep.org/legal/documents/AgreementEstablishingSPREP.PDF at 24 
August 2009. 
83 South Pacific Regional Environmental Program, Fact Sheet: About SPREP (2008) 
http://www.sprep.org/factsheets/pdfs/aboutsprep.pdf at 24 August 2009. 
84South Pacific Regional Environmental Program, Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP) (1993) http://www.sprep.org/legal/documents/AgreementEstablishingSPREP.PDF at 24 
August 2009, Art. 2. 
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atmospheric, land based, fresh water and marine pollution through prevention 
and management.85 
Although only an intergovernmental agreement, SPREP has goals analogous to 
OSPAR, seeking to ensure that the coastal States in a region are united under a 
common agreement to protect the marine environment from dumping and waste 
discharge. Thus, both Australia and Norway are members of regional treaty 
agreements that seek to protect the regional marine environ. 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
An international instrument influential in petroleum licencing is the Energy 
Charter Treaty.86 This international agreement has its origins in the European 
Energy Charter Treaty of 1991 (EECT). The ECT contains a declaration of 
principles for international energy, encompassing diverse areas such as trade, 
transport and investment in the energy sector.87 In addition, Article 18 of the 
1994 European Energy Charter Treaty reaffirms the sovereignty of each state to 
exploit its natural resources.88  
A distinctive feature of the ECT is that it provides a set of rules covering the 
whole energy chain, not just investments in production and generation. It also 
establishes the terms and conditions under which energy can be traded and 
 
85 South Pacific Regional Environmental Program, Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP) (1993) http://www.sprep.org/legal/documents/AgreementEstablishingSPREP.PDF at 24 
August 2009, Art. 2. 
86 This international agreement contains a declaration of principles for international energy, encompassing diverse 
areas such as trade, transport and investment in the energy sector. To date there are 80 member countries, including the 
European Union, Norway and Australia.  See The Energy Charter (2006) http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=5 at 
3 April 2007. 
87 OSPAR Commission, Principles (2008) 
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=00320109000000_000000_000000 at 24 August 2009. 
88 It states: ‘The Contracting Parties recognise State Sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources 
(defined as to include Petroleum). They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject to the 
rules of international law.’ See Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: A Study of the Involvement 
of Industry and Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd ed, 2008), 120-1. 
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transported across various national jurisdictions to international markets.89 
Through its investment and transit provisions, the Treaty supports the 
establishment of new transportation capacity, and facilitates the diversification of 
supply and energy export.90 
The ECT is a legally binding multilateral agreement. It is the only agreement of 
its kind dealing with inter-governmental cooperation in the energy sector, 
covering the whole energy value chain (from exploration to end-use) and all 
energy products and energy-related equipment.91 The provisions of the ECT are 
enforceable through a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism. This can be 
particularly useful in multi-state and multi-party transactions such as the Baku-
Tblisi-Erzurum Gas pipeline that required the consent and agreement of multiple 
governments.  
Both Norway and Australia are signatories to the Energy Charter Treaty, 
although Norway has not yet ratified the Treaty.92  
EC Directives 
Norway is not member of the European Union, but is a member of the European 
Economic Area. This means that a great part of the legal acts of the European 
Union is also binding for Norway. Until the 1st of December 2009 EU consisted 
of three pillars of which the European Community (EC) was the most 
important. After the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU) entered into force on the 1st of 
 
89 The Energy Charter: Treaty Provisions (2006) 
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=40&L=1%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%
5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C   at 3 April 2009. 
90 The Energy Charter: Treaty Provisions (2006) 
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=40&L=1%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%
5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C   at 3 April 2009. 
91 The Energy Charter: Treaty Provisions (2006) 
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=40&L=1%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%
5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C%5C   at 3 April 2009. 
92 The Energy Charter (2006) http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61 at 3 April 2007. 
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December 2009, EU is one entity. EU, and former EC, regulates the legal 
situations in the member states through regulations and directives. 
An EC Directive is a legislative act of the European Union, arising from the 
European Commission.93 The Directives require all member States to achieve a 
particular result, but do not dictate the particular means on how to achieve that 
result. They are binding upon each Member State as to the result to be achieved, 
but leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and method of 
implementation.94 
The legal basis for the enactment of EC Directives is Article 288 of the Treaty 
of the Functioning of the European Union. EC Directives are harmonizing 
measures, used primarily in areas where the diversity of national laws could 
prevent the effective functioning of the European Union. They are 
distinguishable from EU Regulations, which are directly applicable and demand 
absolute uniformity.95 EC Directives allow a member State flexibility in the 
implementation of the law.  
The primary European Union document related to petroleum exploration and 
production is EC Directive 94/22/EC (94/22/EC),96 which establishes the 
guidelines for the exploration and exploitation for hydrocarbons in the twenty-
seven EU member countries97 and three EFTA-countries that are EEA 
 
93 Europa, The European Commission (2008) http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm at 24 August 
2009. 
94 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art 249 (3). 
95 Tony Storey and Chris Turner, Unlocking EU Law (2005), 61. 
96 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for 
Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006. 
97 The member countries of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and The United Kingdom. 
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members, including Norway.98 The Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) 
(PAA) incorporates the requirements of 94/22/EC.99 This Directive outlines a 
number of requisite conditions for petroleum activities, including procedures for 
the granting of hydrocarbon licences that ensure equality of all 
participants,100and objective criteria for the granting of a hydrocarbon 
licence,101 requiring the licencing to be advertised in the Official Journal of the 
EU.102 The Directive also requires reasons for the rejection of the application to 
be provided to unsuccessful applicants.103 
Whilst the EU and its requisite EC Directives are a form of supranationalism,104 
there is an argument that the EU is also a type of Federation.105 If the current 
 
98 The member countries in the EEA are Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. 
99 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for 
Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006. 
100 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for 
Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, 
Art. 2. 
101 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for 
Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, 
Art. 5. 
102 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for 
Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, 
Art. 5. 
103 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for 
Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, 
Art. 3. 
104 The EU is a form of supranationalism, where EC supremacy ensures that member states transcend national 
boundaries or interests to share in the decision-making and vote on issues pertaining to the wider European 
Community. Without the supremacy of EC law, the institutions would be deprived of supranational effect and 
uniformity would be sacrificed to national self-interest. See Tony Storey and Chris Turner, Unlocking EU Law 
(2005), 138 and 155. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher proposes a ‘European Federation’ composed of a 
‘European Parliament and a European government which really do exercise legislative and executive power within 
the Federation.’ This European federation is to be based on a constitutional treaty that regulates, among others, the 
‘division of sovereignty’ between the European institutions and the nation-states. Thus, he distances himself from 
the concept of a European super-state transcending and replacing the national democracies. See Tanja A. Börzel 
and Thomas Risse, Who is Afraid of a European Federation? (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 
(Symposium), part of Jean Monnet Working Paper No.7/00, Symposium: Responses to Joschka Fischer, 1. 
105 See Charles Leben, ‘A Federation of Nation States or a Federal State’ (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
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structure of the EU is compared to the concept of ‘Federation’ as used in the 
literature on federalism, the EU looks like and behaves like a federation, with 
the exception of two features.106 First, the EU lacks ‘taxing and spending’ 
power. Second, the Member States continue to be masters of the constitutive 
treaties.107 Since the EU exhibits many of the features of a federation, it is 
possible to compare Norway and its position in the EU with the federalist 
system of Australia, but there are clearly also great differences in this respect. 
Reliance on statutory regulation of petroleum exploitation 
Offshore petroleum activities in Norway are primarily regulated by the Petroleum 
Activities Act 1996 (Norway) (PAA) and the Petroleum Regulations 1997 
(Norway) (PR). Offshore petroleum activities in Australia are primarily regulated 
by the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) 
(OPAGGSA), and the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Regulations 1985 (Cth) (OPAGGSR).108        
Whilst statutory dominance is expected in a civil law jurisdiction such as 
Norway, it is unusual in common law jurisdictions. However, in order to address 
Paper (Symposium), part of Jean Monnet Working Paper No.7/00, Symposium: Responses to Joschka Fischer, 1.  
106 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, Who is Afraid of a European Federation? (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper (Symposium), part of Jean Monnet Working Paper No.7/00, Symposium: Responses to Joschka 
Fischer, 2. 
107 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, Who is Afraid of a European Federation? (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper (Symposium), part of Jean Monnet Working Paper No.7/00, Symposium: Responses to Joschka 
Fischer, 2. 
108 It is important to note that there has been a history of legislative name changes to the Australian offshore 
petroleum legislation. The initial legislation was the Petroleum Submerged Lands Act 1967 (Cth). This Act was 
rewritten and renamed the Offshore Petroleum Act 2006 (Cth), and entered into force on 1 July 2008. The name of 
this Act was changed to the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) and entered into force 
on 22 November 2008. For a history of OPAGGSA see 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/all/search/B852B89FDB82AECACA25758
D001909BD . The statutory regulation of Australia and Norway is analysed in section 4.2 below. 
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constitutional and policy issues, a detailed statutory framework has been 
established for the regulation of petroleum in the Australian jurisdiction.109  
Common functions and requirements 
When examining and comparing Norwegian and Australian petroleum legislation 
and regulation, parallels exist between petroleum activities regulation in each 
jurisdiction, since each have common internalised functions. In particular, this 
includes a petroleum legislative framework that comprises acts,110 regulations,111 
and administrative guidelines in each jurisdiction.112  
Both countries award petroleum licences to participants, and may also stipulate 
conditions for the award of petroleum licences. Although Norway uses the North 
Sea model, and Australia the North American model, both jurisdictions use the 
award of petroleum licences in formal licencing rounds to establish and maintain 
a relationship between the State and the oil companies during the exploitation of 
petroleum resources in the concession area.113 In addition, there are 
administrative provisions in each jurisdiction for the allocation of petroleum 
licences outside of these formal licencing rounds. In Norway, this includes the 
award of licences in pre-defined areas.114 In Australia, this includes the provision 
 
109 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 93. The legal framework for petroleum regulation is discussed in greater detail 
in section 2.5 below. 
110 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), and the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 
(Cth). 
111 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), and the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 
1985 (Cth). 
112 For both jurisdictions, these administrative guidelines provide applicants and participants with a wide range of 
guidelines relating to petroleum activities, including applying for exploration and production licences, field 
development plans, and decommissioning of structures.  These can be found at www.ret.gov.au at 26 August 2009 
(Australia), and www.npd.no at 26 August 2009 (Norway). 
113 In Australia licences are awarded under division 2 (ss104-109) of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 (Cth). In Norway this requirement is outlined in s3-5, Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
114 See Norsk Oljedirectoratet, Mange Søkere til TFO 2008 (2008 .  
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for the award of a licence over a surrendered block.115 In each jurisdiction there is 
also a requirement for the approval of field development plans prior to the 
commencement of petroleum production.116 In addition, each jurisdiction 
requires decommissioning of petroleum structures when petroleum production 
has ceased.117 
The protection and preservation of the environment is critical in both 
jurisdictions, with participants required to ensure that petroleum operations are 
carried out in a manner that ensures that environmental harm does not occur.118 
Similarly, the protection and preservation of workers safety in petroleum 
activities is also critical, with both jurisdictions creating a national body that 
specialises in ensuring the safety of offshore petroleum industry workers.119  
It is this commonality in internal regulatory functions that enable direct 
comparisons to be made between the regulatory frameworks of two jurisdictions 
of different legal traditions.  
 
115 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s115. 
116 In Australia, approval for production is required under s175 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Act 2006 (Cth). Approval is required under s4-2 and s4-6 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
117 In Australia, this is required under s590 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). This 
is required under s4-2 and 5-1 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
118 In Australia, this is required under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), 
Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 1985 (Cth), Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth), Protection of 
the Sea (Prevention of Pollution From Ships) Act 1983 (Cth) and the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Cth). This is 
required under s1-1, 4-2 and 5-1 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), as well as the Pollution Act 1981 
(Norway). 
119 In Australia, that body is the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA), with safety regulated 
under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). In Norway the safety regulatory body 
is the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) and is regulated by chapter 9 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 
(Norway), and the Regulations Relating to Health, Environment and Safety in Petroleum Activities (NPD). 
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The role of international companies in the exploitation of petroleum 
resources  
Exploitation of petroleum resources is carried out by oil companies, which are 
often international companies based in Europe or North America.120 These 
companies need to comply with the legal regime and regulatory framework 
within the country of activity, as well as the legal regime operational within the 
country of corporate registration. As such, international oil companies are obliged 
to work within a number of legal regimes to exploit petroleum resources. This 
largely internationalises the legal requirements of petroleum exploitation, as 
companies are required to comply with multiple legal systems in numerous 
jurisdictions. 
The level of regulation in petroleum activities for many countries is influenced by 
the interaction between the State and large international oil companies that wield 
considerable power. The regulation of petroleum is largely related to the 
relationship between the international oil companies and the State. This 
relationship exists in all petroleum producing States, and influences the 
regulatory system in those States.   
 
1.4 Sustainable development of petroleum resources 
A central concept in this thesis is ‘sustainable development’, which is seen as 
the goal for development of petroleum resources, which the regulatory 
framework is set to achieve. 
‘Sustainable development’ is a principle first defined by The World 
Commission on Environment and Development (The Brundtland Commission) 
 
120 These companies include ENI, Chevron, Exxon, Shell, BP, and Total.  
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in its report to the United Nations General Assembly.121 In this thesis, I use the 
Brundtland Commission definition of sustainable development, which is 
defined as ‘development which meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs.’122 
Emphasising the notions of fairness and intergenerational equity, the 
Commission stated that sustainable development provides ‘successive 
generations [with] not only man-made wealth but also natural wealth…in 
adequate amounts to ensure continuing improvements in the quality of life.’123 
The concept of sustainable development was recommended as a guiding 
principle to governments and private enterprises, encouraging all countries to 
pursue policies aimed at sustainable and environmentally sound 
development.124  
Although sustainable development was first applied to the environment, it has 
been expanded and reaffirmed by the United Nations to encompass three 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars – economic development, social 
development and environmental protection.125 This is affirmed by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Energy Council in its 
energy assessment, who define sustainable development as ‘energy produced 
and used in ways that support human development over the long term, in all its 
social, economic and environmental dimensions’.126  
 
121 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development UN GAOR 96th Plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/Res/42/187(1987) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm   at 12 December 2007. 
122 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development UN GAOR 96th Plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/Res/42/187(1987) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm   at 12 December 2007, 1. 
123 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development UN GAOR 96th Plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/Res/42/187(1987) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm   at 12 December 2007, 1. 
124 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development UN GAOR 96th Plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/Res/42/187(1987) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm   at 12 December 2007, 1 
125 World Summit Outcomes, [48] UN GAOR 60th sess. UN Doc A/60/L.1 (2005), [48]. 
126  United Nations Development Program, The World Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of 
Sustainability (2000), 3.  
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Many oil companies have embraced the Brundtland Commission definition of 
sustainable development, translating this into a triple bottom line of 
accountability that meshes business strategy with economic, environmental and 
social progress.127 This triple bottom-line congruence for both companies and 
the State is reflected in three areas.  
First is corporate economic growth, measured in terms of revenue, earnings, and 
shareholder return, analogous to a State’s economic growth based on taxes, 
royalties, profit-sharing, revenue and access to domestic petroleum reserves to 
reduce import of petroleum.128  
Secondly, the triple bottom line comprises environmental stewardship, 
measured in terms of increased energy efficiency, pollution reductions and 
mitigation projects.129 This is analogous to a State’s environmental goals for 
clean air water and land, and the preservations of valued ecological areas.130  
Thirdly, it comprises social progress. For the corporation, this is measured in 
terms of community outreach, human rights and labour standards, and diversity 
 
127 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 45. 
128 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 45. 
129 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 45. 
130 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 45. 
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in the workplace.131 This is paralleled in a number of United Nations 
Resolutions, and the social goals of many nations.132 
Today, the United Nations specifies that protecting and managing the natural 
resources base for economic and social development are overarching objectives 
of, and essential requirements for, sustainable development. Dr Hasna argues 
that an important outcome in the pursuit of these three pillars is the 
development of technology.133 Norway has utilised this strategy in the 
sustainable development of its petroleum resources.134 As such, this thesis will 
consider whether the development of technology is crucial in the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources.135   
This thesis does not consider the environmental sustainability of the 
exploitation of petroleum resources. Rather, it focuses on the social and 
economic aspects136 of sustainable development of petroleum resources. As 
such, where the term sustainable development is used in this thesis, it refers to 
maximising the economic and social benefits from the exploration and 
production of petroleum resources, and not environmental sustainability. 
 
131 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 46. 
132 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 46. An example of such a social goal for a nation is that defined in s1-2 of the Petroleum Activities 
Act 1996 (Norway), which requires petroleum to be developed for the benefit of Norwegian society as a whole. 
133 Abdullah M Hasna, ‘Dimensions of Sustainability’ (2007) 2 (1) Journal of Engineering for Sustainable 
Development 47, 49. 
134 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, 
Research Department, 11-12. 
135 This will be considered in Chapter five. 
136 Economic benefits include, but are not confined to, economic diversification of industry, and the capturing of 
production cost spending.  Social development includes increases in knowledge, development of skills and 
competence, and increased social welfare.  
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The legal regime regulating resource exploitation is crucial in encouraging 
sustainable development of petroleum resources.137 The central element of the 
legal regime for petroleum activity is the regulation of the granting of licences 
and concessions for the development of that resource. Yet it should also 
encompass much more. A regulatory regime should incorporate policy factors138 
and an appropriate taxation system in order to provide economic return to the 
State.139 It should also achieve good governance and transparency in the 
management of natural resources, in order to contribute to the national and 
regional economic development.140  
An important consideration in the sustainable exploitation of non-renewable 
resources is intergenerational equity - how much of a State’s endowment of a 
resource should each generation consume, and how much should be retained in 
the ground for future generations. 141 The question that arises is what the optimal 
rate of generational exploitation ought to be. This is an economic question, but 
also raises the legal question how intergenerational equity should influence the 
regulation of petroleum activities, and what obligations to secure 
intergenerational equity a national or international law imposes on a State today.  
The principles for intergenerational equity and justice arise from Rawls’ Theory 
of Justice, incorporating the ‘veil of ignorance’.142 From the ‘original position,’ 
 
137 Allen K Kneese, ‘The Economics of Natural Resources’ (1988) 14 Population and Development Review 281, 
284-5. 
138 Allen K Kneese, ‘The Economics of Natural Resources’ (1988) 14 Population and Development Review 281, 
283-5 
139 Allen K Kneese, ‘The Economics of Natural Resources’ (1988) 14 Population and Development Review 281, 
284-5 
140 Allen K Kneese, ‘The Economics of Natural Resources’ (1988) 14 Population and Development Review 281, 
284-5 
141 Robert Solow, ‘On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources’ (1986) 88 (1) Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics 141, 141. 
142 Rawl’s Theory of Justice arises from the concept of justice as fairness. Under this concept, each person has an 
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others. In addition, the social and 
economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. Firstly, they must be attached to positions and offices open to 
all, under conditions of fairness, and equality of opportunity. Secondly, the social and economic conditions created 
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every generation has a duty to preserve resources, since those in the ‘original 
position’ would not know which generation they were going to be part of.143 At 
the core of this intergenerational equity is the appropriate temporal and spatial 
distribution of the economic and social benefits associated with the exploitation 
of a resource.  
In his model of exhaustible resources, Solow defines intergenerational equity to 
mean equal consumption per capita at each date.144 It requires that the 
development of resources be managed so that the resource, and the benefits from 
that resource, are maintained or enhanced for future generations who are not 
disadvantaged by the exploitation of natural resources.145 The aim of 
intergenerational equity is to find a path, after arbitrary initial conditions, which 
is efficient between generations (inter-temporally efficient), equitable, and does 
not conflict between equity and efficiency.146 This is akin to Rawls’ concept of 
distributive justice.147  
This creates what can be termed intergenerational sustainability, where the 
development of resources by one generation provides economic sustainability for 
generations to come. However the concept of intergenerational sustainability is 
must ensure the greatest benefit for the least advantaged members of society. Rawls argues that the two principles 
would be chosen by representative parties in the original position of equality, which corresponds to the state of 
nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. The principles of justice for the basic structure of society are 
selected from behind a veil of ignorance. This veil deprives the representatives of information about the particular 
characteristics (such as wealth and natural abilities) of the parties that they represent. See John Rawls, ‘A Theory of 
Justice’ in J C Smith and David N Weisstub The Western Idea of Law (1983), 479-80. 
143 Allan V Kneese, ‘The Economics of Natural Resources’ (1988) 14 Supp Population and Development Review  
281, 299. 
144 S Dasgupta and T Mitra, ‘Intergenerational Equity and Efficient Allocation of Exhaustible Resources’ (1983) 24 
(1) International Economic Review 133, 133. 
145 S Dasgupta and T Mitra, ‘Intergenerational Equity and Efficient Allocation of Exhaustible Resources’ (1983) 24 
(1) International Economic Review 133, 133-4.  
146 S Dasgupta and T Mitra, ‘Intergenerational Equity and Efficient Allocation of Exhaustible Resources’ (1983) 24 
(1) International Economic Review 133, 133-4. 
147 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).  
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contested,148 with competing views disagreeing on what exactly needs to be 
sustained for the next generation, and what intergenerational obligations, if any, 
intergenerational sustainability imposes on the current generation.149 Some argue 
that sustainability requires that future generations be left no worse off than earlier 
ones,150 whilst others argue that the needs and entitlements of contemporaries 
should be weighed against the obligations of sustainability for the future 
generations.151 The World Commission notes that a balance should be struck 
between the needs of the people of the present and those of the future, although 
what that balance is remains controversial.152 Yet the general problem with inter-
temporal welfare economics is whether an appropriate concept of 
intergenerational equity is compatible with the efficient allocation of resources. 
The question of how much of a country’s endowment of exhaustible natural 
resources should a generation consume, and how much should be left for 
generations to come,’153 raises practical policy questions relating to the allocation 
and consumption of natural resources.154 The future generations have no active 
voice in contemporary decisions, and the decisions have to be made by the 
current generation. 
 
148 See Michael Jacobs, Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept’ in A Dobson (ed) Fairness and Futurity 
(1999) 21-45. 
149 Janna Thompson, Intergenerational Equity: Issues of Principle in the Allocation of Social Resources Between 
This Generation and the Next (2003) Department of Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services, 
Australian Parliament House. www.aph.gov.au/library at 12 November 2007. 
150 John Pezzey, Sustainable Development Concepts, An Economic Analysis (1992) World Bank Environment Paper 
No. 2. 
151 Wilfred Beckerman, ‘Economists and Sustainable Development: the OECD Report on Policies for Sustainable 
Development’ (1997) 5 (4) World Economics 1, 1. 
152 Janna Thompson, Intergenerational Equity: Issues of Principle in the Allocation of Social Resources Between 
This Generation and the Next (2003) Department of Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services, 
Australian Parliament House. www.aph.gov.au/library at 12 November 2007, 8. 
153 Robert M Solow, ‘On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources’ (1986) 88 (1) Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 141, 141. 
154 Robert M Solow, ‘On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources’ (1986) 88 (1) Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 141, 142. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
56
Dialogue pertaining to the sustainable exploitation of petroleum resources should, 
out of necessity, include all stakeholders: the State, the community, and oil 
companies.155  The outcome of such dialogue should be the development of a 
coherent policy, which is essential for sustainable petroleum resource 
development. The role of policy in sustainable development of Australia’s 
petroleum resources is considered in Chapter three. 
The sustainable development of non-renewable resources for economic and 
social development can be divided into two discrete areas: the sustainable 
extraction of non-renewable resources, and the conversion of non-renewable 
resources into renewable resources for future generations (figure 1 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
155 Alain Dangeard, ‘Sustainable Development Indicators for the Minerals Industry: Who Needs Them? What 
Stakes Justify Producing Them?’ in Elizabeth Bastida, Thomas Walde and Janet Warden-Fernandez (ed), 
International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy (2005) 622. 
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Figure 1: Sustainable development, encompassing the delineation of non-
resource extraction and conversion to renewable resource for the future 
(compiled by author). 
Extraction of petroleum resources can be defined as the production of petroleum 
from the ground, thereby liquidating the petroleum asset for sale.156 It is the 
extraction of petroleum resources that create many economic commercial and 
technical challenges. Economic challenges arise since by extracting the 
petroleum, a State depletes a valued resource that cannot be replaced. Once the 
petroleum is extracted and sold, it is permanently lost.157 Since these resources 
are precious, and the development of the resource is permanent, the focus of 
resource extraction in sustainable development is optimising the extraction of 
the petroleum to ensure that as much of the resource is recovered. This creates 
regulatory challenges for the State in how they regulate the extraction of 
petroleum. 
Another issue in petroleum extraction is how to balance the commercial 
imperatives of the companies that extract the petroleum and the aims of the 
State in the development of the petroleum resources. This is also addressed 
through the regulatory framework. Finally, the extraction of petroleum itself 
creates many technical challenges, as a consequence of field geology 
complexities and the need to balance the maximisation of extraction with 
commercial imperatives of companies. In regulating petroleum extraction a 
State is required to balance the needs of the participants, using technology and 
regulation to maximise the amount of petroleum recovered from a field, whilst 
still remaining an attractive province for oil companies. The issues that Norway 
and Australia have confronted in sustainably extracting petroleum, and the 
 
156 This can be delineated as upstream petroleum activities. Upstream Petroleum is defined as all of the petroleum 
activities that occur up to the point of transfer of the petroleum for the transport, sale and refining of the product. It 
includes exploration and production activities. See http://www.offshore-technology.com/glossary/upstream.html at 
17 January 2009. 
157John M Hartwick, ‘Intergenerational Equity and the Investing of Rents from Exhaustible Resources’ (1977) 67 
(5) The American Economic Review 972, 972. 
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regulatory framework that each State has developed in order to encourage 
sustainable extraction, are the focus of this thesis. 
Since the extraction of petroleum lowers the wealth of a country,158 it is 
essential that the non-renewable resources be converted to a renewable source 
of wealth in order to secure the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources.159 This is because oil wealth is different from other sources of 
national income.160 The income stream from the extraction of oil is resource 
rent rather than return from reproducible capital.161 Therefore, it is essential to 
convert the wealth generated from non-renewable resources resource rent to 
other forms of wealth for future generations.162 Converting this wealth requires 
social,163 political and economic strategies.164 This conversion can be 
accomplished through the development of appropriate taxation strategies that 
adequately capture the value of the resource rent,165 the establishment of 
sovereign wealth funds,166 and the investment of petroleum wealth in human 
 
158 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Making Natural Resources into a Blessing rather a Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya Schiffrin 
(eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development (2005), 14. 
159 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 174-5 
160 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 180. 
161 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 180. 
162 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 180. 
163 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 175. 
164 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 178-80. 
165 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 178-80.    
166 For a discussion on the utility of Sovereign Wealth Funds see Tore Eriksen, The Norwegian Petroleum Sector 
and the Government Pension Fund – Global (2006) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/The_Norwegian_Petroleum_Sector_te.pdf at 7 
November 2009. 
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capital and infrastructure.167 A country can only retain the wealth that 
petroleum resources bring if it reinvests that income earned through petroleum 
extraction into capital, be it human, physical or natural capital, to offset the loss 
of the wealth from natural resources.168  
The optimisation of the extraction of petroleum is the primary focus of 
sustainable development within the confines of this thesis. Whilst this thesis 
acknowledges that the sustainable development of petroleum resources 
necessarily requires the conversion of natural resource wealth to other forms of 
wealth, conversion of petroleum resources is outside the confines of this thesis. 
 
1.5 Norwegian regulatory framework as benchmark for 
the evaluation of Australian regulation 
The Norwegian regulatory framework is used as benchmark for the Australian 
system for a number of reasons. Norway was a modern developed State even 
before it discovered petroleum in the late 60´s. The regulatory framework has 
been developed over short time, but Norway is a State with a long experience in 
regulating exploitation of natural resources and foreign investments in natural 
resource exploration in the country. 
In developing its petroleum regulatory framework, Norway thus could rely on 
previous experience of State controlled natural resource development including 
the control of foreign companies that developed those resources. The petroleum 
licencing system utilised the principles of the Norwegian natural resource 
 
167 For a discussion on the conversion of natural capital to human capital see Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Making Natural 
Resources into a Blessing rather a Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter’s 
Guide to Energy and Development (2005), 16; and Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs, and Joseph E Stiglitz 
(eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007). 
168 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 178-80. 
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management system that had its roots in the management of hydropower 
resources in the early twentieth century.  
After independence in 1905, a series of laws were passed from 1906, 
culminating in the Concession Act 1917 (Norway) (CA).169 Under this Act, any 
foreign company wishing to invest in hydropower plants were required to gain 
approval from the Norwegian parliament.170 The companies had to comply with 
certain corporate structure and governance rules, as laid down by the CA, 
including the use of capital, the price of goods exported, amount of processing 
required prior to export, the use of Norwegian goods and services, and the 
relinquishment of property to the State after the expiration of the licence.171 
Although the State did not exert control over hydrological resources through 
ownership of companies developing the resources (Norsk Hydro was 
established in 1905,172 and only eight percent of the company was held by 
Norwegians),173 the State nonetheless exerted control through regulation of 
companies developing the water resources. Whilst the motivation for control 
over companies exploiting water resources in the early twentieth century was 
the desire for Norway to retain its recently gained economic and political 
independence, the concession system was successful in providing the 
Norwegian State with control over the generation of hydroelectricity.174 This 
 
169 Sima Liberman, The Industrialization of Norway 1800-1920 (1970), Chapter 1. 
170 Sima Liberman, The Industrialization of Norway 1800-1920 (1970), Chapter 1. 
171 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves  (1991) 22-3. 
172 Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), 44. 
173 Norsk Hydro 1905: A New Working Day – 2 December 1905 (2006) http://www.hydro.com/en/About-
Hydro/Our-history/1900---1917/1905-A-new-working-day--2-December-1905/ at 17 March 2009. 
174 The success was primarily attributable to the drive for the modernisation process through ‘State-initiated 
capitalism’. Under this process the State initiated social and economic development where the free market was 
subordinate to government institutions and government led development. The Norwegian government utilised the 
development of hydropower and water resources as the first form of this State-initiated capitalism. See Francis 
Sejersted, ‘Nationalism in the Epoch of Organised Capitalism – Norway and Sweden Choosing Different Path’ (in 
Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003) 106-7. 
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was particularly important given that Norway was dependant upon foreign 
capital for the development the hydropower resources.175  
When Norway contemplated the development of a petroleum licencing and 
concession system in the 1960s, it reflected on its previous experience in the 
management of its water resources to generate hydroelectricity. In particular, it 
utilised its experience in managing foreign investment and companies that are 
utilised to develop the resource. The resulting system of petroleum resource 
management had been recognised by a number of institutions as best 
practice.176 It is acknowledged by the International Energy Authority177 and 
scholars178 that the Norwegian system of petroleum regulation for sustainable 
development of resources represents best practice. Norway represents a ‘potent 
example of the successful development of the petroleum sector and surrounding 
industry’,179 since it successfully exploited petroleum resources through State 
 
175 Patrick Salmon, Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890-1940 (1997), 38-9. 
176 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Survey: Norway (2005) 11. 
177 See International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Norway 2005 Review (2005); Amar 
Inamdar, International Best Practice In Sustainable Development (2002) Government of Papua New Guinea 
http://www.mineral.gov.pg/GreenPaper/WorkingPaper8.htm  at 22 December 2008; International Energy Agency 
(IEA), IEA Commends Norwegian Energy Policy For Exemplary Management of Resources and Wealth, but 
Outlines challenges on Climate change and Energy Security. (2005) 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESS_REL_ID=165 at 21 March 2008. The IEA notes that 
‘Norway’s skill in the development of its large oil and gas resources has made Norway Europe’s largest exporter of 
oil and gas, and is contributing significantly to Europe’s security of supply’. It also noted that ‘The government’s 
transparent and forward-looking way in which it intends to manage the expected decline is commendable as well as 
its plans to extend production for as long as possible. It has taken strong action to increase exploration for new 
fields and to open the industry further to smaller companies. It has also made important progress since the last 
review in reducing state involvement with the partial privatisation of Statoil. Altogether, Norwegian management of 
its petroleum resources is an example of best practice for the management of valuable natural resources in a small 
economy’.  
178 Norway’s petroleum policy and framework is recognised as ‘a potent example of the successful development of 
the petroleum sector and surrounding industry’, since it successfully combined the development of State- owned Oil 
Company and international oil companies as it sought to develop petroleum resources whilst transforming the 
economy and creating an industry. See Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll, Statoil: A Study in Political 
Entrepreneurship (2007) James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/NOCs/Papers/NOC_Statoil_Gordon-Stenvoll.pdf at 12 December 
2009. 1. In addition see Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003)  1 (1) Oil, Gas and 
Energy Law Intelligence <http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 
2009. 
179 Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll, Statoil: A Study in Political Entrepreneurship (2007) James A Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University http://www.gordonenergysolutions.com/files/publications/Statoil_-
_A_Study_in_Political_Entrepreneurship--Study.pdf at 12 December 2007, 1.  
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participation in the exploitation of petroleum. It has exerted State control over 
petroleum licencing, activities and oil companies, whilst transforming the 
economy and creating a new petroleum industry.180 However, it must be noted 
that as the Norwegian petroleum regulation system matures, there have been a 
number of weaknesses identified with the system. In particular, the system has 
been criticised for providing insufficient incentive to develop small, difficult, or 
high-risk fields.181 
Whilst Norway has been recognised as demonstrating best practice in the 
regulation of petroleum for sustainability,182 it is acknowledged that the 
Norwegian system may not be the most suitable for the sustainable development 
of Australian petroleum resources. 
 
1.6 Challenges in the exploitation of petroleum 
resources 
1.6.1 Introduction 
In the introduction in section 1.1, I outlined some of the main challenges for a 
State that wishes to establish the sustainable exploitation of its petroleum 
resources. In this section, I will provide a more comprehensive analysis of these  
challenges. 
 
180 Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll, Statoil: A Study in Political Entrepreneurship (2007) James A Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/NOCs/Papers/NOC_Statoil_Gordon-Stenvoll.pdf at 12 December 
2009, 1. 
181 Criticism by Farouk Al-Kasim, in Bjorn Rasen, ‘Great Regime – But Time for a Revision Says Architect’ (2009) 
2 Norwegian Continental Shelf 7, 8. 
182 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Survey: Norway (2005) 11. 
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Petroleum has a unique role in the global economy and world energy. The 
mechanised transportation sectors of all States in the world are dependant upon 
products derived from petroleum.183 This dependence is at the heart of global 
geopolitical factors that not only transcends economies, but also national 
borders.184 In addition, the increased global demand for petroleum,185 the 
volatility of petroleum prices186 and the superprofit realised in the sale of 
petroleum mean that a difficulty facing States is the rate at which the petroleum 
resources should be developed. Yet another is how the resource revenue should 
be integrated into the State’s economy so that the revenue generates the greatest 
benefit for the State, rather than economic harm. How fast the resources are 
developed, and how a State uses the revenue generated has a major impact on the 
economy and development of a State. If resources are developed quickly, too 
much money may be released into a national economy. If this occurs, a State runs 
the risk of developing resource curse,187 and will not benefit from the resource 
revenue.188  
Resource curse (also known as the ‘paradox of plenty’) is the paradox of a 
country having an abundance of non-renewable natural resources such as oil and 
 
183 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 49. 
184 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, ‘Sustainable Development in the Petroleum Sector’ (2003) in Adrian Bradbrook and 
Richard L Ottinger (eds), Energy Law and Sustainable Development (2003) IUCN Environment Policy and Law 
Paper No. 47, 49.  
185 Petroleum demand has grown every year for the last 20 years, with the first halt in demand occurring in 2008-9 
as a result of the global financial crisis. See EIA, Short Term Energy Outlook 2009-10 (2009) 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/steo at 17 January 2009. 
186 The price of petroleum swung wildly in the years 2004-2008. Crude was priced at around US$30 per barrel in 
January 2004, rising to a record high of almost US$150 in July 2008, and then quickly plummeting to around 
US$40 per barrel in December 2008. See oil prices history at EIA, Petroleum Price Navigator (2009) 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtotworldw.htm at 12 October 2009. 
187 For a discussion on the causes of resource curse, see Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Resource Economics: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993). 
188 Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993), 
12-13. 
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gas, yet failing to achieve economic growth as these resources are developed.189 
Furthermore, often these resource rich countries are characterised by worse 
development outcomes than similar countries with fewer natural resources. This 
is hypothesised by Auty to occur due to a number of reasons, particularly the 
decline in the competitiveness of other economic sectors in the economy, which 
is caused by the appreciation of the real exchange rate as resource revenues 
accumulate in the country.190 Other causes include natural resource revenue 
volatility due to global commodity market variations, government 
mismanagement of the allocation of resource licences or contracts, or weak, 
ineffectual, unstable or corrupt institutions.191  
Together these create many other challenges for those States exploiting 
petroleum, including the non-renewable nature of petroleum,192 and the physical 
and technical challenges associated with the extraction of petroleum.193  
1.6.2 Economic challenges 
When petroleum resources are depleted, there is no continuing revenue stream 
for either the State or the oil companies that exploit the petroleum. Thus, the 
resource needs to be exploited in a manner that provides financial benefits to 
both the oil companies and the State during petroleum exploitation. However, it 
should also provide economic benefits and social development for the State 
after the resource has been depleted, when the State no longer has the petroleum 
resources to exploit and earn revenue.  
 
189 Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 5. 
190 Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993) 
12-13. 
191 Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993; 
Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 5. 
192 John M Hartwick, Non-renewable Resources: Extraction Programs and Markets (1989), 115. 
193 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘Recovering Progress on IOR’ (2008) 2 Norwegian Continental Shelf 9, 10. 
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The economic challenge for any State is how to sustainably develop its petroleum 
resources. To achieve such sustainable development, and to ensure 
intergenerational stability, wealth and prosperity after the petroleum resource has 
been exhausted, is a complicated and demanding task. The State needs to develop 
the social and political institutions and infrastructure to adequately manage the 
development of the petroleum resource as well as the revenue that is generated 
from the exploitation of that resource. Many economic factors, both internal and 
external, may affect a State’s capacity to sustainably develop its resources. 
The petroleum market 
The volatility and uncertainty of the petroleum market, and therefore the revenue 
stream generated from the exploitation of petroleum is a challenge for States in 
the regulation of petroleum exploitation activities. Research by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) demonstrates that the oil market exhibits monthly price 
changes greater than 8%, and there is little evidence of a consistent pattern to oil 
prices.194  
Coupled with this volatility is the huge value of petroleum in the international 
market. The petroleum markets generate super-profits of five to ten times the cost 
of production, making petroleum an important source of income for a State. 
Indeed, for some States, the petroleum resource comprises the vast majority of 
the State’s income.195 It also makes petroleum exploitation extremely profitable 
for oil companies, driving these companies to seek regulatory regimes that enable 
the profit to be maximised.  
 
194 Jeffrey Davis, Roland Ossowski, James Daniel and Steven Barnett, Stabilisation and Savings Funds for Non-
Renewable Resources: Experience and Fiscal Policy Implications (2001), 6. 
195 In 2000, petroleum revenue accounted for over 90% of export earnings. This included Nigeria (99.6 %), Algeria 
(97.2%), and Saudi Arabia (92.1%)  Furthermore, for some countries petroleum exports comprised more that 40% 
of the GDP. This included Bahrain (50.9%), Turkmenistan (493.7%), Nigeria (48.7%), Saudi Arabia, 44.7%), and 
Trinidad and Tobago (41.1%). In comparison, in the same year, petroleum exports comprised 23.7% of Norway’s 
GDP. See Michael L Ross, Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor (2003), 19. 
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The profitability and market volatility of petroleum affects the development of 
petroleum fields. Generally, the smaller a petroleum field is, the more vulnerable 
it is to market volatility. When the price of petroleum is high, a small field is 
more likely to be developed, since the price of petroleum at that time can support 
the necessary infrastructure and start-up costs for that field.196 However, when 
the price of petroleum drops, it is likely that bigger fields, which yield more 
petroleum compared to infrastructure and start-up costs, are more likely to be 
developed.  
Value of petroleum and extraction of the resource 
The usefulness of petroleum resources to society and humanity dictates the value 
of the resource both insitu and after exploitation. Generally, the more necessary a 
resource is and the less capacity to synthetically reproduce the resource, the 
higher the value of the natural resource. The value of that resource will vary, but 
generally the insitu value of a non-renewable resource is recognised as the best 
indicator for the scarcity of a resource.197 Given the increased global demand for 
petroleum, the volatility of petroleum prices198 and the superprofit realised in the 
sale of petroleum, a potent challenge for States is determining when the 
petroleum should be developed, and when it should be left in the ground. Since 
once the non-renewable resource is exploited, it is lost forever, and at the same 
time its undisturbed rate of growth is nil, it is difficult to decide at what rate the 
exploitation shall take place.199  
 
196 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 80. 
197 Myungan Lee, ‘Measure of the Insitu Value of Exhaustible Resources: An Input Distance Function’ (2006) 62 
Ecological Economics 490, 490. 
198 The price of petroleum swung wildly in the years 2004-2008. Crude was priced at around US$30 per barrel in 
January 2004, rising to a record high of almost US$150 in July 2008, and then quickly plummeting to around 
US$40 per barrel in December 2008. See oil prices history at EIA, Petroleum Navigator 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtotworldw.htm at 12 November 2009. 
199 Partha Dasgupta and Geoffrey Heal, Economic Theory and Taxable Resources (1979) 153, 153. 
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There are a number of economic models that consider the value and consumption 
of exhaustible resources. It is important to consider theories of exhaustible 
resource pricing and consumption since the development of an effective 
regulatory system necessarily must consider the rate of depletion, to ensure that 
the resources are developed at a pace that optimises the economic return from the 
resource.200 
Capture of production cost spending  
Another economic challenge is how to capture the revenue generated from 
production cost spending.201 This refers to the expenditure made by oil companies 
in the exploration and production of oil (production costs), when the oil 
companies purchase goods and services required for the production of petroleum. 
Often industries in a State are initially unable to provide oil companies with the 
goods and services they require for oil production, since they do not have the 
capacity to produce the specialised goods and services required. Where domestic 
industries do not initially have appropriate goods, services and skills to meet the 
supply needs of the petroleum industry, the State will fail to capture the economic 
benefits generated by production cost spending on required goods and services. 
Instead, the requisite goods and services will be purchased in foreign countries. 
Therefore, if a State can adequately capture the economic benefits from the 
exploitation of petroleum by capturing production cost spending, then it is more 
likely to sustainably develop its petroleum. 
If industries within a petroleum producing State have the opportunity and 
incentive to develop the requisite industrial and technological goods and services 
required for the production of petroleum, it is possible that economic 
 
200 Partha Dasgupta and Geoffrey Heal, Economic Theory and Taxable Resources (1979) 153, 153. These models 
include Hotellings Rule and Hartwicks Rule, and are considered in Chapter five below. 
201 The author has defined production cost spending as the expenditure by oil companies on costs associated with 
the exploration, development and production of oil, and includes both goods and services. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
68
                                             
sustainability will occur. This is because economic diversification may enable the 
State to capture the production cost spending on goods and services oil 
companies require when exploiting oil resources. Economic diversification 
creates opportunities for the development of new industries and technologies that 
not only capture production cost spending in the petroleum value chain, but are 
also sustainable after petroleum production ceases.202 
This capacity to diversify may be generated through a national procurement 
policy that favours domestic suppliers, and implemented as part of the award of 
the petroleum licence.203 By diversifying, a State creates industries and 
technologies that are sustainable after petroleum production has ceased. At the 
same time, it captures the revenue generated by costs associated with the 
production of petroleum, rather than the revenue flowing to countries external to 
that State. The impact of economic diversification and the sustainable 
development of petroleum is considered in section 4.5.3 below.  
Avoiding resource curse  
Resource curse is a phenomenon where resource-rich countries tend to grow 
slower (using aggregate output per capita as measure) than similar non resource-
rich countries.204 Auty hypothesises that this occurs as a result of a number of 
reasons, particularly the decline in the competitiveness of other economic sectors 
in the economy, which is caused by the appreciation of the real exchange rate as 
resource revenues accumulate in the country.205 Other causes include natural 
 
202 For example the development of steel and concrete technologies in Norway by companies such as Aker 
Solutions. See Ole Andreas H Engen, The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A 
Historical Overview (2007) TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No. 20070605, 45. 
203 See Brent F. Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and 
Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991) for examples of how Norway was able to capture production cost spending 
through the petroleum licensing rounds, especially from the second licensing round. 
204 Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors’ (2006) 65 (3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 605, 608. 
205 Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993), 
15-16. 
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resource revenue volatility due to global commodity market variations, 
government mismanagement of the allocation of resource licences or contracts, or 
weak, ineffectual, unstable or corrupt institutions.206 
Resource curse is a surprising, negative relationship between resource wealth 
and economic growth.207 It is a paradox where a country has an abundance of 
non-renewable natural resources such as oil and gas, yet fails to have economic 
growth as these resources are developed.208 The sixteenth century Spanish 
author Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra first articulated this malady: 
…’the gratification of wealth is not found in its mere possession 
or in lavish expenditure, but in its wise application.’209 
When exploiting its petroleum resources, a State runs the risk of developing 
resource curse,210 and therefore failing to benefit from the resource revenue.211 
The causes of resource curse are complex, and regulatory factors that influence 
the development of resource curse includes the process of allocation of petroleum 
licences, the regulation of petroleum activities, the rate and method of resource 
extraction. It is these factors that may contribute to resource curse that are 
considered in this thesis. However, there are also many other factors that have a 
major impact upon whether the exploitation of petroleum resources will lead to a 
State developing resource curse. These include how much revenue a State 
 
206 Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993), 
15-16. 
207 Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors’ (2006) 65 (3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 605, 607. 
208 Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 5. 
209 Miguel de Cervates Saavedra, in Christine Ebrahim-Zadeh, ‘Back to Basics - Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth 
Manage Unwisely (2003) 40 (1) Finance and Development International Monetary Fund 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/03/ebra.htm at 4 December 2006.  
210 For a discussion on the causes of resources curse, see Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993). 
211 Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 5. 
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generates from the exploitation of its petroleum resources, and how a State 
integrates resource revenue into its economy to ensure the revenue generates the 
greatest benefit rather than harm. The management of resource revenue is a 
complex interaction of fiscal management, socio-political factors and government 
policy, and is outside the confines of this thesis. 
Countries that are rich in resources may also suffer from the closely related 
phenomenon known as Dutch disease. This is an economic illness characterised 
by factor movement, excess demand, and loss of positive externalities.212 This 
concept was first postulated in the late 1960s when the development of large gas 
deposits discovered in the Netherlands in the 1950s began to have a negative 
effect on the Dutch economy.213  
In Dutch disease, as resource deposits are developed, the traded goods sector 
are exposed to foreign competition abroad or domestically, and begins to shrink 
or disappear.214 Resource exports lead to a rapid contraction of the non-resource 
traded goods sector.215  Typically, there is an inflow of foreign capital from 
resource sector earnings, which increases the domestic money supply. A 
consumer preference for foreign currency translates into higher demand for 
non-traded goods, and the real exchange rate appreciates.  This then makes the 
domestic tradable sector less competitive and leads to resource reallocation to 
the non-tradable sector or in extreme cases to de-industrialisation.216  A major 
consequence of this is that the abundance of a resource renders the export 
 
212 Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993). 
213 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Lessons From Dutch Disease: Causes, Treatment and Cures  (2001) Institute of Economic 
Studies, Working Paper W01:06, 2. 
214 Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors’ (2006) 65 (3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 605, 607. 
215 Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors’ (2006) 65 (3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 605, 608. 
216Amar Inamdar, ‘International Best Practice In Sustainable Development’, (2002) Government of Papua New 
Guinea http://www.mineral.gov.pg/GreenPaper/WorkingPaper8.htm at 22 December 2007. 
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sectors uncompetitive, retarding a resource-abundant countries’ ability to 
successfully pursue export-led growth.217  
The dramatic increase in a nation’s wealth often has adverse consequences on a 
nation’s economy as a result of a large influx of foreign currency, the ‘spending 
effect’, and a shift in capital and labour into the production of domestic non-
traded goods to meet the increase in domestic demand and the booming oil 
sector.218  This malady has occurred in a number of oil rich nations in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, including Mexico, Indonesia,219 Nigeria, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina.220 Often, the State does not have the 
capacity, capability or incentive to implement good fiscal management, instead 
choosing to spend the resource income or squander it through corruption. 
‘Dutch disease,’ primarily gains a foothold in nations characterised by political 
instability, poor governance, weak institutions, corruption and undue influence 
by external States, compromising or neglecting the rights of the citizens of a 
State.221  
There is the potential for ‘Dutch disease’ to affect developed nations with newly 
discovered mineral resources, such as Norway in the 1970s.222  To counter the 
 
217Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, The Curse of Natural Resources (2001), 835.  
218 Christine Ebrahim-Zadeh, ‘Back to Basics - Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Manage Unwisely (2003) 40 (1) 
Finance and Development International Monetary Fund 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/03/ebra.htm at 4 December 2006. 
219 Norio Usui, ‘Dutch Disease and Policy Adjustments to the Oil Boom: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and 
Mexico’ (1997) 23 (4) Resources Policy 151, 152.  
220 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Lessons From Dutch Disease: Causes, Treatment and Cures (2001) Institute of Economic 
Studies, Working Paper W01:06, 6-8. 
221 For an example of this, refer to the long running battle between the citizens of Nigeria  and the Nigerian State 
which has a long history of corruption, fiscal mismanagement and a blatant disregard for the people: Thomas 
Baunsgaard, Fiscal Policy in Nigeria: Any Role for Rules? (2003) International Monetary Fund IMF Working 
Paper WP/03/155 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03155.pdf at 3 December 2006, 5; Andrew 
Walker, ‘Blood Oil’ Dripping From Nigeria (2008) BBC New 27 July 2008 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7519302.stm at 12 December 2008. 
222 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, 
Research Department, 11. 
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effects of oil money in the Norwegian economy, the Norwegian State 
implemented fiscal policies and regulatory systems to manage the inevitable 
structural changes in the economy resulting from resource development.223 At 
the core of this fiscal reform was the recognition of the importance of the labour 
force as the most important asset.224 To assist in achieving economic balance 
based on the labour force, sustainable macroeconomic policies encouraging 
economic diversification were developed alongside a pension and tax system 
that encouraged the labour force to continue working. 225  
There is a concern that the exploitation of non-renewable resources in Australia 
has led to an increased susceptibility to Dutch disease. The Australian economy 
has experienced unprecedented growth in the last few decades, as a result of the 
resources boom.226 This has brought about a broad-based assumption that the 
resource-based economy of Australia has successfully diversified whilst 
retaining a foundation in agricultural exports and minerals.227 However, this 
boom may well be a curse in disguise, and the start of the insidious Dutch 
disease.228 This thesis will consider the threat of resource curse and Dutch 
disease in Australia as part of the analysis of sustainable extraction of petroleum 
 
223 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, 
Research Department, 11-12. 
224 Fridjof Berents, Norway’s Management of the Petroleum Revenues (2006) UNCTAD Expert Meeting on FDI in 
Natural Resources, 20-22 November 2006 http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/com2em20p007_en.pdf at 3 
December 2006, 2. 
225 Fridjof Berents, Norway’s Management of the Petroleum Revenues (2006) UNCTAD Expert Meeting on FDI in 
Natural Resources, 20-22 November 2006 http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/com2em20p007_en.pdf at 3 
December 2006, 2. 
226 Australian Bureau of Resources, The Economy and Economic Resources (2008) 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1383.0.55.001Main%20Features52008%20(Edition%201)?o
pendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=1383.0.55.001&issue=2008%20(Edition%201)&num=&view= at 12 
October 2009. 
227 James Goodman and David Worth, ‘The Mineral Resources Boom and Australia’s Resources Curse’ (2008) 61 
Journal of Political Economy 201, 201. 
228 As postulated in James Goodman and David Worth, ‘The Mineral Resources Boom and Australia’s Resources 
Curse’ (2008) 61 Journal of Political Economy 201, 203. 
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resources in Australia, and whether the regulation of petroleum extraction can 
mitigate the potential threat. 
Fundamental to Norway avoiding resource curse in general, and Dutch disease 
in particular, has been the prudent regulation of petroleum extraction, coupled 
with transparency and accountability of government processes.229 In addition, 
Norway has been financially prudent, with mandatory saving of resource 
revenue through the Government Pension Fund – Global (formerly the 
Petroleum Fund).230 Although the management of resource revenue is essential 
to avoid resource curse, this thesis will be confined to a consideration of how 
Norway has utilised the regulation of petroleum extraction to avoid resource 
curse and Dutch disease. In particular, it will focus on how it is possible to use 
the award of petroleum licences to encourage economic diversification, and thus 
stave off the effects of resource-led Dutch disease. 
Capture of petroleum revenue  
A difficulty facing all States in the exploitation of petroleum resources is 
balancing the economic interests of the oil companies that are crucial for the 
exploitation of the resources, with the need for the State to capture appropriate 
economic returns for the development of its resources. Thus an imperative for 
any State is to develop a regulatory framework that provides economic incentives 
for oil companies to exploit petroleum resources, while at the same time capture 
lasting benefits for present and future generations. Generally, this regulatory 
 
229 Fridjof Berents, Norway’s Management of the Petroleum Revenues (2006) UNCTAD Expert Meeting on FDI in 
Natural Resources, 20-22 November 2006 http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/com2em20p007_en.pdf  at 3 
December 2006, 2. 
230 Fridjof Berents, Norway’s Management of the Petroleum Revenues (2006) UNCTAD Expert Meeting on FDI in 
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framework will include a taxation regime that will capture the resource rent in the 
form of taxation or royalty.231  
There is a complex interrelationship between economic benefit and control of the 
exploitation of the resources, since control may be a method of supervision that 
secures a part of the revenue for the State.232 By delegating a portion of control of 
petroleum exploitation to oil companies, the State is effectively renouncing a 
certain part of economic rent and control over resources to oil companies that use 
private capital to exploit these resources. However, the State has the capacity to 
mitigate through the method of allocation of petroleum licences to ensure it is 
able to capture the maximum economic rent in the most appropriate manner. 
Whilst resource taxation regime is outside the confines of this thesis, it will 
consider how a State can utilise the system of licence allocation to maximise its 
opportunities to capture economic rent. 
1.6.3 Commercial challenges: diverging goals of State and 
company 
Whilst the petroleum is owned by the State, the exploitation of these resources is 
rarely undertaken solely by the State, since it lacks the competence and skill to 
develop the resources, and is reluctant to invest public capital into high-risk 
exploration ventures.233 Oil companies, who have the necessary expertise, capital, 
technology and knowledge to develop essential petroleum resources, generally 
undertake the exploitation of petroleum resources. Consequently, the exploitation 
of offshore petroleum resources establishes a symbiotic relationship between a 
State and private oil companies. Each party requires the other for petroleum 
 
231 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Resources Taxation Legislation (2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/enhancing/taxation/Pages/ResourcesTaxationLegislation.aspx at 12 November 
2008. 
232 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 20. 
233 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 19.  
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exploitation to occur. The oil companies need the State since the State is the 
owner of the resource the companies wish to exploit. The State requires the oil 
companies to contribute the financial strength and technology needed to explore 
the resources, and assume the exploration and production risk.  
Therein lies the conundrum. A resource that is owned by the State, linked to 
military might and economic growth, and capable of generating ‘super profits’ is 
largely developed by private companies, whose allegiance is to shareholders 
rather than the States that own the resources, and entrusted to develop these finite 
resources for the benefit of the society as a whole. This relationship between 
State and company is usually one of interdependence with diverging interests, 
needs, perceptions and demands, since each participant has different goals in the 
development of the petroleum, yet requires the participation of the other to 
accomplish their goals.234 The State’s primary focus is to satisfy national 
objectives as defined in its petroleum policies. Often these objectives are focused 
on the development of petroleum resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations.235 This encompasses the need to generate appropriate revenue for 
the State from the exploitation of the petroleum resources, but often also includes 
generating lasting economic benefit and social development, thus requiring the 
sustainable development of the resources.236 Unlike the State, oil companies have 
a single goal. Their aim is to exploit petroleum resources to maximise profit for 
the company and its shareholders.  
This symbiotic relationship yet incongruent goals between the participants 
involved in the exploitation of petroleum resources creates an enormous 
 
234 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 19. 
235 An example of this is the Australian Government’s stated responsibility to ensure that present and future 
generations of Australians derive optimal benefit from its petroleum resources. See Department of Industry, 
Resources and Tourism, Offshore Petroleum Guidelines for a Grant of a Production Licence and Grant of an 
Infrastructure Licence (2002), 7. 
236  Deborah J Shields, ‘Nonrenewable Resources in Economic, Social and Environmental Sustainability’ (1998) 7 
(4) Nonrenewable Resources 251, 255. 
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challenge for the State. How does the State regulate petroleum activities to ensure 
that it generates appropriate socio-economic benefit for the State, as well as 
establishing appropriate incentives to ensure oil companies are attracted to the 
petroleum province237 to develop the resources? The difficulty for any State is to 
establish a regulatory framework that attracts companies to extract petroleum, 
enabling them to fulfil their commercial objectives, whilst at the same time 
developing the petroleum resources in a manner that enables a State to 
accomplish its socio-economic objectives. An effective regulatory framework is 
one that reconciles this challenge, uniting the divergent interests of the 
participants to create a balanced relationship where each of the parties is able to 
fulfil their objectives. 
Where the objectives of one or both of the parties are not being met, then the 
regulatory framework is not effective. If an oil company’s objectives are not 
being realised, it is possible the company will withdraw from petroleum activities 
in that jurisdiction, expending its resources in another jurisdiction. The regulatory 
framework and policies of a State may need to be revised and altered if 
necessary, in order to enable the requisite oil companies to achieve its 
commercial objectives.  
This conundrum has been illustrated in the Australian jurisdiction. Although 
Australia sees itself as a competitive location for investment,238 all participants 
do not hold this view of Australia as a competitive province. APACHE Energy 
notes that the current regulatory framework provides impediments to oil company 
investment in Australia:   
‘Australia competes with all other nations to attract upstream oil and 
gas investment. At all times, irrespective of the level of oil and gas 
 
237 A petroleum province is defined as a biogeographic division, characterised by particular structural or 
petrological features. See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/province at 13 January 2009. 
238 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview For Applicants 2009 (2009), 3. 
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prices, this competition is fierce. Governments need to be aware that 
oil and gas companies factor in the costs and risks associated with 
the regulatory regime when allocating capital.’239 
 This thesis addresses how the petroleum regulatory framework balances the 
objectives of the State and oil companies to achieve sustainable development of 
petroleum resources for the benefit of the State, whilst remaining an attractive 
province for oil companies. It assesses Australia’s capacity to balance the 
objectives of the participants. It also examines how Norway has successfully 
balanced this relationship through a combination of policy, legislation, the 
allocation of petroleum licences and the regulation of petroleum field 
development.240  
1.6.4 Technical challenges 
It is the extraction of petroleum that provides the economic and commercial 
benefits for the participants. These economic and commercial imperatives, 
combined with complex field geology, and recovery of petroleum from 
increasingly deeper offshore fields, creates numerous challenges for oil 
companies that extract the petroleum, and the States that own the petroleum. 
These challenges include increased petroleum production costs, physical 
difficulties in extracting petroleum as a field matures, and the need to develop 
fields with complex geologies as ‘easy oil’ fields are depleted.  
Therefore, one of the most important requirements is to profitably extract as 
much petroleum as possible whilst at the same time ensuring the sustainable 
extraction of petroleum. These technical requirements create additional 
regulatory challenges for the State as it tries to determine whether, as owner of 
 
239 APACHE Energy, Submission to the Australian Productivity Commission of Regulatory Burden on the 
Upstream Petroleum Sector (2008) Submission 14 
http://www.pc.gov.au/dissertations/study/upstreampetroleum/initialsubmissions/sub014.pdf at 16 September 2008. 
240 Field Development is regulated using the Plan for Development and Operation (PDO), as required in s4.2 of the 
Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
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the petroleum, it should regulate field extraction methods and use of 
technology, or should such technical requirements be left to the oil companies 
that specialise in the extraction of petroleum as their core business. 
1.6.5 Regulatory challenges 
History of regulation  
The majority of the twentieth century has been dominated by government 
regulation over the ‘commanding heights’241 of the economy, those segments 
and industries in an economy that effectively control and support other 
segments of the economy. Typical examples of this include oil, railroad, 
banking and utilities.242 This control over the ‘commanding heights’ has been 
traditionally exerted through one of two ways: either through ownership of 
government resources, or through economic regulation of the commanding 
heights.243 
This traditional concept of government regulation over the important aspects of 
the economy is largely attributable to John Maynard Keynes,244 although it had 
its roots in the work of Adam Smith.245 Whilst Smith advocated free markets, 
he also recognised that in certain areas of an economy, there is legitimacy in 
certain forms of State intervention.  Smith utilised the metaphor of the ‘invisible 
hand’, describing the sophisticated allocative powers of the free market that 
ensures that demand and supply for goods and services are constantly kept in 
 
241 A term coined by Vladimir Illich Lenin in November 1922 at the Fourth Congress of the Communist 
International. See Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments 
and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999), 12.  
242 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments and the 
Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999), 12-13. 
243 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments and the 
Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999), 12-13. 
244 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), 378. 
245 Adam Smith is widely recognised to be the founder of modern economics. He wrote his seminal text An Enquiry 
into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations in 1776. 
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alignment, as a result of the self interested efforts of producers working to meet 
the demands of consumers.246 
The Great Depression and the World Wars had a great impact on global 
economics, and signalled a shift toward State regulation and nationalisation of 
the commanding heights of national economies. Keynes, in his great work the 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, advocated State 
intervention in the economy, to mitigate the adverse effects of economic 
recessions and depressions, as well as the cyclical nature of business.247 He 
rebutted neoclassical economic thought that free markets would be able to 
provide for workers as long as workers were flexible in their wage demands, as 
advocated by Smith and his devotees.248 Rather, he argued the need for a mixed 
economy, comprising a predominately private sector, with a role of government 
to regulate important aspects of the economy. This government control over the 
‘commanding heights’ was implemented in the later half of the depression in 
many developed nations including Australia, the United States and United 
Kingdom. It was seen as necessary after the destruction of World War II, and 
deemed efficient and effective until the 1970s.249  
During the late 1970s and 1980s the importance of government control of the 
‘commanding heights’ receded, primarily as a consequence of expansive, 
ambitious governments who had become the main player rather than the referee 
in national economies.250 Globally, governments sought to divest themselves 
 
246 Adam Smith, The Invisible Hand (2008), 54-5. 
247 John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), chapter 22. 
248 John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), chapter 22. 
249 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments and the 
Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999) ,13. 
250 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments and the 
Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999), 13.  
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from government owned businesses, such as utility companies, airlines, and 
railways, turning them over to the marketplace.251  
This shift away from government control has ushered in a period where the 
governments own less and plans less, instead allowing the market economy to 
expand.252 The economic basis of this shift in the role of government in the 
regulation of the ‘commanding heights’ is grounded in the Chicago School253 
approach to economics, which adheres to free market libertarianism.254 Under 
the Chicago School approach, Keynesian economic principles were denounced, 
instead replaced by a faithful adherence to neoclassical economics advocating 
free markets and minimal government regulation of the economy.255 
This shift to neoclassical economics brought a changing role of the government, 
from participant to regulator in States where the State was owner of many of the 
commanding heights of the economy. An example of this was Australia in the 
1980s and 1990s under the Hawke and Keating governments, systematically 
selling or deregulating such commanding heights as banking, airlines, and 
telecommunications.256 Similarly, the United Kingdom, under the control of 
Thatcher who was heavily influenced by free market economics,257 sold or 
 
251 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments and the 
Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999), 12.  
252 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments and the 
Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999), 13-14. 
253 The ‘Chicago School’ refers to the approach of the members of economics from the University of Chicago’s 
School of Economics over the last century. More broadly, it refers to a brand of economics which strictly adheres to 
neo-classical economic theory and free-market libertarianism. See Juan Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists: the 
Chicago School of Economics in Chile (2008), chapter 1 for an overview of the Chicago School. 
254 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), 9-10. 
255 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), 9-10. 
256 James R Green and David J Teece, ‘Four Approaches to Telecommunications Deregulation and Competition: 
the USA, the UK, Australia and New Zealand’ (1998) 7 (4) Industrial and Corporate Change 623, 623-5. 
257 In particular, Thatcher was influenced by Hayek’s warning about the growth of the State and its impact on 
individual freedom and enterprise in his book The Road to Serfdom (1945). For a discussion of this see David 
Parker, The History of Privatisation: Volume 1: The Formative Years 1970-1987 (2009), 19-20. 
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deregulated many commanding heights. This included the denationalisation of 
national industries such as railways, transport, coal mines and the steel 
industry,258 and the denationalisation and subsequent sale of the British 
National Petroleum Company from 1982.259 For the United States, although 
government role in the commanding heights of the economy was confined to 
regulation rather than nationalisation, the impact of Reaganomics260 was 
immense. Regan implemented a program designed to reduce government 
spending and reduce regulation.261 Deregulation of the crude oil occurred in 
1981 as a consequence of Executive Order 12287,262 with all crude and 
petroleum products exempted from price and allocation controls, effective 
immediately.   
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2009 has been attributed to the 
fundamental faults of this neo-classical economic paradigm, particularly 
deregulation, privatisation, and unsustainable debt.263 The failure of free-market 
economics implemented in the 1980s, resulting in the deregulation of the 
financial sector, has been identified as a major causal factor of the GFC.264 
Consequently, the issue of government regulation of the banking sector, and 
 
258 David Parker, The History of Privatisation: Volume 1: The Formative Years 1970-1987 (2009), 17-18. 
259 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 159-161. 
260 Reaganomics refers to the economic policies of President Ronald Reagan during the 1980’s where he advocated 
a return to free-enterprise principles that had been favoured prior to the Great Depression and the Second World 
War. See William A Niskanen, The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics  (2002) 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/Reaganomics.html at 12 October 2009. 
261 William A Niskanen, The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics  (2002) 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/Reaganomics.html at 12 October 2009. 
262 United States Congress, Executive Order 12287 – Decontrol of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products 
January 28 1981 (1981) http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/12881a.htm at 12 October 2009. 
263 United States Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan For Regulatory 
Reform (2009) http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf at 12 October 2009. 
264 Luci Ellis, The Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Counter Measures (2009) Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Paper Presented at the Conference ‘Australia in the Global Storm: A Conference on the Implications of 
the Global Financial Crisis for Australia and its Region’ Victoria University, Melbourne 15 April 2009. 
http://www.rba.gov.au/Speeches/2009/sp_so_150409.html at 12 October 2009. 
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government regulation in general, has been revisited. The United States and the 
United Kingdom, great bastions of the free market and government 
deregulation, have both analysed the need for increased role of government 
regulation in the banking sector.265 Both concluded that greater regulation of 
this sector is required,266 with the United States’ advisory committee 
concluding that principle based regulation should be implemented, focusing on 
effective reduction of systematic risk in the financial sector.267 
Regulatory challenges 
The historical development of regulation in developed countries has a major 
impact on the regulation of petroleum activities undertaken by oil companies, and 
how much the State should exert during the exploitation of resources. Some 
States, such as Australia, the United States, and Canada, have minimal regulation 
of petroleum activities, a feature that typifies the North American system of 
petroleum regulation.268 In this system, the State awards petroleum licences, and 
enforces the laws and regulations protecting workers and the environment. The 
 
265 The United Kingdom recommended the need for greater government regulation of products and markets in the 
Turner Review that considered a regulatory response to the Crisis. See United Kingdom Financial Services 
Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, March 2009 (2009) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf at 15 October 2009. Similarly, the United States had advocated 
greater government regulation of the financial sector. See United States Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 
The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan For Regulatory Reform (2009) http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-
CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf at 12 October 2009. 
266 See United Kingdom Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global 
Banking Crisis, March 2009 (2009) http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf at 15 October 2009, 
chapter 3, and United States Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan For 
Regulatory Reform (2009) http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf at 12 October 
2009, i-iv. 
267 United States Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan For Regulatory 
Reform (2009) http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf at 12 October 2009, i. 
 268 In this system, the State awards petroleum licenes, and enforces the laws and regulations protecting workers and 
the environment. The company is left to exert control over field development, rates of depletion and other issues 
relating to production. See Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea 
Licensing Systems (2004) Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems. A MASC Workshop for 
Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 2. For a further discussion of this system see section 
1.4.1 below. 
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company is left to exert control over field development, rates of depletion and 
other issues relating to production.269  
In other states, such as Norway, the North Sea system of petroleum regulation has 
been developed.270 In this system, the State not only regulates the award of 
licences, but is also involved in the petroleum exploitation through the scrutiny 
and approval of oil company activities, the review of oil company activities, and 
the regulation of petroleum depletion. 271  
The regulatory framework of the LCS enables the State to define the parameters 
of petroleum exploitation within which the participants operate. The host 
government is faced with the challenge of regulating its interaction with the oil 
company in the exploitation of oil resources. In developing these resources, three 
distinct regulatory challenges arise, and are addressed by this thesis.  
Firstly, how does the State utilise the award of petroleum licences to identify and 
select the best participants to find the petroleum?272 Secondly, how and why does 
the State establish a contractual agreement with the selected participants, to 
regulate the relationship between the State and the participating oil companies?273 
In some States, such as Norway, this is governed by the relevant joint venture 
agreement. In other States, such as Australia, this relationship is administrative, 
governed by the existing legislative framework of acts and regulations. Thirdly, 
 
269 See Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems. A MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 2. For a further discussion of this system see section 1.3.1 above. 
270 The North Sea model refers to the regulatory model developed by Norway in particular (but also by the United 
Kingdom), for the exploitation of North Sea oil resources, which had its origins in the regulation of hydro resources 
in Norway since the early twentieth century. See  Brent  F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and 
State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 23. 
271 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
272 Knut Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licensing (1999) CEPMLP Publication 1/99, 3. 
273 Knut Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licensing (1999) CEPMLP Publication 1/99, 3. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
84
                                             
how does the State supervise the exploitation of petroleum resources,274 fulfilling 
not only the terms of the award of the licence, but also the national objectives of 
the State for the exploitation of petroleum?  
Another regulatory challenge facing a State in the development of its petroleum 
resources is the unique nature of the petroleum regulatory legal system. 
Petroleum laws are unique as they require the State to regulate a resource the 
State not only owns, but also has a vested interest in as licencee, regulator of the 
resource, and beneficiary of the profits and benefits that exploitation of the 
resource realises. This creates a complex legal situation since the State’s role in 
the regulation of resource exploitation may conflict with one or some of its other 
roles in the exploitation of petroleum. Compounding this legal complexity is the 
multi-national nature of petroleum activities. This conflict occurs as a result of 
complex contractual arrangements between oil companies, who are subject to 
national and international laws, treaties and conventions, yet are usually only 
accountable for operations in their home State. 275 
Role of the State in regulation  
The regulatory role of the State in petroleum exploration and production is 
critical, creating many regulatory challenges for the State. Without legal 
institutions to develop suitable regulatory regimes for the exploitation of 
petroleum, there is a danger that the State will lose control over resource 
production and revenue, becoming beholden to the petroleum companies that 
exploit the petroleum.276  
 
274 Knut Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licensing (1999) CEPMLP Publication 1/99, 3. 
275 See Hans Jarle Kind, Petter Osmundsen and Ragnar Tveterås, ‘Critical Factors in Transnational Companies’ 
Localisation Decisions: Cluster and Portfolio Optimisation’ in Solveig Glomsrod and Petter Osmundsen, Petroleum 
Industry Regulation Within Stable States (2005), chapter 3 for a general discussion on the multinational nature of 
oil companies. 
276 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
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The State, as owner of the resources for the people, assumes control over, and 
development of, these petroleum resources. A regulatory challenge for the State 
is how much control should be exerted by the State during the exploitation of the 
petroleum. There are a number of possible levels of State regulation in petroleum 
exploitation: minimal intervention, regulatory intervention and participatory 
intervention.277 One of the greatest regulatory challenges for a State is 
determining which form of State regulation is suitable for that State. The level of 
regulation depends on the outcomes that a State is seeking to achieve, and may 
change over time as the regulatory needs of the State alters in response to 
economic, commercial, political and technical factors. 
With minimal intervention, the State assumes the role of the referee in the 
exploitation of the resources. The State primarily engages in the enforcement of 
laws regulating the protection of workers and the environment, as well as 
regulating the distribution of offshore provinces to oil companies.278 The oil 
company is left to exert control over field development plans, equipment 
purchases, production levels and profits.279  In this level of intervention, the State 
remains content to allow the industry to regulate itself, so long as conflict among 
the companies is minimal and competition is fair.280 With this type of regulation, 
it is usually the goals of the oil companies that are paramount, with the State 
content to be guided by the oil companies’ goals and knowledge. It is this form of 
regulation that Australia currently applies. 
 
277 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
278 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
279 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
280 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
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Where regulatory intervention has been implemented, the State assumes the role 
of overseer of petroleum activities.281 The State is not content to merely referee 
from the sideline. Rather, the State is deeply involved in regulating day-to-day 
petroleum operations, without actually engaging in those operations. The State 
intervenes by creating, enforcing and monitoring strict regulations. This enables 
the State to scrutinise and approve almost every action taken by the oil 
companies, including regulation (either directly or indirectly) of the rate of 
petroleum depletion. This form of regulation seeks to balance the interests of the 
State with the need to maintain the presence of oil companies within the 
jurisdiction. It was the form of regulation that was adopted by the United 
Kingdom in the early exploitation of petroleum resources in the North Sea, 
particularly in the 1960s and 1970s.282  
When a State opts for participatory intervention, the State enters into the 
petroleum industry as a shareholder and active participant.283 In adopting a 
policy of participatory intervention, the State maintains all of its duties as set 
out in regulatory participation, but also assumes the role of entrepreneur. By 
entering the industry, the State acquires greater control of the petroleum 
activities, gaining expertise and inside information, exerting regulatory 
influence on offshore activities from both inside and out, as well as adding to 
taxation revenues by turning a profit.284 The Norwegian approach has been to 
not only highly regulate petroleum activities, but to also participate within 
petroleum activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) through Statoil 
and State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI). 
 
281 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8. 
282 This was adopted in the early 1970’s in response to voter demands. See Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: 
Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 9.  
283 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 9. 
284 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 9. 
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Some States, such as Australia, the United States, and Canada currently have a 
regulatory framework that provides for minimal State regulation, relying instead 
on market forces. In these jurisdictions, licences are awarded either through work 
program bidding or monetary bidding, once it has been ascertained that the 
applicant has the requisite financial and technical capacity to effectively exploit 
petroleum.285 Once production licences have been awarded, the oil companies are 
left to control field depletion, relying on market forces and company economic 
imperatives to dictate the rate and amount of extraction of petroleum.286  
With the discovery of North Sea oil reserves, the United Kingdom and Norway 
considered using the North American model of petroleum regulation to regulate 
North Sea petroleum. However this model was dismissed, primarily because the 
auction system gave these governments too little power over the regulation of 
petroleum activities, particularly through the award of licences.287 Instead, the 
governments of these States developed a new system of regulation, referred to as 
the North Sea system of petroleum regulation.  
Like the long established North American model of petroleum regulation, the 
North Sea system of petroleum regulation permits international oil companies to 
participate in petroleum exploration and production, and transfers ownership of 
petroleum at the well-head.288 The major distinction between the two systems is 
the higher level of control exerted by the State in the exploitation of petroleum 
resources under the North Sea system. This control is exerted in the allocation of 
petroleum licences, and the development of petroleum fields.289  As part of the 
 
285 For the award of licences in Australia, refer to  ss104-109 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Exploration Act 2006 (Cth). A detailed analysis of the award of petroleum licences is found in Chapter four below.  
286 The capacity of the Commonwealth to regulate the depletion of a field is regulated under Part 2.4 of the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Exploration Act 2006 (Cth). This company control of field depletion is analysed in 
Chapter five. 
287 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government: Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 32. 
288 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government: Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 33. 
289 In Norway this is regulated under s3-3 and 3-5 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
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award of a petroleum licence, the State not only selects the joint venture (JV) 
participants for a licence, but also selects the operator.290 The State also regulates 
petroleum exploitation through the scrutiny, approval and review of oil company 
activities,  and the regulation of petroleum depletion.291 These two regulatory 
challenges will be considered in Chapters four and five respectively.  
The State as a regulator has a responsibility to establish, maintain and enforce a 
suitable regulatory system for the exploitation of oil resources, ensuring 
adequate control over petroleum production, producers and the environment. 
This regulation is justified since a State regulatory regime can often do what the 
market cannot.292 Often market forces and private law cannot provide an 
effective solution to ensure the sustainable development of petroleum resources, 
particularly where there has been a failure of the market. 293  In instances such 
as these, there is a prima facie case for regulatory intervention in the public 
interest.294 It is important to note that the regulatory solution may be no more 
successful in correcting the inefficiencies of the market or private law.295  
The Norwegian petroleum resource management model seeks to balance the 
competing interests of the participants. The regulatory framework enables 
companies to maximise profits, as well as incentives for oil companies to fulfil 
the States objectives.296 Through direct State financial participation in 
 
290 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-7. 
291 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), Chapter 4. See also Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, 
Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 8.  
292 Anthony Ogus, ‘Regulation’ (2004) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and 
Regulation: Text and Materials (2007), 18. 
293 Anthony Ogus, ‘Regulation’ (2004) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and 
Regulation: Text and Materials (2007), 18. 
294 Anthony Ogus, ‘Regulation’ (2004) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and 
Regulation: Text and Materials (2007), 18. 
295 Anthony Ogus, ‘Regulation’ (2004) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and 
Regulation: Text and Materials (2007), 18. 
296 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 19. 
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petroleum activities297 and the taxation system, the State receives a substantial 
portion of the petroleum revenue. 
In this thesis I will examine whether Australia’s petroleum regulatory system 
promotes sustainable development of petroleum resources. I will also examine 
whether the Norwegian framework has been successful in the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources, and whether the Norwegian regulatory 
experience can provide lessons for Australia. 
1.6.6 Challenges in exploiting petroleum resources in 
Australia 
Australian offshore petroleum is characterised by vast unexplored offshore 
basins, located in the southern hemisphere and remote from European and 
American markets and resources.298 As Australia’s known petroleum resources 
are depleted, there is a pressing need to discover and exploit new resources to 
ensure Australia’s future petroleum and energy security.299 This places a new set 
of challenges on the Australian government for the regulation of its petroleum 
resources. 
Australia has traditionally approached the challenge of economically sustainable 
petroleum resource exploitation by providing a policy and legal framework 
designed to promote investment and attract investors to the Australian petroleum 
 
297 Direct State participation is undertaken through the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI), presently managed by 
and award to the State-owned management company Petoro. This is an arrangement whereby the State is awarded 
interests in a number of fields (at the time of award of licence), pipelines and onshore facilities. This take varies 
from field to field and is essentially dependant on the likely profitability of the field. As one of the participants in 
the field, the State pays its share of the investments and costs, and receives a corresponding share of income from 
the production licence. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector 
(2009), 25. See section 4.5.3 below for a discussion on the role of the State in petroleum activities. 
298 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of Government (2008), 9-13. 
299 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Energy Security (2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/energy_security/Pages/EnergySecurity.aspx at 2 October 2008. 
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provinces.300 This is characterised by the Australian approach of minimal 
intervention in petroleum exploitation, the use of the work program bid system in 
awarding petroleum licences, and retention titles that allow acreage to be reserved 
by companies for later development when they become commercially viable 
fields.301 To date, Australia’s legislative framework encourages oil companies to 
largely regulate themselves in relation to field development and depletion.302 
However, in order to sustainably develop Australia’s petroleum resources, there 
may be a need for alteration to the current regulatory framework. This will be 
considered in detail in Chapter four.  
 
1.7 Thesis structure 
This thesis comprises six chapters. 
Chapter one provides an introduction, thesis statement, methodology, and 
background to challenges in petroleum regulation. 
Chapter two provides a comparative analysis of Australia and Norway, which is 
essential if the petroleum regulatory systems are to be compared. Firstly, I 
examine the role and importance of petroleum in each jurisdiction, including the 
parallel history of petroleum exploitation in each State. I then compare a number 
of indicia of each country, including the political system, legal framework, 
 
300 This policy framework will be comprehensively explored in section 2.6 below. 
301 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Release of Offshore Petroleum Exploration Areas Australia 
2008: An Overview for Applicants (2008) http://www.ret.gov.au/Documents/acreagereleases/2008/site/page2.htm at 
12 June 2008.  
302 This is demonstrated in s161 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) which 
confers upon the licencee the right to recover petroleum and to carry on such operations (s161 (1) (a)) and execute 
such works in the licence area as necessary for the purpose of exploring for and recovering petroleum  (s161 (1) 
(d)). Furthermore, the Australian government notes that it neither undertakes petroleum projects nor engages in 
commercial exploration or development. Rather, it establishes the macroeconomic environment and provides a 
regulatory framework for exploration, development, safety, environmental assessment and revenue collection. See 
also Department of Resources, Industry and Tourism, An Overview for applicants: Australia 2009 Release of 
Offshore Petroleum Exploration Areas (2009) 10. 
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economic structure and petroleum policy of the two countries. The intention of 
this comparison is to demonstrate the capacity to compare the petroleum 
regulatory frameworks of these two developed States, based on their socio-
political and economic similarities, as well as their similarities in regulating 
petroleum. Furthermore, I provide an analysis of Australia’s petroleum policies, 
seeking to identify whether the current policy framework has weaknesses, 
thereby discouraging sustainable development of petroleum. As part of this 
analysis, I examine the petroleum framework of Norway, using the example of 
Norway’s petroleum policy framework to suggest changes in Australia’s 
petroleum policies that will encourage the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources in Australia.  
Chapter three considers the current regulatory framework for the exploitation of 
Australian and Norwegian petroleum. In this chapter I examine the legislation 
pertaining to petroleum exploitation in Australia, to identify if there are 
shortcomings in the current petroleum legislation that prevent the sustainable 
development of petroleum. To determine whether shortcomings are present, I 
examine the prescriptive, rule based nature of Australia’s legislation. I also 
consider how the use of principle based legislation, such as that used in Norway 
and South Australia, could encourage sustainable development of petroleum 
resources. 
In Chapter four I focus on the allocation of petroleum licences. I analyse the 
award of licences in the Australian and Norwegian regulatory frameworks, 
focusing on the award of licences under the discretion system and the work 
program bid system. I compare whether the award of licence through the bid 
system or the discretionary system is more likely to encourage sustainable 
development of petroleum resources. I also analyse whether the discretionary 
award system would be beneficial in optimising Australian petroleum 
development, and achieving national petroleum objectives in Australia.  
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In Chapter five I consider the role of the State in the regulation of production 
from petroleum fields. I examine whether State regulation of the method and rate 
of petroleum production and ongoing field assessment enables the State to 
optimise petroleum exploitation and achieve policy objectives. In this chapter I 
also examine how a State’s ongoing regulation and legislative requirement for 
maximising production can contribute to technologies that result in higher 
production levels, and are transferable to other industrial sectors. I assess the 
regulation of production of petroleum in Australia to determine whether the level 
of control optimises petroleum production, thus ensuring sustainable 
development of petroleum resources in Australia.  
In Chapter six I provide a conclusion to the thesis.  
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2. Comparing Petroleum Producing Countries: 
Australia and Norway 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter 1.3 above, I discussed the general problems of comparative legal 
research. When comparing the petroleum regulation in two countries  
differences in the political systems, economy and resources base, and legal 
system can influence the regulation of a State creating ongoing consequences 
from that regulation.  
The purpose of this chapter is to compare these two jurisdictions. It will 
compare both general domestic systems, as well as petroleum specific issues. In 
this chapter I will examine economic, political and social differences between 
Australia and Norway, discussing their similarities and differences, thereby 
providing a background for the influence of these incongruities or similarities 
on legal comparisons. Firstly, I will examine the role and importance of 
petroleum in both countries, demonstrating many similar issues affecting the 
sustainable exploitation of petroleum resources. I will also demonstrate how 
both countries are sufficiently similar in their legal, social justice and welfare, 
economic and political systems to enable comparisons of the two petroleum 
regulatory systems. I will then outline the development of petroleum policy in 
Australia and Norway, including the parallels and divergences in petroleum 
policy in each country. Finally, I will analyse the petroleum policy of Australia, 
to determine if the petroleum policy of Norway can provide any lessons for 
Australia to encourage the sustainable development of petroleum resources. 
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2.2 Petroleum in Australia and Norway 
Petroleum does not play the same role in Australian economy and society as a 
whole as in Norway. Australia is not a player in the global petroleum market. It 
has proved petroleum reserves of 4.2 billion barrels (bbl), only 0.3% of the total 
global proved reserves.303 However, petroleum is an important part in the 
Australian economy.304 The upstream petroleum sector contributes 2% to 
Australia's GDP,305 directly employing 15,000 people with a further 20,000 
employed indirectly.306 The export of petroleum products (including LNG) was 
the second largest income earner in 2006, behind coal.307 Importantly, LNG 
exports are increasing rapidly, from $5 billion in 2006 to an estimated $8.5 
billion by 2011.308 As a source of import expenditure, crude oil is Australia’s 
largest import in dollar terms, approximately 6.2% in 2006.309 
Australia has been in a petroleum trade deficit position since 2003/04, which 
could rise to exceed $20 billion per annum within the next decade if new 
reserves of petroleum are not found and exploited.310Australia is currently 
 
303 As at end of 2008, as defined in BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009 (2009), 6. 
304 Given the size of Australia and the geographical distribution of people, fuel oil is extremely important in 
Australia. This accounts for the high level of consumption of oil per capita (2.25-3 tonnes per capita per annum) 
trailing only North America and Saudi Arabia. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009 (2009), 13. 
305 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector (2008) Productivity Commission Draft Report, XXI.  
306 APPEA, Fast Facts (2008) 
http://www.appea.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=175&Itemid=295 at 29 January 
2009. 
307 APPEA, Platform for Prosperity: Australian Upstream Oil and Gas Strategy (2007), 4. 
308 APPEA, Platform for Prosperity: Australian Upstream Oil and Gas Strategy (2007), 4. 
309 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector (2008) Productivity Commission Draft Research Report, 12. 
310 APPEA, Platform for Prosperity: Australian Upstream Oil and Gas Strategy (2007), 4. 
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around 70% sufficient in the primary production of crude oil,311 experiencing a 
major petroleum deficit in 2007/8. In the same period, Australia exported 100.6 
million bbl of crude oil and condensate and imported 163.5 million bbl for 
refinery feedstock. Similarly, imports of petroleum exceeded exports by 33%, 
with exports of petroleum and petroleum products valued at $20 billion, while 
imports were valued at $30.4 billion.312 
In contrast to Australia, Norway is a large player in the global oil market. It has 
60 fields in production, producing 2.5 million bbl and 99.3 billion standard 
cubic metres (scm) of gas per day.313 It is the third largest petroleum exporter, 
and sixth largest petroleum producer, accounting for approximately 5% of the 
world crude market.314 Petroleum is an important part of the Norwegian 
economy, comprising 26% of GDP, 34% of State revenue, 23% of total 
investment and 50% of total exports.315 The sector directly employs about 
130,000 people.316 The petroleum activities have significantly contributed to the 
financing of the Norwegian welfare State. Through forty years of petroleum 
activities, the industry has created values in excess of 7000 billion NOK 
(approx A$ 1400 billion) in current terms.317  
Whilst Norway accounts for less than 0.1% of the global population, its 
economic importance is greater than its population indicates. Foreign trade 
 
311 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview for Applicants2009 (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/OverviewForApplicants.pdf  at 25 August 
2009, 4. 
312 APPEA, Platform for Prosperity: Australian Upstream Oil and Gas Strategy (2007), 4.  
313 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 14. 
314 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 14. 
315 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian 
Petroleum Sector (2009), 14. 
316 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2008: The Norwegian 
Petroleum Sector (2008), 14. 
317 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 14. 
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amounts to approximately 37% of Norway’s GDP, and Norway is among the 
world’s top five exporters in the seafood, crude oil and shipping services 
sectors.318 Norway also enjoys considerable market share of the light metals, 
ship equipment, and maritime classification, consulting and marine insurance 
services.319 
Crude oil, natural gas and pipeline services accounted for half of the value of 
Norwegian exports in 2009, earning approximately AU$120 billion (fifteen 
times the value of fish exports), not including the export of petroleum related 
goods and services.320  In the petroleum industry, technology and information 
are increasingly important. Goods and services exports from this sector are also 
significant.321 Norwegian service exports increased to around AU$35 billion in 
2004, and now accounts for almost half of service-oriented export revenues, 
with the other half comprising commercial and financial services and other 
petroleum-related services.322 
2.2.1 Petroleum fields and production 
Australia’s petroleum resources are a mix of mature fields323 and frontier 
regions.324 Australia has some mature fields, particularly the Gippsland and 
 
318Norway in International Trade (2009) http://www.norway.org/aboutnorway/economy/trade/general/  at 22 
December 2009. 
319 Norway in International Trade (2009) http://www.norway.org/aboutnorway/economy/trade/general/  at 22 
December 2009. 
320 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector 2006 (2009), 15.  
321 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 14. 
322 Norway in International Trade (2005)  http://www.norway.org/policy/trade/trade/general.htm at 22 December 
2006. 
323 A mature field is defined as a field that have been extensively explored and high levels of production occur in 
these areas. Characteristics of mature areas include familiar geology, fewer technological challenges and well-
developed infrastructure. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector 
(2009), 30, and Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law 
in Europe’, in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law 
in Europe: National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 882. 
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Otway Basins in South-Eastern Australia.325 There are large tracts of frontier 
areas, particularly in North-Western Australia. This is a result of the successful 
submission for jurisdiction over an additional 2,500,000km2 of continental 
shelf, confirmed by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf in April 2008.326 This area requires extensive exploration to 
realise possible petroleum reserves.327 
The Norwegian Continental Shelf is also characterised by mature provinces 
with highly developed infrastructure and declining fields.328 Norway also has a 
number of frontier areas, particularly the Barents Sea area in northern Norway. 
Given the territorial, geological and political challenges in developing these 
areas, the Norwegian Parliament has released a management plan for petroleum 
activities in the area.329 As such, Norway faces a similar need for resource 
management of mature fields as well as frontier tracts. Both jurisdictions 
require a resource management and development strategy that encompasses 
324 Frontier regions are characterised by little geological knowledge or data, significant technical challenges, and a 
lack of infrastructure, see Finn Arnesen, et. al., ‘Energy Law in Norway’ (2007) in M Roggenkamp, et. al. Energy 
Law in Europe (2007) , 882. These areas have high levels of uncertainty, although there are still possibilities of 
making substantial discoveries. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum 
Sector (2009), 30. 
325  Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview for Applicants 2009 (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/OverviewForApplicants.pdf  at 25 August 
2009, 8. 
326 Geoscience Australia, Australia’s Maritime Jurisdiction Extended (2008) 
http://www.ga.gov.au/ausgeonews/ausgeonews200806/inbrief.jsp at 31 January 2008. 
327 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview for Applicants 2009 (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/OverviewForApplicants.pdf  at 25 August 
2009, 8. 
328 In particular the North Sea area, south of 620 N. Exploration activities in this area include the award of licences 
in  special licencing rounds to ensure that there is access to critical infrastructure before the end of the life of that 
infrastructure. The areas awarded are tailored so that companies get the acreage when they have specific production 
plans, ensuring that maximum recover of petroleum occurs. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The 
Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 31-33. 
329 Norwegian Storting, Comprehensive Management Plan for the Marine Environment and the Waters off Lofoten 
(2006) Storting White Paper No. 8 (2005-6). This plan presents the framework for petroleum activities in the area, 
establishing guidelines for the location of petroleum activities. Petroleum licences in the 20th Licensing round were 
awarded on the basis of this management plan. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian 
Petroleum Sector (2009), 35. 
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these differing areas with the aim of sustainable development of petroleum 
resources.330 
As noted by the Australian Productivity Commission, Australia’s petroleum 
resources are in decline, leading to a likely decrease in the economic 
contribution of petroleum to the Australian economy.331 As production declines 
and imports increase, Australia will need to import a greater percentage of its 
petroleum for energy use. Like Australia, Norway is characterised by declining 
petroleum resources, with petroleum forecasts indicating a sharper production 
decline than first anticipated.332 This is attributable to less production from 
known resources, fewer new discoveries ready for development, and reserves 
that remain to be proven.333 
Both Australia and Norway face challenges in extracting petroleum resources in 
declining fields in order to meet its economic needs. Additionally, both nations 
seek energy security. For Australia, that is security of supply. Similar to the 
USA who is also a net petroleum importer, Australia is vulnerable to sources of 
supply for petroleum, particularly at a time where 61% of all global petroleum 
supplies are contained in the politically unstable Middle East region.334 Thus 
there is an imperative for both Norway and Australian States to maximise their 
extraction of petroleum. 
A major objective for Australia is to increase petroleum production to ensure 
that it does not have to continue to import high levels of petroleum to meet 
 
330 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002),11. 
331 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 83. 
332 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 6.  
333 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 1. 
334 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009 (2009), 6.  
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domestic energy needs. To meet this objective, Australia needs to maximise the 
recovery of petroleum, since the greater the recovery of resources, the greater 
the economic contribution of the petroleum sector to Australia. This concept, 
known as value creation, means that the extraction of petroleum resources is 
directed by the State to ensure that the greatest value and benefit of the 
petroleum resources are extracted for the benefit of society. The concept of 
value creation in the exploitation of petroleum resources is not new. It is a part 
of the petroleum regulatory framework in Norway, and the concept of value 
creation directs all Norwegian petroleum activity.335 
2.2.2 Development of petroleum regulation 
Offshore petroleum was discovered in Norway in 1969. Prior to the establishment 
of the first Norwegian production well, the Norwegian government consulted 
with industry, investment, business, government, international colleagues and 
experts to establish a suitable framework for Norwegian petroleum exploration 
and production.336  From the outset, there had been an emphasis on a high level 
of State participation, with the establishment of Statoil (State Oil Company) in 
1972 and the development of a legal regime to support the development of 
national industries.337 
Norwegian Petroleum policy has developed and maintained a focus on the 
development of petroleum resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations. That focus for petroleum resource development continues today, 
and is reiterated in Norwegian petroleum legislation, where petroleum is 
developed in a manner that ensures all of the society benefits, but that 
 
335 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 11. 
537 Kenneth W. Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1978), Chapter 4.  
337 Kenneth W. Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1978), Chapter 4. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
101
                                             
development does not occur to the detriment of other sectors of Norwegian 
society. Rather, other sectors of Norwegian society are enhanced.338 
Norway has established and maintained a controlled development of the 
petroleum sector through the licencing concession system and strong government 
participation and regulatory control.339 Correspondingly, Norwegian industry and 
infrastructure has similarly developed in a controlled manner, as a consequence 
of a favourable procurement policy during the first twenty five years of 
petroleum development and government policies, which required partnerships 
between foreign and domestic companies, as well as making research programs 
mandatory.340 
Natural resource development in Norway encompasses a combination of 
competent licencing, the development of related and supporting industries, and 
investment in infrastructure and human capital.341 Since the early 1970s, 
national management and State participation have been key factors in 
Norwegian oil and gas policy.342 This participatory role of the Norwegian State 
has been acknowledged as critical in the successful development of the 
petroleum industry.343  
Since the early 1970s an advantageous economic position was created for 
Norwegian companies by the implementation of mandatory domestic 
 
338 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s1-2. 
339 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1978), Chapter  4. 
340 Øystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry  (2004) Middle Eastern 
Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 19 September 2009. 
341 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009. 
342 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009. 
343 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009.  
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procurement of goods and services for petroleum production.344 Conditions 
attached to the award of petroleum licences since the second licencing round in 
1972 have enabled the development of Norwegian industry. These conditions 
required the use of local goods and services, thereby largely protecting 
Norwegian companies from 1972 to 1994.345 During this period, the award of 
goods and services contracts, favoured the Norwegian applicant, since Norwegian 
tender was calculated as value added (in manpower and monetary terms). This 
meant that even if the Norwegian tender was greater that other tenders (up to 
10%), the Norwegian bidder was awarded the contract.346 This linking of 
licencing and the economic development of Norwegian industries, services and 
skills has been seen as fundamental in the success of the Norwegian petroleum 
industry, both domestically and internationally.347  
Experience within, and commentary on the development of the Norwegian 
petroleum industry demonstrates that concurrent industry and petroleum 
production development can generate immense wealth and ensure economic 
sustainability for the society that owns the natural resource.348Additionally, the 
Norwegian petroleum regulatory system has demonstrated that engaging local 
industries, resources and skills is essential for successful, long-term resource 
development.349  Where this occurs, such as in Norway, there are greater direct, 
 
344 This was mandated in the Royal Decree of 8 December 1972. It included a provision that required licencees to 
use Norwegian offshore supplies when ‘competitive’ with regard to price, quality and schedule of delivery. 
See.Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 71. 
345 Øystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry  (2004) Middle Eastern 
Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm  at 19 September 2009. 
346 Øystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry  (2004) Middle Eastern 
Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 19 September 2009. 
347 Øystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry (2004) Middle Eastern 
Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 19 September 2009. 
348 Øystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry (2004) Middle Eastern 
Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 19 September 2009. 
349 Øystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry (2004) Middle Eastern 
Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 19 September 2009. 
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individual, financial and other benefits to a society than if petroleum resource 
exploitation is undertaken in isolation, without the development of associated 
industries and infrastructure at the same time.350 Consequently, it is generally 
recognised that the Norwegian petroleum licencing system is one of the most 
successful regulatory frameworks employed for the sustainable exploitation of 
natural resources.351 The Norwegian petroleum licensing framework is 
considered in Chapter four. 
Similar to Norway, offshore petroleum resources were discovered in Australia 
in 1965, with petroleum production commencing in 1969.352 Australia also 
utilised the licencing and concession system in petroleum exploitation. In 
Australia, petroleum resource exploitation has occurred against a backdrop of 
changes in the focus of petroleum policy. This has largely been the result of 
changes in government, and a response to market forces.353 
Since the commencement of petroleum production in 1969, there have been 
little economic diversification policies in Australia. Rather, policy has placed an 
emphasis on attracting international oil companies to undertake petroleum 
exploration and production.354 There has been some attention to upstream 
issues, particularly in relation to the Commonwealth’s provision of funding for 
pre-competitive geoscience data in offshore Australia.355 In response to the 
 
350 Øystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry  (2004) Middle Eastern 
Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 19 September 2009. 
351 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009.  
352 Esso/BHP, Bass Strait Oil and Gas (2002) http://www.exxonmobil.com/Australia-
English/PA/Files/publication_2002_BassStrait.pdf at 2 August 2007, 3. 
353 For changes in policy and government over the last forty years, and its impact on petroleum exploitation in 
Australia, refer to Section 2.6 below. 
354 Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy: A Strategy to Promote 
Petroleum Exploration and Development in Australian Offshore Areas (1999), 4. 
355 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of Government (2008), 4. 
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implementation of National Competition Policy in Australia in the 1990s, there 
was a review of the offshore petroleum sector.356 More recently, recognition by 
the Australian government that there are considerable regulatory burdens in the 
upstream offshore petroleum sector has led to a Productivity Commission 
inquiry into the industry.357 
 
2.3 The State as owner of petroleum resources 
The prevailing rule in petroleum resource management is that ownership of 
petroleum resources insitu is vested in the State.358 The exception to this is 
found in onshore petroleum resources in the US, where the law of capture 
applies. Under this rule, the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and 
gas.359  
As owner of the petroleum, the State has a responsibility to ensure that the 
resources are developed for the benefit of the citizens.360 Therefore, it is the role 
of the State to assert control over the development of the resources to maximise 
the economic and social benefits for the State and its citizens, while ensuring 
the least possible environmental harm.361 This control is asserted by 
 
356 This was completed by ACIL Pty Ltd, and the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee. The outcomes 
of this review have been published in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition 
Policy Review of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000). 
357 See Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and 
Gas) Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008.  
358 Anis Al Qasem, Principles of Petroleum Legislation (1985), 17. 
359 Howard R Williams, Richard C Maxwell and Charles J Meyers, Cases and Materials in the Law of Oil and Gas 
(1956), 19. 
360 This responsibility is articulated at an international level in Article 1 of United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. Adopted by 
General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
361 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo, and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 895-6. 
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establishing, maintaining and enforcing a regulatory framework for the 
exploitation of petroleum resources. This framework should assert adequate 
control over petroleum production, the producers (the participants), and the 
environment,362 whilst at the same time seeking to implement national 
petroleum objectives.  
All mineral and petroleum resources in Australia are owned by the State. This is 
reiterated in State onshore petroleum legislation (for example in section 9 of the 
Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld)), although this is not expressly stated in the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA). 
Sovereign rights in respect of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of 
the Australian Continental Shelf are vested in and exercisable by the Crown in 
right of the Commonwealth under the Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) 
(SSLA).363 Furthermore, the Commonwealth government accepts responsibility 
to ensure that present and future generations of Australians derive optimal 
benefit from its petroleum resources.364   
The right to petroleum resources in the United Kingdom is vested in the Crown, 
conferring upon the State the exclusive right to explore for and produce 
petroleum.365 This includes the right to petroleum that lies in the substrata of the 
Territorial Sea,366 as well as the Continental Shelf of the United Kingdom.367 
 
362 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 8-9. For a detailed discussion of the respective roles of the state in petroleum 
regulation, see section 1.5.4.  
363 Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth). 
364 The Commonwealth claims this responsibility over the development of offshore petroleum resources of the 
seabed beneath the Commonwealth’s marine jurisdiction. Department of Industry, Resources and Tourism, 
Offshore Petroleum Guidelines for a Grant of a Production Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002), 
7. 
365 Petroleum Act 1998 (UK), s2 (1). 
366 Petroleum Act 1998 (UK), s2 (2).  
367 Petroleum Act 1998 (UK), s 10 (7). 
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The right to subsea mineral resources in Norway is vested in the State under the 
Norwegian Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to Exploration and Exploitation of 
Submarine Natural Resources.368 Initially, this Act also applied to petroleum, 
but in 1985 this provision was taken out of the 1963 Act and moved to the 
Petroleum Act 1985 (Norway), and later to the PAA, which now grants the 
Norwegian State the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits and the 
exclusive right to resource management.369  
To efficiently and effectively exploit its petroleum, the State as owner of the 
resources assigns property rights to third parties (usually the private sector) for 
exploration, development and production activities through the award of 
petroleum licences.370 The petroleum exploration and production licence is the 
legal arrangement between the State and the third party. The regulation of the 
award of petroleum licence and how the process of awarding licences can 
contribute to the sustainable development of petroleum is considered in 
Chapter four. 
 
2.4 Petroleum property rights 
Exclusive ownership of petroleum resources is a feature common to both the 
Norwegian and Australian petroleum regulation systems, as ownership of 
petroleum resources is vested in the State in both jurisdictions. As such, both 
jurisdictions are able to offer assurance of ownership of the petroleum resources 
to any oil company wishing to invest in the State.  
 
368 Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to Exploration and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources (Norway). 
369 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) 1-1. 
370 ABARE, Australia’s Petroleum Resource Rent Tax: An Economic Assessment of Fiscal Settings (2003) ABARE 
eReport 03.1, 27.  
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The award of a petroleum licence creates property rights between the State and 
the participants. A contractual relationship is also created between the 
participants exploiting the petroleum through the establishment of a JV between 
the participants.  Depending on the jurisdiction, a JV may be formed prior to the 
award of licence, such as in Australia,371 or as a mandatory requirement upon 
the award of a licence, such as in Norway.372 
As the owner of insitu petroleum resources,373 the State has the unfettered right 
to award proprietary rights in its petroleum resources in order to exploit those 
resources.374 When the State awards a petroleum licence, the State ‘fetters’ its 
ownership rights, since the State is unable to transfer its ownership rights over 
the resource area for the period of the licence,375 since the regulatory 
framework, particularly the petroleum legislation and the type of licence that 
has been granted, fetter the States rights. However, once the licence has expired, 
the State is free to transfer proprietary rights in the acreage to others. The 
property rights of the State may also be fettered by that State’s entry into a 
Union,376 such as Norway’s entry into the EEA. 
 
371 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview for Applicants: Australia 2009 Release of Offshore 
Petroleum Exploration Areas (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/OverviewForApplicants.pdf at 25 August 2009.  
372 As outlined in s6-6 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Guidelines To 
Plan For Development And Operation Of A Petroleum Deposit (PDO) And Plan For Installation And Operation Of 
Facilities For Transport And Utilisation Of Petroleum (PIO).2000 (2000) 
http://www.npd.no/regelverk/r2002/frame_e.htm  at 22 March 2009. 
373 The Crown retains insitu rights over natural resources for two primary reasons. Firstly, the resources provide the 
State with high economic value. Secondly, ownership of petroleum resources enables the government to have 
control over the development of those resources. 
374 Art. 1 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 
1962.  
375 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All? Reflecting On Governance and North Sea Licencing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems A MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunsmuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 4. 
376 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All? Reflecting On Governance and North Sea Licencing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper : BC Offshore: Potential and Problems A MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunsmuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 4. 
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The award of a petroleum licence by a State confers property rights upon the 
licencee.377 Upon the award of a licence in both Norway and Australia,378 the 
licencee is granted exclusive rights over the licence area.379 These proprietary 
rights are transferable, and can be sold, as is the case with other proprietary 
rights in property. 
It is possible to define the rights conferred by the award of a petroleum licence 
as conditional rights, dependent upon a condition to be satisfied for the right to 
be either possessed or exercised. The conditions of the grant of a petroleum 
licence are usually outlined either within the legislative framework, or in 
administrative guidance notes that accompany a release of acreage for 
licencing.380 
In Australia, the transfer of title to a licence occurs as part of a Farm-In/Farm-
Out agreement. It is authorised under ss472-474 of the Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA), and executed under ss3-
4 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 1985 
(Cth) (OPAGGSR) using prescribed forms set out in Schedule 4 of the 
Regulations. Similarly, it is possible to transfer a licence or participating interest 
in Norway. This right is conferred under s10-12 of the Petroleum Activities Act 
1996 (Norway) (PAA) and s72 of the Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway) 
 
377 Property rights in this context are those rights pertaining to the permissible (socially sanctioned) use of 
resources, goods and services. See D W Pearce (ed), The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics (1986), 364. 
378 The exploration licence in Australia and the production licence in Norway. 
379 The grant of an exploration licence in Australia confers the right to explore for petroleum in the 
Commonwealth’s offshore zone under section 98 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 
(Cth). Whilst the Act does not expressly confer exclusive rights over the permit area, the exclusivity of those rights 
are implied rights since the exploration for petroleum in the offshore area is prohibited under s97(1) of the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006, unless exploration activity is authorised by the grant of an 
exploration licence under s97(2) of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006. The grant of an 
exploration permit entitles the licencee to apply for a production permit to recover petroleum in the event of a 
commercial discovery. In Norway, exclusive exploration and production rights are granted to the licencee upon the 
grant of a production licence under section 3-3 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
380 The legislative framework and administrative guidelines associated with the award of a petroleum licence are 
discussed in detail in Chapter four. 
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(PR). In addition, the right is conferred in Article 23 of the Joint Operating 
Agreement (Norway) (JOA). In both States, government approval is required for 
the transfer to occur.381 
The right to petroleum that has been extracted is not expressly outlined in the 
Australian legislative framework. Rather, there is an implied right to ownership 
of the petroleum under s161 (1) (a) of OPAGGSA, where an exploration licence 
authorises the licencee to recover petroleum from the licence area. Furthermore, 
the unauthorised recovery of petroleum from offshore areas is prohibited,382 
implying that ownership of any recovered petroleum is conferred only upon the 
licencee authorised to carry out petroleum production and recovery operations. 
The award of a petroleum licence in Norway confers upon the licencee the right 
of ownership to the produced petroleum, as it passes into the production well.383 
This right to petroleum is explicit in the PAA, conferring ownership of oil upon 
production to the licencee.384 Transfer of ownership of petroleum is also 
expressed in the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA), with each party having the 
right and obligation to take and dispose of a share of the produced oil, 
equivalent to each parties participating interest.385 Under the Norwegian JOA, 
the property right, liability and risk pertaining to the produced oil is transferred 
 
381 For approval requirements in Australia see s478 of the offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2006 (Cth). Approval for transfer of interest in Norway is required under s10-12 of the Petroleum Activities Act 
1996 (Norway), and extends to direct or indirect transfer of interest or participation in the licence, assignment of 
shareholdings and other ownership shares which may provide decisive control of a licencee possessing a 
participating interest in a licence.  
382 Prohibited under s160 (1) of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006. 
383 ‘Lifting’ of Petroleum is often seen as the point of delivery of oil, when the oil is capable is being transferred 
from the well to a storage or transportation vessel. Schlumbergers Glossary of Oilfield Terms does not define 
lifting, delivery or point of transfer. Instead, the point at which title passes is often defined in the relevant 
legislation.  
384 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) s3-3, para 3. 
385Joint Operating Agreement (Norway), Art. 20.1: Lifting of Oil.  
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to each party at a point of delivery that is determined by the Management 
Committee prior to the commencement of oil production. 386 
2.4.1 Alteration of legal rights 
The oil industry, like many other industries, conducts its operations within a 
changing society. However, unlike most other commercial activities, petroleum 
activities are likely to continue over long periods, often for twenty years or 
more. The long-term nature of petroleum activities creates a need for stability 
and continuity in the operating conditions relating to the petroleum activity.  
This means that companies require certainty in the conditions related to a 
petroleum licence, in the jurisdiction where they are conducting the petroleum 
activities. Therefore, it is important that the activities should occur in a 
jurisdiction where the State does not support, as a general legal principle, the 
right to unilaterally alter the conditions of established contracts.  
This does not mean that the State does not have the right to alter the legislation 
to make regulatory changes to the conduct of petroleum activities.387 Indeed, 
States can and often do make alterations to legislate for the protection of 
workers and the environment, and to alter rates of resource taxation. Indeed, 
both Norway and Australia have many examples of changes in the legislative 
requirements for the safety of workers or the protection of offshore petroleum 
workers.388 Changes in the regulatory environment that alters future projects is 
accepted by petroleum participants, since future changes can be planned for, 
and factored into the costing and assessment of projects. Rather, it means that 
 
386Joint Operating Agreement (Norway), Art. 20.1: Lifting of Oil. 
387 Omon Anenih, The UK Petroleum Production Licence – Is it a Contract or Regulation and Does it Matter? 
CEPMLP Annual Review (2002) http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/assets/images/Omon.pdf at 12 December 
2008. 
388 For example the alteration of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) in 2004 to reflect the creation of 
the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA). Similarly, there were legislative changes in Norway in 
the 1990s and 2000s that altered the regulatory framework for offshore safety. Furthermore, a special rate of 
taxation for petroleum was introduced in Norway in  1975 unde rthe Petroleum Taxation Act 1975 (Norway). 
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the conditions for existing licenses cannot be changed unilaterally to the 
detriment of the licence holders. 
The dilemma that jurisdictions face is striking the balance between certainty for 
the participating company, and flexibility for the State that owns the resources, 
in order to adapt the regulatory framework to new conditions and changes in 
policy. This raises regulatory and constitutional issues for all countries, and 
especially Australia and Norway. In order to be able to compare the legislative 
frameworks that regulate petroleum activities, it is important that neither 
Australia nor Norway accept retrospective alteration of conditions relating to 
petroleum activities.  
Neither Australia nor Norway accepts the retrospective alteration of the 
conditions of a petroleum licence. In Norway, Article 97 of the Norwegian 
Constitution  bans the retrospective effect of new legislation. This is 
demonstrated by s11 of the Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway) (PR) 
pertaining to the conditions and requirements for granting a production licence. 
This section clearly states that the conditions and requirements set out in the 
current PR only apply to production licences granted after 1 September 1995. 
Licences granted prior to this date are not affected by legislation enacted after 
the commencement of the licence. 389 The rejection of the retrospective 
application of law was illustrated by the outcome of the 1985 Norwegian 
Supreme Court case between Phillips and the Norwegian government.390 Under 
the Royal Decree of 8 December 1972 Relating to Exploration of and 
Exploitation of Petroleum in the Seabed and Substrata of the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf,  the Norwegian government attempted to alter the period of 
payment of petroleum production taxation by all licencees from three months to 
 
389 See Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), r11. 
390 See Norsk Retstidende (Rt) 1985, 1355. The Royal Declaration from 8 December 1972 was interpreted to not 
have effect on older licences which were regulated by the Royal Decree of 1965. 
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thirty days.391 The Norwegian Supreme Court held this alteration to the 
payment period did not have effect on established licences that were regulated 
by the Royal Decree of 9 April 1965 relating to Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Submarine Petroleum Resources (the 1965 Decree). The Court 
found that the changes could not be applied retrospectively, rather only for new 
licences awarded. 
Similarly, section 165 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA) defines the duration of a petroleum licence based 
upon the time of conferral of the licence, to ensure that there are no retroactive 
changes to the period of a petroleum licence.392 This ensures that there is a 
stable investment environment for oil companies, but still enables the 
parliament to enact prospective changes to petroleum legislation (for example 
for environmental or worker safety), if required.393  
The limits for what is considered the retroactive effect of legislation is 
complicated, and to some extent controversial in both Australian and 
Norwegian legal doctrine. Whilst the retroactive application of legislation is 
important, is not possible to give a deeper analysis of this problem within the 
limits of this thesis. However, the rejection of retrospective contractual change 
as a legal principle in both Australia and Norway ensures that the regulatory 
framework of both jurisdictions can be compared. 
 
 
391 These facts arise from an english interpretation of the following report from  Norsk Retstidende (Rt) 1985, 1355: 
Sammendrag: Krav om erstatning for rentetap som følge av endring av betalingsfristreglene for 
produksjonsavgiften. De første tillatelser til utvinning av petroleum på norsk kontinentalsokkel ble gitt i 1965 med 
hjemmel i lov av 21. juni 1963 nr. 12 om utforskning og utnyttelse av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster og 
forskrifter gitt ved kgl. res. av 9. april 1965. Etter 1965-resolusjonen skulle produksjonsavgiften betales i halvårlige 
terminer innen tre måneder etter utløpet av den enkelte termin. Nye forskrifter ble gitt ved kgl. res. av 8. desember 
1972. Etter denne resolusjon skulle betaling skje kvartalsvis innen 30 dager etter terminens utløp. 
 
392 See Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s165 (1). 
393 Omon Anenih, The UK Petroleum Production Licence – Is it a Contract or Regulation and Does it Matter? 
CEPMLP Annual Review (2002) http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/assets/images/Omon.pdf at 12 December 
2008. 
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2.5 Commonality of internal systems 
As this thesis will compare functions in the regulatory framework in the 
Norwegian and Australian upstream petroleum sector, it is necessary to compare 
the legal, political, economic and social systems of Australia and Norway. It is 
possible to identify parallels and differences between the two nations, to provide 
the necessary background against which the two petroleum regulatory regimes 
can be analysed, compared and conclusions drawn. 
2.5.1 Law and legal structure 
Australia 
The Australian legal system derives from the common law system, which 
originated in medieval England. Common law is derived from both statute and 
precedent, developing on a case by case basis.394 In this system, stare decisis is 
central, where lower courts are bound by the superior courts.395 The exception to 
this is the High Court of Australia, which is neither bound by its own decisions, 
or the decisions of other courts.396  
All Federal and High Court judges are appointed by the Governor-General, as 
specified in the Australian Constitution.397 Generally, the appointment is made 
upon the recommendation of the Cabinet, on the advice of the Attorney-General. 
Selection is based on merit, which includes legal excellence, demonstrated 
capacity for industry, and a suitable temperament for judicial function.398 A judge 
 
394 R Hughes, G Leane, and A Clarke, Australian Legal Institutions: Principles, Structures and Organisation (2nd 
ed. 2003), 48-9, 196. 
395 R Hughes, G Leane, and A Clarke, Australian Legal Institutions: Principles, Structures and Organisation (2nd 
ed. 2003), 197. 
396 C Cook, R Creyke, R Geddes and D Hamer, Laying down the Law (6th ed. 2005), 75. 
397 Constitution of Australia, s72 (i).  
398 Phillip Ruddock, Selection and Appointment of Judges (2005) Speech Delivered at the University of Sydney 
Law School, 2 May, 2005. 
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cannot be removed except by the Governor-General, on address from both 
Houses of Parliament.399 
As a consequence of the federalist system of government in Australia, there is a 
dual judicial structure in Australia. The Australian judicial system comprises nine 
jurisdictions (six states, two mainland territories, and the federal judicial system). 
There are two parallel court structures in Australia: the federal judicial system 
and the state judicial system.400 All six state courts have the three levels of 
primary courts (Magistrates, District or County Court, and Supreme Court), as 
well as a Supreme Court of Appeal. The state structure evolved in the 
independent colonies, and by the time of Federation in 1901, they were well 
established. A federal system of courts was created under the Australian 
Constitution upon Federation.401 
The High Court of Australia is the apex of both the state and federal judicial 
systems, acting as an appellate court for the state and federal judicial systems.402 
In addition, the High Court of Australia is the court of original jurisdiction for all 
constitutional issues, as stipulated in s75 of the Australian Constitution. 
Norway 
The Norwegian Legal system is best characterised as a civil law system, with its 
origins dating back to the 10th century.403 English law has also influenced 
Norwegian law, and it is arguable that the Scandinavian legal tradition 
represents a separate legal tradition in Europe.404 Norway has a Criminal Code, 
                                              
399 Constitution of Australia, s72 (ii). 
400 See R Hughes, G Leane, and A Clarke, Australian Legal Institutions: Principles, Structures and Organisation 
(2nd ed. 2003), Chapter 7 for a discussion of the Australian judicial system. 
401 Constitution of Australia, s71. 
402 Constitution of Australia, s73.  
403 Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, Administration of Justice in Norway: A Brief Summary (1980), 9. 
404 See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd ed. 1998), 277. 
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and the Constitution prescribes the enactment of a Civil Code, but the 
enactment of this code was never completed. Most of the civil law is now 
regulated in single Acts for specific areas. The central feature of the Norwegian 
legal system is therefore that Acts of parliament govern most areas, but courts 
also play an important role in development of the law, through interpretations 
and gap filling of the Acts. A decision by the Supreme Court is regarded as 
binding for lower courts and for the Supreme Court, but there are specific 
procedures to be followed if the Supreme Court intends to deviate from earlier 
opinions. Cases where the constitutional validity of an Act is tested is decided 
by a plenary decision of the Supreme Court.405 
Norwegian entry into the EEA means that decisions of the European Free Trade 
Agreement (EFTA) Court406 and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are also 
binding sources of law.407 Although not strictly binding, the ECJ will not depart 
from past decisions without good reason.408 As such, the case law of the ECJ 
provides a major source of EU Law, and is applicable to Norway in all aspects 
related to the EFTA and the EEA. In addition, a decision by the European 
Human Rights Court, which decides cases under the European Human Rights 
Convention, is binding on all national courts. 
There is only one system of courts in Norway, reflecting the unitary structure of 
the Norwegian political and judicial system. For civil and criminal matters there 
are three ordinary courts: the District or City Court, the High Court and the 
                                              
405 Lars Winsvold and Bard Thorsen, Norwegian Courts and the Administration of Justice (2001) 
Utensriksdepartmentet http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/English/Stoltenberg_I/ud/032001-990374/dok-bu.html at 8 
August  2006. 
406 For example EFTA Surveillance Authority v Kingdom of Norway (Norsk Tipping Case) (2007) Case E-106 
http://www.eftacourt.int/images/uploads/E-1-06_Judgment.pdf at 25 August 2009. 
407 ECJ decisions are seen as a tertiary source of Law. See Tony Storey and Chris Turner, Unlocking EU Law 
(2005), 63. 
408 Tony Storey and Chris Turner, Unlocking EU Law (2005), 64. 
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Supreme Court.409 Similar to Australian courts, the courts are independent, and 
Judges are appointed by the King-in-Council in accordance with the Norwegian 
Constitution.410 The courts are managed by a special independent body, which 
also makes advice on appointment of justices. Judicial positions are open to 
jurists from all professional backgrounds, including advocates (lawyers) and 
academics.411 Once appointed, justices are unable to be removed from office 
against their will. Dismissal can only occur following a court hearing and a guilty 
verdict of misconduct.412 However, the decision to prosecute for offences relating 
to a judge’s duties can only be made by the King-in-Council. Permanently 
appointed judges cannot be indicted for public order offences, and Supreme 
Court judges enjoy even stronger protection and can only be removed through an 
impeachment process.413 
Comparison of legal traditions 
Whilst on the surface it would appear that these two legal systems have very little 
in common, a deeper examination of the two systems reveals some important 
similarities. It appears that the common law and civil law systems are drawing 
closer together,414 leading some scholars to declare the distinction between the 
two systems to be obsolete.415 The harmonisation process in the EU also leads to 
a development of English law, moving the UK away from its traditional common 
law roots towards a hybrid system of law similar to the Norwegian legal tradition. 
 
409 Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, Administration of Justice in Norway: A Brief Summary (1980), 22. 
410 Art 22, Constitution of Norway. 
411 Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, Administration of Justice in Norway: A Brief Summary (1980), 89. 
412 Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, Administration of Justice in Norway: A Brief Summary (1980), 89. 
413 Art. 86, Constitution of Norway. 
414 Jim Corkery, Starting Law, (2002), 117. 
415 James Godley, ‘Common Law und Civil Law: eine uberholte Unterscheidung’ (1993) 1 Zeitschrift fur 
Europaisches Privatrecht 498, in Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private 
Law’ (2006), chapter in Mathias Riemann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law (2006), 558-9. 
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An examination of some features of the Australian and Norwegian legal systems 
demonstrates this hybridisation. Although Australia is a common law system, 
there is an increasing dependence on statute. This is illustrated in both the volume 
of statutes enacted yearly (over 159 new Commonwealth statutes enacted in 
2008),416 and the size of the statutes (the current Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) is over 850 pages).417 In addition, a 
number of Australian jurisdictions have codified some areas of law.418 
Norwegian courts have always played a role in the development of Norwegian 
law. In addition, since Norway is part of the EEA, it is subject to decisions from 
the European Court of Justice and the EFTA Court. Furthermore, both the 
Australian and Norwegian judicial systems comprise a number of specialised 
tribunals.419 These similarities indicate that the legal systems are sufficiently 
similar to enable comparison of the two jurisdictions. 
2.5.2 Welfare and social justice 
Welfare in Australia is governed by the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth).  The 
principles on which the Australian welfare system is based have altered 
substantially during the post-war era. In the period immediately after the Second 
World War, the welfare system was designed to provide a meagre system of 
welfare payments for the unemployed, sick or old, combined with a system of 
wage regulation to prevent poverty and reduced dispersion of incomes.420 
 
416 ComLaw, Acts by Year – 2008 (2008) 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/legislation/act1.nsf/browseview?OpenForm&VIEW=asmade&ORDER=bynu
mber&COUNT=100&START=101&CLASSIFICATION=&CATEGORY=act-2008 at 25 August 2009.   
417 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
418 An example of this is Queensland, which has codified its Criminal Law – See Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/C/CriminCode.pdf at 25 August 2009.  
419 In Australia there are Tribunals at both State and Federal level, and are generally specialised tribunals, eg the 
Dust Diseases Tribunal (NSW), and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Cth). In Norway such Tribunals include 
the Severance Tribunal, Social Security Tribunal, and the Industrial Tribunal. 
420 Francis G Castles, ‘A Farewell to Australia’s Welfare State’ (2001) 31 (3) International Journal of Health 
Services 537, 538. 
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However, the socio-political effects of the depression and war fostered a turn 
toward Keynesian macro-economic policy and increased social welfare.421 
Major reform in the welfare system occurred in the 1980’s with the election of a 
new federal government in 1983.422 The new government attempted to introduce 
a ‘corporatist national management of quasi-Scandinavian kind’ to the welfare 
system.423 This system was based on income and assets test of recipients.424 It 
saw the reintroduction of universal health care (Medicare), real attempts to 
address child poverty, the introduction of a mandated second tier system of 
superannuation, and subsidised child care for working mothers425 In this era, 
Australia was one of the leading OECD countries for social expenditure growth, 
with social spending increasing 4% per annum, compared with the OECD 
average of 2.5%.426 The means test requirement of the system sought to ensure 
that the benefits were directed to those in extreme need, however it appeared to 
be marked by growing social inequality.427 
The welfare system created in the 1980s and 1990s was systematically 
dismantled by a change of government in 1996. The impetus for change was the 
 
421 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 416. 
422 Some major welfare reforms occurred under the Whitlam government in 1972-75, including universal health 
system (Medibank), welfare payments for single parent families. Much of the reform that had been planned was cut 
short by the dismissal of the government in 1975 by the Australian Governor-General. The reforms alluded to in 
this section are the result of the Hawke-Keating government which was in power 1983-1996. 
423 This system attempted to implement a Scandinavian model of welfare into the Australian capitalist economy. 
See Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 418. 
424 Francis G Castles, ‘A Farewell to Australia’s Welfare State’ (2001) 31 (3) International Journal of Health 
Services 537, 538. 
425 Francis G Castles, ‘A Farewell to Australia’s Welfare State’ (2001) 31 (3) International Journal of Health 
Services 537, 538. 
426 Francis G Castles, ‘A Farewell to Australia’s Welfare State’ (2001) 31 (3) International Journal of Health 
Services 537, 538. 
427 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 418. 
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White Paper on Employment Policy in 1994,428 driven by the elected 
government’s aim to create full employment through the generation of new and 
worthwhile jobs.429 The government was primarily concerned with a fundamental 
restructuring of the post-war welfare system to overcome the perceived issue of 
‘welfare dependency’.430 This was executed through low levels of benefit for the 
unemployed, means testing of benefits, and ‘incentives’ such as ‘Work for the 
Dole’ schemes, requiring welfare recipients to work two days per week for 
unemployment benefits.431  
The overarching principle that drove this attitude to welfare was a need to reduce 
systematic welfare abuse.432 As such, citizens were encouraged to tip off the 
government about alleged welfare fraud.433 More importantly, there was a social 
stigma attached to welfare recipients in Australia, possibly due to a combination 
of the individualistic culture in Australia,434 and the perception that welfare 
recipients are somehow societal ‘losers’.435 
Another change in government in 2007 saw a return to social justice attitudes 
toward welfare in Australia. The National Platform of the elected government 
outlined an aspiration for the fair distribution of wealth and universal benefit 
 
428 Commonwealth of Australia, White Paper on Employment Policy (1994). 
429 Rob Watts, After the White Paper: Renovating Social Policy in the 1990’s (1995) 1994 National Conference on 
Unemployment, Unemployment: Challenges and Solutions, Queensland University of Technology Carseldine 
Campus, 19-26. 
430 Peter Saunders, ‘Australia is not Sweden: National Cultures and the Welfare State’ (2001) 17 (1) Policy 29, 29. 
431 Peter Saunders, ‘Australia is not Sweden: National Cultures and the Welfare State’ (2001) 17 (1) Policy 29, 31. 
431 CentreLink, Report a Suspected Fraud (2006) 
http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/about_us/fraud_index.htm.  at 1 November 2006. 
432 Peter Saunders, ‘Australia is not Sweden: National Cultures and the Welfare State’ (2001) 17 (1) Policy 29, 31. 
433 CentreLink, Report a Suspected Fraud (2006) 
http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/about_us/fraud_index.htm at 1 November 2006. 
434 Peter Saunders, ‘Australia is not Sweden: National Cultures and the Welfare State’ (2001) 17 (1) Policy, 29, 30. 
435 Kay Cook, Centrelink Rhetoric and Reality: An Analysis of Social Exclusion Amongst Low Income Women 
(2004) Social Policy Congress 2004. Victorian Council of Social Services, Melbourne, Australia. 
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from economic growth, continuous improvement in living standards, and 
reallocation of resources to those most in need.436 This return to social justice has 
been demonstrated by the introduction of some paid maternity leave, tax relief for 
working families, education tax deductions, aged pension reform, and permanent 
carer supplements.437 
Social justice and welfare in Norway is seen as reinforcing the existing norms of 
collective responsibility.438 It is designed to take citizens from ‘the cradle to the 
grave’,439 reflecting Norwegian Government policy of a welfare society and 
sustainable development.440 The fundamental principle that underpins the 
Norwegian Welfare systems is that of equality:  
‘One main objective of the Government’s welfare policy is to provide 
security for society’s most disadvantaged groups. []… the 
Government wishes to gear our social security and welfare systems 
more to those who are most economically disadvantaged.’441 
The Norwegian political system is committed to a welfare State that provides 
security for all, improved distribution of incomes and living standards, equal 
rights and obligations for all, and opportunities for work for the most 
economically disadvantaged.442 The system of welfare in Norway is based on a 
number of basic institutional parameters of the Scandinavian welfare system: 
 
436 Australian Labor Party, National Platform, 2007 (2007), 11-12. 
437 Australian Labor Party, The Government: Mid-Term Progress Report (2009) 
www.alp.com.au/media/0609/mspm150.php at 25 August 2009. 
438The Norwegian Welfare System (2002)  http://library.thinkquest.org/18802/norwelf.htm at 30 October 2006. 
439 The Norwegian Welfare System (2002)  http://library.thinkquest.org/18802/norwelf.htm at 30 October 2006. 
440 Norsk FinansDepartementet, Report No. 29 to the Stortinget (2002 – 2001): Guidelines for Economic Policy 
(2002). 
441 Norsk Sosial- og HelseDepartementet, White Paper no. 50 (1998 – 1999): The Equitable Redistribution White 
Paper (1999) http://www.dep.no/aid/english/doc/reports/030005-994052/dok-bn.html  at 30 October 2006, 2-3. 
442 Redistribution White Paper (1999) http://www.dep.no/aid/english/doc/reports/030005-994052/dok-bn.html  at 
30 October 2006, 2. 
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universal coverage, high income replacement rate, liberal qualifying conditions, 
and welfare services as a citizenship right.443 Norway’s developed social 
welfare system provides a social safety net that extends to all residents of 
Norway.444 The policy of the Norwegian government is that all residents have a 
right to economic assistance and other forms of community support during 
illness, old age or unemployment.445 
The Norwegian health and social welfare system is predominantly publicly 
financed, using a combination of general and separate taxation. About 35% of the 
Norwegian Budget is spent on the Norwegian health and welfare system.446 The 
national insurance (or social security) is a collective insurance scheme where all 
wage earners contribute a fixed percentage of their earnings as a national 
insurance tax.447 Non-workers, including spouses, unemployed, and students, 
also qualify for social security benefits, with the same rights to assistance and 
health care as those with salaries.448 
Similar to Australia, there has been a recent move to reform the Norwegian 
welfare system, demonstrated in the welfare White Paper.449 Comprehensive 
changes are being considered, focusing on family, targeted unemployment 
 
443 John D Stephens, The Scandinavian Welfare State: Achievements, Crisis and Prospects (1995) United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development Discussion Paper 67, 5. 
444 Malfrid Bolstad, Norway’s Social Security and Health Service (2005) UtenriksDeparmentet 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/english/norway/social/032005-990494/dok-bn.htm at 30 October 2006. 
445 Malfrid Bolstad, Norway’s Social Security and Health Service (2005) UtenriksDeparmentet 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/english/norway/social/032005-990494/dok-bn.htm at 30 October 2006. 
446 Malfrid Bolstad, Norway’s Social Security and Health Service (2005) UtenriksDeparmentet 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/english/norway/social/032005-990494/dok-bn.htm at 30 October 2006. 
447 Malfrid Bolstad, Norway’s Social Security and Health Service (2005) UtenriksDeparmentet 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/english/norway/social/032005-990494/dok-bn.htm at 30 October 2006. 
448 Malfrid Bolstad, Norway’s Social Security and Health Service (2005) UtenriksDeparmentet 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/english/norway/social/032005-990494/dok-bn.htm at 30 October 2006. 
449 Sosial- og Helse Departmentet, White Paper no. 50 (1998 – 1999): the Equitable Redistribution White Paper 
(1999) http://www.dep.no/aid/english/doc/reports/030005-994052/dok-bn.html 2006 at 29 October 2006. 
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assistance, stronger focus on vocational assistance for the disabled, and a pension 
system that ensures high and increasing employment amongst the elderly.450 
Norway continues to address the issue of equal redistribution and inclusion.451 It 
is expected that reforms will aim to reduce income gaps, create a labour market 
for all, create a welfare state which meets the needs of a multicultural population, 
adjust social policy to meet the changes in family relations and increases in the 
numbers of single persons, and meet the needs of an ageing population.452 
Current government policy toward social justice and welfare has some 
similarities in Australia and Norway. In both countries there is a recognised need 
to ensure jobs, health and basic social equality exists for all citizens. This 
provides a platform for comparison between the two jurisdictions. 
2.5.3 Economy and economic development 
Australia is categorised as a ‘laissez-faire’ developed economy.453 Prior to 
World War II, Australia was the epitome of a protectionist State, explicitly 
linking job protection, profit protection, wage protection and racial/cultural 
protection.454 The devastating effects of the Depression led to increased social 
welfare. The 1941-9 government had a socialist agenda, seeking to extend 
public ownership of the commanding heights.455 The governments from 1949-
 
450 Ingjerd Schou, Challenges to our Welfare System (2004) 
http://www.dep.no/odinarkiv/english/bondevik_II/asd/044051-090081/dok-bn.html at 29 October 2006. 
451 Guri Ingebrigtsen, Increasing Social Inequality, Towards a Fragmented Social Policy (2002)  
http://www.dep.no/odinarkiv/english/stoltenberg_I/shd/030001-090011/dok-bn.html at 29 October 2006. 
452 Ingjerd Schou, Challenges to our Welfare System (2004) 
http://www.dep.no/odinarkiv/english/bondevik_II/asd/044051-090081/dok-bn.html at 28 October 2006 
453 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Offshore Acreage (2002), 19. 
454 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 414. 
455 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 416. 
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1972 did nothing to disturb this State regulation of the economy.456 
The shift away from State regulation in some areas of the Australian economy 
came with the election of the Hawke Government in 1983.457 This was one of 
the first examples of deregulation of a socially democratic government, with 
deregulation occurring in some areas of the finance and transport sectors.458 
Deregulation occurred later in the telecommunications sector as a consequence 
of the Davidson Report regarding telecommunication regulation.459 
Today, Australia has shed its protectionist polices, adopting a free-trade, free 
enterprise, capitalist approach, open to global competition which has resulted in 
economic inequality.460 The ‘commanding heights’ of the economy461 are 
neither controlled nor directed by the government, and market forces are left to 
shape many sectors of the economy. For the petroleum sector, this laissez-faire 
approach to economic management means that foreign investment is welcomed, 
encouraged by a strong, stable government and economy characterised by the 
application of the rule of law.462 
Australia is richly endowed with natural resources including gas, uranium, 
petroleum, coal, gold. Rising domestic economy output, particularly in the 
 
456 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 416. 
457 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 418.  
458 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 418. 
459 Committee of Inquiry into Telecommunications Services in Australia, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Telecommunications Services in Australia (1982) Chair J. A Davidson.  
460 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 419. 
461 As defined in Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Governments and 
the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (1999), 12-13. 
462 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview for Applicant s2009 (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/OverviewForApplicants.pdf at 25 August 2009, 
10. 
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resources sector, robust business and consumer confidence, rising exports of 
raw materials/agricultural products and growing ties with China are driving the 
Australian economy. This has resulted in rapid growth, particularly in the last 
two decades. This robust economic growth is reflected in the United Nations 
Human Development Index,463 where Australia is ranked number four.464 
However, Australia struggles with the economic consequences of its resource 
endowment. As early as the 1960s, Australia experienced a bout of Dutch 
disease as a consequence of the rise of the minerals and energy export sector,465 
characterised by a loss of manufacturing industries and increased sectorial 
employment in resources-related industries. The threat of resource curse and 
Dutch disease has been considered by Australian scholars, with some 
concluding that the resource curse is ‘alive and well in Australia’s latest 
resource boom’.466 
The Norwegian economy may be best described as a ‘dirigiste’ developed 
economy.467 This type of economy is characterised by heavy State involvement 
in the economy, controlling the ‘commanding heights’, such as key the areas of 
the petroleum, hydropower and resources sectors, through large State 
enterprises.468 Norway is richly endowed with natural resources, including 
petroleum, hydropower, fisheries, forests, and minerals. Oil and gas account for 
 
463 The Human Development Index is an objective index  compiled by the United Nations, and is used to rank 
Member Countries’ level of ‘human development, implying whether a country is developed, developing or 
underdeveloped. It provides normalized measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per 
capita for countries worldwide. 
464Australia is ranked behind Iceland (1), Norway (2), and Canada (3).  United Nations Development Program, 
Human Development Indices: A Statistical Update 2008 (2009)  
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Complete.pdf  at 25 August 2009, 25. 
465 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist Protectionism to 
Globalisation’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 417. 
466 James Goodman and David Worth, ‘The Mineral Resources Boom and Australia’s Resources Curse’ (2008) 61 
Journal of Political Economy 201, 216. 
467 A dirgeste economy refers to a State directed economy, where the State involves itself heavily in the national 
economy.  See Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Offshore Acreage (2002), 19-20. 
468 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Offshore Acreage (2002), 19. 
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one third of all Norwegian exports. The capacity of the Norwegian State to 
convert resource abundance into economic prosperity is attributable to a long 
history of State control over resource development, beginning in the 19th 
century, where the emerging Norwegian State was seen as the most important 
basis for economic and social development, with the free market subordinate to 
the State.469 
As a result of Norway’s history of nurturing strong democratic norms, it had 
concerns in legitimising large concentrations of power into the hands of private 
companies.470 Private companies were seen by the Norwegian government as a 
junior partner to government.471 This was demonstrated by the regulation of 
foreign capital investment in the development of water resources for 
hydroelectric power in Norway in the early 20th century. This provided the 
Norwegian government with the capacity to nationalise trade and industry. The 
State established a central role in the development of water resources,472 
demanding that Norwegian natural resources be safeguarded for Norwegian 
interests by curbing the growth of capitalist corporations.473 This led to the 
implementation of legislation requiring international investments to gain the 
approval of the Norwegian parliament.474 Government control over companies 
exploiting water resources in the early 20th century established a precedent of 
strong government control over the development of natural resources, which 
 
469 Francis Sejersled, ‘Nationalism in the Epoch of Organised Capitalism: Norway and Sweden Choosing Different 
Paths’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 98. 
470 Francis Sejersled, ‘Nationalism in the Epoch of Organised Capitalism: Norway and Sweden Choosing Different 
Paths’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 99. 
471 Francis Sejersled, ‘Nationalism in the Epoch of Organised Capitalism: Norway and Sweden Choosing Different 
Paths’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 99. 
472 Francis Sejersled, ‘Nationalism in the Epoch of Organised Capitalism: Norway and Sweden Choosing Different 
Paths’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 105. 
473 Francis Sejersled, ‘Nationalism in the Epoch of Organised Capitalism: Norway and Sweden Choosing Different 
Paths’ in Alice Teichova (ed), Nation, State and the Economy in History (2003), 106. 
474 Concession Act 1917 (Norway). For a discussion of the regulation of international investment and foreign 
companies in the development of hydropower in the early 20th century, see section 1.4.1. 
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continues today in the development of Norway’s petroleum resources. 
Unlike many other countries rich in raw materials, natural resources have made 
significant long term contribution to the Norwegian economy, making Norway 
one of the most prosperous economies in the world, demonstrated by Norway’s 
ranking on the Human Capital Development Index.475 
The economic similarities and differences between Australia and Norway are 
illustrated in figure 2 below, comparing a number of key economic indicators 
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment, current account balance, 
debt and foreign reserves. 
 
 
TABLE OF COMPARISON: ECONOMIC INDICATORS    
(2008 unless otherwise indicated; standardised in $US) 
 Australia Norway 
Population  21,262,641 (July 2009 est) 4,660,539 (July 2009 est.) 
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) $802.9 billion $276.3 billion 
GDP  (Official Exchange Rate) $1.013 trillion  $451.8 billion 
GDP(Real Growth Rate) % 2.4 2.5 
GDP (Per Capita – PPP)  $38,200 $59,500 
GDP (Composition by Sector)   Ag: 3.4%; Industry: 21.1%; Services 75.6% Ag: 2.4%; Industry: 42.2% Services 53% 
Labour Force  10.95 million 2.591 million  
Labour Force by occupation  Agriculture: 3.6%; Industry: 21.2%; Services: 75.2% Agriculture: 4%; Industry: 22% 
Services: 74% 
Unemployment Rate 4.2% 2.6% 
Inflation Rate (CPI)  4.4% 3.8% 
Budget Revenue: $321.9 billion; 
Expenditure: $315.8billion 
Revenue: $266.2 billion 
Expenditure: $178.1 billion 
Current Account Balance (year) -$44.04 billion (deficit)  $88.34 billion 
Exports  $189.9 billion  $173.6 billion 
Imports $194.2 billion $85.95 billion 
                                              
475 The Human Capital Development index is a measure compiled by the United Nations that ranks countries 
according to the level of ‘human development.’ Norway has been amongst the top three countries for the past 
several years and rated number two in the world in 2008. See United Nations Development Program, Human 
Development Indices: A Statistical Update 2008 (2009)  
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Complete.pdf  at 25 August 2009, 25. 
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ReservesForeign Exch/Gold $32.92 billion $50.95 billion 
Debt External $799.8  billion $475.9 billion 
Aid Donor $2.123 billion (2006)  $2.954 billion (2006) 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Economic Indicators, Australia and Norway. (Source: Compiled by 
author from CIA World Fact Book  www.cia.gov/cia/publications). 
 
An assessment of the economic indicators in the above table illustrates the many 
economic similarities between Norway and Australia. Gross Domestic 
Production (GDP) is a measure of the strength of an economy, and is defined as 
the market value of all goods and services produced in a country within a given 
time.476 It is calculated thus:  
GDP = consumption + investment + government spending + (exports -imports) 
GDP in Norway is approximately one third of Australia (as compared using 
purchasing power parity), which is logical, given that the Norwegian population 
is one fifth of Australia. Similarly, GDP per capita is one third higher in Norway 
than Australia. This may be seen as a measure of labour productivity, since as the 
productivity of a worker increases, then employers must compete for the workers 
by paying higher wages. In practical terms, it also indicates that wages are higher 
in Norway than in Australia.  
An examination of GDP by sector reveals a strong Norwegian industrial sector. 
The Norwegian industrial sector accounts for 41.9% of the total GDP. In 
Australia, industry only accounts for 26.2% of total GDP. Yet the industrial 
sector in both countries accounts for approximately 22% of employment.  
A comparison of employment indicates that Australia has an unemployment rate 
almost double that of Norway, around 4.5% during 2008. Unemployment rates 
                                              
476 For definition of GDP see United Nations Development Program, Human Development Indices: A Statistical 
Update 2008 (2009)  http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Complete.pdf  at 25 August 2009, 55. 
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are very important, since they act as a barometer for the health of a nation’s 
economy. However, it is important to realise the pitfalls of comparing 
international unemployment rates,477 as different indicators may be used to 
measure unemployment in each country. An unemployment rate of 
approximately 5% in any economy is ‘healthy’. Any lower and the rate would be 
seen as inflationary due to the upward pressure on wages, and any higher could 
decrease consumer spending, with subsequent ripple effects within the 
economy.478 
Inflation is defined as a rise in the general level of prices against baseline 
purchasing power.479 In Keynesian economics, its cause is the result of pressures 
in the economy expressing themselves in prices, influenced by the relative 
elasticity of wages, prices and interest rates.480 
Inflation in Norway and Australia is below 5%, indicating the relative health of 
both economies.481 This low rate creates many benefits for both nations, 
including macroeconomic stability, improved efficiency, and greater transparency 
of relative prices.482 
Both Norway and Australia have a robust export sector, worth around $180 
billion per annum. Norway imports only $85 billion worth of goods and 
services, about half of its exports, and half of Australia’s imports. As a result, 
 
477 Constance Sorrentino, International Unemployment Rates: How Comparable Are They?’ (2000) June Monthly 
Labor Review  3, 4-5. 
478  United States Department of Labor, Current Employment Statistics (2005) 
http://www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm#overview at 26 October 2006.  
479 Oxford Dictionary, (2005). 
480  William Baumol and Alan S. Blinder, Macroeconomics: Principles and Policy (10th ed, 2006).  
481 The CPI as at June 2009 was 1.45% in Australia (see http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/6401.0 at 12 
September 2009), and as at August 2009 was 1.9% in Norway (see  www.ssb.no/englilsh at 12 September 2009).  
482 Kate Barker, Adjusting to Low Inflation – Issues for Policy Speech to Manchester Statistical Sociality, 
Manchester, 18 February 2003. Bank Of England (2003) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2003/speech190.pdf  at 26 October 2006. 
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Norway enjoys a budget surplus of $88 billion, whilst Australia has a budget 
deficit in excess of $44 billion. Norway also enjoys considerable foreign 
exchange and gold reserves, in excess of $50 billion, whilst Australia’s gold 
reserves are around $32 billion.   
Both States have external debt, with Australia’s debt almost double that of 
Norway. It is worthwhile to note that Norway is an external creditor, and member 
of the Paris Club.483 At present, Norway has Participating Creditor Agreements 
with over 20 countries, including Ecuador, Benin, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Peru and Jamaica.484 
A comparison of the two economies has highlighted many similarities between 
the two countries. Both enjoy high GDP’s, with low unemployment and inflation. 
In addition, both nations’ exports exceed $100 billion per annum, with Norway’s 
imports 50% less than its exports. Each State enjoys considerable assets, with 
both having comparable foreign reserves. Norway has the added benefit of the 
Government Pension Fund - Global, which exceeded NOK 2,385 billion 
on 30 June 2009.485 
There are demonstrable economic similarities between the two countries, 
enabling comparison between these two countries.  
 
483 The Paris Club comprises governments with large claims on other governments throughout the world. See Paris 
Club, Agreements With Norway as a Participating Creditor Country (2006) 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/countries/countries.php?INDICE_DET=37 at 26 October 2006. 
484 Paris Club, Agreements With Norway as a Participating Creditor Country (2006) 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/countries/countries.php?INDICE_DET=37 at 26 October 2006.  
485 Norges Bank, Government Pension Fund, Global: Size and Return (2009) http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____41397.aspx as at 26 August 2009. This equates to approximately AU$480 billion. 
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2.5.4 Government, political systems, and policy development 
Australia is a constitutional monarchy, based on the Constitution of Australia 
established in 1901 at Federation.486 The monarchy is represented by the 
Governor-General,487 who performs constitutional, ceremonial and non-
ceremonial duties as the Queen’s representative.488 It is a parliamentary 
democracy,489 where power and authority is vested in the people.490 
Australia has a federal system of government as a result of Federation, which 
brought together the separate colonies upon the adoption of the Australian 
Constitution.491 Prior to the creation of the Federation under the Constitution, 
each of these colonies had their own parliament and constitution.492 The 
federalist system of government was chosen since it had been particularly 
successful in other jurisdictions in preserving state power bases and interests, 
whilst at the same time creating a national government with genuine, but 
restricted powers.493 
When the Federation was established, the separate colonies reiterated the need to 
preserve their existing interests and their powers.494 Consequently, there is a 
division of responsibilities and functions between the state and federal 
 
486 G. Singleton et. al, Australian Political Systems (7th ed. 2003), 25-9. Federation occurred when the six separate 
British self-governing colonies of New South Wales, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Western 
Australia formed a Federation under the Constitution of Australia. 
487 Constitution of Australia, s2. 
488 Constitution of Australia, s2. 
489 Constitution of Australia, s1. 
490 G. Singleton et. al, Australian Political Systems (7th ed. 2003), 5. 
491 The Constitution was enacted in the United Kingdom Parliament as a section of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900 (Imp). Upon the Constitution coming into force on January 1, 1901, the separate colonies 
collectively became states of the Commonwealth of Australia  
492 Patrick Keyzer et. al., Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (7th ed. 2004), 201. 
493 G. Singleton et. al, Australian Political Systems (7th ed. 2003), 28.  
494 G. Singleton et. al, Australian Political Systems (7th ed. 2003), 27. 
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governments. The Commonwealth has concurrent legislative powers enunciated 
in the Constitution.495 There is also some express exclusive legislative powers 
granted to the Commonwealth under the Australian Constitution.496 All 
remaining power is vested in individual states and territories. This is reflected in 
each state’s constitution, which grants a plenary power to make laws for the 
‘peace, welfare and good government’ of that state.497 The states are able to 
legislate for any area that is not specifically enumerated Commonwealth powers. 
Where there is an inconsistency between state and Commonwealth power, the 
Commonwealth prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.498 Whilst both 
mainland territories are self-governing, Commonwealth law may invalidate 
territory legislation at any time.499 
Australia’s Constitution, like many constitutions, is imbued with the concept of 
separation of powers, where the legislature, executive and judiciary are 
separate,500 ensuring the independence and accountability of each arm of 
government.501 
The Commonwealth of Australia does not have an express power to regulate and 
manage natural resources. The Commonwealth’s capacity to legislate with 
respect to mineral resources was addressed by the High Court of Australia in 
 
495 These powers are known as enumerated powers and are primarily outlined in section 51 of the Constitution of 
Australia. 
496 For example s52 and s90 of the Commonwealth Constitution. For a discussion of the powers of the 
Commonwealth and states see Patrick Keyzer et. al., Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary 
(7th ed. 2004), Chapter 8.  
497 The plenary nature of State legislative power was recognised by the Privy Council in Powell v Apollo Candle Co 
(1885) 10 App Cas 282. See Gerard Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories 
(2006), 106-7. 
498 Constitution of Australia, s109. 
499 Constitution of Australia, s122. 
500 The functions and responsibilities of each of these arms of government are outlined in Chapter I (Legislature), 
Chapter II  (Executive) and Chapter III (Judiciary) of the Australian Constitution. 
501 For a discussion of separation of powers and the rule of law, see Jennifer Clarke, Patrick Keyzer and James 
Stellios, Hanks’ Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (8th ed. 2009), Chapter 1. 
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Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth.502 The decision of the High Court in 
Murphyores conferred on the Commonwealth the capacity to legislate with 
respect to trade and commerce with other countries.503 This enabled the 
Commonwealth to exercise control over export activities under section 51(i) of 
the Australian Constitution.504 Under a number of enumerated powers505 in 
section 51 of the Constitution,506 the Commonwealth also has the capacity to 
legislate with respect to the environment.507 
There is a three-tiered political and administrative system in Australia. The 
Commonwealth Government has enumerated powers in areas such as social 
services, taxes, trade and commerce, defence, immigration and external affairs. 
The six independent state governments and two self-governing territories, all with 
their own constitutions and legal systems,508 are responsible for education, 
hospitals, and the development of onshore natural resources. All of the states 
(except Queensland) also have a lower house (Legislative Assembly) and upper 
house (Legislative Council). The third tier of government is local government.509 
 
502 Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1.  
503 Under s51 (i) of the Australian Constitution, … the parliament shall, subject to the constitution, have power to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government with respect to trade and commerce with other countries, and 
among the states. 
504 For a discussion of Murphyores see Patrick Keyzer et. al., Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and 
Commentary (7th ed. 2004), 834.  
505 These powers are enumerated primarily in s51 of the Constitution of Australia. 
506 Specifically s51 (i), the trade and commerce power; s51 (xx), the corporation’s power; and s51 (xxix), the 
external affairs power. 
507 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. The Tasmanian Dam Case arose when the Tasmanian 
government challenged the Commonwealth’s capacity to prevent the Tasmanian government from developing a 
hydro-electric scheme on the Franklin River. The Commonwealth sought to prevent the Tasmanian government 
from the development through the enactment of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth). The 
Act was the domestic implementation of Australia’s international obligation as a signatory to the International 
Convention Concerning World Cultural and Natural Heritage, The Commonwealth relied on s51(xxix) (the external 
affairs power) and s51 (xx) (the corporations power) for the constitutional validity of the Act. In a split decision 
(4:3), the High Court upheld the validity of the Act, and the Commonwealths right to rely on the external affairs 
and corporation’s powers to regulation matters with respect to the environment. 
508 See Constitution of Australia, s106, s107. 
509 Local governments are not formally recognised in the Constitution of Australia. 
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Local government areas derive their authority primarily through delegated State 
legislation.510 Local government members are elected to represent their local 
communities, to provide appropriate services to meet community needs in an 
efficient and effective manner, and to facilitate and co-ordinate local efforts and 
resources in pursuit of community goals.511 
Similar to Australia, Norway is a constitutional monarchy, based on the 
Constitution of 1814.512 The monarchy is a hereditary monarchy, with the order 
of succession to the throne outlined in Article 6 of the Norwegian 
Constitution.513 The system of government is a parliamentary democracy, with 
the Norwegian constitution, like the Australian Constitution, imbued with the 
doctrine of the separation of powers.514 
The main organ of the Norwegian parliament is the Storting, which comprises 
members elected for four years.515 When new legislation is considered, the 
Storting divides itself into an upper house (Lagting) and a lower house 
(Odelsting) through internal election.516 Like most Nordic countries, Norway is 
a unitary system of government, with a relatively small central government, 
comprising small policy ministries and strong independent agencies.517 There is 
 
510 Dennis Pearce, Delegated Legislation in Australia (2005), Chapter 1. 
511 See Local Government Association of Australia, Declaration on the Role of Australian Local Government 
(1997) http://www.alga.asn.au/about/declaration.php at 12 August 2009. 
512 Constitution of Norway, Art. 3. 
513 S6 of the Norwegian Constitution notes that The order of succession is lineal, so that only a child born in lawful 
wedlock of the Queen or King, or of one who is herself or himself entitled to the succession may succeed, and so 
that the nearest line shall take precedence over the more remote and the elder in the line over the younger. 
514 Section B of the Norwegian Constitution (Art. 3-48) concerns Executive Power and the Royal Family. Section C 
of the Constitution (Art. 49-85) Concerns Legislative Power and the Rights of Citizens. Section D of the 
Constitution (Art. 86-91) is concerned with Judicial Power. 
515 Constitution of Norway, Art. 54. 
516Constitution of Norway, Art. 73. 
517 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, E-Government Studies: Norway Assessment (2006) 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/COMNET/PUM/egovproweb.nsf/viewHtml/index/$FILE/Norway_exesum.pdf  at 21 
March 2006. 
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also a three-tiered political and administrative system in Norway, comprising a 
central government,518 counties (fylkekommune),519 and municipalities 
(kommune).520 There is a tradition of regional self-government at the municipal 
level, which has been in existence for centuries.521 In each municipality, the 
Governor (Fylkesmann) represents the central government, ensuring that the 
local authority activity is done in accordance with statutory provisions.522 
Norway is also part of the EEA, requiring domestic implementation of EC 
Directives, Regulations and Ordinances.523 This adoption is executed by 
incorporating these sources of law into domestic legislation.524 This may be 
accomplished by either rewriting existing legislation, or implementing new 
legislation.  
There are many similarities between Australian and Norwegian political systems. 
First, and foremost, is the existence and preservation of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. Both systems constitutionally separate the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, guarding the independence of each.  
Both Australia and Norway are constitutional monarchies, with the royal 
representative having a designated role in the government.  The role of the 
 
518 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Managing Across Levels of Government: Norway 
(1997) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/12/1902291.pdf at 8 August 2006, 365-6. 
519 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Managing Across Levels of Government: Norway 
(1997) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/12/1902291.pdf at 8 August 2006, 365-6. 
520 Kommunal og Regionaldepartmentet, The Main Features of the Norwegian Election System – Summary (2005) 
http://www.dep.no/odinarkiv/english/bondevik_II/krd/016051-090142/dok-bn.html  at 1 August 2006. 
521 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Managing Across Levels of Government: Norway 
(1997) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/12/1902291.pdf at 8 August 2006, 363. 
522 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Managing Across Levels of Government: Norway 
(1997) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/12/1902291.pdf at 8 August 2006, 363-4. 
523 Tony Storey and Chris Turner, Unlocking EU Law (2005), 61-3.  
524 Tony Storey and Chris Turner, Unlocking EU Law (2005), 61-3; see also Thomas Michelat and Dag Erik 
Rasmussen, Country Reports: Norway Legislation Guide (2006) 
http://www.iflr1000.com/default.asp?page=38&CH=3&sIndex=2&CountryID=53 at 20 October 2006. 
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Governor-General in Australia is constitutional and ceremonial, with 
constitutional duties largely confined to acting on the advice of Ministers and 
authorising executive decisions.525 However, the Governor-General has the 
capacity to dissolve the parliament in certain circumstances.526 In Norway, the 
role of the Monarch is similarly largely ceremonial, enunciated in the Norwegian 
Constitution.527 
The Australian system of government is characterised by a strong, dominant 
Commonwealth government, and equally independent states and territories.528 
The Commonwealth has increasingly sought to extend its powers over state 
governments, demonstrated by industrial relations legislation529 that moved 
industrial relations from state jurisdiction to federal jurisdiction.530 There remains 
a constant tension between the states and the Commonwealth, often alleviated 
through a High Court hearing and determination.531 This differs to the unitary 
system of government in Norway. 
Australia is a dualist State, and international Treaty or Convention obligations 
must be incorporated into domestic legislation in order for the Treaty or 
Convention to have domestic effect. Norway is also dualist, as it is required to 
 
525 The Role of the Governor-General is outlined in s2 of the Constitution of Australia. 
526 See s57, Constitution of Australia. 
527 See Art. 2, Constitution of Norway. 
528 The Constitutional supremacy is reinforced by s109 of the Constitution of Australia: where state and 
Commonwealth laws are inconsistent, the Commonwealth law will prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. See 
Jennifer Clarke, Patrick Keyzer and James Stellios, Hanks’ Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and 
Commentary (8th ed. 2009), 56-71. 
529 The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) was amended by the Workplace Relations Amendment Act 2005 (Cth) 
(Work Choices), was a comprehensive change to industrial relations law in Australia. It successfully enlarged the 
Corporations Power (s51(XX) of the Australian Constitution), removing from the states the power to legislate with 
respect to  industrial relations. For a discussion of the Work Choices legislation see  Jennifer Clarke, Patrick Keyzer 
and James Stellios, Hanks’ Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (8th ed. 2009), 383-387. 
530 NSW v Commonwealth; Western Australia v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1. 
531 Under section 76 of the Commonwealth Constitution, the High Court of Australia is the only court with original 
jurisdiction to determine questions in relation to the Commonwealth Constitution. 
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incorporate supranational law into domestic legislation through the incorporation 
of EU Directives as required. This is a compulsory requirement of the EEA 
Agreement of which Norway is a signatory. Australia has no such compulsory 
supranational law obligations. The relationship of Norway to the European Union 
through the EEA is similar in some respects to the federalist structure of the 
Australian system of the Commonwealth and states.532 Arguably, this similarity 
enables comparison of the two jurisdictions. 
Comparative analysis between Australia and Norway illustrates political and 
structural similarities in the government and political systems of Australia and 
Norway. Both nations are constitutional monarchies that place democracy and the 
separation of powers at the apex of the political framework. In both systems, the 
monarch in some form is integral within the machinations of government. These 
similarities enable comparisons to be drawn between the two countries. 
 
2.6 Petroleum policy and its influence on petroleum 
regulation 
Policy has been defined by Justices Crennan and Gummow of the High Court of 
Australia as ‘a principle or course of action which is adopted or proposed 
particularly by the legislature and by the executive in its administration of 
legislation’.533 It is essentially a course of action that is intended to influence, 
determine and guide the decisions, actions and legislative process of a 
government.534 In the context of natural resource development, policy is the 
 
532 Charles Leben, ‘A Federation of Nation States or a Federal State’ (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 
(Symposium), part of Jean Monnet Working Paper  No.7/00, Symposium: Responses to Joschka Fischer, 1. 
533 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194  [80] per Crennan and Gummow JJ. 
534 Paolo de Sa, ‘Mineral Policy: ‘A World Bank Perspective’ in E Bastida, T Walde and J Warden-Fernandez 
(eds), International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy (2005), 494-5. 
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current position or focus of a government in developing a natural resource, and 
will usually encompass political and fiscal policies. Resources policy is 
determined by the complex interaction of many factors, including a country’s 
mineral potential, location in the world, political stability and current 
infrastructure.535 Sustainable development of petroleum resources is directly 
linked to resource exploitation policy, since it is fiscal, regulatory, depletion and 
economic diversification policies that interact to create conditions conducive to 
generating and sustaining wealth.536   
The building blocks of effective petroleum policy are predicated on the 
interdependence between the State as resource owners and oil companies as 
resource exploiters.537 Since governments lack the technical capacity or 
available capital needed to develop these natural resources, they need to harness 
the talents and energies of international oil companies to develop the resources. 
This is particularly evident in the initial phase of resource development, where 
governments lack the appropriate knowledge or decision-making capacity.538 
Consequently, political, economic and social forces exerted by the petroleum 
industry often influence national governments.539  
For the State, the formulation of an appropriate petroleum policy is crucial for 
the successful exploitation of petroleum resources.540 Successful, adaptive 
polices seek to recognise the non-renewable nature of petroleum resource, 
 
535 Paolo de Sa, Mineral Policy: ‘A World Bank Perspective’ in E Bastida, T Walde and J Warden-Fernandez (eds), 
International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy (2005), 494-5. 
536 Richard M Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis (1993), 
46.  
537 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 234. 
538 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What, How? (1976), 4. 
539 Arild Holt-Jensen, ‘The Sharing of Petroleum Resources: Resource Poverty and Richness Around the Northern 
European Seas With Special Reference to the Norwegian Position’ (1996) 39 (2) Geojournal 211, 211.  
540 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government: Strategy in the North Sea (1980),  151-158. 
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ensuring sustainable exploitation of the resources by utilising the strengths of 
private oil companies to exploit the resources the State owns.541  
Oil companies want to maximise the return on their capital investment and create 
conditions of long-term stability for themselves through maximising their share 
of the financial gains and control of petroleum activity.542 For oil companies, a 
comprehensive State petroleum policy ensures the oil companies can utilise their 
strengths, research and ingenuity to sustain and enhance their competitiveness in 
petroleum exploitation while meeting community expectations in all operational 
aspects.543 In addition, a policy statement assists the participants to realise 
sustained and confident competitiveness by being able to make decisions within a 
clear and cohesive framework of objectives and principles.544 
State ownership of petroleum resources and the strong State interests in 
petroleum activity, makes a strong link between the petroleum policy and the 
legal regulations. The state has to develop regulations and legal institutions that 
will create a development in line with the policy of the state. Since each state 
has to deal with the international petroleum industry and the highly commercial 
market of petroleum, it is a complicated task to achieve the policy objectives of 
each state. 
Good petroleum policy attempts to balance the needs of the State as owner and 
regulator of the petroleum resources, with the needs of the oil companies. 
Therefore, the aim of a national petroleum policy should be to maintain a balance 
between the interests, rights, obligations and benefits of all of the participants in 
the exploitation of petroleum resources. Practically, this means that a sound 
 
541 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government: Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 151-158. 
542 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 21. 
543 Bernard Taverne Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 87. 
544 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 87. 
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domestic energy policy should have as its principal objective the secure 
possession of and access to petroleum resources.545 
2.6.1 Development of petroleum policy in Australia and 
Norway 
Early petroleum policies 
Australia 
Offshore Petroleum production and exploration in Australia has occurred since 
the 1960s with the discovery of petroleum in Bass Strait in 1965.546 There have 
been a number of changes in the policy framework governing the petroleum 
industry since the 1960s. These changes have been influenced by the complex 
interaction of changes in government, oil strikes over the last forty years, and a 
shifting Australian approach to government control over the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy with successive changes in federal governments since 
the mid 1970s.  
At the time petroleum was discovered in the 1960s, the government focused on 
two main areas of policy: exploration for further deposits and the establishment 
of petroleum price parity as a policy for the development of Australia’s 
petroleum resources.547 The Gorton government established the ‘controlled 
price’ concept for all domestic oil in 1968. This remained in place without 
adjustment until 1975.548  
 
545 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 87. 
546 Esso/BHP, Bass Strait Oil and Gas (2002) http://www.exxonmobil.com/Australia-
English/PA/Files/publication_2002_BassStrait.pdf  at 2 August 2007, 3. 
547 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16, 16.  
548 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16, 16. 
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Prime Minister Whitlam announced a major policy change relating to 
exploration in 1975, however this was not implemented since the government 
was dismissed by the Governor-General in 1975 by a double dissolution of the 
parliament.549 Upon a change of government in December 1975, the Fraser 
government returned to oil pricing parity, raising the price of local oil to full 
import parity.550 This policy focus remained until a change of government in 
1983. 
Norway  
When the UK and Norwegian governments began formulating petroleum 
exploration and development policies in the 1960s, they decided early on that 
they could not accept the prevailing international relationship between 
governments and oil companies in the exploitation of sovereign petroleum 
resources.551 Whilst they knew that they did not want to accept the North 
American model of petroleum regulation, the governments did not have an 
alternative regulatory framework. The UK government relied on precedent in 
commerce and industry, initially adopting a non-participatory approach in the 
early regulation of oil and gas.552 
Given the inexperience of the Norwegian State in the regulation of petroleum 
resources, they emulated the UK’s approach, initially adopting a similar non-
participatory approach to regulation in the 1960s.553 However, the Norwegian 
State was dissatisfied with this minimalist role of the State. Historically, 
 
549 The double dissolution of the parliament is authorised under s57 of the Australian Constitution, where there is an 
irrevocable disagreement between the two Houses of Parliament.  
550 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16, 16. 
551 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 14. 
552 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 186. 
553 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 186. 
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Norway favoured strong State regulation and intervention in the management of 
natural resources, illustrated by the State’s strong regulation of hydropower 
since the early 20th century.554 
The principles of Norwegian petroleum policy were laid out in 1971 in the ‘ten 
oil commandments’,555 a set of goals and strategies to guide national 
involvement in the development of petroleum resources throughout the value 
chain, whilst focusing on the protection of the environment.556 These 
commandments underpinned Norwegian oil policy, dictating two essential 
policy elements that remain central to Norwegian petroleum policy today: 
sound macroeconomic policy, and the creation of a State-owned oil company to 
participate in the exploitation of oil resources and develop domestic industry.557 
Although Statoil has been partly privatised, it remains an important vehicle for 
national petroleum policy. 
 
554 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 187-8. 
555 The Norwegian ten oil commandments were approved by the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) on 14 June 1971, 
and comprised the following: 
1. That national supervision and control must be ensured for all operations in the Norwegian continental shelf; 
2. That petroleum discoveries are exploited in a way that makes Norway as independent as possible of others for its 
supplies of crude oil; 
3. That new industry is developed on the basis of petroleum; 
4. That the development of an oil industry must take necessary account of existing industrial activities and the 
protection of nature and the environment; 
5. That flaring of exploitable gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf must not be accepted, except during brief 
periods of testing; 
6. That petroleum from the Norwegian Continental Shelf must as a main rule be landed in Norway, except in those 
cases where socio-political considerations dictate a different solution; 
7. That the State becomes involved at all appropriate levels, and contributes to a coordination of Norwegian 
interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the creation of an integrated Norwegian oil community which 
sets its sights both nationally and internationally; 
8. That a State oil company be established which can look after the government’s commercial interests and pursue 
appropriate collaboration with domestic and foreign oil interests; 
9. That a pattern of activities is selected north of the 62nd parallel which reflects the special socio-political 
conditions prevailing in that part of the country; and  
10. That large Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks for Norway’s foreign policy.  
See Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), 46. 
556 Willy H Olsen, Petroleum Revenue Management- An Industry Perspective (2002) 2 Paper presented at the Oil, 
Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department of the WBG and ESMAPO, Workshop on Petroleum Revenue 
Management, Washington DC, 23-24 October, 2004, 2. 
557 Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll, Statoil: A Study in Political Entrepreneurship (2007) James A Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/NOCs/Papers/NOC_Statoil_Gordon-Stenvoll.pdf at 12 December 
2009, 2-5. 
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These commandments outlined four areas of importance for the Norwegian 
government in the exploitation of their petroleum resources. Firstly, the role of 
the Norwegian State, to supervise and control all aspects of the Norwegian 
petroleum industry at appropriate levels. This included the coordination of 
Norwegian interests, and the creation of an integrated Norwegian oil 
community.558 Secondly, the petroleum licensing and concession system was to 
ensure energy security for Norway, reducing the reliance on other States as 
much as possible for its energy requirements.559 Thirdly, the commandments 
were to ensure there was fair consideration of social, economic, political and 
environmental factors in the development of the petroleum resources.560 
Finally, the Norwegian licensing and concession system was to develop 
petroleum-based industries, based on the foundation of existing industries.561 
Norwegian petroleum polices have been through a number of distinct phases, 
although they have always been underpinned by the ten oil commandments. 
Initially, from the mid 1960s until the early 1980s, petroleum policy in the 
infant Norwegian petroleum industry was characterised by nationalist and 
protectionist policies. The objective of this nationalist strategy was to nurture 
and encourage Norwegian petroleum companies through information exchange, 
technology transfer and skilling, to build the capacity for Norwegian companies 
to develop Norway’s petroleum resources.562 While multinational oil companies 
were intended to play an important long-term role, the goal of building up a 
Norwegian oil community was defined in the early stages of petroleum 
 
558 See in particular commandments 1, 7 and 8. 
559 See in particular commandment 2. 
560 See in particular commandments 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. 
561 See in particular commandments 3 and 4.  
562 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 4. 
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policy.563 Protectionist policies in the form of a favourable procurement regime 
existed to assist in the development of domestic industries.564  
The petroleum licencing system is based on the policy of State direction and 
control. This had its genesis in the early 1970s as Norway debated what form 
State control and participation would take. Labour justified the need for heavy 
State control and participation by examining the UK licencing policy of rapid 
development, noting  
‘… they are committed to the free play of market forces, and are 
primarily concerned to organise operations so that a large number 
of companies and groups should be tempted to take part. This is 
claimed to be provide the best guarantee that the resources will be 
exploited quickly and efficiently. I say: good luck to them. We 
have chosen a different approach, and should continue it. The 
industry Minister has stated on several occasions that we should 
take our time and make haste slowly. I agree. Nobody – and least 
of all the Norwegian community – would be served by pursuing a 
policy in this area which creates a kind of oil fever, and lays the 
basis for an industry which nobody has control over or 
comprehends. Norway is a novice oil nation in every respect. That 
makes it all the more necessary that we take the time necessary to 
achieve acceptable and controllable progress in what is a new 
field for us.’565 
 
563 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2003: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2004), 63. 
564 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 19. 
565 Thorbjørn Berntsen in Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), 47 (emphasis added 
by Author). 
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Petroleum Policy: 1980s – mid 1990s 
Australia 
A major shift in Australia’s petroleum policy occurred at a time of increasing 
internationalisation and a shift toward a free market.566  During the 1980s, the 
federal opposition567 had indicated that its policies for the development of 
offshore petroleum resource would have as its primary aim a long-term 
sustainable indigenous energy economy.568 This included the establishment of a 
national oil corporation that would operate side by side with private oil 
companies but with strategic as well as commercial objectives.569 This 
corporation would also provide information to the government to assist in the 
development of national oil and gas policy.570 
In 1983, the newly elected Hawke government571 undertook an assessment of 
Australia’s offshore petroleum resource policies, recognising the importance of 
maintaining a program of exploration and development of the petroleum 
industry.572 In 1985, the Hawke government recognised and articulated the 
enormity of implementing a new petroleum policy, and the need for the 
government to make incremental changes to the petroleum regulatory system. 
 
566 Gareth Evans, ‘the Petroleum Industry: Building Our Achievements’ (1985) 25 APPEA Journal 22, 23. 
567 The Federal Opposition is the political party that has not been elected to govern Australia (the federal 
government), rather it sits ‘in opposition’ to the elected government. 
568 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16, 19. 
569 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16, 19 
570 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16, 19. 
571 So called because it was led by The Hon. Robert Hawke. 
572 Gareth Evans, ‘The Petroleum Industry: Building Our Achievements’ (1985) 25 APPEA Journal 22, 23. 
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The petroleum industry had indicated it did not want the system to be altered, or 
it may prevent investment in oil and gas exploration.573 
The Hawke government announced a new offshore petroleum policy framework 
in 1990, with the objective of maximising the benefit to all Australians through 
an efficient and competitive exploration industry that could assess Australia’s 
petroleum resources, and develop the petroleum resources for the benefit of the 
Australian nation.574 These policy goals were addressed by an offshore petroleum 
strategy that implemented a comprehensive program for the release of offshore 
acreage areas for exploration, the provision of geological data from Australian 
government agencies, and the provision of attractive offshore petroleum title and 
taxation arrangements.575 The major policy elements of this new policy included 
the release of offshore areas for exploration by companies, the collection of 
exploration data, and the dissemination of data to companies exploring for 
petroleum. This was accompanied by an improvement in oil company awareness 
about Australia's title acquisition and taxation arrangements.576  
This policy reflected the ideology of the Hawke government, which advocated 
for societal goals such as security, fairness and equality, beliefs in communities 
and families, social justice and compassion, environmental sustainability, 
freedom, liberty and enterprise; and opportunity for all.577 It heralded a maturing 
 
573 Gareth Evans, ‘The Petroleum Industry: Building Our Achievements’ (1985) 25 APPEA Journal 22, 23. 
574 Department of Primary Industries, Offshore Strategy: Promoting Petroleum Exploration Offshore Australia 
(1990), 1. 
575 Department of Primary Industries, Offshore Strategy: Promoting Petroleum Exploration Offshore Australia 
(1990), 1. 
576 Department of Primary Industries, Offshore Strategy: Promoting Petroleum Exploration Offshore Australia 
(1990), 1. 
577 Australian Labor Party, Enduring Labor Values (2007) http://www.alp.org.au/platform/chapter_01.php at 18 
March 2008.  
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of Australian petroleum policy, by seeking to maximise the contribution of 
petroleum to all Australians.578  
Norway  
Norwegian petroleum polices throughout the 1980s and early 1990s followed the 
key Norwegian oil and gas policies that were developed in the early 1970s. There 
was a continued focus on national management and control of petroleum 
resources. Until the early 1980s, petroleum policy in the infant Norwegian 
petroleum industry was characterised by nationalist and protectionist policies. 
The objective of this nationalist strategy was to nurture and encourage Norwegian 
petroleum companies through information exchange, technology transfer and 
skilling to build the capacity for Norwegian companies to develop the petroleum 
resources.579 While these multinational firms were also intended to play an 
important long-term role, the focus of petroleum policy during the 1980s was the 
goal of building up a Norwegian oil community.580 Protectionist policies in the 
form of a favourable procurement regime existed to assist in the development of 
domestic industries.581 This initial period of reliance on protectionist policies was 
reduced as knowledge and technology strengthened during the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s. 
Petroleum policy from the mid 1990s  
Australia  
A change of government occurred in 1996, with the election of the Howard 
government. An early focus of the new government was a review of the 
 
578 These policy phases were noted by Devaraj in M Devaraj, ‘Government Policies Concerning the Discovery and 
Development of New Offshore Oil Provinces, with Focus on India and the North Sea’ (1983) 8 Ocean Management 
251, 251. 
579 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 4. 
580 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Facts 2003: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2003), 63. 
581 Noreng, Øystein, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
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offshore petroleum regulatory framework. Working closely with the petroleum 
sector, the government set about building on some elements of the 1990 
petroleum policy, as well as incorporating the policy position of the petroleum 
industry. This review (the Parer review) developed a policy that sought to create 
certainty for investors and other stakeholders.582 It was premised on the creation 
of a highly competitive (in an economic sense) operating environment, allowing 
industry to respond confidently to international challenges and to seize 
international trade and investment opportunities.583 It sought to offer high levels 
of certainty to investors about their rights and responsibilities and in the 
processes of public decision-making which it was hoped would encourage 
investment.584 The policy also sought to support industry’s efforts to achieve 
sustained wealth generation through growth, innovation and enhancement of 
value.585 
The policy relating to petroleum resources was outlined in the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Policy Statement released in 1998. This policy statement 
delineated a framework for the development of Australian mining and 
petroleum industries, cementing Australia’s commitment to provide investors 
with a positive, strong, stable framework of government policies to ensure 
certainty for investors, minimise investment impediments and promote 
investment in the Australian petroleum industry.586 The aim of this policy was 
 
582 Warwick Parer, ‘Delivering National Prosperity’ (1998) Address to the 1998 APPEA Conference 9 March 1998, 
Canberra. 38 APPEA Journal Part 2, 11. 
583  Warwick Parer, ‘Delivering National Prosperity’ (1998) Address to the 1998 APPEA Conference 9 March 
1998, Canberra. 38 APPEA Journal Part 2, 11. 
584 Warwick Parer, Launch of the Commonwealth Government’s Minerals and Petroleum Resources Policy 
Statement Parliament House, Canberra 2 February, 1998 (1998) 
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/23763/ministers_parer_speeches.pdf at 2 December 2008.  
585 Warwick Parer, Launch of the Commonwealth Government’s Minerals and Petroleum Resources Policy 
Statement Parliament House, Canberra 2 February, 1998 (1998) 
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/23763/ministers_parer_speeches.pdf at 2 December 2008.   
586 Department of Industry, Sciences and Resources, Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy – A Strategy to 
Promote Petroleum Exploration and Development in Australian Offshore Areas (1999), 2-3.   
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to ensure that Australia remained a reliable, long-term supplier to the world’s 
resources and energy markets.587 The commercial nature of the revised policy 
focused on commercial interests and industry control in the development of 
Australian petroleum resources. It reflected the Howard government focus on a 
‘small’ government that minimises interference whilst maximising individual 
and private sector initiative.588  
Australia’s petroleum policy has seen two major reviews in the last twenty 
years.589 The policy formulated by the Hawke government in 1990 aimed at 
promoting an efficient and competitive petroleum exploration and production 
industry, based on the perceived need to benefit all Australians. This policy was 
changed by the Howard government in 1998, focussing on providing high levels 
of certainty to investors and to encourage international investment in the 
offshore industry. The revised 1998 policy was geared to attracting oil 
companies into Australian offshore waters, with government objectives driven 
by sector-wide policy mechanisms for commercial development.590  
An energy sector-wide policy review in 2004 incorporated a consideration of 
Australia’s petroleum policy.591 The review was prompted by the leading role 
that the domestic energy sector has played in the sustained economic growth of 
Australia’s economy.592 The review sought to maximise the economic value of 
Australia’s energy resources, provide Australians with a reliable supply of 
competitively priced energy whilst at the same time ensure an appropriate return 
 
587 Department of Industry, Sciences and Resources, Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy – A Strategy to 
Promote Petroleum Exploration and Development in Australian Offshore Areas (1999), 2-3.   
588 Australian Liberal Party, What Does the Liberal Party Stand For? (2008) 
http://www.liberal.org.au/about/ourbeliefs.php at 18 March 2008.  
589 For the development of Australia’s petroleum policy refer to section 2.6.5 above. 
590 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004), 51-3. 
591 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004), 51-3. The development of petroleum policy is 
outlined in section 2.5.5 above. 
592 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004). 
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to the community for the depletion of these non-renewable resources, as well as 
meeting social and environmental objectives.593 This review reiterated the 1998 
policy position for Australia’s offshore petroleum sector, and development of 
the nation’s petroleum resources remains guided by the principles laid down in 
the 1998 policy paper.594 
The petroleum policies implemented by the Howard government in 1998 
indicated a move toward a petroleum policy consistent with the initial phase of 
Australian petroleum policy phases. In particular, it sought to ensure autonomy 
for oil companies in petroleum activities, with petroleum exploration and 
production driven by the petroleum sector. The framework created by the 
Howard Government was driven by the need to encourage commercial 
investment and maintain international competitiveness.595 However, the 
election of the Rudd government in 2007 has meant a change in the emphasis of 
Australia’s petroleum policy.  
Two significant events since 2007 indicate a shifting petroleum policy emphasis 
in Australia. The first was the commissioning of an issues paper by the 
Australian Productivity Commission regarding regulatory burden in the 
upstream oil and gas sector.596  A review of regulatory policy formed a 
peripheral part of that review.597  
 
593 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004), 51-3. 
594 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004), 51-3.  
595 Department of Industry, Sciences and Resources, Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy – A Strategy to 
Promote Petroleum Exploration and Development in Australian Offshore Areas (1999), 2-3. 
596 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008. 
597 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008, 4. 
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Secondly, the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism publicly declared 
in 2008 that: 
... ‘the Australian government is committed to creating a policy 
framework to expand Australia's resource base, increase the 
international competitiveness of [the] resources sector and 
improve the regulatory regime, consistent with the principles of 
environmental responsibility and sustainable development.’598 
The Rudd government seeks to build on the previous government’s petroleum 
framework implemented in 1998, which seeks to enhance Australia’s 
international competitiveness and attract foreign investment in the petroleum 
sector. The Rudd government has indicated its intention to encourage 
international competitiveness as a foundation for an improved regulatory 
regime, but based upon expanding Australian resources in a manner consistent 
with the principles of sustainable development.599 Whilst the current policy 
framework, as laid down in the 1998 petroleum policy, addresses exploration 
and commercial aspects of Australian offshore petroleum exploration and 
production, it does not enunciate a commitment to encouraging sustainable 
petroleum development for all Australians. Hence, although the Australian 
government has a current national petroleum policy objective to ensure 
stewardship of petroleum resources to increase the resource base in a manner 
consistent with sustainable development, the existing 1998 policy does not 
reflect this national petroleum objective, rather focussing on commercial 
interests. 
 
598 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Resources (2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/RESOURCES/Pages/Resources.aspx at 12 December 2008. 
599 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Resources (2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/RESOURCES/Pages/Resources.aspx at 12 December 2008. 
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Norway 
 Upon entry into the EEA in 1994, Norway was required to implement EC 
Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using 
Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of 
Hydrocarbons (1994). This meant that no longer could Norway favour 
Norwegian companies in the allocation of petroleum licences to encourage 
economic diversification. By this time, Norway has developed domestic 
industries that captured production cost spending, as well as diversifying many 
industries. This meant that whilst Norwegian companies could no longer be 
favoured, they were able to compete effectively with international companies.  
Norway continues to observe the ten oil commandments, although the emphasis 
of Norwegian petroleum policy has shifted. Today there is a policy of 
internationalisation,600 spearheaded by Statoil as operator and participant in 
international oil fields. The reasoning for this was primarily to capitalise on 
Norwegian competence and technology.601 Other reasons included exploiting 
the potential of emerging markets, to even out fluctuations in the level of 
petroleum activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, and to acquire new 
technology and know-how.602 This policy is pursued to ensure long-term value 
creation, continued industrial development and economic development for 
Norway and Norwegians. 
 
600 Internationalisation in this context refers to the Norwegian Oil industry, (including Statoil Hydro, suppliers and 
associated industries) seeking to participate in petroleum activities in areas aside from the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. 
601 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
602 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
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2.6.2 Current policy failures in Australia 
A major review of Australia's petroleum policy has not been completed since 
1998. The present government has determined that Australian petroleum policy 
should exploit petroleum resources consistent with the principles of sustainable 
development, optimising the benefit for present and future Australians.603 Yet 
the existing petroleum policy was developed in 1998, a remnant of the Howard 
government. It aims to encourage an efficient and competitive petroleum 
exploration and production industry,604 focusing on commercial aspects of 
Australian offshore petroleum exploration and production. 
Australian petroleum policy has essentially left the development of Australia’s 
petroleum resources to the Australian petroleum industry. The Howard 
government clearly stated its commitment to creating a thriving competitive 
upstream petroleum industry by working in close cooperation with the private 
sector.605 The vision of the Howard government was of  
‘an aggressively competitive, innovative and growing minerals and 
petroleum sector which contribute[d] strongly to rising national 
prosperity, employment and regional development.’606 
At the 1998 conference of Australia’s peak petroleum body, the Australian 
Production and Exploration Association (APPEA), Senator Parer, the then 
Minister for Minerals and Resources, noted that the challenge for the 
government was to put in place a legislative and policy framework that allows 
 
603Department of Industry, Resources and Tourism, Offshore Petroleum Guidelines for a Grant of a Production 
Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002), 7.   
604 Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy:  A Strategy to Promote 
Petroleum Exploration and Development in Australian Offshore Areas (1999), 1. 
605 Senator Warwick Parer, Delivering National Prosperity (1998) Opening Address, APPEA National Conference, 
1998, Canberra. 38 APPEA Journal Part 2, 7. 
606 Senator Warwick Parer, Delivering National Prosperity (1998) Opening Address, APPEA National Conference, 
1998, Canberra 38 APPEA Journal Part 2, 8.  
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industry to efficiently develop the resources to create sustained increases in 
wealth.607 
This challenge appears to have not been met. As a consequence of Australia’s 
commercial-oriented policies, Australian resource development is geared toward 
making itself attractive to foreign investors. The policy minimises State 
participation, allowing oil companies to manage and control the type and rate of 
resource development. As a result, investors have a free hand in the exploitation 
of the petroleum resources in which they have heavily invested.608  
In 2007 APPEA indicated its strategic objectives include developing an 
efficient industry, ensuring the benefits of Australia’s oil and gas resources 
enjoyed by the Australian people is maximised, petroleum energy security 
delivered and the long term sustainability of the Australian oil and gas industry 
is assured.609  Furthermore, it has called for an increased role for the Australian 
Government in the exploration for petroleum provinces:  
... ‘Whilst there is no substitute for a frontier discovery 
to stimulate exploration there is an important role for 
the Australian governments in facilitating exploration 
of these frontier areas by undertaking pre-competitive 
geoscience work required to demonstrate their 
petroleum potential.’610 
 
607 Senator Warwick Parer, Delivering National Prosperity (1998) Opening Address, APPEA National Conference, 
1998, Canberra 28 APPEA Journal Part 2, 11.  
608 Senator Warwick Parer, Delivering National Prosperity (1998) Opening Address, APPEA National Conference, 
1998, Canberra 38 APPEA Journal Part 2, 8.  
608 Senator Warwick Parer, Delivering National Prosperity (1998) Opening Address, APPEA National Conference, 
1998, Canberra 28 APPEA Journal Part 2, 11. 
609 APPEA, Platform for Prosperity: Australian Upstream Oil and Gas Strategy (2007), iii. 
610 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of the Government (2008), 8. 
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… ‘it must be further developed by [governments of] all 
jurisdictions if the opportunity to discover new oil 
provinces, and thereby sustain Australia’s oil industry, 
is to be maximised.’611 
Arguably, current petroleum policy does not maximise the value of oil and gas 
resources for the Australian people. This is partly attributable to changes in the 
global petroleum market, and Australia’s petroleum reserves. Australia's last 
petroleum policy was reviewed in the late 1990’s, at a time Australia’s 
attractiveness as an exploration destination was second only to the United 
Kingdom.612 Today, Australia is still a minor petroleum province, and it is no 
longer attractive in prospective terms. In the ten-year period to 2002, 154 
companies commenced or recommenced exploration operations in Australia, 
whilst 168 companies left Australia’s petroleum provinces in the same 
period.613 It would appear that current petroleum policies that mandate 
commercial investment and strong industry control are not successful. Australia 
needs to rethink its petroleum policies. In addition, regulatory challenges and 
burdens have eroded the attractiveness of Australian petroleum provinces as a 
place for commercial investment.614  
This current minimalist ‘referee only’ policy taken by the previous Australian 
government appears to have failed the Australian petroleum industry, as well as 
failing to sustainably develop the petroleum resources. The commercially 
focussed policy of industry attraction and investment has not achieved its 
 
611 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of the Government (2008) ,39. 
612 Senator Warwick Parer, Delivering National Prosperity (1998) Opening Address, APPEA National Conference, 
1998, Canberra APPEA Journal Part 2, 11.  
613 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of the Government (2008), 36. 
614 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008, 4. 
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objectives of developing a strong, aggressive offshore petroleum sector. The 
targets that were set 10 years ago, in relation to achievements for the Australian 
industry have gone largely unfulfilled.615 Production is decreasing, exploration 
is down and Australia is less attractive as a petroleum exploration province.616 
Furthermore, by its own admission, the petroleum industry is requesting more 
government intervention, especially in the area of pre-competitive data to 
encourage exploration, especially in frontier areas.617 
2.6.3 Choices for policy change – lessons from Norway 
The petroleum policy implemented by Norway could serve as an example of a 
policy framework that embraces sustainable development of petroleum 
resources in a competitive international market. The petroleum policy objective 
in Norway is to secure a pattern of licencing which effectively promotes the 
best possible resource management of Norwegian petroleum resources, thereby 
laying the basis for creating the highest possible value and government 
revenues.618   
When oil was discovered by Norway in the North Sea and Australia in Bass 
Strait in the 1960s, the predominant model for the interaction between 
companies and governments in the exploitation of petroleum was the traditional 
concession system of the North American model.619 This model was predicated 
on the notion that governments imposed a certain number of regulations but did 
 
615 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of the Government (2008), 37. 
616 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of the Government (2008), 37-9. 
617 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of the Government (2008), 39. 
618 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2003: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2003), 63. 
619 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 14. 
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not intervene directly in the petroleum industry.620 The development of this 
model in North America was borne out of the historical precedent of regulation 
of industry and enterprise in North America, where there had been a long 
history of minimalist regulation and a laissez-faire approach to business. 
The North American system of regulation was the only model available for 
consideration by the governments of Norway, the UK and Australia when 
formulating policy and regulatory framework for the newly discovered oil 
resources in their respective territories. Since these governments had no 
experience in the exploitation of petroleum resources, there was little precedent 
that they could draw on to emulate when formulating policy and regulation 
relating to petroleum exploitation in the North Sea.  
Australia’s historical origins and precedent regarding industry and enterprise 
was similar to that of the United Kingdom, given the colonial origins of 
Australia. The UK and Australian approach to business and private sector 
investment has been a ‘liberal-pluralist‘ approach, characterised by the 
government uninvolved in capital accumulation and allocation, arms length 
relations with business, the development of policies subject to societal 
pressures, and the reliance on market solutions to economic problems.621 
Given this background, it is not surprising that Australia adopted the North 
American non-interventionist form of regulation when developing its offshore 
petroleum policy. The result was the formulation of a non-interventionist policy 
 
620 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 17. 
621 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991),184. For a commentary on the history and origins of British economic policy and the 
interaction of government and the private sector in the UK see John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: 
Financial Systems and Politics of Industrial Change (1983); David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: 
Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States (1986); and Peter A Hall, Governing the Economy: 
The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (1986). 
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by the Australian government, and the implementation of a regulatory 
framework that was characterised by minimal intervention and regulation.622 
In the early 1970s there was a significant shift in Norwegian petroleum policy. 
The State implemented changes reflecting Norway’s traditional social 
democratic approach to economics and regulation of the private sector.623 This 
shift was given impetus as new petroleum discoveries on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) shifted the Norwegian States bargaining position with 
the oil companies in the favour of the State. It was realised that companies were 
willing to pay a higher price for the right to explore on the NCS. Consequently, 
the Norwegian State sought to expand its control and participation in petroleum 
activities on the NCS.  
This increased control and participation in petroleum activities on the NCS was 
formulated and developed against the influence of, and interaction with, global 
events that had significant impact on the capacity of the Norwegian State to 
increase its control over petroleum activities in the North Sea. Norwegian 
policy was influenced by oil companies, government officials and associated 
Norwegian industries that exerted their views and desires about regulation of 
industry in Norway.624 However, the Norwegian tradition of strong government 
control meant that both the Left and Right contributed to the formulation of the 
participatory intervention approach to the regulation of NCS petroleum 
activities.625 
 
622 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16, 16. 
623 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 187-8. 
624 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 187-8. 
625 It is important to note that three separate governments from both conservative and ‘liberal’ sides of politics were 
involved in the formulation and implementation of petroleum policy in Norway in the 1970’s.  The Borten 
government (Conservative) initiated the policy review, the Bratelli government (Labour Party) largely formulated 
the new policies, and the Korvald government (Conservative) implemented most of the new regulatory system 
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Prevailing geopolitics and global economics were also a major contributing 
factor to the formulation of petroleum policy in Norway. Oil companies in the 
1970s were increasingly affected by the political and economic events of the 
decade, particularly the OPEC embargo and crisis in 1973, and events in the 
Middle East, particularly the Iranian Revolution in 1979.626 
These threats from foreign entities and a shift in global geopolitics stirred 
nationalistic fervour in many States, and in Norway these ‘sentiments inspired a 
long-range strategy aimed at bringing the greatest possible benefit to Norwegian 
society.’627 Ongoing Norwegian petroleum policy has been predicated on the 
concept of developing its resources in a responsible controlled manner for the 
benefit of Norwegian society as a whole. This benefit has not only included the 
development of policies for the extraction of petroleum, but also policies for the 
management of revenue. In addition, the Norwegian State has always focused 
on the concomitant development of the supply industry within the domestic and 
international petroleum business arena. The combination of these policies has 
seen Norway flourish under a management system that implements these 
overriding principles. 
The implementation of Norwegian nationalist sentiments has resulted in the 
formulation of a policy aimed at the economic diversification of the Norwegian 
industry, ensuring that there was a development of the domestic industrial 
capability and reduced reliance upon the oil industry as the major economic 
force. 628 Norway was keen not to fall victim to Dutch disease. Therefore, it 
when it came to power. For a discussion on this see Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and 
State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 34. 
626 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 39-40. 
627 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 69-70. 
628 Brent  F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991),  69-79 
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formulated and implemented procurement policies that stimulated research and 
development in the petroleum industry and encouraged diversification within 
the industrial sector.629 
These global geopolitical and economic threats also influenced the activities of 
oil companies, who began to seek proven oil fields in ‘safe’ provinces. Norway, 
with its guaranteed fields of Ekofisk, Statfjord and Frigg was highly sought 
after. This further strengthened its bargaining position, enabling it to develop a 
highly regulatory framework that became known as the North Sea model, 
characterised by government control over all aspects of exploration, field 
development and production.  
The Norwegian government sought to exert control over the development 
resources. One government minister articulated the government fears regarding 
private oil companies by noting that ‘this isn’t a battle field where wealthy 
private interests will be allowed to fight over who should take the profits.’630 The 
Storting also voiced its apprehension over the conduct of international oil 
companies, who were seen to be ‘enjoying excess profits at the expense of 
consumers and oil exporting countries.’631 Therefore, the Norwegian government 
adopted a mercantilist role,632 tying oil interests to other interests by developing a 
procurement policy that encouraged the development of an indigenous petroleum 
industry.  
The rationale of this policy approach was that the petroleum industry operated on 
public land, and was extracting resources-in-the-ground that were in public 
 
629 Brent F Nelsen, ‘Explaining Petroleum Policy in Britain and Norway, 1962 – 90’ (1992) 15 (4) Scandinavian 
Political Studies 307, 318. 
630 Thorbjørn Berntsen in Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), 47. 
631 Norwegian Storting, Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society, (1974) Storting Report No. 25 1973-4, 30. 
632 Øystein Noreng with Farshad Tehrani, The Norwegian Experience of Economic Diversification in Relation to 
Petroleum Industry and the Relevance to Iran (2005) The 10th Institute for International Energy Studies (IIES) 
Conference Tehran 4-5 December 2005, 6. 
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ownership. Consequently, lifting oil and gas means depleting a public capital 
base, for which compensation should be found in the building up of other assets 
to secure a continuity of income. To implement this policy, the Norwegian 
government embarked on an aggressive strategy of development of associated 
industries in the first twenty years of petroleum exploration and production. This 
economic diversification was encouraged through the active participation of a 
mix of national and international companies, and especially the building up of 
Norwegian competence. Since 1970, Norwegian governments have regarded it as 
essential to promote competition in the oil industry while at the same time 
actively promoting the business opportunities for Norwegian industry, thereby 
achieving success in obtaining high local content in activities.633 This policy was 
formally declared in 1972 by the Royal Decree of 8 December 1972 Relating to 
Exploration of and Exploitation of Petroleum in the Seabed and Substrata of the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, and implemented through conditions attached to 
the granting of licences from the third petroleum licencing round.634 
The Royal Decree required, amongst other things, all licencees to use Norwegian 
suppliers for offshore petroleum goods and services where Norwegian companies 
were competitive regarding quality, service, schedule of delivery, and price.635 
Local content provisions were incorporated to encourage and promote the 
development of infant petroleum industries.636 The licencing conditions 
stipulated strict control over actual supplies of goods and services to the 
 
633 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
634 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 71-5. This round occurred in 1974, therefore it was the first official implementation of 
the procurement policy from the 1972 Decree. However, there had been some development of local industry prior 
to this official decree. 
635 ‘competitive’ in this context meant that if tenders from Norwegian companies were up to 10% above 
international companies, they were to be favoured. For a discussion on the economic diversification policies in 
Norway during the 1970s, see Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the 
British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 71. 
636 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 71. 
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development and production activities, securing Norwegian companies an active 
part in the competition for deliveries.637 During the awarding of supply contracts, 
the operator was required to inform the Ministry of its recommended supplier and 
Norwegian content, and the Ministry ensured that the Norwegian bidder was 
awarded the contract.638 This was essential for all oil companies, resulting in 
Norwegian contracting and supply ranging from 50-70% of all goods and 
services during this period.639   
There are two enduring elements of Norwegian petroleum policy that have 
remained, from the initial phase in the 1960s to the mature phase that Norway 
entered in the mid 1990s. First, Norwegian oil and gas resources are identified 
as part of the national wealth. Thus, the whole population (both current and 
future generations) should benefit from the depletion of these resources, 
implying that petroleum revenues must be managed to optimise the social and 
economic benefit for present and future generations. In order to meet this first 
goal of Norwegian petroleum policy, the second element of Norwegian policy is 
to attract the best of international expertise and competence, and to promote co-
operation between domestic and international players. The Norwegian 
government sees international expertise as essential for sustainable resource 
development, since the combination of domestic and international knowledge 
and effort ensures the maximum value for Norway’s petroleum resources.640  
 
637 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Speech by the State Secretary Bjorg Sandal, in Baku, Azerbaijan 5 June 
2000. http://www.odin.no/odinarkiv/english/stoltenberg_I/oed/026031-090011/dok-bn.html at 23 December 2006. 
638 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006.   
639 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
640 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Norwegian Organisation of the Petroleum Sector (2006) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/The-Ministey/Other-political-Staff/avskjedigete/State-Secretary--Anita-
Utseth-/Speeches-and-articles/2006/The-Norwegian-organisation-of-the-petroleum-sector.html?id=420787 at 2 
December 2008. 
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Petroleum policy has matured as a consequence of this ‘whole of society’ view 
of petroleum resources in Norway. Today there are six main areas of petroleum 
policy in Norway, refined to meet the collective needs of the petroleum 
industry, the Norwegian State, the EEA and other international requirements. 
These areas include the right to subsea deposits, maintaining national control of 
and benefits from the petroleum industry, nurturing and developing a skilled 
and competitive oil company and supply industry, establishing a future fund for 
today’s and future generations, and to focus on the environment to ensure 
environmental sustainability for present and future generations.641 
The Norwegian policy framework is frequently considered by other oil and gas 
producing countries that seek to emulate the Norwegian experience of 
maximising the value of its petroleum resources,642 since Norway is one of the 
few nations that have avoided resource curse.643 The Norwegian policy 
framework provides an example for any country that seeks to sustainably 
exploit their petroleum resources, with its long-term policy outlook on resource 
management.644 
2.6.4 A new petroleum policy for Australia? 
The analysis of Norwegian and Australian offshore petroleum resource policy 
highlights similarities and differences between Australian and Norwegian 
 
641 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
642 Willy H Olsen, Petroleum Revenue Management- An Industry Perspective (2002) 2 Paper presented at the Oil, 
Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department of the WBG and ESMAPO, Workshop on Petroleum Revenue 
Management, Washington DC, 23-24 October, 2004, 3. 
643 For a discussion of how Norway has avoided resource curse refer to Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the 
Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors’ 
(2006) 65 (3) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 605. 
644 Willy H Olsen, Petroleum Revenue Management- An Industry Perspective (2002) 2 Paper presented at the Oil, 
Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department of the WBG and ESMAPO, Workshop on Petroleum Revenue 
Management, Washington DC, 23-24 October, 2004, 3. 
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petroleum policies. Importantly, this analysis has highlighted the difference in 
policy planning between the two nations. Norway’s fundamental policies were 
developed in the early 1970s, and were formulated to establish suitable fiscal, 
regulatory and political policies to develop the resources. These policies were 
regularly revised, and often adapted to incorporate legal, social and political 
changes. Conversely, Australia developed its first comprehensive petroleum 
policy in 1990, some 25 years after the discovery of petroleum in Bass Strait. A 
comparison of the petroleum policies of Australia and Norway is illustrated in 
figure 3 below. Importantly, it demonstrates the fundamental policy differences 
between Australian and Norwegian petroleum policy frameworks – particularly 
the level of government control over the development of petroleum. 
 
 
Factors Australia Norway 
Political Policy 
 Controlled development of resource  
 Stated policy objective to maximise wealth for the benefit of present and 
future generations 
 Participation of the State in petroleum exploitation 
 Politically stable  
 People as owners of the resource and beneficiaries 
 Role of the state as manager and participant 
 Role of the state - minimalist 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Policy 
 Strong Legal Institutions 
 Licencing and Concession System (LCS) 
 Discretionary system to assist state in times of change  
 Regulatory framework for capture of economic rent  
 Ability to control rate of depletion 
 JOA/ contractual framework 
 Transparency and accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other policy areas 
 Active development of technology and R&D 
 Role of oil company controlled for balanced return of income to both 
company and State  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of Norwegian and Australian 
petroleum policies (Compiled by author) 
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The above figure confirms that there are many policy similarities between 
Australia and Norway, enabling a comparison between national petroleum 
objectives. It highlights focus of petroleum policies in Norway upon the 
development of petroleum resources for the benefit of the Norwegian people and 
for the maximisation of wealth compared to Australian policies which are 
commercial in focus, seeking to attract foreign investment. This may well be a 
remnant of Australian self-critical view of itself as a province of low 
attractiveness and prospectivity. It also demonstrates the role of the Norwegian 
State as manager and controller of the exploitation of petroleum resources 
compared to Australian policy position in the development of petroleum 
resources as one of minimal government participation. Conversely, the 
Norwegian State developed and implemented, from an early stage, a public 
policy that created a State Oil Company that competed with oil companies and 
demanded the exchange of information, skills and technology.  
Success of the Norwegian petroleum industry can be attributable to the multiple 
policy choices by the Norwegian government, underpinned by a framework of oil 
commandments.645 Norwegian petroleum policy as a whole, and the creation and 
role of Statoil in particular, has demonstrated how ‘one can structure the 
petroleum policy in a manner that serves the economy as a whole rather than the 
interests of a limited number of individuals in the economy.’646 With suitable 
adaptation, these policy choices can be applied to a cross section of energy-
producing countries. 
The comparison of Australian and Norwegian policy demonstrates that although 
both States today have a national petroleum policy focussed toward sustainable 
 
645 Richard Gordon, Statoil: Lessons From a Study of Political Entrepreneurship slide 5 (2007) 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/NOCs/Presentations/Dubai-Gordon_Stenvoll-Statoil.pdf at 12 
January 2008.  
646 Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll, Statoil: A Study in Political Entrepreneurship (2007) James A Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/NOCs/Papers/NOC_Statoil_Gordon-Stenvoll.pdf at 12 December 
2009, 2. 
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development of petroleum resources,  Australia has failed to develop a coherent 
policy framework to develop the petroleum resources for the benefit of the 
Australian people, both for this and future generations. In order for the Australian 
people and community to benefit from the endowment of petroleum resources, 
there needs to be a shift in the Australian petroleum policy framework. As such, 
Australia’s petroleum political, fiscal and regulatory policies are in need of re-
evaluation. A suitable policy framework to use as a point of reference is the 
Norwegian policy framework, since Australia has many similarities to Norway in 
terms of the need to create wealth, as well as a similar political, economic and 
social framework. In addition, both States also utilise the licencing and 
concession system for the regulation of petroleum resources.  
A number of changes in Australian petroleum policy framework could 
encourage sustainable development of petroleum resources. Australian 
petroleum policy should consider a greater State role in the management of 
petroleum resources. Rather than embracing a policy predicated on commercial 
investment, there needs to be a focus on the exploitation of the resources by oil 
companies for the benefit of the State and community. Any policies embraced 
by Australia need to be based on the concept that Australia’s petroleum 
resources belong to the Australian people, and should be exploited in a manner 
that is beneficial to present and future generations.  This is a fundamental policy 
shift for Australia, with a focus on the people and the State rather than 
partnership with oil companies for the exploitation of resources.  
2.7 Conclusion 
In some respects, the Australian petroleum industry is still in its infancy, similar 
to Norway in the 1970s and 1980s. It is characterised by vast frontier areas,647 a 
 
647 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Offshore Acreage Release 2006: An Overview for Investors 
(2006).  
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need to accumulate geotechnical data,648 and a shifting policy landscape. The 
Norwegian system of petroleum regulation has been developed in response to 
similar technical and regulatory challenges. As such, there are lessons that can be 
taken from the Norwegian experiences and address the issues facing Australian 
petroleum development today. 
Certainly, there are differences between the two countries, particularly in the way 
that petroleum resources have been developed. However, this chapter has 
demonstrated that many similarities can be identified between Australia and 
Norway. Each State develops its resources within common international law 
norms. Both are constitutional monarchies, with comparable legal systems. The 
economies of the two countries are comparable, with an emphasis on the export 
on primary resources. Furthermore, each country has implemented a system of 
welfare to assist its population.  
When considering the development of petroleum in the two countries, both 
countries discovered petroleum around the same time, and use the licencing and 
concession system to develop these resources. Furthermore, each country has an 
economic imperative to develop those resources. Whilst that economic 
imperative is not the same, it has provided an impetus to develop petroleum 
resources. These similarities are sufficient to enable Australia to consider the 
experiences of Norway in the regulation of petroleum to encourage sustainable 
development. 
 
648 Geoscience Australia, Big New Oil Program (2004) http://www.ga.gov.au/oceans/og_BigNewOil.jsp at 21 
October 2006. 
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Control over the production of petroleum has been considered by Norway to be 
essential for the generation of wealth. Using a controlled, analytical approach to 
petroleum exploitation similar to the Norwegian approach, the Commonwealth 
may be able to facilitate the sustainable development of Australia’s offshore 
petroleum resources. Therefore, Australian petroleum policy needs to focus on 
the development of petroleum resources for the benefit of current and future 
generations. To that end, petroleum policy should emphasise maximising wealth 
and creating enduring value, rather than attracting commercial investment.  
At present, the Australian government, by its own admission, merely plays 
referee to the petroleum industry,649 within the licencing and concession system 
that regulates petroleum activities. However Australia has also indicated a 
national petroleum objective to develop a petroleum policy framework that not 
only expands its international competitiveness, but also expands the resource 
base consistent with the principles of sustainable development.650 The current 
difficulty for Australia is that the current policy framework, laid down in 1998, 
remains focussed on commercial development and enhancing commercial 
interests. To implement the policy objectives enunciated by the Rudd 
government in 2007, Australia requires a fundamental alternation to the current 
policy framework. The Norwegian petroleum policy framework may provide 
some guidance for Australia when formulating a new petroleum policy. The 
Australian policy should incorporate a strong regulatory framework and 
licencing system that is transparent and accountable but also incorporates 
discretion to ensure petroleum regulation can be adjusted to suit economic 
conditions whilst still providing clear direction and guidelines. A detailed 
analysis of the central elements of a regulatory framework for such 
development is found in Chapter three. 
 
649 Senator Warwick Parer, Delivering National Prosperity (1998) Opening Address, APPEA National Conference, 
1998, Canberra 38 APPEA Journal Part 2, 7. 
650 As laid down by the Rudd Government at Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Resources (2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/RESOURCES/Pages/Resources.aspx at 12 December 2008. 
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3. Structure of regulatory legislative frameworks 
for sustainable development of petroleum 
resources  
3.1 Introduction 
Petroleum exploration and production are subject to high risk and a changing 
economic and technological environment. It is necessary for both the State as 
regulator, and the companies who perform the petroleum activities, to be able to 
adapt to new conditions over the period of a petroleum licence, which may span 
twenty years or more. Therefore, it is important to establish a regulatory 
legislative framework that balances the need for flexibility and stability with the 
State’s petroleum policy objectives.  
At first glance, it appears that the interests of the State and oil companies in the 
exploitation of petroleum are the same: to produce as much petroleum, as cheaply 
as possible. However there are also divergent interests, since the State is also 
concerned with its national petroleum objectives. A State’s interests are 
necessarily focussed on the development of the national petroleum resource as a 
whole, including the development of petroleum-producing provinces, and the 
concomitant infrastructure required to develop those resources. This differs to the 
focus of individual petroleum companies, which concentrate on their portfolio of 
petroleum fields in many jurisdictions and in various stages of development. A 
company views its commitment and field development strategy in the broader 
perspective of global petroleum activities and the necessary deployment of 
physical and human resources to accomplish commercial goals, whilst the State 
focuses on the petroleum resources they own in their jurisdiction. 
The legislative regulatory framework should reflect a State’s petroleum policy 
objective, establishing, maintaining and enforcing a system of competence651 to 
 
651 In this context the meaning of competence is proficiency, capacity or authority. See Torben Spraak, ‘Explicating 
the Concept of Legal Competence’ in Jaap C Hage and Dietmar Pfordten (eds) Concepts in Law (2009), 67. 
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regulate petroleum activities in a manner consistent with a States national 
petroleum objectives. These include the effective development of, and maximum 
ultimate recovery from petroleum fields, and maximisation of benefit to the 
national economy from such development.652 This competence includes 
legislative and administrative competence. Legislative competence establishes 
and maintains a legal regulatory framework for the conferring of rights and 
interests relating to petroleum exploitation, and the competence to make legal 
decisions regarding these rights and interest. Administrative competence confers 
upon a regulatory body the necessary knowledge, jurisdiction and decision-
making capacity to regulate petroleum activities consistent with national 
petroleum objectives.  
In previous chapter, I analysed the development of petroleum policy in 
Australia and Norway. In this chapter I will discuss the legal measures that can 
be used to achieve these policy goals. I will engage in a functional analysis of 
the petroleum legislative frameworks in Australia and Norway, comparing 
Australia’s rule based legislation with Norway’s more principle based 
legislation, in order to assess which system is more effective in sustainably 
exploiting its petroleum resources. I will focus on an examination of the 
structure and function of the legislation and regulatory framework, rather than 
the detailed content of the legislation. In this analysis I will compare and 
contrast the structure and function of the central elements in the regulation and 
the legislative and administrative tools utilised to achieve the policy goals, by 
drawing upon examples of the legislation pertaining to the award of a petroleum 
licence in Australia and Norway. A more thorough examination of the 
legislative content of Norwegian and Australian petroleum legislation regarding 
the award of petroleum licences, and the regulation of field development for the 
sustainable development of petroleum resources is made in chapters four and 
five respectively. In this chapter I also examine the organisation of the 
 
652 Kamal Hossein, Law and Policy in Petroleum Development Changing Relations Between Transnationals and 
Governments (1979), 32. 
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administrative body that implements the petroleum legislation, to determine 
what impact the structure and function of the administrative body has on the 
capacity of a State to sustainably develop its petroleum resources. 
In addition to legislative and administrative regulation, the petroleum regime also 
encompasses contracts used to regulate the relations between the participants in 
petroleum activity. The construction and function of these contracts form part of 
the regulatory legislative regime. Therefore, in this chapter I examine the 
structure and function of Australian and Norwegian joint venture agreements. 
Although I make a broad analysis on the importance of the contractual 
agreement, I focus on how the Management Committee is capable of enabling the 
State, regardless of whether the State participates in petroleum activities, to 
regulate petroleum activities to enable a State to satisfy its petroleum objectives. 
 
3.2 Legal problems arising from the roles of the State 
in petroleum activities 
The regulatory legislative framework for petroleum activities must be constructed 
as a function of what the State seeks to accomplish in developing its resources.653 
The State has to develop legal institutions and suitable regulatory regimes for the 
exploitation of petroleum. Without such institutions, there is a possibility the 
State will lose control over the resource exploitation, resulting in less effective 
resource extraction and becoming beholden to the petroleum companies that 
exploit the petroleum.654 
 
653 Australian petroleum policy has previously been focussed on encouraging commercial investment and petroleum 
exploitation driven by oil companies. The change of government in 2007 has seen the federal government focus 
Australia petroleum policy on the sustainable development of petroleum resources to maximise the benefit from the 
development of these resources. Norwegian policy remains focused on the development of petroleum resources to 
ensure benefit for all of Norwegian society. 
654 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 185-6. 
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The State, as owner of petroleum resources, may have two roles when developing 
petroleum resources. Firstly, the State has the role of regulator of petroleum 
activities. This requires the State to regulate petroleum activities in a manner 
which creates and maintains benefits for that State.655 Secondly, the State can 
assume the role of participant in petroleum exploitation.656 When doing so, the 
State enters the realm of commercial activities in an attempt to create benefits for 
its society. 
This creates challenges for States in developing and maintaining an effective 
regulatory regime, but it also creates possibilities for effective sustainable 
resource management.  
3.2.1 The State as a regulator 
The State as a legal regulator 
Since the State assigns proprietary rights657 to third parties to exploit petroleum 
resources, the State needs to ensure that it has the necessary legal and 
administrative competence to regulate the exploitation of its petroleum 
resources in a manner that meets the national petroleum objectives. Therefore, 
the State is required to create an effective regulatory framework that establishes 
the legal competence of that State to regulate petroleum activities. This legal 
competence is found in the relevant Acts and Regulations that govern petroleum 
activities in each State, and is considered in section 3.3 below. The 
administrative competence is conferred through the regulatory body or bodies 
that administer petroleum activities. The State, as resource owner, acts as the 
administrative body to implement the legal regulatory regime that has been 
 
655  Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 185-6. 
656 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 185-6. 
657 Proprietary right refers to the right that is possessed with the ownership of the property. See www.Legal-
explanations.com at 14 March 2009. 
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established, including the grant of petroleum licences, as well as reviewing 
petroleum policies.658 The capacity and jurisdiction of the administrative body 
will affect the capacity of the State to implement national petroleum objectives. 
The administration of petroleum activities is considered in section 3.4 below.  
The State as economic regulator 
Some States, particularly the UK and Norway, utilise its role as regulator to 
establish conditions that favour national services and industries, thus building 
competence within these sectors utilising the legislative framework regulating the 
grant of petroleum licences. The Norwegian government implemented an 
economic diversification policy, encouraging the development of a national 
petroleum industry concomitant with an increase in petroleum activities from the 
late 1960s.659 There was a policy of encouragement of Norwegian skills and 
industries capable of capturing petroleum cost spending, mandatory petroleum 
R&D in Norway, increased workforce skilling and education and technological 
development.660 
The regulation of petroleum activities through the award of petroleum licences 
to encourage the development of national industries and sectors is considered in 
Chapter four. 
3.2.2 The State as a participant in petroleum activities  
In some petroleum producing States, the government not only regulates 
petroleum activities, but also participates in petroleum activities. Many States 
participate in petroleum activities through a national oil company. Since early 
 
658 Gunnar Gjerde, The Norwegian Model and the Working Relationship Between the Authorities and the Industry: 
As Seen from the Authorities’ Point of View (2006).  
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Norwegian%20model/Norwegian_model_program_Gunnar_Gjer
de.pdf at 12 March 2008, 2-5. 
659 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 1. 
660 See  Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) 
Middle East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006, for 
a discussion on the implementation of the Norwegian procurement policy. 
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licencing rounds, the Norwegian government has participated in petroleum 
activities through the national oil company Statoil.  
Aside from participation by a State oil company as a commercial entity, there is 
the capacity for the State to participate directly in petroleum activities. Non-
commercial State participation has been achieved in Norway by the Norwegian 
government establishing a direct financial interest in petroleum fields.661 
Whether these forms of State participation are effective in encouraging 
sustainable development of resources is considered in section 3.5 below. 
3.2.3  Economic and commercial challenges for participants 
Commercial participants in petroleum exploitation are required to respond to 
the petroleum market and the economic/commercial imperatives of the oil 
company and its shareholders, since there is a commercial requirement for the 
company to realise profit by developing fields and utilizing resources on a 
global level. This differs to the focus of the State. Where the State participates, 
its focus is to implement the national petroleum objective, having concern for 
only domestic petroleum activities. Therefore if a State participates in 
petroleum activities it is (or should be) interested in the development of the 
resources to meet the State’s policy objectives, rather than generating 
commercial profit. These differing outcomes create difficulties in the regulation 
of the participants of petroleum activities. However, the use of a common 
contract between all participants may alleviate some of these difficulties. 
Therefore, in section 3.5 of this chapter I address the use of a common contract 
between all participants to enable the State to attain its petroleum objectives of 
sustainable development whilst still enabling oil companies to meet their 
commercial need to generate profit.  
 
 
661 The legislative competence for the State to create a State financial interest arises under s 3-6 and 11-1 of the 
Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway).  
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3.3 Structuring legislative regulation  
3.3.1 Principles of legislative regulation: rule based or 
principle based? 
Legal regulation can be defined as ‘a principle, rule or law designed to control or 
govern conduct’.662 The legislative framework regulating petroleum exploitation 
encompasses legal instruments such as primary legislation, subordinate 
legislation as well as administrative decisions made by public officials utilising 
policy guidelines.663 The legislative framework designed by the State is a 
fundamental tool in the administration of petroleum activities in that State. The 
legislative framework established by a State can include either rule based or 
principle based legislation.664  
Rule based regulatory frameworks rely on legislatively entrenched rules to 
regulate petroleum activities. These systems tend to require new rules every 
time a new regulatory situation arises.665 In addition, rule based regulation can 
lead to regulatory inconsistencies, and rigidity, and are prone to creative 
compliance in order to adjust to new situations.666  
Principle based regulation moves away from detailed, prescriptive rules, instead 
relying on broadly stated principles or objectives to set the standards by which 
companies conduct their operations,667 and the basis for decision making by 
 
662 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008). 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008, 3. 
663 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008). 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008 6. 
664 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 3. 
665 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 7. 
666 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 7. 
667 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 3. 
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public authorities. Under this type of legislation, there is a reference to general 
rules that express fundamental obligations that the participants should 
observe.668 It is often known as objective based regulation since it seeks to 
implement the policy objectives using broad principles rather than specific 
rules.  
Principle based regulatory systems tend to provide flexibility and are more 
likely to allow a petroleum regulatory regime to respond to new issues as they 
arise, since they contain an element of State discretion in the implementation of 
the relevant law. Generally, principle based regulation is drafted at a high level 
of generality, intending to be overarching requirements rather than rigid 
rules.669 This ensures that the legislation has a broad application to a wide range 
of circumstances.670 This ensures an outcome consistent with the general 
principles imbued in the regulatory framework, as well as enabling the 
legislation to be flexible and respond to the needs of petroleum producers 
within the ever-changing petroleum market. Between these two archetypes of 
regulation there can of course be many solutions with different level of 
combinations of rules and principles. 
Whichever system of petroleum regulation a State chooses, it must be able to 
not only regulate petroleum activities, but also respond to the unique issues that 
arise in the regulation of petroleum exploitation. This includes the long-term 
relationship between the State and the participants exploiting the petroleum 
within a volatile, fast-changing market, and the need for certainty of conditions 
for the oil companies that choose to engage in petroleum activities within that 
State. This response should be in a manner that is transparent, predictable and 
consistent with the overarching petroleum objectives of that State. Therefore, 
 
668 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 6-7. 
669 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 7. 
670 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 4. 
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the legal and administrative framework must be constructed as a function of 
what a State seeks to accomplish in the management of its petroleum resources. 
What a State seeks to accomplish in the exploitation of its petroleum resources 
is outlined in its petroleum policy. As part of its national petroleum policy 
objectives, Australia seeks to increase its resource base within a framework of 
sustainable development. Therefore, the legal framework that is constructed 
should be capable of attaining that outcome. 
3.3.2 Challenges of a Federalist system in regulatory 
legislative frameworks for sustainable petroleum development  
Since the Australian government is based on federalism, there are particular 
legislative and administrative challenges that govern the exploitation of offshore 
petroleum in Australia. This has also influenced Australia’s regulation of its 
offshore petroleum resources. 
Initial arrangements between the Commonwealth and states for the exploration 
and production of offshore petroleum were created under the 1967 Petroleum 
Agreement.671 This agreement was forged between the Commonwealth, states 
and affected territories and is officially known as the Agreement Relating to the 
Exploration for and the Exploitation of, the Petroleum Resources, and Certain 
Other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of Australia and of Certain 
Territories of the Commonwealth and of Certain Other Submerged Land signed 
October 16, 1967 (Petroleum Agreement). The Agreement did not intend to 
create legal relationships enforceable in a court of law.672 Rather, it noted that 
petroleum activities would be encouraged by uniform legislative measures on 
the continental shelf beyond territorial limits, and that the state and national 
governments would cooperate to ensure effectiveness of authorities over 
 
671 Constance D Hunt, The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia (1989), 63. 
672 Constance D Hunt, The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia (1989), 64. 
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petroleum resources.673 The legal status of the Petroleum Agreement was made 
clear in clause 26 of the Agreement –  
‘the Governments acknowledge that this Agreement is not 
intended to create legal relationships justiciable in a Court of Law 
but declare that the Agreement shall be construed and given effect 
to by the parties in all respects according to the true meaning and 
spirit thereof’. 674  
To achieve constitutional legitimacy, each state and territory government 
legislated with respect to offshore petroleum operations in identical terms to the 
Commonwealth petroleum legislation (known as ‘mirror’ legislation).675 In 
addition, all governments agreed not to make, amend or repeal regulations 
under the legislation except under a prior agreement to do so.676  
The Petroleum (Submerged Lands ) Act 1967 (CTH) (PSLA) was conceived as 
an ingenious legal mechanism to give effect to the Petroleum Agreement,677 
securing offshore petroleum development without having to resolve the 
jurisdictional issues between the Commonwealth and the states.678 This 
legislation arose because of the constitutional arrangements that existed 
between the Commonwealth and states at the time the PSLA was enacted. This 
PSLA addressed the constitutional demarcation of jurisdictions by enacting a 
comprehensive legislative ‘code,’ creating joint Commonwealth-state 
administration of petroleum of titles.679 Much of the details ordinarily contained 
 
673 Constance D Hunt, The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia (1989), 63. 
674 See Michael Crommelin, ‘The Legal Character of Petroleum Production Licences in Australia’ in Terrence 
Daintith, The Legal Character of Petroleum Licences: A Comparative Study (1981), 61. 
675 Michael Crommelin, ‘The Legal Character of Petroleum Production Licences in Australia’ in Terrence Daintith, 
The Legal Character of Petroleum Licences: A Comparative Study (1981), 62, and Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 
122 CLR 177. 
676 Michael Crommelin, ‘The Legal Character of Petroleum Production Licences in Australia’ in Terrence Daintith, 
The Legal Character of Petroleum Licences: A Comparative Study (1981), 62. 
677 Constance D Hunt, The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia (1989), 64. 
678 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas (2005), 13. 
679 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 93. This joint management required the establishment of two Authorities that 
regulate petroleum activities: The Joint Authority, which comprises the relevant Commonwealth Minister and the 
responsible State Minister, and the Designated Authority, comprising the responsible state or territory Minister. 
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in regulations are contained in the PSLA, since if administrative delegation 
occurred there was a risk of variation or conflict between the Commonwealth 
and states.680 To reduce the capacity for the states to go their own way, the 
provisions of the petroleum legislation were necessarily detailed,681 granting 
each state or territory the legislative capacity to grant dual titles to oil 
companies under State Authority and Delegated Authority from the 
Commonwealth.682 Consequently, there are eight petroleum jurisdictions in 
Australia.683  
The relationship between the states and the Commonwealth was altered in 1973 
when the Commonwealth claimed the offshore maritime zones in the Sea and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth). The NSW government immediately 
challenged the constitutional validity of this legislation in the High Court.684 
NSW contended that they held rights in the territorial waters from the baseline 
seaward three nautical miles, the same as those rights for fishing held in Bonser 
v La Macchia.685 The High Court in NSW v Commonwealth686 held that 
sovereign rights in relation to the Continental Shelf outside the territorial waters 
were vested in the Commonwealth. Furthermore, with the exception of Gibbs 
and Stephen JJ in dissent, the Justices also concurred that the sovereignty in the 
territorial waters was vested in the Commonwealth.687 As a consequence of this 
decision, the states were denied property rights in the seabed and subsea terrain 
of the territorial waters, since their territory ended at low-water mark.688 This 
 
680 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas (2005), 13. 
681 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas (2005), 13. 
682 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas (2005), 13. 
683 Commonwealth Offshore, New South Wales (NSW), Western Australia (WA), Tasmania, Victoria, Northern 
Territory (NT), South Australia (SA) and Queensland (Qld). 
684 NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 8 ALR 1.  
685 Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177. 
686 NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 8 ALR 1. 
687 NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 8 ALR 1. 
688 Pat Brazil, Offshore Constitutional Settlement 1980: A Case Study in Federalism (2001) Centre for International 
and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National University, 2. 
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decision had a major impact on the states’ jurisdiction over, and income from 
offshore petroleum, and prompted negotiations between petroleum-producing 
states and territories and the Commonwealth.  
A permanent solution to these constitutional issues was reached in the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement in 1980, and enacted at state and Commonwealth 
level through mirror legislation (Commonwealth and state Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Acts).689 In addition, a plethora of other necessary 
legislation was enacted to enable the implementation of the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement.690  The offshore jurisdiction of the states/territories is 
defined in section 5 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA) as agreed to by the states and the Commonwealth 
in the Offshore Constitutional Agreement, which remain in force today: 
a. Commonwealth offshore petroleum legislation is limited to the area outside 
the coastal waters of the States and the Northern Territory;691 and 
b. For this purpose, the outer limits of the State and Northern Territory coastal 
waters should start 3nm from the baseline of the territorial sea;692 and  
c. The States and the Northern Territory should share, in the manner provided 
by the OPA, in the administration of the Commonwealth offshore 
petroleum legislation;693 and 
d. State and Northern Territory offshore petroleum legislation should apply to 
State and Northern Territory coastal waters;694 and  
 
689 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth), Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Registration Fees Act 1990 (WA), 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Vic), Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Qld), Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (SA), Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Tas), Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act 1982 (NSW), and Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Taxation Act 1967 (NSW), as outlined in Michael Crommelin, 
‘The Legal Character of Petroleum Production Licences in Australia’ in Terrence Daintith, The Legal Character of 
Petroleum Licences: A Comparative Study (1981), 62. 
690 Required Acts include Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980; Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Powers) 
Act 1980; Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980; Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Title) Act; and Offshore 
Minerals Act 1984 (Cth). 
691 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s5(2)a. 
692 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s5(2)b. 
693 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s5(2)c. 
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e. The Commonwealth, states and the Northern Territory should try to 
maintain, as far as practicable, common principles, rules and practices in 
regulating and controlling the exploration for, and exploitation of offshore 
petroleum beyond the baseline of Australia’s territorial seas.695 
The prescriptive, rule based legislative structure that was created by the 
Commonwealth in 1967 to establish a framework for petroleum activities was 
necessary at that time. However, as a result of the agreement reached in the 
Offshore Constitutional Agreement, as well as the states’ acquiescence to 
Commonwealth control of offshore petroleum safety regulation, there is an 
indication that prescriptive legislation may no longer be essential.696  
3.3.3 Method of regulation: rule based or principle based 
regulation? 
Australia’s legislative framework for the petroleum licencing system must be 
characterised as a rule based legislative system. Australia’s initial petroleum 
legislation (the PLSA) was ‘a combination of painstaking detail and grand-scale 
delegation’697 that remains today as a coherent, but highly unusual system of 
offshore petroleum regulation, articulated by administrative rules and powers 
within the Principal Act.698 It operates by prohibiting the activities it covers (for 
example extracting petroleum), and then granting companies an administrative 
authorisation to conduct the activity (this is known as a ‘command and control’ 
scheme of authorisation).699 This is demonstrated by section 97 (1) of the 
Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA), 
694 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s5(2)d. 
695 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s5(2)e. 
696 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 91. This is analysed in section 4.3.3 below. 
697 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas (2005), 13. 
698 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 91.  
699 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study (2005), 175. 
An example of the command and control is section 77 of the OPA, which prohibits the unauthorised exploration of 
petroleum offshore, and then confers the rights to explore offshore in section 78 of the OPA.  
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where ‘a person commits an offence if that person explores for petroleum; and 
the exploration occurs in an offshore area,700  then excuses the taking of 
petroleum under section 97 (1) where the taking of petroleum is ‘authorised by 
a petroleum exploration permit, or otherwise required by or under this Act’.701 
This differs to principle based legislation such as Norway, where the State 
merely stipulates the requirement for  a licence in order to recover petroleum 
from an area, such as the right to recover petroleum,702 rather than making it 
illegal to recover petroleum then creating conditions to make it legal, such as 
under section 97 of the OPAGGSA. 
As a result of the changes to petroleum licencing and activities, the detailed, 
PSLA has required over 1000 amendments from 1965-2005, resulting in over 
thirty separate compilations of the Act.703 A rewrite of the PSLA, the Offshore 
Petroleum Act 2006 (Cth) (OPA), was enacted in 2006, and touted as a plain 
English rewrite of the PSLA.704 Industry and government alike had identified 
the PSLA as cumbersome, unwieldy and complex as the result of numerous 
amendments and updates.705 The OPA contained only changes to the structure 
and style of the legislation, implementing only a few minor policy changes from 
the framework set out in the PSLA.706 
Where the previous petroleum legislation (the PSLA) had been 391 pages, the 
rewrite was over 630 pages. However, it would appear that the new legislation 
(the OPA) was no better than its predecessor the PSLA, which was described by 
Professor Daintith as ‘old, fat and ugly, and not likely to score highly in a 
 
700 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s97 (1). 
701 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s97 (2). 
702 The right  for the state to regulate petroleum activites is granted under s 1-2 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 
(Norway), and the right to recover petroleum is conferred under  s 3-2 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 
(Norway) 
703 The full legislative history of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) can be found at 
www.comlaw.gov.au.  
704 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Bill, 2005 (Cth)  (2005), 2.  
705 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Bill 2006 (Cth) (2005), 2.  
706 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Bill 2006 (Cth) (2005), 2. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
182
                                             
legislative beauty contest.’707 Furthermore, Daintith expressed concern over its 
replacement (the OPA), noting in 2004 that ‘replacing an Act…[ ] by one which 
is even fatter would be a profoundly disappointing result.’708 Unfortunately, this 
concern has been realised, with the rewrite of the PSLA being fatter and uglier, 
a 650 page prescriptive tome709 that required over one hundred amendments 
prior to its commencement in July 2008. The OPA has since become even fatter 
and uglier in its new incarnation as the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse 
Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA) as a result of the addition of offshore 
greenhouse gas storage provisions.710 
The current offshore petroleum legislation, the Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA), is rule based, 
demonstrated by the length and level of detail of the legislation.711 At over 830 
pages, the legislation addresses in minutiae the award and management of 
licences and titles, safety arrangements for offshore petroleum activities and the 
jurisdiction of the Joint and Designated Authorities.712 Such minutia can be 
illustrated by the requirements for a simplified outline to explain the general 
ideas contained in the legislation. For example, legislation relating to the award 
of petroleum exploration licences spans twenty one sections and forty pages.713 
A simplified outline of what these sections and pages contain is included in 
section 96 of OPAGGSA: 
 
707 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 92. 
708 Terence Daintith, ‘Administering the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act: Too Much Discretion or Too Little?’ 
(2004) AMPLA Yearbook 2004 1, 43. 
709 In its first incarnation as the Offshore Petroleum Act 2006 (Cth). 
710 The OPA was amended to incorporate Greenhouse Gas Storage legislative provisions and renamed the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA) on 1 November 2008.  
711 The Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA) found its first incarnation as 
the Offshore Petroleum Act 2006 (Cth) (OPA) in 2006. Although enacted in 2006, the OPA did not enter into Force 
until 1 July 2008 after all relevant jurisdictions had enacted ‘mirror’ legislation. In November 2008 the OPA was 
renamed the OPAGGSA, and the greenhouse gas storage provisions were incorporated by the Offshore Petroleum 
Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Act 2008. 
712 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act (Cth).  
713 The award of a petroleum licence is covered in sections 97 to 117 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse 
Gas Storage Act (Cth), pages 111 to 151. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
183
 
It is an offence to explore for petroleum in an offshore area except: 
 (a) under a petroleum exploration permit; or 
 (b) as otherwise authorised or required by or under this Act. 
• This Part provides for the grant of petroleum exploration permits 
over blocks in an offshore area. 
• A petroleum exploration permit authorises the permittee714 to 
explore for petroleum in the permit area. 
• There are 3 types of petroleum exploration permits: 
 (a) a petroleum exploration permit granted on the basis of 
work program bidding (a work-bid petroleum 
exploration permit); 
 (b) a petroleum exploration permit granted on the basis of 
cash bidding (a cash-bid petroleum exploration permit); 
 (c) a petroleum exploration permit granted over a 
surrendered block or certain other blocks (a special 
petroleum exploration permit). 
If a petroleum pool is identified in a petroleum exploration permit area, 
the Joint Authority may declare a location over the 
blocks to which the petroleum pool extends. 
 
This detailed legislative framework is accompanied by brief regulations, the 
Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations (OPAGGSR),715 
just 15 pages long. These petroleum regulations are confined to particulars 
relating to a petroleum discovery, survey of wells, and current rates for fees.  
This is an unusual regime, since most petroleum regulatory frameworks place 
the regulatory details in the regulations rather than in the primary legislation.716 
Furthermore, since both the Act and the Regulations are parliamentary 
instruments, they can only be altered by parliamentary process. This has been 
suggested by the World Bank as an ineffective way of managing the change that 
                                              
714 Note that permittee and licencee are equivalent, and mean the legal entity which has the proprietary rights to 
explore for and produce petroleum. In Australia, an exploration licence is also called an exploration permit, even 
though it confers proprietary rights.  
715 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 1985 (Cth). These regulations began life as the 
Petroleum (Submerged Land) Regulations 1985 (Cth), with a name change on 1 July 2008. 
716 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 93. 
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is required in petroleum regulation.717 Indeed, the World Bank sees the role of 
regulations as subsidiary instruments to the petroleum legislation, not intended 
for legislative enactment, since this maintains maximum flexibility to respond 
to current petroleum developments which require changes in the regulation of 
petroleum operations.718 
The use of principle based legislation, rather than detailed rule based regulation 
has been a feature of Norwegian petroleum regulation since its first petroleum 
Act.719 The legal basis and regulatory framework for petroleum activities in 
Norway today is conferred by the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) 
(PAA) and the associated Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway) (PR), which 
are a subsidiary instrument, amended by Royal Decree, pursuant to the PAA.720 
The PAA is a brief, principle based Act (only 30 pages) that confers rights and 
duties on participants for the exploitation of petroleum in Norway. The details 
for the regulation of petroleum activities are outlined in the PAA, including 
provisions for the management of exploration and production of activities, 
cessation of petroleum activities, safety, liability, and environmental provisions, 
as well as general provisions relating to the State and other industries. This is 
illustrated by the brevity of petroleum law relating to the grant of petroleum 
licences in Norway. The grant of a licence is covered in fifteen sections over 
four pages. These fifteen sections cover not only the award of a licence, but also 
 
717 William T Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper WPS 1420, 4.  
718 William T Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper WPS 1420, 27-28.    
719 Act 12 of 21 June 1963 Relating to exploration for and exploration of submarine natural resources. This Act 
contained three basic principles:  
1. The right to submarine natural resources was vested in the State.  
2. The King may grant Norwegian or foreign persons, including legal persons the right to explore for or exploit 
natural resources.  
3. The King may issue regulations concerning such activities.  
See Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo; and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 896. 
720 See section 1-1 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996, (Norway). 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
185
                                             
cover third party exploration and facilities,721 area relinquishment,722 and 
surrender of a petroleum licence.723   
The differences in the structure of the Australian and Norwegian regulatory 
legislative frameworks can be assessed by an examination of the respective 
legislative sections pertaining to the award of a petroleum licence which enables 
the conduct of petroleum exploration and production.724 By comparing the 
Australian legislation and Norwegian legislation pertaining to the award of a 
licence to conduct petroleum activities, it is possible to highlight the legislative 
structure and its effects on the capacity of the regulatory legislative framework 
to encourage sustainable development.   
The rigid, rule based nature of Australia’s petroleum legislation is demonstrated 
in  sections 104-107 of OPAGGSA, which legislates for the award of an 
exploration licence, using the work program method of allocation (which is the 
standard method of allocation):  
104  Application for work-bid petroleum exploration permit—
advertising of blocks 
Invitation to apply for a petroleum exploration permit 
 (1) The Joint Authority may, by notice published in the Gazette: 
 (a) invite applications for the grant by the Joint Authority of a 
petroleum exploration permit over the block, or any or all of the 
blocks, specified in the notice; and 
 (b) specify a period within which applications may be made. 
 (2) If the Joint Authority has published a notice under subsection 110(1) 
inviting applications for the grant of a petroleum exploration permit 
over a block, the block must not be specified in a notice under 
subsection (1) of this section at any time during the period specified in 
the subsection 110(1) notice. 
Note: Subsection 110(1) deals with cash-bid petroleum exploration 
permits. 
Application for petroleum exploration permit 
 (3) An application under this section must be accompanied by details of: 
 
721 See section 3-11 and 3-12 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996, (Norway).  
722 See section 3-14 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996, (Norway). 
723 See section 3-16 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996, (Norway). 
724 It is important to note that in Australia it is the award of a exploration licence (or permit) which confers the right 
to explore for and eventually produce petroleum upon application to the Joint Authority. The equivalent licence in 
Norway is the production licence. Therefore, the Australian exploration licence and the Norwegian production 
licence are compared.  
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 (a) the applicant’s proposals for work and expenditure in relation to 
the block or blocks specified in the application; and 
 (b) the technical qualifications of the applicant and of the applicant’s 
employees; and 
 (c) the technical advice available to the applicant; and 
 (d) the financial resources available to the applicant. 
Note 1: Part 2.10 contains additional provisions about application 
procedures. 
Note 2: Section 256 requires the application to be accompanied by an 
application fee. 
Note 3: Section 258 enables the Designated Authority to require the 
applicant to give further information. 
Maximum number of blocks 
 (4) The number of blocks specified in an application under this section 
must not be more than 400. 
Minimum number of blocks 
 (5) If 16 or more blocks are available, the number of blocks specified in an 
application under this section must not be less than 16. 
 (6) If less than 16 blocks are available, the number of blocks specified in 
an application under this section must be the number available. 
 (7) Subsections (5) and (6) do not apply to applications if the Joint 
Authority, for reasons that the Joint Authority thinks sufficient, 
includes in the subsection (1) notice a direction that subsections (5) and 
(6) do not apply to those applications. 
Attributes of blocks 
 (8) The blocks specified in an application under this section must be 
blocks that are constituted by graticular sections that: 
 (a) constitute a single area; and 
 (b) are such that each graticular section in that area has a side in 
common with at least one other graticular section in that area. 
 (9) Subsection (8) does not apply to applications if the Joint Authority, for 
reasons that the Joint Authority thinks sufficient, includes in the 
subsection (1) notice a direction that subsection (8) does not apply to 
those applications. 
105  Grant of work-bid petroleum exploration permit—offer document 
Scope 
 (1) This section applies if an application for the grant of a petroleum 
exploration permit has been made under section 104. 
Offer document 
 (2) The Joint Authority may: 
 (a) give the applicant a written notice (called an offer document) 
telling the applicant that the Joint Authority is prepared to grant 
the applicant a petroleum exploration permit over the block or 
blocks specified in the offer document; or 
 (b) by written notice given to the applicant, refuse to grant a 
petroleum exploration permit to the applicant. 
Note 1: Section 259 sets out additional requirements for offer 
documents (for example, a requirement that an offer 
document must contain a summary of conditions). 
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Note 2: If the applicant breaches a requirement under section 258 to 
provide further information, the Joint Authority may refuse to 
give the applicant an offer document—see subsection 258(3). 
106  Ranking of multiple applicants for work-bid petroleum 
exploration permit 
Scope 
 (1) This section applies if: 
 (a) the Joint Authority publishes a notice under subsection 104(1) 
inviting applications for the grant of a petroleum exploration 
permit; and 
 (b) at the end of the period specified in the notice, 2 or more 
applications have been made under section 104 for the grant of a 
petroleum exploration permit over the same block or blocks. 
Most deserving applicant may be given offer document 
 (2) The Joint Authority may give an offer document under section 105 to 
whichever applicant, in the Joint Authority’s opinion, is most deserving 
of the grant of the petroleum exploration permit. 
 (3) In determining which of the applicants is most deserving of the grant of 
the petroleum exploration permit, the Joint Authority must have regard 
to criteria made publicly available by the Joint Authority. 
Ranking of applicants 
 (4) For the purposes of this section, the Joint Authority may rank the 
applicants in the order in which, in the Joint Authority’s opinion, they 
are deserving of the grant of the petroleum exploration permit, with the 
most deserving applicant being ranked highest. 
 (5) The Joint Authority may exclude from the ranking any applicant who, 
in the Joint Authority’s opinion, is not deserving of the grant of the 
petroleum exploration permit. 
Applicants who are equally deserving of the grant of the petroleum 
exploration permit 
 (6) If the Joint Authority: 
 (a) has considered the information accompanying the 189 
applications; and 
 (b) is of the opinion that 2 or more of the applicants are equally 
deserving of the grant of the petroleum exploration permit; 
the Joint Authority may, by written notice given to each of those 
applicants, invite them to give the Joint Authority details (the 
work/expenditure details) of their proposals for additional work and 
expenditure in relation to the block or blocks concerned. 
 (7) A notice under subsection (6) must: 
 (a) specify the kinds of work/expenditure details that the Joint 
Authority considers to be relevant in determining which of the 
applicants is most deserving of the grant of the petroleum 
exploration permit; and 
 (b) specify the period within which the work/expenditure details 
must be given to the Joint Authority. 
 (8) If an applicant gives work/expenditure details to the Joint Authority, 
and those details are: 
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 (a) of a kind specified in the notice; and 
 (b) given within the period specified in the notice; 
the Joint Authority must have regard to the details in determining 
which of the applicants is most deserving of the grant of the petroleum 
exploration permit. 
Criteria 
 (9) An instrument setting out criteria under subsection (3) is not a 
legislative instrument for the purposes of the Legislative Instruments 
Act 2003. 
Note: See also section 109, which deals with the effect of the 
withdrawal or lapse of an application. 
107  Grant of work-bid petroleum exploration permit 
  If: 
 (a) an applicant has been given an offer document under section 105; 
and 
 (b) the applicant has made a request under section 260 in relation to 
the offer document within the period applicable under that 
section; 
the Joint Authority must grant the applicant a petroleum exploration 
permit over the block or blocks specified in the offer document. 
Note: If the applicant does not make a request under section 260 
within the period applicable under that section, the 
application lapses at the end of that period—see subsection 
260(4). 
 
A close examination of these sections demonstrates the prescriptive based 
nature of Australia’s legislation. Section 105 considers the offer of a licence to 
an applicant. It prescribes in detail what happens when the administrative 
authority does offer a document (s105 (2) a), or when an offer is refused (s105 
(2) b). Further, the section also then contains a number of notes instructing that 
there are additional requirements for offer documents or further information 
under sections 259 and 258.  
The comparable sections of the Norwegian legislation relating to the grant of a 
production licence are found at section 3-5 of the PAA: 
  Section 3-5 Announcement and granting of a licence 
Prior to the granting of a production licence, the Ministry shall, as a rule, 
announce the area for which applications for production licences may be 
submitted. The announcement shall be published through notification in The 
Norwegian Gazette (Norsk Lysingsblad) and the Official Journal of the 
European Communities.  The notification shall stipulate a time limit for the 
filing of applications of not less than 90 days, and it shall contain such 
information as decided by the Ministry. 
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The granting of a production licence shall be done on the basis of factual and 
objective criteria, and the requirements and conditions stated in the notification.  
The King is not obliged to grant any production licence on the basis of the 
applications received. The King may grant production licences without 
announcement.  Prior to such granting of a production licence, the licensees of 
production licences in all adjacent areas shall be given the opportunity to apply 
for a production licence for the area in question.  Notification shall be published 
in The Norwegian Gazette (Norsk Lysingsblad) and the Official Journal of the 
European Communities indicating the blocks which are affected. 
Further regulations about the content of an application for production licence, 
and about the payment of application fees, are issued by the King. 
 
Furthermore, the details regarding the criteria for an award of a licence are 
outlined in the Norwegian PR:  
Section 10 Criteria for granting production licences 
In the interest of furthering the best possible resource management, production 
licences are granted on the basis of the following criteria: 
a) the technical competence and financial capacity of the applicant, 
b) the applicant’s plan for exploration and production in the area for which a 
production licence is sought. 
If the applicant is or has been a licensee according to an exploration licence, the 
Ministry may also take into consideration any form of inadequate efficiency or 
inadequate responsibility that may have been demonstrated by the applicant as a 
licensee. 
The criteria for granting a licence shall in accordance with section 3-5 third 
paragraph first sentence of the Act be formulated and applied in a non-
discriminatory manner among the applicants. The first sentence applies 
correspondingly in relation to criteria relating to the composition of the group of 
licensees and the appointment of an operator. 
If two or more applications are regarded to be equal on the basis of the criteria 
above, other relevant objective and non-discriminatory criteria that will make 
possible a final choice between the applications, may be used as basis for 
granting the licence. 
 
Section 11 Conditions and requirements 
Conditions and requirements for granting a production licence and for 
conducting petroleum activities pursuant to a production licence, shall be based 
solely on the need to ensure that the petroleum activities within the area 
comprised by the production licence, are carried out in a proper manner. 
Conditions for conducting activities pursuant to a production licence shall be 
based on consideration for national security, public order, public health, 
transport safety, environment protection, protection of biological resources and 
national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value, the safety of the 
facilities and the employees, systematic resource management (eg production 
rate or the optimisation of the production activities) or the need to ensure fiscal 
revenues. 
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This section shall be applicable only to production licences granted after 1 
September 1995. 
 
Interestingly, the Australian legislation does not outline the criteria for the 
selection of a licencee in either OPAGGSA or OPAGGSR. Although the 
regulatory legislative framework regarding the grant of a petroleum licence 
under a work program bid in Australia stipulates the need to refer to selection 
criteria,725 the criteria are not part of either OPAGGSA or the OPGGSR. Rather 
the criteria are administrative directions and guidelines that have been issued by 
the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism.726 To date727 over twenty of 
these administrative directions have been published, many of which are 
outdated and incorrect.728 Whilst these guidelines are not binding and have no 
legal effect, they tend to operate to define how decision-making by government 
occurs and provide some transparency in the decision-making process.729 The 
concern is that the legislation refers decision-makers to the guidelines to select 
the winning work program bid in the award of an exploration licence,730 yet the 
guidelines are out of date and refer to legislation and bodies that no longer 
exist.731 
                                              
725 Under s 106 (3) of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
726 For a collection of these guidelines see 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/upstream_petroleum/offshore_petroleum_regulation_and_legislation/offshore_petr
oleum_legislation_regulation_and_guidelines/Pages/OffshorePetroleumLegislationRegulationandGuidelines.aspx 
at 1 September 2009.  
727 Current to September 2009. 
728 An example of this at the time of writing is the guidelines Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Bid 
Assessment Criteria: A Guideline in Relation to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (2002) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Upstream%20Petroleum/Bid_assessment_criteria.pdf at 3 September 
2009. These guidelines were issued in 2002, and still make reference to the superseded Petroleum (Submerged 
Land) Act 1967 (Cth). 
729 S Barrymore, ‘Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 – Rewrite and Beyond’ (2006) 46 APPEA Journal 2006 
533, 536. 
730 Under s106 (3) of OPAGGSA the Joint Authority must have regard to criteria made publicly available to select 
the most deserving work program bid. These criteria are found in Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
Bid Assessment Criteria: A Guideline in Relation to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (2002) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Upstream%20Petroleum/Bid_assessment_criteria.pdf at 3 September 
2009. 
731 The Bid Assessment Criteria: A Guideline in Relation to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 not only 
contains the assessment criteria, but makes reference to legislation that no longer exists (The PSLA) and a 
government department that has been superseded. See Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Bid 
Assessment Criteria: A Guideline in Relation to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (2002) 
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It is also possible to make a direct comparison of the Australian and Norwegian 
legislation regulating the advertising of a licencing round to highlight the 
differences in the legislation. The Australian legislation regulating the 
advertising of the advertising of a licencing round is prescriptive and 
complicated:  
Invitation to apply for a petroleum exploration permit 
 (1) The Joint Authority may, by notice published in the Gazette: 
 (a) invite applications for the grant by the Joint Authority of a 
petroleum exploration permit over the block, or any or all of the 
blocks, specified in the notice; and 
 (b) specify a period within which applications may be made. 
 (2) If the Joint Authority has published a notice under subsection 110(1) 
inviting applications for the grant of a petroleum exploration permit over 
a block, the block must not be specified in a notice under subsection (1) 
of this section at any time during the period specified in the subsection 
110(1) notice. 
Note: Subsection 110(1) deals with cash-bid petroleum exploration 
permits.732 
 
This differs to the direct, objective based legislation of Norway regarding the 
advertising of a licencing round:  
Prior to the granting of a production licence, the Ministry shall, as a 
rule, announce the area for which applications for production licences 
may be submitted. The announcement shall be published through 
notification in The Norwegian Gazette (Norsk Lysingsblad) and the 
Official Journal of the European Communities.733 
 
The advertising requirement in section 3-5 of the PAA illustrates the general, 
more principle based nature of the legislation. Rather than specifying the rules 
regarding the advertising of the licencing rounds, the Act merely notes that 
advertising is required.  
The Australian legislation is vastly different to the Norwegian legislation. 
Whereas the Australian legislation sets out rules and procedures, the Norwegian 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Upstream%20Petroleum/Bid_assessment_criteria.pdf at 3 September 
2009. 
732 Section 104 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006.  
733 Section 3-5 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996, (Norway). Italics added by author. 
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legislation provides a broad framework for the conduct of petroleum activities, 
and regulations that direct the activities within the resource management 
guidelines set down in section 11 of the PR. Together the PAA and the PR 
establish a framework that  confers discretion on the Norwegian State to 
regulate petroleum activities to meet its resource management goals,734 and 
ensures that the criteria for the award of petroleum activities have legal 
competence, since they are regulatory legislative framework. An analysis of the 
award of petroleum licences is made in Chapter five. 
3.3.4 Construction of a regulatory legislative framework for 
sustainable resource management. 
A concern with the development and implementation of a rule based legislative 
framework such as that in Australia is that its rigidity may create unnecessary 
burdens for participants in the exploitation of petroleum. Unnecessary burdens 
may be defined as ‘those incremental costs that could be eliminated by better 
regulatory design, administration and enforcement, without detracting from 
desired policy outcomes or objectives.’735 Regulatory burdens have been 
identified as a source of increased cost and delay in projects, contributing to the 
decreased attractiveness of a province as a location for investment in petroleum 
activities.736 In petroleum regulation, regulatory burdens can include unnecessary 
delays and uncertainties in obtaining required approvals, overlapping or 
 
734  The resource management principles are laid down in the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). The first is 
under s1-2, which establishes a requirement that resource management is carried out in a long-term perspective for 
the benefit of Norwegian society as a whole. This is further strengthened in section 4-1, Petroleum Activities Act 
1996 (Norway), stipulating that as much petroleum as possible must be extracted (‘prudent production’), in 
accordance with sound technical and economic principles, to avoid waste of petroleum resources. 
735 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008). 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008,6-7. 
736 See the submission by APPEA to the Australian Productivity Commission relating to regulatory burdens in the 
Australian upstream petroleum sector: see APPEA, Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of the 
Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (2008) Submission 16 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/83422/sub016.pdf at 17 October 2008, 6. 
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inconsistent regulatory requirements, especially if there are multiple 
jurisdictions.737 
Another concern is that the Australian regulatory legislative framework may lead 
to inconsistencies in application, rigidity, and may promote creative compliance 
in order to adjust to new situations.738  In addition, the legislation is based on 
prohibition and authorisation of activities. Whilst the structure of the legislation 
might deter some behaviour,739 it could also fail to provide positive incentives for 
at least some companies.740 Indeed, Daintith notes that some companies are likely 
to embrace the adage ‘if we can’t do it our way we won’t do it at all, or we’ll go 
somewhere else to do it’.741 This means that companies are likely to either hand 
back licences or seek opportunities in other jurisdictions. Both are actions that are 
not likely to encourage optimal development of Australia’s offshore petroleum 
resources.  
Australia has continued to embrace complex, detailed legislation that requires 
constant amendments. Since the newly created OPA was passed by the 
parliament in 2006, there were five separate Amending Acts,742 with the 
majority of changes occurring prior to the Principal Act entering into force in 
2008.743 Furthermore, OPAGGSA, which entered into force in November 2008, 
 
737 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008, 6-7. 
738 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 108. 
739 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 108. 
740 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 108. 
741 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 108. 
742 Amending Acts include Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Datum) Act 2008; Offshore Petroleum Amendment 
(Miscellaneous Measures) Act 2008; Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008; 
Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greater Sunrise) Act 2007; and Australian Energy Market (Gas Legislation) Act, 
2007.  
743 The Offshore Petroleum Act 2006 (Cth) commenced on 1 July 2008. (See s2 of the Act for commencement 
details). 
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has already undergone substantial amendment, requiring four new compilations 
of the legislation in its first eighteen months.744  
Certainly, the prescriptive, regulatory legislative framework for Australian 
offshore petroleum was initially necessary to administer Australia’s offshore 
petroleum activities.745 However, research suggests that an objective based 
approach to legislation is preferable for the regulation of petroleum activities,746 
since prescriptive legislation tends to create unnecessary regulatory burden and 
duplication.747  
A review of the PSLA in 2000, required for the adoption of Australian National 
Competition Policy (NCP) reforms,748 identified that although there had been 
some shift from prescriptive to objective based regulation, the regulation of 
petroleum activities offshore still remained prescriptive and rule based.749 
Furthermore, the review identified many instances of regulatory burden and 
duplication in the petroleum legislation.750  
A review of regulatory burden in the offshore petroleum sector in 2008-2009 
also demonstrated that the current legislative provisions continue to impose 
significant burdens on the upstream offshore petroleum sector.751 These burdens 
hamper sustainable socio-economic development, as they create delays, reduce 
flexibility, impede the financing of projects and defer production and 
 
744 As current to 1 January 2010. For a list of these legislative compilations see www.comlaw.gov.au.  
745 This was due to the complex constitutional requirements as a result of the Federation. The Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement has resolved this. 
746 ACIL Consulting Pty Ltd, Report to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee (2000). 
747 The regulatory burden was the subject of an Australian Productivity Commission Study in 2008-9, with the final 
report and recommendations released in April 2009. See Australian Productivity Commission, Review of 
Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) Sector – Research Report (2009) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, XXIII. 
748 By the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee. 
749 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 23. 
750 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 23. In addition, the report identified a need to convert 
directions in oilfield practice to objective based regulation. 
751 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
XXIII. 
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revenues.752 This has a major impact on the economic viability and 
sustainability of a project. It is estimated that expediting the regulatory approval 
process for a major project by one year can increase the net present value of 
returns 10-20% since it brings forward the income streams.753 
The legal and administrative burdens characterising the current legislative 
framework impose significant economic effects on the participants, affecting 
the economic return of a project.754 Regulatory burden increases compliance 
costs in major projects, as well as increasing project expenditure and delay 
approvals.755 In addition, regulatory constraints that delay or defer production 
start-up can diminish project returns, reducing net present value of economic 
benefits likely to be generated.756 Together, these can have a negative impact on 
investment attractiveness, which has been identified as an Australian petroleum 
policy objective.  
High compliance costs, and delay costs arising from Australia’s complex 
regulatory regime not only reduces the profitability for all participants, but also 
reduces the sectors ability to attract project capital from international 
investors.757 This means that the current legislative regime is working at cross-
 
752 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
XXIII. 
753 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
XXV. 
754 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009; 
and Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), 184.  
755 This is particularly evident in Western Australia. See Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory 
Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) Sector – Research Report (2009) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009; and Australian Productivity 
Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) Sector – Draft Report (2009), 
183-4. 
756 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009; 
and Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), 186-7. 
757 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009; 
and Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), 190. 
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purposes with the national policy objectives. Rather than attracting international 
investment to develop petroleum resources, the current legislative framework 
serves as an impediment to attracting international investment in the sector.758  
The current legislative framework also has a major impact on the management 
of petroleum resources. Resource regulation in Australia is intended to 
maximise the return to Australia for the exploitation of its petroleum 
resources.759 At present the regulation of petroleum resources is multi-authority 
and multi-jurisdictional.760 However, not all jurisdictions agree on the role of 
the government in the management of resources.761 Some jurisdictions, such as 
Western Australia, see the role of the government as paramount in the 
management of resources.762 Other jurisdictions, such as South Australia, see 
no specific role for the government.763 Where there are differences between 
government perceptions of national interest, there is likely to be conflict 
between government and commercial imperatives in some jurisdictions.764  
This discord between states on the role of government in the management of 
resources for the benefit of the community is assisted by the lack of an 
objectives clause in the petroleum legislation. The OPAGGSA, (and the PSLA 
prior to that), did not have a defined objective.765 The PSLA Review 
 
758 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), 190.  
759 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 31.  
760 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 
XXIII. 
761 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 
XXV. 
762 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), 83.  
763 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), 84.  
764 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
31; Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), 84. 
765 Until mid 2009. 
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Committee, and ACIL,766 who assessed the PSLA in 2000,767 concurred that a 
clear statement of the objective of the legislation is fundamental to good 
program design and the delivery of effective outcomes.768 Both agreed that 
without a clear objective statement, it is difficult to deliver sustainable 
development of petroleum resources.769 Both also agreed that the objective of 
the legislation should be to optimise/maximise the current net value of the 
petroleum resources, although they differed on how that is most likely to be 
achieved.770  
The PSLA Review Committee recommended the adoption of an objectives 
clause that makes explicit reference to getting the best value from the resource 
for the nation, with appropriate strategies for achieving that objective.771 
Further, the Committee articulated government responsibility as steward of 
petroleum resources, holding them in trust for the whole community.772 In 
addition, the Committee was mindful that it is private oil companies, with 
commercial imperatives, that enable the value of petroleum resources to be 
realised. As such, the Committee recommended that the legislation be objective 
based with a clear statement of objectives regarding the development of 
petroleum resources to benefit the Australian community.773 The Productivity 
 
766 ACIL refers to ACIL Consulting Pty Ltd, who was commissioned by the PSLA Review Committee, utilising 
their expertise and independence to provide input into the review and assist with the preparation of the report and 
recommendations. See Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of 
the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000). 
767 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009 
OR Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Interim Report (2009), 190. 
768 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 7. 
769 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 7. 
770 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 7. 
771 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 7-8. 
772  Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 7-8. 
773 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000),7-8, 23-4. 
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Commission review on regulatory burden supported the need for a defined 
objectives clause.774 In its 2009 report, the Productivity Commission 
recommended that the Australian government should ensure that legislative 
intent is clearly defined through clear explanatory memorandums and objectives 
clauses, to ensure that there is a transition to objective-based legislation.775  
An objectives clause has been inserted in the new OPAGGSA.776 This clause 
notes that the objective of OPAGGSA is to provide an effective regulatory 
framework for petroleum exploration and recovery, and the injection and 
storage of greenhouse gases in offshore areas.777 However, the clause fails to 
articulate the national petroleum objectives. If the Commonwealth were to 
review and rewrite the OPAGGSA, the new legislation should expand on the 
existing objective clause to clearly articulate the goals and responsibilities of the 
Commonwealth in the exploitation of petroleum resources. This objective 
clause should reflect the petroleum policy of expanding Australia’s resources 
base, increasing international competition and improve the regulatory regime 
consistent with principles of environmental responsibility and sustainable 
development. 
It is important to recognise that not all petroleum jurisdictions in Australia have 
continued to preserve the prescriptive approach to petroleum regulation that is 
the behemoth Australian Commonwealth petroleum legislation. A major review 
of onshore petroleum legislation in South Australia in 1996 recognised that 
significant benefits lay in adopting objective based regulation.778 The review 
required an extensive process of industry and public stakeholder consultation, 
 
774 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
LIV. 
775 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
LIV. 
776 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s3. 
777 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s3. 
778 E Alexander and J Morton, ‘Selecting the Winning Bid’ (2002) APPEA Journal 523, 523. 
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and took four years to complete.779 It was intended that the new legislation 
would be aligned to South Australian state government objectives for the 
management of their petroleum resources, which is to maximise the public 
benefit derived from Australia’s discovered and undiscovered petroleum 
resources.780  
The resultant South Australian Petroleum Act 2000 (SA) (PASA) represents a 
significant departure from the Australian legislative tradition of prescriptive, 
rule based legislation. Certainly it has been easier for South Australia to 
legislate using objective based legislation, since they have not had to negotiate 
the myriad of constitutional and regulatory issues that exist due to the offshore 
jurisdictions that arose from the Offshore Constitutional Settlement.781 The 
legislative reform was driven by changing community perceptions, particularly 
in relation to the environment and sustainability. The new PASA sought to 
provide certainty, openness, transparency, flexibility, practicality and 
efficiency.782 In applying these principles, the PASA achieves a more effective 
means for allocation and managing the exploration and development rights to 
the resources. It also provides a more effective means for ensuring security of 
production and supply is maintained at a prudent level.783 
Unlike OPAGGSA, the PASA outlines its objectives in detail.784 Its objectives 
are to create an efficient, effective and flexible regulatory system for the 
exploration and production industries,785 to encourage and maintain 
 
779 Primary Industries and Resources South Australia, Petroleum Act 2000 Summary, (2008) 
http://www.petroleum.pir.sa.gov.au/legislation/relevant_acts_and_regulations at 15 August 2009. 
780 E Alexander and J Morton, ‘Selecting the Winning Bid’ (2002) APPEA Journal 523, 523. 
781 It is important to note that this legislation applies to onshore petroleum resources only. 
782 Primary Industries and Resources South Australia, Petroleum Act 2000 Summary (2009) 
http://www.petroleum.pir.sa.gov.au/legislation/relevant_acts_and_regulations at 12 August 2009. 
783 Primary Industries and Resources South Australia, Petroleum Act 2000 Summary (2009) 
http://www.petroleum.pir.sa.gov.au/legislation/relevant_acts_and_regulations at 12 August 2009.  
784 These are outlined in s3 of the Petroleum Act 2000 (SA). 
785 Petroleum Act 2000 (SA), s3 (a). 
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competition,786 to minimise environmental damage,787 ensure security of supply 
for users,788 establish appropriate consultative processes for those affected by 
the activities including the general public,789 and to protect the public from 
risks.790  
Interestingly, the Australian petroleum industry has indicated that the relatively 
straightforward PASA could be considered a benchmark for other 
jurisdictions.791 The Australian peak petroleum industry, APPEA, noted that  
‘…the South Australia Petroleum Act 2000 is simple to follow and 
regulate. This principle legislation is 61 pages long and the 
subordinate regulations 41 pages in length. While the length of the 
legislation may not be a critical factor in assessing the 
appropriateness of legislative frameworks, the ease of 
comprehension of the legislation and its purpose are discernible 
factors when reading legislation’.792  
It appears that a legislative framework similar to South Australia’s objective 
based PASA for onshore petroleum activities has the support of the Australian 
petroleum industry, due to its brevity and simplicity, therefore providing the 
Commonwealth with a legislative structure for future Acts. Furthermore, the 
PASA demonstrates a shift in legislative drafting from a prescriptive approach 
to a more objective, outcome oriented legislation.  
The World Bank recognises that principle based regulation for petroleum 
resource development is superior to the rule based form, in order to provide 
 
786 Petroleum Act 2000 (SA), s3 (b). 
787 Petroleum Act 2000 (SA), s3 (d). 
788 Petroleum Act 2000 (SA), s3 (f). 
789 Petroleum Act 2000 (SA), s3 (e). 
790 Petroleum Act 2000 (SA), s3(g). 
791 APPEA, Submission to Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream 
(Petroleum and Gas) Sector –Issues Paper (2008) Submission 16 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/submissions on 14 September 2009, 14. 
792 APPEA, Submission to Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream 
(Petroleum and Gas) Sector –Issues Paper (2008) Submission 16 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/submissions on 14 September 2009, 14. 
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optimal resource management.793 Since short, thorough, broad, generic petroleum 
legislation is ‘the cornerstone of effective petroleum legislative framework.’794 
The World Bank stipulates that this broad legislation should be not overly 
detailed, and should be accompanied by enabling regulations to give both parties 
a clear legal framework to develop petroleum resources.795 It also recognises that 
principle based regulation provides flexibility for the State in the regulation of 
petroleum activities, and is more likely to produce behaviour which fulfils the 
states regulatory objectives.796  
The South Australian petroleum legislation meets the criteria defined by the 
World Bank as an effective petroleum regulatory framework. It is a short, 
objective-based Act with enabling regulations. Along with the compact PASA, 
the Petroleum Regulations 2000 (SA) (PRSA) are enabling regulations, setting 
out licence application requirements, environmental protection requirements, 
notices regarding drilling etc, and general reporting requirements.  
The Norwegian regulatory legislative framework for petroleum activities 
correlates with the view of the World Bank as an effective, efficient regulatory 
package for petroleum activities,797 as it comprises a short, objective based Act 
with enabling regulations that clearly outline the requirements for petroleum 
activities whilst conferring discretion upon the State in petroleum exploitation. 
This flexibility enables the Norwegian State to provide participants with an 
efficient and effective legal framework to establish and continue petroleum 
activities that benefit both the State and oil companies, rather than strict 
 
793 William T Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper WPS 1420, 4. 
794 William T Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper WPS 1420, 3. 
795 William T Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper WPS 1420, 3-4. 
796 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) Paper Presented at the 
Banco Court, Sydney, 27 March 2007, 7. 
797 As recommended by William Onorato, ‘World Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas 
Development’ (2001) 39 (1) Alberta Oil Review 70, 77. 
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conditions that are difficult or impossible to alter in response to market 
fluctuations.798 
The Norwegian legislative framework creates predictable and transparent 
legislative conditions, clearly defining the rights and responsibilities of the 
participants.799 One of the major strengths of the Norwegian legislation is that, 
like the South Australian legislation, it focuses upon the outcomes that the State 
seeks to accomplish, rather than the rules on how to extract petroleum. A 
flexible, objective based regulatory legislative framework like Norway or South 
Australia could assist Australia in attaining its national petroleum objectives of 
sustainable petroleum development. 
Identified regulatory burden,800 and demonstrated industry support for change 
to Australia’s regulatory legislative framework similar to the South Australian 
onshore petroleum legislation, indicates that the Australian petroleum industry 
is ready to embrace legislative change. The capacity of Norwegian petroleum 
legislation to maximise the value of petroleum resources may demonstrate that 
principle based legislation is suitable to accomplish sustainable resource 
development. The acceptance of the South Australian legislation by the 
petroleum industry, and the demonstrated success of the Norwegian legislative 
framework in encouraging sustainable development of petroleum resources 
indicate that Australia could encourage sustainable development of petroleum 
resources using principle based legislation rather than continue to utilise a rule 
based legislative framework. It is feasible for Australia to undertake a detailed 
review and rewrite of the OPAGGSA and create an objective based legislation. 
South Australia’s petroleum legislation, and the process of community and 
industry consultation that created the legislation, could serve as a useful 
 
798 William T Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper WPS 1420, 4. 
799 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009). 
800 Identified by the Australian Productivity Commission in its report Australian Productivity Commission, Review 
of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) Sector – Research Report (2009) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009. 
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example of legislative reform that is acceptable to both government and 
industry.  
 
3.4 Administration of petroleum regulation 
3.4.1 Principle of a competent administrative authority 
The role of a petroleum administrative authority is to implement the regulatory 
legislative framework to assist the State in achieving national petroleum 
objectives. It operates to coordinate the development of a State’s petroleum 
resources.801 A single administrative authority with the competence to 
implement government petroleum policy and negotiate with oil companies is a 
necessary legal institution for competent exploitation of resources.802 A State 
should develop a single authority, intergovernmental and inter-ministerial if 
required, to licence, contract and supervise petroleum operations.803 This body 
should have the necessary legal capacity as well as decision-making capacity to 
regulate petroleum objective consistent with national petroleum objectives. 
3.4.2 Administration of petroleum activities in Australia and 
Norway  
In Norway a single administrative authority, the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD), was established by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
(MPE) in the early 1970s, with a mandate to manage Norwegian oil and gas 
resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.804 The NPD provides an 
effective administrative authority for the management of petroleum resources, 
 
801 William Onorato, ‘World Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas Development’ (2001) 39 
(1) Alberta Oil Review 70, 74. 
802 William Onorato, ‘World Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas Development’ (2001) 39 
(1) Alberta Oil Review 70, 74. 
803 William Onorato, ‘World Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas Development’ (2001) 39 
(1) Alberta Oil Review 70, 75-6. 
804 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, History (2005) http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/Organisation/History/  at 12 
October 2008.  
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since it is a single body with extensive expertise in petroleum exploitation, 
responsible for administering and regulating petroleum activities within a 
coordinated legal regime.805 
The Norwegian State sees clarity, transparency, and predictable processes and 
decisions essential in the working relationship between the government and the 
industry. Clarity is perceived as particularly important since it is only through 
clearly articulated regulatory roles that efficient and effective resource 
management can occur.806 Thus the NPD was established as a single regulatory 
authority, ensuring clarity, certainty and transparency in the regulation of all 
aspects of petroleum exploitation.807 
The NPD, as a specialist administrative body for petroleum activities, has as its 
prime objective ‘contributing to creating the greatest possible values for society 
from the oil and gas activities by means of prudent resource management’.808 To 
attain its objective, the NPD performs a number of roles, including regulatory, 
planning and advisory, and information storage and management. 
The NPD performs a regulatory role by setting frameworks, stipulating 
regulations and making administrative decisions in areas where it has delegated 
authority.809 It also performs an advisory role, directing the Ministry for 
Petroleum and Energy (MPE) on matters regarding petroleum development. In 
particular, the NPD emphasises cooperation, long-term solutions, and joint 
operations to ensure sustainable development of petroleum resources, particularly 
 
805 See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/ at 27 November 2009. 
806 The framework of Norwegian Petroleum resource policy principles and objectives comes from Gunnar Gjerde, 
The Norwegian Model and the Working Relationship Between the Authorities and the Industry: As Seen from the 
Authorities’ Point of View (2007) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Norwegian%20model/Norwegian_model_program_Gunnar_Gjer
de.pdf  at 12 March 2008, 2-5. 
807 See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/ at 27 November 2009. 
808 See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/ at 27 November 2009. 
809 See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/ at 27 November 2009. 
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time critical resources in mature areas, to ensure it meets its national petroleum 
objectives. The NPD also has a responsibility for all petroleum data from the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), maintaining a comprehensive petroleum 
database that contains seismic and well data, as well as a core repository.810 It is 
important to note that from 1st January 2004, the regulatory responsibility for 
safety, emergency preparedness and the working environment in the petroleum 
sector was taken over by a special body, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety 
Authority (PSA), a Subordinate to the Ministry of Labour. The responsibility was 
taken over from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, who now has only the 
regulatory responsibility for petroleum activities.811 
This differs substantially to the administration of Australian offshore petroleum 
resources. Current offshore petroleum legislation (OPAGGSA) establishes two 
authorities for the management of petroleum resources.812 The regulation of 
offshore petroleum resources is the responsibility of the Commonwealth and 
the state/territory governments, resulting from the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement.  
Onshore and coastal waters (effectively the first three nautical miles from the 
coastline) are the regulatory and administrative jurisdiction of the relevant 
states and territories, with each allocating petroleum rights, administering 
petroleum operations, including occupational health and safety, and collecting 
royalties on petroleum produced.813  
Beyond the coastal waters (seaward of the first three nautical miles of the 
Territorial Sea) to the outer limits of Australia's continental shelf, the 
management of offshore petroleum is divided between the Commonwealth and 
 
810 See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/ at 27 November 2009. 
811 See Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority at www.psa.no.   
812 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act (Cth), Part 1.3, Division 1. 
813 Department of Tourism Industry and Resources, Offshore Acreage Release 2006: Roles and Responsibilities of 
Government (2006) www.industry.gov.au/acreage releases/2006/HTML/Overview/contents_8.HTML at 7 April 
2007. 
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state/territory governments, through the Joint Authority (JA) and the 
Designated Authority (DA).814 The state and territory governments act as the 
DA, and are responsible for the day-to-day decision making in respect of the 
area of the Continental Shelf off the coast of the relevant state. The relevant 
Commonwealth minister and his state counterpart form a JA for each State, and 
are responsible for the major decisions in the offshore Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, including the grant, renewal and cancellation of titles.815 In the 
event of a disagreement in the JA, the Commonwealth view prevails.816 This 
structure of administration means there are at least two regulatory bodies that 
an oil company is required to liaise with in order to develop petroleum 
resources within a licence area. 
 
3.4.3 A critical analysis of Australian administration of 
petroleum activities 
The Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) recognised in 2006 that 
although some attempts have been made to streamline upstream petroleum 
administration and harmonise local, state and Commonwealth legislation, there 
is scope for further improvement in the regulation and administration of 
offshore petroleum in Australia.817 Consequently, the Australian Productivity 
Commission commissioned an inquiry into regulatory burdens and impediments 
that hamper petroleum exploration and production in Australia.818 The dual 
level of offshore petroleum resource management at state and Commonwealth 
 
814 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s56. 
815 Terrence Daintith, ‘State-Company Relations in Offshore Oil Exploitation: Regulatory and Contractual 
Analysis’ in Barry Barton, et. al, (eds), Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (2006) 267, 277. 
816 Pat Brazil Offshore Constitutional Settlement 1980: A Case Study in Federalism (2001) Centre for International 
and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National University, 2. 
817 Council of Australian Governments, CoAG: Meeting Outcomes: Reducing the Regulatory Burden (2006) 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2006-07-14/index.cfm#reduce at 17 October 2007. 
818 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008. 
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level, as well as the added jurisdictional layer of local government planning and 
approvals, was identified by the Productivity Commission as a regulatory 
impediment affecting resource development and investment in the onshore 
petroleum sector.819  
The current Australian administrative regime has been identified as a regulatory 
environment that is burdensome for oil companies, due to multiple jurisdictions 
and hundreds of regulatory approvals and decision points.820 Each of these 
means hundreds of opportunities for regulatory failure,821 which translates to 
lost opportunity for sustainable socio-economic development of petroleum 
resources.  
The Productivity Commission inquiry into regulatory burden in the Australian 
Offshore Petroleum Sector822 recommended the establishment of a new national 
offshore petroleum administrative body to improve productivity and decrease 
regulatory burden in the Australian petroleum industry.823 The recommendations 
include the establishment of a new independent statutory authority that would 
serve as a single national offshore administrator in Commonwealth waters, with 
regulatory responsibility for resource management, pipelines and environmental 
approval and compliance.824 The Commission recommended that the body would 
 
819 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector: Productivity Commission Issues Paper (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/82026/upstream-petroleum-issues.pdf at 11 August 2008, 5. 
820 Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, Submission to the Productivity Commission 
Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/83422/sub016.pdf at 17 October 2008, 7. 
821 Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, Submission to the Productivity Commission 
Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (2008) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/83422/sub016.pdf at 17 October 2008, 7. 
822 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009. 
823 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 
XX.  
824 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 
292. 
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serve to either regulate activities in Commonwealth waters only,825 or all offshore 
petroleum activities seaward of low water mark.826  
The recommendation by the Australian Productivity Commission for a single 
regulatory administrator is supported by the Australian oil and gas industry. Its 
peak body the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association 
(APPEA) has identified the dual levels of administration as a problem, since they 
increase the amount of compliance costs.827 A singe administrative model, such 
as the petroleum administration framework in South Australia under the PASA, 
was highlighted by APPEA as an effective way of regulating petroleum 
exploitation in a clear, effective and transparent manner.828 Further, APPEA sees 
a single authority model as a system capable of providing all necessary approvals, 
licences and permits for petroleum exploration and production, whilst at the same 
time encouraging investment in petroleum activities.829  
Similar duplication occurred in the regulation and administration of safety in 
Australian offshore petroleum activities prior to 2005. This duplication and 
inconsistency arose as a result of the number and inconsistency of Acts, 
directions and regulations regulating safety in offshore petroleum activities.830 
A review into the regulation of Australian offshore petroleum safety, concluded 
 
825 Known as the NOPR-CW model, see Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the 
Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) Sector – Research Report (2009) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 288. 
826 Known as the NOPR regulation model. This would require the states to confer state power over coastal waters 
on the Commonwealth. See Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream 
(Petroleum and Gas) Sector – Research Report (2009) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 88-92. 
827 APPEA, Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream 
Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (2008) Submission 16 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/83422/sub016.pdf at 17 October 2008, 7. 
828 APPEA, Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream 
Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (2008) Submission 16 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/83422/sub016.pdf at 17 October 2008, 49. 
829 APPEA, Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream 
Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (2008) Submission 16 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/83422/sub016.pdf at 17 October 2008, 49. 
830 Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Offshore Safety and Security, Petroleum and Electricity 
Division, Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety Case Review: Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore 
Petroleum Safety (2005), 6. 
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in 2003, found that the Australian legal and administrative framework for 
health, safety and the environment in the offshore petroleum industry was 
complicated and insufficient to ensure appropriate, effective and efficient 
regulation and operation of the offshore petroleum industry.831 This 
administrative duplication in offshore petroleum safety was alleviated in 2005 
by the creation of the Australian National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority 
(NOPSA).832 NOPSA administers all offshore petroleum safety legislation, 
including Commonwealth, state and territory coastal waters.833 NOPSA’s 
objectives are regulating and improving health and safety in the offshore 
petroleum industry, as well as reducing regulatory burden in the offshore 
petroleum industry.834 Although NOPSA only regulates offshore petroleum 
safety,835 it demonstrates the capacity and constitutional capability to create a 
multi-jurisdictional, cross-jurisdictional body to regulate offshore petroleum 
activities in Australia.   
A single administrative body is practical, since it removes a number of 
regulatory processes for participants in petroleum production, and would 
increase Australia’s attractiveness as a province for petroleum production and 
exploration. It would ensure seamless regulation and remove regulatory burden 
since companies would only deal with a single organisation rather than the 
multiple regulatory authorities that currently exist in Australia. Furthermore, it 
would reduce regulatory burden substantially, and therefore enable the 
sustainable socio-economic development of Australia's offshore petroleum 
resources.  
 
831 Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Offshore Safety and Security, Petroleum and Electricity 
Division, Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety Case Review: Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore 
Petroleum Safety (2005), 5. 
832 National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority, Welcome to NOPSA (2010) www.nopsa.gov.au at 10 February 
2010. 
833 National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority, Welcome to NOPSA (2010) www.nopsa.gov.au at 10 February 
2010. 
834 NOPSA, History of NOPSA (2008) http://www.nopsa.gov.au/history.asp at 10 August 2008. 
835 NOPSA, History of NOPSA (2008) http://www.nopsa.gov.au/history.asp at 10 August 2008. 
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The creation of a single administrative body for the regulation of offshore 
petroleum activities is constitutionally possible in Australia.  Should there be a 
lack of state and territory support, the Commonwealth could establish and 
maintain a single administrative body by invoking the corporations power,836 or 
the trade and commerce power.837 However, there are a number of State 
governments in Australia that have expressed reservation over the creation of a 
single regulatory authority, citing a concern that such a body could undermine 
the cooperative federalism represented by the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement.838 Yet if a single regulatory body were created as a result of the 
referral of state and territory powers for petroleum regulation to the 
Commonwealth, then cooperative federalism would be reinforced rather than 
undermined, since a state or territory would be freely agreeing to cooperate with 
the Commonwealth to encourage sound resource management.839 
The failure of Australia to create a single regulatory authority not only 
contributes to regulatory burden, but it also fails to encourage sustainable 
development of Australia’s petroleum resources. This is because the regulation 
of petroleum is undertaken by seven different governments, under two 
administrative bodies, with no clear objective focused on implementing national 
petroleum objectives. The administration of petroleum regulation in Norway by 
the NPD demonstrates that the creation of such a legal institution is capable of 
securing the legal and administrative competence to implement the Norwegian 
petroleum objective of sustainable petroleum development for the benefit of 
Norwegian society.   
 
 
836 s51 (xx) of the Constitution of Australia.  
837 s51 (i) of the Constitution of Australia. 
838 The primary objectors were the NT and Western Australian Governments. See Australian Productivity 
Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) Sector – Research Report (2009) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 291. 
839 It is possible for the States to refer their powers in a specific area of responsibility to the Commonwealth, such 
as the referral of arbitration and conciliation powers by Victoria to the Commonwealth under the Commonwealth 
Powers (Industrial Relations Act) 1996 (Vic). 
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3.5 State regulation of petroleum activities and 
participants through the petroleum contract 
The exploitation of petroleum is a commercial venture, undertaken as a joint 
activity between oil companies with the express purpose to produce petroleum 
as profitably as possible.840 Whilst the relationship between the State as owner 
of the petroleum resources and third parties as licencees to exploit the 
petroleum resources is governed through the regulatory legislative 
framework,841 the commercial relationship between the companies is managed 
by an agreement between the parties commonly known as a Joint Venture 
Agreement (JVA) or a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) 
 The JVA is a mixture of legal and practical elements, since it is a commercial 
agreement, but its backbone is legal.842 It serves as a binding legal agreement 
between all of the participating parties, including the State where the State is a 
participant, but it can also be a part of the general regulatory framework utilised 
by the state to govern petroleum activities. 
It also provides a framework for the conduct of commercial petroleum 
activities, and decision-making within the scope of those commercial activities 
through the management committee of the joint venture agreement.  Whilst it 
focuses on the essential legal provisions of the agreement for petroleum 
activities, it also establishes the basis for sharing the rights and liabilities 
between the licencees for a particular petroleum licence. Each licencee has a 
participating interest, and the JVA ensures that the rights and liabilities that 
arise in connection with a petroleum licence are shared between the licencees in 
proportion to their participating interest.843 The JVA also governs the conduct 
 
840 Knut Kaasen, ‘Scope of Joint Operating Agreements in Norway’ (2001) 281 Marius Yearbook 2001, 175, 190. 
841 ABARE, Australia’s Petroleum Resource Rent Tax: An Economic Assessment of Fiscal Settings (2003) ABARE 
eReport 03.1, 27.  
842 Knut Kaasen, ‘Scope of Joint Operating Agreements in Norway’ (2000) 261 Marius 127, 147.  
843 Michael P Taylor and Thomas P Winsor, Joint Operating Agreements (1989), 5. 
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of an operation of a licence through the appointment of an operator who is 
responsible for the day-to-day responsibility for the conduct of petroleum 
activities. As a part of this, the JVA secures the control over the petroleum 
operations on a field through the management committee.844 
3.5.1 Types of petroleum contracts in Australia and Norway 
The Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) in Australia serves no regulatory role for 
the State in the regulation of petroleum development, since the State does not 
participate in petroleum activities.  
The JVA in Australia is a wholly private agreement between the joint venture 
(JV) parties. As such the joint venturers are able to put as many or as few 
provisions into the JVA as the parties require. There is no government 
regulation of the formation of a JVA. However, the JVA requires statutory 
approval for the project being conducted by the JVA, and is subject to the 
statutory obligations outside of the JVA, including the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), OPAGGSA, and common law fiduciary duties. Once a JV is 
formed and approved by the relevant authority,845 the JVA regulates the 
relationship between the participants in a JV and the development of petroleum 
resources. 
Generally, all Australian commercial JVAs in the petroleum industry are 
unincorporated joint ventures (UJV). In this commercial arrangement, the 
members of the JV associate themselves for the particular acreage exploration 
or production venture and share the production from the venture, rather than the 
profits from the company, and then apply for a petroleum exploration licence. 
In this legal relationship, the participants enter into a contractual relationship for 
a particular licence area, without forming a separate legal entity. These 
 
844 Michael P Taylor and Thomas P Winsor, Joint Operating Agreements (1989), 5. 
845The relevant authority will depend on which jurisdiction the petroleum development falls into. If it is an offshore 
development that falls under the auspices of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), 
then the JV will be approved by the JA in that state/territory.   
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individual JV agreements fall under commercial-in-confidence, and are 
unavailable to anyone but participants, or those parties with access to the 
petroleum register.846  
The structure of the UJV and the relationship between the participants means 
that there are a number of critical issues that must be addressed when forming a 
JVA for the exploitation of petroleum resources. These issues include the scope 
purpose and duration of the JV, the obligations and rights of the participants, 
and the structure of the JV for the operation, management and control of the JV. 
Other vital issues include an identification of assets committed to the joint 
venture, including the taking of security over a JV participant’s interests. 
Participating interests of the participants are detailed in the JVA, setting out the 
proportionate shares or interests of the JV held by each participant. It also 
creates legal rights between the parties as tenants-in-common to take a specified 
proportion of JV production, separately and for its own account.847  
It is important to note that there is no uniform commercial JVA in Australia. 
The Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) has developed a 
Model Form Joint Operating Agreement (MFJOA) to encourage greater 
harmonisation of JVAs in the oil and gas industry.848 This MFJOA seeks to be 
flexible, accommodating the preferences of all parties and legal regimes.849 The 
existence of such an international model JVA supports the World Bank view of 
the essential nature of a model contract between the parties.850 There appears to 
 
846 For example see Western Australia Department of Mines and Petroleum, Title Search Request (2009) 
http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/5776.aspx at 27 November 2009. 
847 Mallesons Stephen Jaques, Joint Ventures (2005) 
http://www.mallesons.com/publications/2005/Dec/8222123W.htm at 12 July 2009. 
848 Catia Malaquias Miles, ‘AIPN 2002 Model Joint Operating Agreement in Oil and Gas Joint Ventures’ (2003) 22 
Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 153, 154. 
849 Catia Malaquias Miles, ‘AIPN 2002 Model Joint Operating Agreement in Oil and Gas Joint Ventures’ (2003) 22 
Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 153, 153. 
850 William T Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper WPS 1420, 45. 
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be some use of this model agreement in Australia, although there still remains a 
preference for individually negotiated JV agreements.851  
There are provisions for government ratification of JVAs for offshore petroleum 
activities in Western Australian through non-compulsory State Agreements.852 
State Agreements are contracts between the Government of Western Australia 
and proponents of major resource projects (both mining and petroleum, onshore 
and offshore). They are ratified by an Act of the State Parliament.853 They 
specify the rights, obligations, terms and conditions for development of the 
project and establish a framework for ongoing relations and cooperation 
between the State and the companies developing the petroleum.854 Rather than a 
regulatory tool for resource development, State Agreements are a facilitating 
mechanism, ensuring development of specific long-term projects through a 
negotiated agreement to ensure long-term certainty, land tenure and complex 
approvals. They are utilised to provide greater certainty to the project, security 
of tenure, and reduce sovereign risk for investors.855 
When entering into a State Agreement, the Western Australian government 
seeks to satisfy several objectives. Primarily, the objective is to facilitate the 
efficient and effective development of Western Australia’s petroleum 
resources.856 This includes managing the development by ensuring it is 
consistent with state policies on issues such as land use, conservation, 
 
851 Catia Malaquias Miles, ‘AIPN 2002 Model Joint Operating Agreement in Oil and Gas Joint Ventures’ (2003) 22 
Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 153, 154. 
852 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2007) 
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/documents/investment/State_Agreements_text_v2.pdf at 30 March 2008, 1. 
853 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2007) 
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/documents/investment/State_Agreements_text_v2.pdf at 30 March 2008, 1. 
854 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2009) 
http://www.dsd.wa.gov.au/6641.aspx#6666 at 3 September 2009, 1. 
855 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2007) 
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/documents/investment/State_Agreements_text_v2.pdf at 30 March 2008, 1. 
856 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2007) 
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/documents/investment/State_Agreements_text_v2.pdf at 30 March 2008, 1. 
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competition, and infrastructure.857 However, the government also seeks to 
ensure that the resource development provides economic and social benefits for 
the Western Australian community.858  
The Western Australian State Agreements generally operate throughout the life 
of the project. To this end, there are provisions in the State Agreements that 
deal with matters such as assignment, variation of contractual provisions, and 
force majeure. Provisions are also included for the submission of additional 
proposals if the joint venturers wish to modify, expand or vary the project. It is 
important to note that only the JV parties can alter the terms of the project, since 
the State Agreement does not give the Western Australian government the right 
to alter the project proposal once it has been approved by the parliament. 
Although not compulsory, there is some indication that the Australian resources 
industry approves of State Agreements, particularly for large projects. This is 
indicated by the take-up rate of Western Australian State Agreements, which 
have been used for the last 40 years. Currently, state agreements are utilised in 
over 70% of all major development projects in Western Australia, accounting 
for over $4 billion in processed minerals and energy production in Western 
Australia.859  
The State Agreements reduce a large amount of regulatory burden for oil 
companies, since project approvals at state and federal level are fast tracked, as 
well as brought together under a single umbrella.860 Once a State Agreement 
has been ratified by the Western Australian parliament, it is the only regulatory 
compliance document required for project development. This considerably 
reduces compliance burden and costs for oil companies, thus contributing to 
 
857 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2007) 
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/documents/investment/State_Agreements_text_v2.pdf at 30 March 2008, 1. 
858 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2009) 
http://www.dsd.wa.gov.au/6641.aspx#6666 at 3 September 2009, 1. 
859 Chamber of Minerals and Energy, State Agreements (2004), 1. 
860 Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources, State Agreements (2009) 
http://www.dsd.wa.gov.au/6641.aspx#6666 at 3 September 2009, 1. 
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sustainable economic development of offshore petroleum resources. To date, 
State Agreements have been used in all major resources projects in Western 
Australia, including the North West Shelf Gas Project and the Barrow Island 
Gas Project, and include several international oil companies.861 
The absence of a contractual regulatory relationship between the licencee and 
the State in Australia encourages oil companies to invest in Australia, thereby 
fulfilling a primary objective of Australia’s petroleum policy.862 Australia's 
stated policy objective is to attract international oil companies, and remain 
competitive and attractive to investors. A lack of contractual agreement between 
the State and companies encourages international investors, since oil companies 
are attracted to Australia’s regulatory environment that is free from government 
interference in production and cessation of activities.  
In Norway the joint petroleum activities between participants is regulated by a 
joint venture agreement known as the Joint Operating Agreement (Norway) 
(JOA).  Under section 3-3 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) the 
State may stipulate as a condition for the granting of a production licence that 
the licencees are required to enter into agreements with specified contents with 
one another.863 Without a JOA, petroleum exploitation cannot commence.864 
Therefore, together with the PAA and the PR, the mandatory JOA forms part of 
a regulatory trinity that enables the State to regulate all aspects of petroleum 
development and production.865  
 
861This includes agreements concluded under the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Limited’s (Private) Act 1919, British 
Imperial Oil Company, Limited (Private) Act 1925, Commonwealth Oil Refineries Limited (Private) Act 1940 and   
Texas Company (Australasia) Limited (Private) Act 1928. 
862 The advantages of a contractual relationship are discussed in, Terence Daintith, ‘State-Company Relations in 
Offshore Oil’ in Barry Barton, et. al, Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (2006), 277. 
863 For example, see Norwegian Petroelum Directorate, Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence 
(2008), s 4.  
864 Petroleum Activities Act 1996, (Norway), s 3-3. 
865 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjorett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 28. 
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An important regulatory aspect of the Norwegian JOA is that the participants of 
a petroleum licence are selected by the NPD, and the joint venture is formed by 
the Norwegian State.866 Furthermore, the State appoints the operator for the 
joint venture. By establishing the requirement of a universal JOA, and then 
selecting the companies that will be party to that JOA, the State is able to exert 
control over the development of a field. This enables the government to direct 
petroleum operations, since the JOA stipulates all conditions concerning 
petroleum activities, including management of the JV, petroleum activities, 
liability, sole risk field development, and financial arrangements.867 The 
Norwegian JOA also enables the NPD to consider environmental and socio-
economic factors in the exploitation of petroleum resources.868 Thus the JOA, 
as part of this regulatory trinity, enables the Norwegian State to regulate 
petroleum activities in a manner that encourages the sustainable exploitation of 
petroleum resources in abidance of Norway’s petroleum policy.869  
3.5.2 Petroleum contracts as regulatory tools 
External regulation as the State regulator 
The Norwegian State uses the contractual arrangements contained in the JOA as 
a tool to regulate petroleum operations activities as well as regulating the 
relationship between those participating in petroleum activities on the NCS,870 
including the regulation of the activities of the management committee.871 It 
also forces the participants to comply with the resource management policy of 
 
866 The legislative capacity ofr the state to select the participants of a licence are found in section 3-4 and 3-5 of the 
Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
867 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway). 
868 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjorett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 29. 
869 This is stipulated in Art 15-17 of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway).. 
870 This is particularly possible through the field development requirements of Art. 15-17 of the Joint Operating 
Agreement (Norway). See also  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Petroleum Facts 2001 (2001), 60. 
871 Art. 1-5, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway). 
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the Norwegian government through the regulation of field development under 
Articles 15-17 of the JOA.  
By controlling the activities of the participants through the JOA, the Norwegian 
State is able to assert greater direct control of the petroleum operations than is 
possible through licencing alone. This contrasts to Australia, where the company 
generally drives petroleum development and controls operations. While the aim 
of Australia’s petroleum policy is the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources, the lack of a uniform, transparent Joint Venture agreement may 
hamper the sustainable development of petroleum in Australia, since the State has 
no regulatory capacity to exert influence of the decisions and behaviour of the 
joint venturers. The commercial nature of Australian JV contracts reflects the 
interests of the joint venturers. Once a JVA is concluded and a licence is awarded 
to the joint venturers, the consortium has the right to develop the field according 
to its goals, objectives and resources.  
Once a field development plan is approved,872 the licencee is free to exploit the 
petroleum resources in accordance with environmental and safety statutory 
requirements.873 The licencee is able to develop the field according to its 
resources and requirements, and there are no mandatory requirements for 
minimum rates of production or oil recovery. There is evidence that the 
development of a petroleum deposit by a licencee without direction or regulation 
from the State is unlikely to extract the optimal amount of petroleum from a 
deposit.874 Rather, it is likely that the licencee will extract the petroleum at as low 
 
872The preparation of a field development plan is governed by the Department of Industry, Resources and Tourism, 
Offshore Petroleum Guidelines for a Grant of a Production Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002). 
This guideline was last reviewed in 2002.  
873 This will include the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOSPA) safety requirements under 
Chapter 4, Parts 6.4 and 6.8 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Storage Act 2006 (Cth), and associated 
Regulations, the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), Environmental 
Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth), Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution From Ships) Act 1983 
(Cth), and relevant state environmental legislation.   
874 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjorett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 28. 
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a cost as possible,875 abandoning the field when profitability is marginal.876 This 
issue of whether state regulation of field development optimises the extraction of 
petroleum from a field is analysed in Chapter five. 
A method of external control exerted by the Norwegian State over petroleum 
activities is through the management committee that is required as part of the 
Norwegian JOA. The management committee is the supreme body of the joint 
venture,877 and has a key role in the JV’s strategy by focussing the JV on the 
goals of the particular petroleum activities.878 Under the JOA, each participant 
in the JV is required to actively contribute to the management and control of the 
joint venture activities.879 The mandatory nature of the management committee 
provides the basis for forcing a participant or a group of participants into an 
activity within the joint venture by means of decisions adopted by their fellow 
participants in the licence, and enforced through the management committee.880 
This implies that a participant can be forced into activities defined by the 
quorum of the management committee, or may have to refrain from an activity 
that do not secure the support of the majority of the management committee.881 
This requirement enables the State to ensure that not only are the participants 
active within the JOA, but also that the activities undertaken by the JV as part 
of the JOA are agreed to by the management committee which is focused on the 
goals of the JV. In addition, the provisions on sole risk operations is an example 
that the State, in its own interest, makes sure that the agreement makes a basis 
for those companies who wants to make further effort than the others to do so. 
 
875 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjorett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 28. 
876 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjorett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 28.  
877 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway), Art. 1.3. 
878 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway), Art. 1.3. 
879 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway), Art. 1.3. 
880 Knut Kaasen, ‘Scope of the Joint Operating Agreement in Norway’ (2001) 281 Marius 173, 177. 
881 Knut Kaasen, ‘Scope of the Joint Operating Agreement in Norway’ (2001) 281 Marius 173, 179. 
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Internal regulation as a participant 
The Norwegian approach to petroleum regulation has been not only regulation 
of petroleum activities through legislative competence and administrative 
bodies, but also by participating in petroleum activities on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) from the early licencing rounds.882 Although foreign 
oil companies initially dominated exploration and developed the first 
Norwegian oil fields, it was always the intention for the Norwegian State to 
directly participate in petroleum activities.883 In the early years there was close 
cooperation with established international oil companies, in partnership with the 
international supplier industry, and frequent forced marriages between small 
Norwegian companies and huge international companies.884  
Whilst oil majors have always had, and continue to play a role in Norway’s oil 
development, the Norwegian State defined the goal of developing a fully 
competitive domestic oil industry based on State participation of petroleum 
exploitation at an early stage.885 This was primarily accomplished through the 
establishment of Statoil in 1972 to engage in petroleum activities on the NCS as 
a fully integrated oil company.886 By 1973 it became the Norwegian State’s 
chosen instrument for participation in the petroleum sector.887  
There were a number of reasons for the establishment of Statoil. Initially, 
Statoil played an important role in assisting the Norwegian State to gain 
expertise in the oil and gas industry,888 and increase government knowledge of 
 
882  For a discussion of Norway’s participation see Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and 
State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 8-9, and section 1.6.1 above. 
883 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Norwegian Oil History in Brief, (2006) 
http://www.odin.dep.no/filarkiv/204702/FactsOG0104.pdf at 23 December 2006.  
884 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Speech by the State Secretary Bjorg Sandal, in Baku, Azerbaijan 5 June 
2000. http://www.odin.no/odinarkiv/english/stoltenberg_I/oed/026031-090011/dok-bn.html at 23 December 2006. 
885 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Speech by the State Secretary Bjorg Sandal, in Baku, Azerbaijan 5 June 
2000. http://www.odin.no/odinarkiv/english/stoltenberg_I/oed/026031-090011/dok-bn.html at 23 December 2006. 
886 See Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), for a discussion on the establishment 
of Statoil, and its expansion into international markets in the late 1990s. 
887 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 63. 
888 Norwegian Storting, ‘Storting Proposal No. 114 (1971-1972)’ (1972), 8 in Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per 
Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, in Martha M Roggenkamp, 
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petroleum exploration and production.889 With increased knowledge and 
competence in both Statoil and the MPE, the State used Statoil’s participation in 
petroleum activities on the NCS to exert State control in the petroleum sector. 
This included control over the rate of production and the price of petroleum.890 
This control was possible since Statoil, as a 100% State-owned oil company, 
was positioned as a participant within the petroleum industry, thus enabling the 
State to regulate petroleum activities from within the petroleum sector.  
The Norwegian government used the participation of Statoil in petroleum 
activities to gain knowledge, skills and experience from international oil 
companies. This was accomplished by through the mandatory inclusion of 
Statoil in the award of all petroleum licences.891 Statoil was granted a 50% 
participating interest in all licences from the third licencing round,892 as well as 
favourable voting rules in the requisite Joint Operating Agreement (Norway) as 
part of the award of the licence. Together, this established Statoil in a dominant 
position in the decision-making process.893 Other benefits bestowed on Statoil 
during this period included a carried interest option in the exploration phases, 
and the option to increase its participating interest during exploration if 
petroleum was found.894 This favourable position, including carried interest, 
was maintained until the mid 1980’s. In 1984, Statoil’s regulatory dominance 
Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and 
International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 895. 
889 Norwegian Storting, ‘Storting Proposal No. 114 (1971-1972)’ (1972), 8 in Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per 
Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, in Martha M Roggenkamp, 
Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and 
International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 895-6. 
890 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How (1976). 
891 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How (1976), 64-6. 
892 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 892. 
893 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 892. 
894 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 892. 
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was reduced when it lost its automatic right to veto its partners' proposals on 
licences where it held a stake of 50 % or more. To exercise this veto it needed 
to obtain the consent of the MPE.895  
Statoil was reorganised in 1985, as a result of the proposal of the Norwegian 
government and decision by the Parliament,896 which was concerned with the 
dominance of Statoil on the NCS, and the effect this could have on attracting 
participants in petroleum activities.897 State participation, which until this time 
had been vested in Statoil, was split between Statoil as a commercial oil 
company and the newly created State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI).898  
The admittance of Norway to the EEA further reduced the dominance of Statoil 
as a State regulatory instrument.899 From the fifteenth licencing round, Statoil 
was not automatically granted an interest in all licences.900 This was a direct 
consequence of the application of Article 4 in the EEA agreement and Directive 
94/22 EC that required the objective, non-discriminatory grant of licences.901  
Today, Statoil is a public company, after partial privatisation in 2001 when it 
was listed on the Oslo and New York Stock Exchanges,902 with the Norwegian 
 
895 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 892. 
896 Based on Norwegian Storting, Storting Melding No. 73 (1983-84) and Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 
Organiseringen av statens deltagelse i petroleumsvirksomheten (1983) NOU 1983: 16.  
897 Based on Norwegian Storting, Storting Melding No. 73 (1983-84) and Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 
Organiseringen av statens deltagelse i petroleumsvirksomheten (1983) NOU 1983: 16. 
898 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, The States Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) (2008) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/State-participation-in-the-petroleum-sec/the-states- at 9 February 
2010. Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in 
Europe’, in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in 
Europe: National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 892-3. 
899 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 893. 
900 The fifteenth licensing round took place in 1996. For a list of licencing rounds see Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, Annual Report, 1998 (1998).  
901 Finn Arnesen, Finn, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in 
Europe’, in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo; and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in 
Europe: National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 893. 
902 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Statoil ASA (2006) http://www.odin.no/oed/english/doc/026031-120018/dok-
bn.html at 23 December 2006.  
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Government holding 76.3% of the company after a share sell-down in July 
2004.903 As a result of a merger between Statoil and the oil and gas division of 
NorskHydro in 2007, the Norwegian now government holds 67% of Statoil. 
Statoil participates in licences on equal terms and conditions as all other 
participants.904 
Since 1985 the Norwegian Government has participated in the Norwegian 
petroleum sector as a direct investor, rather than as a commercial oil company, 
through the SDFI. The operation of the SDFI is regulated under chapter 11 of 
the PAA.905 The Norwegian State’s share of a field under SDFI is decided when 
production licences are awarded, and the size of the State’s share varies from 
field to field.906 Typically, this direct financial interest is 5%, but often as high 
as 30%, such as in Statfjord Ost and Statfjord Nord.907  
The State has established Petoro, a management company that acts as a licencee 
in production licences and infrastructure on behalf of the Norwegian State,908 
managing the commercial aspects related to the SDFI interest.909 However, 
Petoro does not own the SDFI assets. These are retained by the State.910 As a 
licencee, Petoro is a party to the JOA, and therefore has the same rights and 
obligations as other participants of the licence. Since they are party to the same 
 
903 Statoil, Government is Biggest Share Holder (2006) 
http://www.statoil.com/STATOILCOM/HMS/SVG03503.NSF/UNID/A5294A11452CEECCC1256E61002EAC5E
?OpenDocument at 23 December 2006.  
904 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
905 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), Chapter 11.  
906 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2008: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2008), 25. The award of 
petroleum licences is considered in Chapter four below. 
907 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2008: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2008), 142,145. 
908 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Petoro AS (2006) 
http://www.dep.no/oed/norsk/dok/andre_dok/brosjyrer/026031-120016/dok-bn.html at 23 December 2006. 
909 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, The States Direct Financial Interest (SDFI)  (2008) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/State-participation-in-the-petroleum-sec/the-states- at 9 February 
2010. It is important to note that the SDFI is managed by the 100% State owned management company Petoro.  
910 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Petoro AS (2006) 
http://www.dep.no/oed/norsk/dok/andre_dok/brosjyrer/026031-120016/dok-bn.html at 23 December 2006. 
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terms as the other participants in the JOA, the Norwegian State receives its 
share of revenue equal to its share in the field, and is a member of the 
management committee.911 As a 100% State-owned entity, Petoro continues to 
enable the Norwegian government to regulate petroleum activities, since it is a 
member of the management committee in all fields where Petoro is a licencee. 
At present this includes over 120 production licences on the NCS,912 and 
comprises control over 33% of Norway’s petroleum resources and 25% of total 
Norwegian oil and gas production.913  
Unlike Norway, from the commencement of petroleum activities in Australia 
the Commonwealth and state governments of Australia decided not to 
participate in petroleum activities or engage in commercial petroleum 
exploration and development.914 Rather, petroleum exploitation is undertaken 
wholly by the private sector, which initiates exploration and development, in a 
manner similar to the United States. The Australian government regulates 
petroleum activities and the petroleum sector through the regulatory legislative 
framework and its administrative bodies.915 The participation of Australian 
government in petroleum activities in Australia has not been seriously 
considered since the early 1980s, when the federal opposition indicated its 
intention to create a national oil company and participate in offshore petroleum 
 
911 Joint Operating Agreement (Norway), Article 1. 
912 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, The States Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) (2008) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/State-participation-in-the-petroleum-sec/the-states- at 9 February 
2010.  
913 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, The States Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) (2008) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/State-participation-in-the-petroleum-sec/the-states- at 9 February 
2010. 
914 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview for Applicants 2009 (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/OverviewForApplicants.pdf at 25 August 2009, 
10. 
915 See 1999 policy. These included establishing the macroeconomic environment (broad economic policy); provide 
a regulatory framework for exploration, development, project approval processes, safety, environmental assessment 
and revenue collection, reduce commercial risk in minerals and petroleum exploration by collecting and 
disseminating geoscientific information; and look for ways to remove impediments to the industry's 
competitiveness. 
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activities.916 This was publicly rejected by the petroleum industry in 1985. In 
their petroleum policy statement, the Australian Petroleum Exploration 
Association (APEA, which would later become APPEA) concluded that it could 
not support the establishment of an Australian hydrocarbon corporation.917 The 
view of APEA was that no federal government should create a body to compete 
with private enterprise for skills, equipment and capital in an already tight 
market that exists for all three.918 However, Norway’s experience with Statoil 
demonstrates that the establishment of a State oil company does not compete for 
skills, equipment and capital, as outlined by APEA. Rather, it encourages 
sustainable development of petroleum resources by enabling the State to 
regulate the activities of the participants through the management committee of 
the JOA.  
3.5.3 Does State participation in petroleum activities and the 
JOA encourage sustainable development?    
Under the Norwegian JOA, the State exerts control over petroleum extraction. 
The combination of the regulatory legislative framework and contractual 
regulation under the terms of the JOA gives the State extraordinary capacity to 
control all aspects of petroleum exploitation. The State utilises its legal 
institutions, including the regulatory and administrative functions as a method 
of State orchestration of petroleum resource development, where all phases and 
aspects of petroleum operations are coordinated and controlled by the State as 
resource owner,919 represented by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
 
916 Paul Keating, ‘The Labor Approach to Petroleum Exploration Development and Pricing’ (1980) 20 APPEA 
Journal 16. 
917 Australian Petroleum Exploration Association, Petroleum Policy in Australia: The Exploration Industry’s 
Perspective (1985), 5. 
918 Australian Petroleum Exploration Association, Petroleum Policy in Australia: The Exploration Industry’s 
Perspective (1985), 5. 
919 Ulf Hammer, ‘Introduction’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007), 23. 
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(MPE), and conducted through the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD).920 
The licencees know that the State has the capacity and the will to implement its 
socio-economic objectives through legislative and administrative control. 
Therefore, the licencees are enticed to act similarly, considering not only their 
commercial interests, but also the socio-economic will of the State, without 
being legally compelled to do so.921 
By participating in petroleum operations and being subject to the JOA along 
with other participants, the JOA forms a basis for dialogue between the 
companies and the Norwegian State, enabling a number of benefits to accrue to 
the State. Firstly, the State increases its level of competence, since as a 
participant it is privy to vast amounts of information about the petroleum fields, 
as the information is required to be passed to them as a participant in the 
JOA.922 Also, since the State and the oil companies participate together in the 
commercial aspects of petroleum activities, the State has a forum to express and 
implement its socioeconomic objectives. This enables the State to blend the 
interests of all participants to create a regulatory arrangement agreeable to both 
public and private parties.923 This interrelationship between parties through the 
JOA is an important aspect of Norwegian system, since it facilitates a balance 
of commercial and socio-economic considerations, and enables both parties to 
cooperate to accomplish their objectives. 924 
The capacity of the Norwegian State to regulate all aspects of petroleum 
activities has encouraged the sustainable extraction of petroleum resources in 
 
920 The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is the Norwegian government department responsible for the 
development of offshore petroleum resources in Norway. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate is the regulatory 
authority that was created by the MPE in the early 1970s to regulate petroleum activities on behalf of the MPE. 
921 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 33. 
922 For example through the work program, field development plan, and reporting requirements under s12-17 of the 
Joint Operating Agreement (Norway). 
923 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 33. 
924 Finn Arnesen, ‘The Relationship Between the Authorities and the Licencees’ in Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett, 
Petroleum Law Compendium, Volume 1 (2007) 25, 33. 
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Norway. Today the Norwegian State is aware of the need to attract and retain 
oil companies, especially as its provinces mature. It uses the JOA to establish a 
relationship with participants, sustainably exploit petroleum by controlling the 
activities of those participants through the management committee. This does 
not appear to be the case in Australia. Rather, the relationship that is established 
between the Australian State and oil companies is geared toward satisfying the 
commercial interests of oil companies, in order to continue to attract and retain 
international investment. Whilst attracting commercial investment was the 
premise of Australia's petroleum objective, the recent goal of sustainable 
development of Australia's petroleum resources does not seem attainable under 
the current contractual structure in Australia.  
As owner of Australia’s petroleum resources, the Australian government has the 
capacity to require companies to enter into a uniform contractual arrangement 
for the development of the petroleum. The reticence of the Australian 
government to demand this may arise from the perceived need to continue to 
make Australia an attractive province for international investment. However, 
the Australian government is in the driver’s seat, with the capacity to require 
companies to enter into a JVA with the State as a condition of the award of 
licence. This is because oil companies need access to petroleum resources, and 
without the State-awarded petroleum licence, oil companies have no access to 
petroleum resources. Therefore, the companies are dependant upon the State to 
access the petroleum deposits they require for their commercial enterprises.  
Licences for petroleum provinces that are not under the control of a national oil 
companies are in demand, particularly since State oil companies control over 
80% of the world’s oil resources.925 Australia is an attractive petroleum 
province, especially the provinces in Northwest Australia that contain vast LNG 
deposits, partly because these resources are not controlled by a State oil 
company. Furthermore, the Australian petroleum industry has expressed a 
 
925 Valerie Marcel, States of Play: National Oil Companies Control 80% of the Worlds Oil Resources But They Are 
Not All The Same (2009) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/states_of_play at 27 November 2009. 
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desire to be one of the top five locations for oil and gas exploration and 
development investment.926 This provides the Australian government with an 
opportunity to establish a petroleum regulatory legislative framework that not 
only remains attractive to oil companies, but to also set conditions that will 
enable the exploitation of the petroleum resources to benefit both the companies 
and Australian society. 
The Norwegian JOA has demonstrable capacity to encourage the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources. The Norwegian State has used the JOA 
both as a regulatory tool and as a participant within the JOA to compel oil 
companies to operate within a framework that allows the State to fulfil its goal 
of creating the best possible value for Norwegian society,927 as well as enabling 
the companies to maximise their return from the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf.928 As a mandatory resource management tool, the JOA has been effective 
in encouraging sustainable development of petroleum resources in Norway for 
almost forty years. 
Should Australia substantially review and rewrite its petroleum regulatory 
legislative and administrative framework to a more objective based legislative 
framework,929 there will be a need for a uniform contract for participants. The 
Norwegian JOA provides an example of an effective model that enables the 
State to encourage the sustainable development of petroleum resources. 
It is important to realise that the State participation in petroleum activities not 
only enables the State to regulate petroleum activities from within, but also 
realises a substantial amount of revenue for the State. The revenue generated by 
the Norwegian State on the NCS was over 409 billion NOK in 2008.930 Of that, 
 
926 APPEA, Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry: Platform for Prosperity (2006), 7.  
927 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 19. 
928 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 19. 
929 As recommended by the World Bank, Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA), 
and the PSLA Review Committee. 
930 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 24. This equates to 
approximately A$80 billion. 
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239 billion NOK was realised from petroleum taxation.931 The direct financial 
participation of the State in petroleum activities generated 153 billion NOK in 
revenue for the Norwegian State, thus maximising the value of Norway’s 
petroleum resources. Indeed, forty percent of petroleum revenue in 2008 was 
realised from the SDFI interest, while dividends from Statoil only generated 17 
billion NOK for the Norwegian government.932 Although a large sum of money, 
the dividends from Statoil Hydro was less than 1/8 the amount of revenue 
generated from the State’s SDFI interest. 
The Norwegian experience provides a valuable lesson for Australia. It 
demonstrates that direct State financial participation in petroleum activities, 
rather than through a State-owned oil company, enables the State to regulate 
petroleum activities from within the JV to ensure that sustainable development 
of petroleum resources is realised through the maximising of the value of those 
resources. Given the ongoing strong industry resistance to the establishment of 
a national oil company in Australia, and Norway’s demonstrated capacity to 
generate economic benefit from direct State participation rather than dividend 
returns from a national oil company, it may be beneficial for Australia to 
consider State financial participation in petroleum activities to encourage the 
sustainable development of its petroleum resources.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
The legislative framework that presently exists in Australia does not encourage 
sustainable development, to the extent that is possible. The prescriptive, rule 
based legislation creates unnecessary regulatory burden with economic and social 
costs. Furthermore, it fails to meet the criteria defined by the World Bank as an 
 
931 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 24. This equates to 
approximately A$48 billion. 
932 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 24. This equates to 
approximately A$530 billion and A$3.5 billion respectively.. 
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effective regulatory legislative framework. Legislative frameworks from other 
jurisdictions, including South Australia and Norway indicate that a principle 
based or objective based legislative framework, with broad enabling legislation 
and complementary regulation, reduces regulatory burden. In addition, the 
Norwegian regulatory legislative framework encourages the State and oil 
companies to develop the petroleum resources to meet the interests of the State 
whilst still realising a profit.  
The experiences of jurisdictions with objective based petroleum regulatory 
legislative frameworks, particularly South Australia, have found favour with the 
Australian petroleum industry. It is possible that if legislative reform was to occur 
in Australia, the principle based legislation that has been implemented in South 
Australia, and demonstrated in Norway to be effective in sustainably developing 
petroleum resources could be embraced by the Australian petroleum industry.  
Model contracts, such as model JOAs that are mandatory in Norway, have been 
demonstrated to be effective in stipulating regulatory and commercial 
conditions for petroleum activities. They also ensure that oil companies operate 
within a framework that allows the State to fulfil its goal of creating value, 
while at the same time enabling participating companies to maximise their 
return. They enable the State, through the management committee and the 
conditions associated with the management committee, to control petroleum 
activities as a regulator. In addition, where the State is a participant in 
petroleum activities, either as an oil company or through direct financial 
interest, the JOA enables the State to have maximum control over petroleum 
activities through voting rights and the management committee 
Australia does not a mandatory contractual framework, nor does it establish a 
contractual relationship between the State and oil companies since it does not 
participate in petroleum activities. However, there are there are the provisions 
for State Agreements in Western Australia. These agreements are in effect a 
statutory agreement that contribute to the sustainable development of petroleum 
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resources, since they enable the effective development of resources by reducing 
regulatory burden, defining the rights and obligations of the parties, and 
ensuring that resource exploitation provides economic and social benefits for 
the Western Australian community. Should State Agreements be implemented 
as a mandatory agreement for all petroleum activities, they may be able to 
contribute to the sustainable development of petroleum resources in Australia. 
This may be achieved through mandatory economic and social benefit 
requirements for the community, as well as reduced regulatory compliance 
requirements.  
As part of an effective legislative framework for the exploitation of petroleum, 
the World Bank has identified the need for a single administrative authority. 
Petroleum exploitation in Australia occurs under the regulation of both the JA 
and the DA. The Australian Productivity Commission has demonstrated that the 
existence of these dual regulatory bodies create regulatory overlap, and can 
inhibit effective petroleum development. Furthermore, the Productivity 
Commission recommends that a single regulatory body should be established to 
ensure that effective resource management and development occurs.  
Through its regulatory framework and participation in petroleum activities, the 
Norwegian State has established and maintained a regulatory legislative 
framework that encourages the development of Norwegian petroleum resources 
for the benefit of both the Norwegian State and oil companies alike, whilst 
enabling the Norwegian State to establish and maintain control over petroleum 
activities.933 The State as resource owner acts as the regulative and 
administrative body, establishing policies, framework conditions and decisions 
 
933 Gunnar Gjerde, The Norwegian Model and the Working Relationship Between the Authorities and the Industry: 
As Seen from the Authorities’ Point of View (2007) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Norwegian%20model/Norwegian_model_program_Gunnar_Gjer
de.pdf at 12 March 2008, 2-5. 
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relating to petroleum activities.934 In addition, the State also participates directly 
in petroleum activities through Petoro, particularly in major fields.935  
The Norwegian experience demonstrates that State participation in the 
petroleum sector, and a principle based regulatory legislative framework 
contributes to sustainable development of petroleum, enabling the government 
to have a wide discretionary role to implement its national petroleum policies of 
maximising the value of petroleum resource development for the benefit of 
Norwegian society. It also enables the Norwegian State as a participant to direct 
petroleum activities to encourage sustainable development. By closely 
regulating and administrating petroleum activities, the Norwegian government 
supervises the conditions of production and resource development, to ensure 
that the activities of petroleum companies are aligned to State interests. Thus, 
the regulatory legislative framework and administration of petroleum activities 
that has been implemented by the Norwegian government provide a potent 
example for Australia, demonstrating the capacity to utilise the petroleum 
regulatory legislative framework to encourage sustainable development of 
petroleum resources. 
 
934 Gunnar Gjerde, The Norwegian Model and the Working Relationship Between the Authorities and the Industry: 
As Seen from the Authorities’ Point of View (2007) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Norwegian%20model/Norwegian_model_program_Gunnar_Gjer
de.pdf at 12 March 2008, 2-5. 
935 The framework of Norwegian Petroleum resource policy principles and objectives comes from Gunnar Gjerde, 
The Norwegian Model and the Working Relationship Between the Authorities and the Industry: As Seen from the 
Authorities’ Point of View (2007) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Norwegian%20model/Norwegian_model_program_Gunnar_Gjer
de.pdf at 12 March 2008, 2-5. 
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4. Award of petroleum licences  
4.1 Introduction 
The process of allocating petroleum licences under the licencing and concession 
system (LCS) has several important roles in the States management of its 
petroleum resources. Firstly, the allocation of a petroleum licence seeks to 
identify the best partner for the State to conduct petroleum activities in a 
particular licence area. This is to ensure that the licence is given to companies 
with the technical and financial capacity to carry out the exploration in an 
effective and safe manner, so that the States interests are considered, and that the 
extraction of petroleum in the field is maximised.  
Secondly, the allocation of petroleum licences establishes a relationship between 
the State and the oil companies that will extract the resource. The State will 
normally attach a number of conditions to the licence. Balancing this relationship 
is one of the greatest challenges in the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources since each of these participants have different objectives when 
extracting petroleum.936 Throughout this relationship the State, to a greater or 
lesser degree, exerts control over the way the partner oil companies carry out 
their petroleum activity in the basis of the licence. In some jurisdictions, that 
control might be minimal. Once a petroleum licence is allocated and the plan for 
development of a field is approved, the participants may be left to develop the 
field, subject to meeting requisite regulatory conditions. In other instances, the 
State exerts control over all facets of licence allocation and petroleum activities, 
and will participate in the extraction of petroleum. 
 
936 For a discussion of the economic and commercial challenges that confront companies and the State when 
seeking to sustainably develop the petroleum resources, see section 1.2 above. 
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The process for the allocation of a petroleum licence is similar in all petroleum 
jurisdictions that utilise the licensing and concession system (LCS). It initially 
involves the State identifying areas for petroleum exploration, and the 
subdivision of these areas into discrete contract areas of a predetermined size.937 
These areas (also known as acreage) are offered to national and international oil 
companies by a suitable tendering process (the licencing round), and the licence 
awarded. This process will usually include negotiations relating to the technical, 
financial and contractual terms and conditions for the award of the licence, 
consistent with their petroleum prospectivity and with the national interest.’938 
The allocation of a petroleum licence encapsulates not only the process of the 
award of a petroleum licence, but also marries the method of allocation with the 
national petroleum interests. State petroleum interests are generally articulated 
in a State’s petroleum policy, and regulated by the legislative framework. 
Where sustainable development of petroleum resources is a national policy 
objective, such as in Australia and Norway, the method of allocation is crucial 
in ensuring that sustainable development of petroleum resources occurs. 
In this chapter I focus on the method of allocation of petroleum licences in the 
award of licences in Australia, examining the process and importance of the 
allocation of petroleum licences. In doing so, I focus on the bid system of 
allocation of petroleum licences, and whether it is capable of securing or 
encouraging sustainable development of petroleum resources. I include an 
analysis of the Australian licencing system, focussing on whether the method of 
allocation is consistent with Australia’s national petroleum objectives. Part of this 
analysis includes a consideration of the relationship that is established between 
the Australian State and the oil companies when petroleum licences are awarded. 
The capacity of a State to award a petroleum licence through discretionary 
 
937 Michal Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), xxii. 
938 Michal Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), xxii. 
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allocation is also considered, analysing whether the discretionary allocation of 
petroleum licences is more likely to encourage the sustainable development of 
petroleum resources. I compare the Australian method of allocation of a 
petroleum licence to the Norwegian and UK method of allocation, to assess 
which method is most likely to encourage the sustainable development of 
petroleum in Australia.  
4.2 Award of licences and sustainable development 
The LCS is often, although not always, utilised in countries with relatively low 
reserves and high costs associated with offshore oil production, and dominated by 
a special taxation rate for petroleum production.939 A survey of countries that 
utilise the modern licencing and concession system indicates this is accurate, with 
developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, 
Australia and the Netherlands all implementing LCS for the regulation of oil and 
gas.940 
The LCS allows for as little or as much State participation as the State desires or 
requires at any given time, and also allows changes in the level of participation 
over time.941 Norway, for example, has changed its system for and level of 
direct State participation several times.942 Under the LCS, a licence is granted 
for a specific type of petroleum operation, usually for exploration or 
 
939 Abdulaziz Al-Attar and Osamah Alomair, ‘Evaluation of Upstream Petroleum Agreements and Production 
Costs’ (2005) OPEC Review 242, 245-6 
940 Abdulaziz Al-Attar and Osamah Alomair, ‘Evaluation of Upstream Petroleum Agreements and Production 
Costs’ (2005) OPEC Review 242, 245-6. Although each of these countries has low reserves compared to Saudi 
Arabia and other OPEC countries, Norway has substantial resources. 
941 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 6 
942 For an outline of the history of the Norwegian licencing system see Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: 
Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991). 
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production.943 It is granted for a specific area (the licence area), for a specific 
period.944 Depending on the regulatory framework governing the LCS, the 
licence may confer exclusive rights, in the sense that for as long as the licence is 
valid, and subject to certain conditions, the licencee is authorised to exercise the 
rights conferred in the licence against third parties.945 Often, non-exclusive 
licences are conferred for geological and geophysical prospecting, while an 
exclusive licence is usually conferred for exploration work that involves 
drilling, as well as for production operations.946 
The licencing of petroleum acreage occurs between the petroleum rights holder 
(the State, usually represented by the relevant Ministry) and international oil 
companies. The process of allocating a licence for the development of 
petroleum reserves can broaden the number of applicants for an area, ensuring 
that the largest number of oil companies is able to apply for access to the 
acreage on offer.947 Furthermore, the process is regarded as politically 
legitimate by the community, since it is viewed as open and transparent.948 This 
 
943 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 146-7.  
944 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 147. 
945  Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 146. The conferral of exclusive rights differs in each jurisdiction. In Norway, the 
conferral of an exploration licence confers non-exclusive rights under s2-1 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 
(Norway). 
946  Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 146. 
947 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm at 12 December 2006. 
948 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 7. 
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ensures that petroleum extraction can occur with little negative electoral 
reaction.949 
The award of a petroleum licence is essential for the commencement of 
petroleum extraction.950 Upon the allocation of an exploration or production 
licence, exclusivity over the licence area is awarded to the licencee, who gains a 
proprietary right to explore and produce petroleum.951 
Property rights regarding petroleum resources for both the State and the 
licencee are recognised and enforced under the LCS.952 Whilst the petroleum 
remains in situ, even if part of a grant of production licence, the petroleum 
resources are owned by the State.953 
A production licence confers ownership of petroleum when it is produced in 
accordance with the terms of the licence. ‘Produced’ is defined to be when the 
petroleum enters the well that has been legitimately drilled by the licencee.954 
This system of ownership is related to the ancient ‘rule of capture’ and title of 
 
949 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 7 
950 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunsmuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 7. 
951 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 3, 
3. It is essential to note that unlike the Australian licencing system, a grant of an exploration licence in Norway 
does not automatically confer the right for a production licence for the exploration area on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. Furthermore, the rights that are conferred by the Norwegian exploration licence significantly 
differ to the rights conferred by the Australian exploration licence. Whereas the Australian exploration licence 
confers an exclusive right to engage in seismic and drilling exploratory operations, the exploration licence in 
Norway only provides for  non-exclusive surface seismic and geosciences activities. The rights conferred under the 
Norwegian exploration licence are similar to those conferred under the Special Prospecting Authority in the 
Australian jurisdiction. The rights akin to those granted under the Australian exploration licence are granted under 
the Norwegian Production Licence, which confers exclusive exploration rights to the licencee. 
952 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 7. 
953 United States Department of the Interior, Coastal Marine Institute, Fiscal System Analysis: Concessionary and 
Contractual Systems Used in Offshore Petroleum Arrangements (2004), 5. 
954 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 147.  
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the petroleum is transferred to the oil company upon the petroleum reaching the 
wellhead, as the petroleum is ‘caught’ by the licencee in the wellhead.955 The 
licence gives a right to explore for and produce petroleum, and thereby acquire 
ownership to the produced petroleum.956 This exclusivity protects the licencee 
against exploration from other parties in the licence area for the period that the 
licence is valid.  
A primary objective for any State in exploiting its petroleum is to capture as 
much economic rent as possible by maximising the total rent generated without 
affecting the incentives for the operators to be efficient.957 Economic rent refers 
to the return that the ‘land owner’ derives simply by being an owner of that land, 
and varies according to the different qualities of the land.958 It is the total revenue 
derived from some activity on that land in excess of the sum of the supply prices 
of all capital, labour and other inputs,959 and is the difference between existing 
market price for a commodity and its opportunity cost.960 
Economic rent in natural resource production is known as resource rent, and is 
the difference between the value of the resource produced and the cost to extract 
it. Costs include exploration, development and production costs, as well as an 
appropriate share of revenue for the natural resource company.961 The resource 
rent is the surplus (or excess profit) that results from the exploitation of the 
 
955 Colin Roberts, ‘Resource Regulatory Systems’ (2006) Australia’s Paydirt 93, 93.  
956 For example the grant of exclusive rights for a Norwegian production licence, and ownership of the oil produced 
is guaranteed under s3-3 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway).  
957 Knut Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licensing (1999) CEPMLP Publication 1/99, 3-4. 
958 John Cordes, ‘An Introduction to the Taxation of Mineral Rents’, in James Otto (ed) the Taxation of Mineral 
Enterprise (1995), 27. 
959 John Cordes, ‘An Introduction to the Taxation of Mineral Rents’, in James Otto (ed) the Taxation of Mineral 
Enterprise (1995), 27. 
960 John Cordes, ‘An Introduction to the Taxation of Mineral Rents’, in James Otto (ed) the Taxation of Mineral 
Enterprise (1995) 26. 
961 Daniel Johnson, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts (1994), 5-6. 
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resources. Governments attempt to capture as much of this rent as possible 
through various means, including levies, royalties taxes and bonuses.962 A 
method of realising the greatest amount of economic rent is by allocating 
petroleum licences by bidding (either cash or work program), therefore ensuring 
that the company that is most efficient will be awarded the licence. The majority 
of the economic rent is paid up front, 963  with a royalty or taxation delivering the 
balance of the economic rent after petroleum has been produced.964  
The objective of a State in the exploitation of the petroleum resources, and the 
benefits it wishes to reap varies depending on the petroleum policy formulated 
by the State. The allocation of petroleum licences should reflect the petroleum 
objectives of the State, to ensure that the exploitation of petroleum resources is 
capable of meeting these policy objectives.965 For some States, such as the 
United States, the objective is to realise the highest possible resource rent for 
the petroleum resources, through the allocation of petroleum licences by cash 
bidding to the requisite oil companies.966 For others, such as Norway and the 
United Kingdom, the objective of the State may be to not only capture the 
resource rent, but to also achieve other policy objectives including rapid 
exploration and development, economic growth, technological and industrial 
development, geopolitical strength or influence, sustainable development, or 
independence. These are important aspects in choosing a system of allocation of 
a petroleum licence, 
 
962 John Cordes, ‘An Introduction to the Taxation of Mineral Rents’, in James Otto (ed) the Taxation of Mineral 
Enterprise (1995) 26. 
963 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System’ (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 1-2. 
964 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System’ (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 1-2. it is this 
method of allocation that is used in offshore leases in the United States. 
965 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Resources (2009) 
www.ret.gov.au/resources/Pages/Resources.aspx at 2 February 2009. 
966 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 4-6. 
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For Australia that petroleum policy objective is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to 
offer high levels of certainty to investors and to encourage investment in the 
offshore Australian petroleum industry in a highly competitive environment.967 
This includes allowing companies to manage their risk in a regulatory 
framework that is predictable, transparent, equitable and timely.968 Australian 
petroleum policy also seeks to expand Australia’s resource base and improve 
the regulatory regime consistent with the principles of sustainable 
development.969 These national petroleum objectives require Australia to utilise 
a system of allocating licences that address the commercial and socio-economic 
challenges associated with the sustainable development of its petroleum 
resources.  
For Norway, the objectives for the development of petroleum resources are 
maximum value creation from petroleum resources, within a framework of 
responsible environmental and resource management policies.970 This means that 
when exploiting the petroleum resources, the Norwegian State ensures that the 
exploitation of the resources contributes to improving the welfare, employment 
and environment of the State, whilst at the same time taking into consideration 
regional policies and activities, particularly fishing.971 
 
967 Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy: A Strategy to Promote 
Petroleum Exploration and Development in Australian Offshore Areas (1999), 4. 
968 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004), 51-3. 
969 See Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Resources (2009) 
www.ret.gov.au/resources/Pages/Resources.aspx at 2 February 2009. 
970 For a discussion on the Norwegian petroleum policy framework see Chapter three above. 
971 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s1-2. 
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4.2.1  Process of award of licence 
In most instances the award of petroleum licences occur within formal licencing 
rounds.972 Formal licencing rounds are discrete acts of licencing that take place 
on a regular basis, often annually or biannually, at which pre-defined acreage is 
publicly offered for licencing by the State.973 Formal licencing rounds can assist 
the State to identify the most suitable party to develop a petroleum field since 
the formal process encourages companies to apply for a licence, and be assessed 
according to the stipulated criteria.974 They create competition between 
companies wishing to be active in the exploitation of petroleum within that 
province.975 Licencing rounds are used in Norway to ensure that the parties that 
are selected for a licence area are the most capable for the particular geology 
and conditions of that field.976 They can also assist the State to lessen its risk by 
ensuring that companies assume the exploration and production risk.977  
This formal process is often supplemented with ‘out of round’ or informal 
licencing rounds, in order to fulfil policy goals. Often international oil companies 
approach a State informally for access to acreage (which may or may not be 
 
972 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Offshore Acreage (2002), xxii. In Australianthere are annual 
licencing rounds, whereas in Norway the licencing occurs on a less frequent basis, generally every two years. 
973 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 137. An example of this is the announcement requirement found in section 3-5 of 
the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway).  
974 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003)  1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009, 2-3. 
975 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003)  1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009, 2-3. 
976 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s110. 
977 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003)  1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009, 2-3. See also 
Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 4-5, and Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics and Government Policies (1999), Chapter five 
on conditions regarding the award of petroleum licences. 
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specified), and a bargain is struck, without competition from other companies.978 
Another method is the Norwegian ‘out of round’ licences under the Award in 
Predefined Area (APA) rounds.979 Such rounds award acreage mostly in mature 
provinces to encourage exploration, since there is an expectation of smaller oil 
discoveries.980 They are made as part of the implementation of the policy of 
prudent production, with the aim of discovering and developing these petroleum 
resources in mature areas using new technologies, before existing infrastructure 
in the fields are decommissioned.981 In addition, these rounds encourage 
sustainable development by ensuring petroleum resources are discovered and 
developed before existing infrastructure is closed down.982 
There are two principle methods of awarding licences within the LCS.983 The 
first is the bid or auction system, where licences are ‘sold’ to the highest bidder. 
This bid or auction may include either cash bidding, where the licence is sold to 
the highest bidder, or work program bidding (WPB), where the licence is 
awarded to the applicant that bids to spend the highest amount of work in dollar 
terms, on exploration for petroleum in the licence area. The second is the 
discretionary system of allocation. The system of allocation is outlined in figure 4 
                                              
978 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999), 137. 
979 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, APA 2009: Continued Broad Interest for Mature Areas on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (2009) Press Release 16 September 2009, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/press-
center/Press-releases/2009/apa-2009-continued-broad-interest-for-ma.html?id=577167 at 19 October 2009. 
980 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, APA 2009: Continued Broad Interest for Mature Areas on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (2009) Press Release 16 September 2009, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/press-
center/Press-releases/2009/apa-2009-continued-broad-interest-for-ma.html?id=577167 at 19 October 2009. 
981 See Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Norway, APA 2008 – Broad Interest for Mature Norwegian Shelf (2008) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/press-center/Press-releases/2008/apa-2008--broad-interest-for-mature-
area.html?id=528899 at 12 October 2008.  
982 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, APA 2009: Continued Broad Interest for Mature Areas on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (2009) Press Release 16 September 2009, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/press-
center/Press-releases/2009/apa-2009-continued-broad-interest-for-ma.html?id=577167 at 19 October 2009. 
983 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 4-5. 
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below.  
Figure 4: Method of allocation of petroleum licence: bid/auction 
method or discretionary method (compiled by author). 
 
Under the bid system, whether the auction is made by cash auction or a work 
program bid system, the bidder with the highest value (either cash or work 
program) is awarded the licence. This system occurs in few countries with LCS. 
An example of the use of the cash bid system is the United States.984 Cash bonus 
bidding was used for the grant of exploration licences in several Australian highly 
prospective petroleum areas between 1985 and 1992.985 It is current government 
policy not to use cash bids for the allocation of petroleum licences.986  The use of 
work program bidding in Australia is analysed in section 4.3.2 below. 
The bid system of allocation enables an oil company to assert control over the 
licencing process by stating what they are prepared to pay for the property rights 
over the acreage being offered for licence by the government.987 The value of 
those property rights is expressed in terms of how much a company will pay as a 
cash bonus or special royalty rate. 
Under the second method of allocation of petroleum licences, the discretionary 
system, the State allocates licences according to administratively or politically 
 
984 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 4-5. See also Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing 
Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 3, 3-4. 
985 Trudi Rodgers and Stewart Webster, Resource Rent Mechanisms in Australian Primary Industries: Some 
Observations and Issues (2007) Paper presented at the 51st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society Conference 2007, Sydney, 12. See also Department of Resources, Energy and 
Tourism, An Overview for Applicants: Release of Offshore Petroleum Exploration Areas, Australia 2008 (2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/OverviewForApplicants2008.pd
f at 12 September 2008, 14. 
986 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Cash Bidding System: A Guide in Relation to the Australian 
Government’s Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (2004), 1. However ,it is important to note that s110-114 of 
the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) provides for the allocation of a petroleum 
licence using cash bidding. 
987 Knut Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licensing (1999) CEPMLP Publication 1/99, 2. 
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created criteria defined by the State,988 enabling the government to define and 
assert a set of legal conditions to which the participating oil company is expected 
to conform.989 Often, it is the criteria used and the transparency of the process 
that is a source of concern,990 although this has been somewhat mitigated by the 
requirement for objective, transparent criteria in the award of licences, 
particularly in the EU and EEA countries.991 The discretionary system is a feature 
of the North Sea system of licencing, developed by Norway since it began 
awarding licences in 1963.992 
Some academics perceive the use of administrative procedures for the allocation 
of petroleum licences as questionable, since it is non-transparent, relies on 
discretion and decision-making authorities have limited information on relative 
cost efficiency.993 However, the voluntary participation by a company in the 
discretionary allocation of petroleum licences indicates their acceptance of the 
conditions of the award of licence, and confidence in the method of allocation. 
Further, a company’s participation in petroleum activities under discretionary 
allocation indicates their acquiescence to the level of control imposed by the State 
over petroleum exploration, development and production. The utility of the 
discretionary award of licences for the sustainable development of a State’s 
petroleum resources is considered in section 4.4 below.  
 
988 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (1999). 
989 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 5. 
990 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 4-5. 
991 Refer for instance to the EC Hydrocarbon Directive: Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of The 
Council of 30 May 1994 On The Conditions For Granting And Using Authorizations For The Prospection, 
Exploration And Production Of Hydrocarbons (1994). 
992 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 23. 
993 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 3, 
3. 
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As figure 5 below demonstrates, the process for the award of petroleum licences 
under the work-program bid system in Australia and the discretionary system in 
Norway is similar. In each system, acreage is released, a joint venture of oil 
companies is formed, the licence is awarded by the State, and petroleum 
activities commence, regulated by the relevant legislative framework. The 
similarities and differences between these systems, and the implications for the 
sustainable development of petroleum resources, is analysed in section 4.3 and 
4.4 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Award of petroleum licences in Australia (top) and Norway 
(bottom). Note that the process is very similar in each jurisdiction. In 
Australia the JV is formed by individual companies who then apply for 
the licence. In Norway, the JOA is established between the State and 
the participating oil companies after the licence is awarded, and the 
participants are selected by the State (figure compiled by author).  
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4.3 Award of licence by bidding 
4.3.1 Cash bid system 
Under the cash bid system,994 a licence is awarded to the applicant that is the 
highest bidder for a defined acreage area.995 The award is made following strict 
economic criteria, where the true market value of the acreage is the price it 
fetches in a competitive marketplace.996 It is based on the economic theory that 
the company willing to pay the most for the acreage is the one most suited for 
the job.997 
Cash bidding is theoretically the most efficient approach to the allocation of a 
petroleum licence since the State allocating the rights receives resource rent 
payment and benefits from an efficient allocation system (as the most efficient 
company can afford to bid the highest).998 Allocation by cash bid is seen as an 
incorruptible method of maximising the price paid for the grant of a petroleum 
licence.999 In addition, it is seen as a system that avoids the shortcomings that 
may affect the discretionary allocation of licences, particularly corruption.1000 
However, the inherent uncertainty regarding the petroleum quality and quantity 
of a particular field means that bidders will discount their cash bonus bids 
 
994 This is also referred to as the auction system, and the two terms will be used interchangeable in this thesis. 
995  Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 5. 
996 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007. 
997 Espen Myhra, Introduction to Different Licencing Systems, (2006) 5th Workshop of Philippines Petroleum Policy 
and Management Case Study, 14-18 March, 2006, Cebu City, 
http://www.ccop.or.th/ppm/document/PHWS5/PHWS5DOC07_myhra.pdf on 11 November 2008, 3-5. 
998 Trudi Rodgers and Stewart Webster, Resource Rent Mechanisms in Australian Primary Industries: Some 
Observations and Issues (2007) Paper presented at the 51st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society Conference 2007, Sydney, 12. 
999 Tim Warman and Lauren Goldblatt, ‘The Work Program Bidding System For Exploration Permits Under the 
Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act 1967 (Cth) (2008) 27 Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 178, 179. 
1000 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 10-11. 
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accordingly.1001 A company bidding for a licence in an area where they do not 
know for sure whether there is petroleum, or if there is petroleum, how much 
petroleum the field contains, will have to calculate a considerable risk in the 
bid. This means that sometimes, particularly in a province of unproven geology, 
the cash bid may not be an accurate reflection of the real economic worth of the 
province since there is no comprehensive data pertaining to the province.1002  
The objective of the cash bid system is two-fold. It serves as a method for the 
allocation of licences, as well as a resource rent taxation tool.1003 The cash bid 
system in its pure form ‘approximates an optimal system’1004 where the State 
seeks to maximise and collect the net present value of the economic rent. This is 
optimal since the amount bid reveals the bidders valuation of the acreage 
offered.1005 Therefore, not only does the cash bid system collect maximum 
amount of resource rent, but it also reveals to the government how valuable the 
bidding company believes the acreage to be, and which company values that 
acreage the most.1006 That information is crucial to a government since it 
furnishes the State with the capacity to assess the value of the acreage to the 
State itself and the companies that wish to exploit it.  
 
1001 Trudi Rodgers and Stewart Webster, Resource Rent Mechanisms in Australian Primary Industries: Some 
Observations and Issues (2007) Paper presented at the 51st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society Conference 2007, Sydney, 12. 
1002 Trudi Rodgers and Stewart Webster, Resource Rent Mechanisms in Australian Primary Industries: Some 
Observations and Issues (2007) Paper presented at the 51st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society Conference 2007, Sydney, 12. 
1003 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 5. 
1004 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 5. 
1005 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 5. 
1006 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 5. 
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The cash-bid/auction system attempts to capture the economic rent by pitting 
bidders for the resource against each other.1007 In this competitive situation, 
bidders give up some of the prospective economic rent to the licencing authority 
in return for a petroleum licence that confers exclusive right to petroleum 
exploration and production.1008 Since theoretically each bidder gains an 
advantage, the expectation is that the auction system will result in bidders 
attempting to outbid each other, until the State has captured all of the economic 
rent.1009 A concern of the auction system is the low number of bidders. Where 
this occurs, it has been demonstrated that sealed bids are preferred over oral 
bids, since they ensure that uncertainty is captured.1010 
Cash bidding in the North American system of licencing 
Aside from an occasional use by other countries, the cash bid system has been 
used almost exclusively by the United States, which has a long history of the 
use of cash or ‘bonus’ bidding for oil and gas licences.1011 The system has been 
used for the allocation of both onshore tracts of publicly owned land in the 
states,1012 as well as for the allocation of offshore licences in the Gulf of 
 
1007  Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 5. 
1008 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 5. 
1009 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 5. 
1010 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 7-8. 
1011 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach To Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007.  
1012 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 4. Petroleum licencing in the USA is a combination of lease contracts on public lands, designed according to the 
patterns developed by the private sector, plus general taxation. See Bernard Mommer, Private Landlord-Tenant 
Relationship in British Coal and American Oil: A Theory of Mineral Leases (1997), 44. Under the US legal system, 
mineral resources are the property of the public or private owner of the land on or beneath which the mineral 
resource is located. See Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum 
Regulation, Economics and Government Policies (1999), 174. Ownership of petroleum in the USA is governed by 
the ‘rule of capture’, where the landholder can extract as much oil and gas he desires from his land, so long as he 
conducts his operations without trespassing or interfering with the rights of neighbours to drill into the same 
geological formation under their own lands. For a discussion of ownership of mineral resources in the USA see 
John S Lowe, Oil and Gas Law (1988) 9-10. 
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Mexico.1013 This system has been almost exclusively used in the United States 
(US) since the mid 1970’s.1014 
State participation in the development of petroleum resources in the US is 
minimal, primarily confined to the development of regulatory legislation.1015 
US laws related to petroleum (onshore public land, and offshore) provide for 
regulatory control through leasing. Regulations stipulate the requirement for the 
proper management of operations (or suspension thereof), relinquishment of 
area, prompt and efficient exploitation and development of the lease area, and 
the cancellation of the lease if the owner fails to comply with regulations issued 
under the Act.1016 In addition, it is a legal requirement that leases cannot be 
awarded to citizens of another country whose laws, customs or regulations 
prevent legal or natural persons from obtaining leases over public lands.1017 
Individual states in the US have enacted laws to allocate petroleum licences on 
private tracts of land and state owned public land.1018 Most public land leases 
with known petroleum producing geological structures is allotted through an 
auction system, whilst ‘unknown’ land is allotted on a first come, first serve 
basis.1019 Generally, offshore competitive leases in the US are allotted for a 
fixed term by the federal government.1020 They are initially awarded for five 
years, although are extendable by two years if a number of criteria related to 
 
1013 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 1. 
1014 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 6. 
1015 Bernard Taverne, An Introduction to the Regulation of the Petroleum Industry: Law, Contracts and 
Conventions (1992), 14. 
1016 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industries and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and 
Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd ed. 2008), 170-173. 
1017 Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (1983), 83. 
1018 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industries and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and 
Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd ed. 2008), 170-173. 
1019 Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (1983), 83-4. 
1020  Using the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1953 (US). 
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exploration are satisfied, including the commencement of drilling 
operations.1021 
When implementing the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1953 (OCSLA),1022 
the US federal government incorporated a simple means of cash bid allocation 
of leases.1023 Today, the OCSLA requires the allocation of licences on the outer 
continental shelf to ensure the protection of the environment, and returns 
revenues to the federal government in the form of bonus bids, rents, and 
royalties.1024 It also incorporates a number of other alternative bidding 
systems,1025 mixing the capacity for broad discretion with a number of highly 
prescriptive planning and program arrangements. Only the auction system has 
been used for the allocation of licences to date.1026 
4.3.2 Work Program Bidding 
Similar to the cash bidding process, WPB utilises a system of bids in order to 
allocate petroleum licences to companies. It is a competitive bidding system 
based on the concept that the winning company is the company able to perform 
the most exploration.1027 Under WPB, petroleum licences for exploration are 
awarded to companies that ‘bid’ to perform specific activities that are desired 
 
1021 Sale governed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1953 (US), s18 with the lease awarded for a period of 
5 years.  
1022 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1953 (US). 
1023 Terence Daintith, ‘Administering the Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act: Too Much Discretion or Too Little?’ 
(2004) AMPLA Yearbook 2004 1, 34.  
1024 Marc Humphries, Outer Continental Shelf: Debate Over Oil and Gas Leasing and Revenue Sharing (2008) 
CRC Report for Congress, http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Dec/RL33493.pdf at 11 November 2008, 4. 
1025 Terence Daintith, ‘Administering the Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act: Too Much Discretion or Too Little?’ 
(2004) AMPLA Yearbook 2004 1, 34. 
1026 Daintith, Terence, ‘Administering the Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act: Too Much Discretion or Too Little?’ 
(2004) AMPLA Yearbook 2004 1, 34. 
1027 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 10-11. 
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by the State licencing the petroleum resources.1028 The rationale behind the 
WPB system is to encourage and provide an incentive for companies to 
effectively explore for petroleum.1029 
The number and type of areas that are bid for by potential licencees, as well as 
the quality of those bids determine the success of the WBP.1030 The quality of 
the bids refers to the amount and timing of the proposed work programs, as well 
as the technical and financial resources.1031 Generally, the optimal work 
program for an area (which is analogous to the investment outlay) is likely to be 
positively related to the expected profitability of exploring (and the subsequent 
development) of the area, and influenced by factors such as future oil prices and 
prospectivity of the acreage.1032 
The decision by a company to participate in the bidding process is influenced by 
an assessment of the business environment, and whether the oil company is 
prepared to engage in activities with the perceived return-risk profile.1033 If 
embarking on a bid, the company assesses the acreage and formulates an 
optimal (profit maximising) work program for the area. Similar to the cash bid, 
this assessment is based on such factors as prospectivity of the area, technology 
available, expected price for the oil that will be sold, and whether there are 
 
1028  Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 2. 
1029 Tim Warman and Lauren Goldblatt, ‘The Work Program Bidding System For Exploration Permits Under the 
Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act 1967 (Cth) (2008) 27 Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 178, 180. 
1030 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 2. 
1031 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 2 
1032 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 3-4. 
1033 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 3. 
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potential buyers if petroleum is discovered.1034 Other factors that may also be 
taken into account include the type of crude the acreage is likely to contain, 
water depth, and costs associated with the development of the field.1035  
The optimal work program forms the basis of the competitiveness of the bid, 
although the submitted bid will also be a function of the competitiveness of the 
tender, where competitiveness is related to the number of companies submitting 
competitive bids for the area.1036 It is also related to the number of companies 
actively participating in the industry and the likely bids from competing 
companies. Similar to cash bidding, the more companies that bid for acreage, 
the greater the competition between the companies, and therefore the greater the 
likelihood that the WPB will be optimal.1037 
Ideally, the selection of the winning bid should be based on terms and criteria 
that are final and binding (enforcing the concept that it is a contract between the 
State and the oil company).1038 The successful work bid should bind the 
licencee to their commitments in a manner that bonus or royalty systems do not, 
therefore limiting operator discretion.1039 This is accomplished through the 
specified work program, which generally requires the licencee to drill a certain 
 
1034 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 3. 
1035 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 3. 
1036 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 4. 
1037 The bid can be greater than optimal where there is a presumption that the field will contain more oil and gas 
than it actually does. For example in the Cornea Field in North-Western Wester Australia. For a discussion on the 
Cornea Field see section 5.3 below. Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) 
Energy Journal 1, 2-4. 
1038 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 2-4. 
1039 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 5-6. 
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number of wells at particular locations, and run a certain amount of seismic 
survey.1040 Unfortunately, often the bidder is required to speculate as to what 
criteria the State considers important when awarding petroleum licences thus 
introducing an element of discretion into the allocation of petroleum 
licences.1041  
A difficulty with the bidding system (both cash and WPB) is a lack of 
information. Since the companies do not know whether a field contains 
petroleum, there is limited knowledge upon which a company can base its bid 
upon. This means that companies decide the potential of a field, and the value 
of a field is left to market forces prevailing upon the parties that bid, with the 
bid most optimistic about the value of the field winning. The winning company 
might be the company most able to maximise the potential of the field, but it 
may also be an over optimistic company that believes they can find oil in the 
field. However if the field is dry, no company, optimistic, wealthy or 
competent, can find oil when it does not exist, although at least a competent 
company has the greatest chance of finding and developing petroleum 
resources.1042  
The value of the WPB system is that it is able to establish geological 
information regarding prospectivity of the field, since the selection of a bidder 
based on the exploration work program means that the award of a licence under 
a WPB will at least realise information regarding the field.  
 
1040 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 6. 
1041 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 2. 
1042 An example of this is the Norwegian giant field Ekofisk, and is discussed in Chapters five and six. 
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Work program bidding in Australia 
In Australia, the Commonwealth government is responsible for offshore oil and 
gas resources outside the three-mile territorial sea limit, allocating exploration 
and production property rights through the WPB system.1043 Australia is one of 
the only petroleum producing countries to allocate petroleum licences solely on 
the WPB.1044 This form of the bid system has been used since it operates within a 
free market philosophy that welcomes international companies,1045 which have 
the necessary resources, knowledge and competence to develop the petroleum 
resources without State participation. This is important for Australia, since one of 
its primary national petroleum objectives is to encourage international investment 
in the offshore petroleum sector.1046 To support the free market ethos, Australia 
has no mandatory local equity requirements and has no government owned oil 
companies.1047 This also supports another goal of the Australian government 
which is to not participate in petroleum activities.1048 By encouraging 
experienced international companies to bid for acreage in Australia, there are 
fewer requirements for State intervention or participation. 
Early awards of petroleum licences in Australia were made using cash bonus 
bidding particularly for highly prospective petroleum areas, with the values of 
 
1043 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s104-9. 
1044 Terrence Daintith, Research Report: Discretion and Prescription in the Administration of Petroleum Policy 
(2005), 26. 
1045 Department of Resources Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: An Overview for Applicants 
(2008), http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Acreage%20Releases/2008/site/page2.htm at 12 October 2008 
3. 
1046 Ref to petroleum policy as outlined in Chapter three. 
1047 Department of Resources Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: An Overview for Applicants 
(2008), http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Acreage%20Releases/2008/site/page2.htm at 12 October 2008, 
3.  
1048 Department of Resources Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: An Overview for Applicants 
(2008), http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Acreage%20Releases/2008/site/page2.htm at 12 October 2008, 
3-4. 
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winning cash bids ranged from A$1 million to A$20 million,1049 although the 
inherent uncertainty regarding the quality of a particular field means that 
bidders discounted their cash bonus bids accordingly.1050 This form of 
allocation of petroleum licences has not been used in Australia since 1993,1051 
and Australian acreage is allocated using the work program bidding system.1052 
However, there still remain legislative provisions for the award of licence 
through cash bidding in Australia under the Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPPAGSA).1053 
The process for the allocation of a petroleum licence is outlined in figure 5 above. 
It commences when applications for exploration licences for offshore acreage 
areas are invited in the annual release under the work program bidding system in 
accordance with OPAGGSA.1054 These releases of acreage will usually comprise 
a mix of mature and frontier fields.1055 Companies interested in a particular 
acreage form a commercial Joint Venture, appointing an operator for the acreage 
in which the application is being made. The JV then submits a work program bid 
for the acreage to the Joint Authority (JA). If accepted, an exploration licence is 
 
1049 Trudi Rodgers and Stewart Webster, Resource Rent Mechanisms in Australian Primary Industries: Some 
Observations and Issues (2007) Paper presented at the 51st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society Conference 2007, Sydney, 12. 
1050 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 6. 
1051 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Cash Bidding System: A Guide in Relation to the Australian 
Government’s Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (2004), 1. 
1052 Trudi Rodgers and Stewart Webster, Resource Rent Mechanisms in Australian Primary Industries: Some 
Observations and Issues (2007) Paper presented at the 51st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society Conference 2007, Sydney, 12. 
1053 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s110 – 114. 
1054 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s126. See also s104 (1). 
1055 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Release of Offshore Petroleum Exploration Areas Australia 
2008: An Overview for Applicants (2008).  
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awarded to the JV by the JA,1056 and exploration activities to fulfil the work 
program commence.1057 
Today, most Australian acreage is allocated using the work program bidding 
system, with exploration licences awarded for an initial term of six years.1058 The 
bid comprises two parts: the mandatory Primary Work Program (Years 1-3), and 
the Secondary Work Program (Years 4-6).1059 When bidding for a petroleum 
licence under the WPB system in Australia, the applicant is required to propose a 
minimum guaranteed work program (including expenditure), for each year of the 
first three years. At a minimum, this should include exploration wells to be 
drilled, seismic and survey activities, and data evaluation.1060  
The granting of an exploration licence authorises the licencee to explore for 
petroleum in the licence area,1061 as well as conferring an exclusive right to 
explore, including seismic survey and the drilling of wells.1062 The amount of 
seismic activity and the number of exploration wells to be drilled is stipulated by 
the JV group when applying for the licence in the work program bid. Therefore, 
the level of activity will differ in each licence area, depending upon the amount 
of work that was bid by the applicant. 
 
1056 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s99. 
1057 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s99 (5). 
1058 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Offshore Acreage Release 2006: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2006) www.industry.gov.au/acreagereleases/2006/HTML/Guidance/guidance_contents.html at 7 April 2007. 
1059 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: An Overview for Applicants 
(2008), http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Acreage%20Releases/2008/site/page2.htm at 12 October 2008, 
2. 
1060 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: An Overview for Applicants 
(2008), http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Acreage%20Releases/2008/site/page2.htm at 12 October 2008, 
2. 
1061 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s98. 
1062 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s98. 
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Whilst the exploration licences (or permits) are awarded for an initial term of 
six years,1063 there is the capacity to extend the permits twice.1064 At each 
renewal of the licence, 50% of the permit area must be relinquished, with a 
maximum of two renewals permitted.1065 Effectively, this provides the licencee 
with 25% of the original area awarded at the end of the renewal periods.1066 If 
the exploration has yielded commercially exploitable reserves of petroleum, a 
production licence may be applied for under OPAGGSA.1067 Should the 
discovery be non-commercial at the time of discovery, but likely to be in the 
next fifteen years, the licencee is able to apply for a retention licence under 
OPAGGSA,1068 which permits the licencee to retain title to the acreage for five 
years1069 and the capacity to renew the retention lease.1070 
Upon making a potential commercial discovery of petroleum, the licencee is 
required to notify the Designated Authority (DA) in writing, nominating 
block(s) for declaration of a location over the area of a potentially commercial 
discovery.1071 Following the declaration of the location, the licencee has two 
 
1063 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Offshore Acreage Release 2006: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2006) www.industry.gov.au/acreagereleases/2006/HTML/Guidance/guidance_contents.html at 7 April 2007. See 
also Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s102.  
1064 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s102, s119. 
1065 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 3. 
1066 This is similar to the relinquishment of acreage in Norway under the production licence. See Petroleum 
Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-9. 
1067 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 170, with conditions on the licence 
stipulated in s161. 
1068 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), chapter 2, part 2.3, Division 1 and 2, ss 134-
146, with conditions or the retention lease stipulated in s141 (2) of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
1069 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s139 (1). 
1070 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 153. 
1071 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Resources Division, Offshore Petroleum Guideline for Grant 
of a Production Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002) 4. 
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years (unless an extension is granted) to apply to the DA for a production 
licence or a retention licence.1072 
Production licences are required in order for petroleum to be removed from the 
acreage for commercial sale.1073 Chapter 2, part 2.4 of OPAGGSA provides for 
the grant of production licences over blocks in an offshore area,1074 and 
conditions of petroleum licences.1075 If an applicant wishes to proceed with the 
commercial development of a field, the grant of a production licence occurs 
after the submission of a written assessment of the discovery.1076 A two-stage 
consultation process with the JA and the DA then follows. Initially, the licencee 
produces a preliminary field development plan as part of the consultative 
process, to secure the JAs approval of the production licence and associated 
infrastructure requirements.1077 After approval of the preliminary field 
development plan, and in consultation with the government, the licencee 
submits a finalised field development plan (FDP) to the JA to facilitate formal 
field approval requirements. The granting of the production licence confers 
production rights on the licencee.1078 If a licencee wishes to change a FDP, it is 
required to seek the approval of the relevant bodies in accordance with 
OPAGGSA.1079 
 
1072 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), 141 (3). 
1073 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s161.  
1074 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s159 - 167. 
1075 Especially under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s162. 
1076 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Resources Division, Offshore Petroleum Guideline for Grant 
of a Production Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002) 8, Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s163. 
1077 Resources Division, Department of Industry, tourism and Resources, Offshore Petroleum Guideline for Grant 
of a Production Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence. (2002), 8.  
1078 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s170.  
1079 See Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s168 (4) and 168 (5). 
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Whilst OPAGGSA establishes the procedure for the award of an exploration 
licence,1080 and the rights conferred by an exploration permit,1081 the Act does 
not outline the criteria or process for the assessment of applications for acreage 
under WPB. Rather, the criteria for the assessment of applications are published 
in the annual Guidance Notes for Applicants.1082 This is because the Australian 
regime is unique, being purely administrative in nature,1083 with no contractual 
arrangements between the parties when the licences are allocated.1084 It is 
administered by prohibiting petroleum exploration activities,1085 and then 
granting companies the administrative authorisation to explore and recover 
petroleum.1086 
In deciding the winning bid, the JA is required to have regard to the 
predetermined, publicly outlined criteria that has been established by the 
State.1087 Current criteria for the award of WPB in Australia includes the 
number and timing of exploration wells to be drilled, the amount, type and 
timing of seismic surveying to be carried out, the amount, type and timing of 
any purchasing or licencing of existing data, significant appraisal work over any 
 
1080 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s104. 
1081 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s98. 
1082 The Guidance Notes for Applicants are published annually by the relevant Department concerned with the 
administration of petroleum titles, in conjunction with the release of petroleum acreage available for bidding. In 
2008 the responsible body was the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, and can be found at 
www.ret.gov.au/resources/petroleum at 12 December 2008. 
1083 Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ 
(2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 94-95; Terence Daintith, ‘Administering the Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act: 
Too Much Discretion or Too Little?’ (2004) AMPLA Yearbook 2004 1, 7. 
1084 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 127, Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a 
Regulatory Regime’ (2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 94. 
1085 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s97. 
1086 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s98. Terence Daintith, ‘A Critical Evaluation 
of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a Regulatory Regime’ (2000) AMPLA Yearbook 2000 91, 107 for a 
further discussion on the conundrum of ‘command-and-control’ regulation.  
1087 As stipulated by the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s106 (3). 
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previous petroleum discoveries within the area.1088 If a winning applicant 
cannot be chosen on the basis of the minimum guaranteed work program, the 
amount and timing of work proposed under the secondary work program will be 
assessed against the above criteria to determine the winning applicant.1089 
Work program bidding and Australia’s petroleum policy objectives  
Australia’s petroleum policy objectives are a mixture of a commercial focus to 
attract investment as well as the sustainable development of its petroleum 
resources.1090 Australia utilises the WPB method of allocation of exploration 
licences since it sees this method as most likely to select the company most 
likely to achieve the fullest assessment of the petroleum potential within the 
permit area in the minimum guaranteed period.1091 Whilst the aim of the award 
of a licence should be to implement the objectives of Australia’s petroleum 
policy, it is argued that the current legislative provisions and good standing 
provisions undermine the implementation of national petroleum objectives.  
When awarding a petroleum licence in Australia, the JA is required to take into 
consideration the past performance of the applicant, even where the applicant’s 
proposed work program is the highest submitted.1092  Of particular importance 
is whether the applicants have been participants in previous licences that have 
 
1088 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 4-5. 
1089 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 4-5. 
1090 This policy is analysed in detail in Chapter two. 
1091 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 4. 
1092 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 5. 
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been cancelled as a result of a default in work program commitment and there 
was no agreement to maintain good standing.1093 In the first instance, an 
applicant must satisfy the JA of its capacity to undertake its proposed work 
program. In particular, the applicant company is required to prove the adequacy 
of financial resources and technical expertise available to the applicant.1094 In 
addition, the applicant must demonstrate the likelihood that it will continue to 
have access to sufficient resources to meet the requirements of the proposed 
work program and other commitments previously entered into in other permit 
areas. The future viability of any consortium that is lodging the application must 
be demonstrated, and include evidence that a satisfactory commercial Joint 
Venture Agreement (JVA) has been or can be reached, and the capacity of each 
party to work with the rest of the consortium.  
A major factor in the award of a petroleum licence is the applicant's past 
performance in other petroleum exploration areas in Australia (good 
standing).1095 A company that has previously defaulted on its work program 
conditions in a petroleum exploration licence, but wishes to maintain future 
good standing, is able to do so if it can satisfy the government requirements to 
maintain good standing. These requirements include, at a minimum, a 
significant attempt to assess the petroleum potential of the licence area by at 
 
1093 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 5. 
1094 The Guidance Notes for Applicants are published annually by the relevant Department concerned with the 
administration of petroleum titles, in conjunction with the release of petroleum acreage available for bidding. In 
2009 the responsible body was the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, and these guidelines an the 
guidelines for previous acreage releases can be found at 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/upstream_petroleum/offshore_petroleum_exploration_in_australia/Pages/Offshore
PetroleumExplorationinAustralia.aspx at 12 December 2009.  
1095 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 4. Italics added by author. 
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least completing seismic survey.1096 Once seismic survey is completed, a 
licencee may be able to maintain good standing, even if in default, by 
undertaking to spend an amount of money equal to the monetary value of the 
outstanding work commitments on qualifying work in permits over re-released 
areas.1097 The monetary value will be the amount negotiated by the company 
and the JA, divided by the company’s equity in the licence. The defaulting 
company is required to agree in writing to maintain its good standing, and to 
disclose the agreed work program in a public statement.1098 
The capacity to maintain good standing was introduced in 2000, in response to 
the default on the Cornea field by a Shell-Chevron JV (the Shell consortium). 
Shell (the operator) was awarded an exploration permit over blocks WA-265-P 
and WA-266-P in Western Australia. This acreage was contiguous to the 
Cornea structure in block WA-241-P, which was also held by the Shell 
consortium. In bidding for the blocks, the Shell consortium bid a minimum 
guaranteed minimum work program three times greater than any previously 
successful application under the PSLA.1099 The Shell consortium bid highly for 
the two licences because the Cornea structure within block WA-241-P was 
mapped to extend into the contiguous blocks being offered.1100 Included in the 
 
1096 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 10. 
1097 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 10. 
1098 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008, 10. 
1099 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 130. Note that the legislation that regulated offshore petroleum activities at the time of the Cornea 
field default was the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) (PSLA). 
1100 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 130. 
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mandatory work program for the two blocks were 1,550 km2 of 3-D seismic and 
47 wells. At the end of the first year, the requisite seismic survey had been 
completed, and six of the 47 obligatory wells had been completed.1101 
Shell’s analysis of the results from the six test wells in WA-265-P and WA-
266-P, combined with geological results from WA-241-P, led the consortium to 
conclude that there had been an error in the assessment of the Cornea 
structure.1102 Instead of a commercial discovery, the reservoir was adverse, 
comprising a high viscosity thin oil rim, unconsolidated sand, low permeability 
and very high water connate saturations, resulting in less than ten percent 
recoverable oil.1103 Given these poor results, the consortium applied under s103 
(1) of the PSLA to the JA for the second permit year to be suspended, and the 
term of each permit extended by a similar period. 1104 The legal basis for the 
application was that drilling results had invalidated the geological modelling 
upon which the work program bid was based, and therefore the Shell 
consortium needed time to remodel the field. The JA rejected the application on 
the grounds that disappointing drill results, poor quality seismic data or the 
failure to prove a prospect are not normally considered to be force majeure.1105 
A further five test wells were drilled by the consortium, with Shell concluding 
that it was unlikely in the extreme that any possible discovery in WA-265-P and 
 
1101 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 130. 
1102 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 131. 
1103 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 131. 
1104 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 131. 
1105 Commonwealth of Australia, Permit Conditions and Administration – Work Program Bidding System, 01/3/R6, 
November 2001 (2001). 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
265
                                             
WA-266-P could be developed commercially, even in conjunction with Cornea 
in WA-241-P.1106 
Under s104 of the PSLA, the Shell consortium was required to complete the 
primary work program for the first three years, or would be deemed to have 
breached the mandatory work requirements. Further, it was only possible to 
surrender of the exploration licence and retain good standing at the 
commencement of the fourth year, once the three-year minimum program had 
been completed. However, the Shell consortium sought to surrender the licences 
within the first three years, which was disallowed under the provisions of the 
PSLA at that time.1107 The consortium therefore had three options available.1108 
They could drill the remaining mandatory wells at a cost of approximately $122 
million, apply under s104 (1) PSLA for consent to surrender the permits, or 
refuse to complete the guaranteed mandatory work program and suffer 
cancellation of the permits under s105 PSLA.  
The option of drilling the remaining wells was not favoured by the Shell 
consortium, which felt that they should not have to drill as it was inconsistent 
with the government’s often repeated assurance that ‘the government will never 
force permittees to drill post-holes.’1109 The consortium felt that the only option 
available was to seek the surrender and cancellation of the permits.1110 
 
1106 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Commonwealth of Australia, Permit Conditions and Administration – Work Program Bidding System, 01/3/R6, 
November 2001 (2001) 127, 131. 
1107 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 132.  
1108 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 134. 
1109 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 134. 
1110 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 133-4. 
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Australia’s petroleum peak body APPEA provided the government with a series 
of recommendations for the situation, which affirmed a number of important 
principles - any changes to the minimum guaranteed work program should be 
transparent, maintain the integrity of the system, be capable of uniform 
application, result in a loss of acreage by the licencee, and be simple.1111 
The Minister refused to cancel the permits, the basis of his decision being  
‘I do not believe your proposal to allow the surrender of the permits 
would be consistent with the work program bidding system. 
Maintaining the integrity of the work program bidding system, with 
fairness to all companies exploring offshore, is the overriding 
concern of the Government... I do not believe that the Designated 
Authority would consider it appropriate to give consent to the 
cancellation of the permits in accordance with s104 (3) of the 
PSLA.’1112 
Meanwhile, Shell and Chevron were individually awarded further exploration 
licences in WA98-12, 14 and 15, even though each was in default of work 
commitments in licence areas WA-265-P and WA-266-P. Furthermore, the DA 
rejected the Shell consortium application for surrender of WA-265-P and WA-
266-P, and the JA cancelled the exploration licences for WA-265-P and WA-
266-P for failure to complete the mandatory primary work program.1113  
However, in October 1999 Shell and Chevron, in separate negotiations, 
concluded agreements with the Federal Minister for Industry, Science and 
Resources to maintain its good standing with the Commonwealth and West 
 
1111 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 134-5. 
1112 Senator the Honourable Nick Minchin, Federal Minister for Industry, Science and Resources, in David 
Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural Resources 
127, 136. 
1113 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 136.  
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Australian governments, subject to the completion of exploration work in areas 
not taken up in recent releases.1114 This was despite the cancellation of the 
licences in WA-265-P and WA-266-P. The outcome of the individual 
negotiations by Shell and Chevron became embodied in the PSLA as part of an 
amendment to the PSLA in 2000.1115 These legislative amendments enabled the 
JA to rank multiple applicants based on its opinion, and could at their discretion 
exclude an applicant that they determined was not deserving of the grant of an 
exploration permit.1116 
In introducing the ‘good standing’ provisions as a result of the default by the 
Shell consortium, the Australian government introduced an element of 
discretion into the award of licences in Australia. No longer is a company 
precluded from other exploration licences if they are in default of work 
programs, or have had previous licences cancelled.1117 Instead, a company is 
now able to default on its work program conditions but still maintain its good 
standing.1118 The company needs only to demonstrate to the government that it 
has made a significant attempt to assess the petroleum potential of the permit 
area (at least conduct seismic surveying commitments)1119 and ‘spend an 
 
1114 Senator Nick Minchin, Governments Agree to Shell Maintaining Good Standing (1999) Media Release; David 
Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural Resources 
127, 136-7. 
1115 Amendments were in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2000 (Cth). 
1116 Now embodied in Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s106 (2). 
1117 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Guidance Notes for Applicants (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/GuidanceNotesForApplicants.pdf at 21 August 
2009, 5. 
1118 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Guidance Notes for Applicants (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/GuidanceNotesForApplicants.pdf at 21 August 
2009, 8. 
1119 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Guidance Notes for Applicants (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/GuidanceNotesForApplicants.pdf at 21 August 
2009, 8. 
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amount equal to the agreed monetary value of the outstanding work 
commitments on qualifying work in permits over re-released area.’1120 
Bunter sees the requirement for good standing in Australia as much more 
rigorous than the demand for a cash guarantee under cash bidding, since there is 
requirement for a level of work to be performed rather than a mere cash bid and 
assurance.1121  However, there are serious flaws in this reasoning. Presently, the 
provisions to maintain good standing in the event of a company defaulting on a 
mandatory work program require the company to spend an agreed sum of 
money on exploration in a re-released area. Yet the agreed monetary value is 
not necessarily the monetary value the winning work bid program originally 
agreed to spend on exploration. This is illustrated by the amount of money the 
Shell consortium was required to spend on ‘other exploration work’ to maintain 
good standing in relation to WA-265-P and WA-266-P. 
In the original winning work program bid, the consortium estimated that the 
wells would cost AUD$3.5 million each to drill.1122 During the negotiations to 
maintain good standing after the licences were cancelled, Shell (acting alone) 
persuaded the government to accept that the wells could in fact be drilled for 
AUD$1.7 million each.1123 This reduced the cost to the Shell consortium for 
drilling the remaining 35 wells required in the primary work program from 
AUD$122.5 million to AUD$59.5 million, effectively half the original value. In 
doing so, the value of Shell’s share of the cost (equal to its 50% participating 
 
1120 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Guidance Notes for Applicants (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/GuidanceNotesForApplicants.pdf at 21 August 
2009, 8 emphasis added by author.  
1121 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 89. 
1122 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127. 
1123 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 137-8. 
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interest) was reduced from A$61.25 million to A$30 million, saving the 
company A$30 million.1124 
The agreed monetary value provisions as part of the ability for a company to 
retain good standing operates to the detriment of other bidders and the 
government. The negotiations between Shell and the Australian government 
effectively resulted in the 50% reduction in the value of exploration work to be 
conducted by Shell. It also raises serious questions about the bidding process 
and award of licences based on work program bidding. If the value of drilling 
the wells was estimated to be A$3.5 million each at the time of bidding, how is 
it that the value of drilling the wells has been reduced 50% four years later, 
effectively reducing the value of exploration for the Australian government? 
Furthermore, other bidders are placed at a disadvantage, since the value of the 
winning bid may be reduced when valued as agreed monetary value under the 
good standing provisions.  
The current good standing provisions provide a winning work program 
company with a ‘get out of jail free’ provision. Where the winning bidder 
performs some of its exploration work, and finds that the field is a poor prospect 
for petroleum, the precedent set by Shell in Cornea and the current good 
standing provisions means that a consortium is able to cancel its permit prior to 
completing the mandatory primary work program, at a reduced price if agreed 
to. This undermines the objectivity of work program bidding, where the 
government auctions off exploration risk to the oil companies, who were 
included in the exploitation of petroleum because of their desire to assume the 
risk of exploration, where Bunter says the risk should fall.1125 Instead, the 
government assumes part of the risk of exploration, because it allows the 
 
1124 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 137-8. 
1125 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 96. 
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company to cancel a licence, thereby reducing its risk in acreage where 
petroleum prospects turn out to be poor.  
The good standing provision may also encourage companies to over inflate the 
cost of their work program during the bid process in order to win certain 
acreage. This would be more likely for acreages that are particularly attractive 
and are likely to contain petroleum deposits. Should the licence area fail to 
show a commercial discovery, the winning consortium could invoke the good 
standing provisions, and have their financial commitment to exploration 
seriously reduced. This could be prevented by stipulating that the winning bid 
of a company may be converted under the good standing provisions based on 
the original monetary value stipulated in the winning bid, rather than an agreed 
monetary value. Thus, the company would still be spending the designated 
amount on exploration activities on the Australian Continental Shelf, but in an 
area of differing prospectivity. This could discourage companies from 
overbidding to win exploration licences in attractive acreage, and then 
negotiating lower values of exploration if the acreage fails to yield expected 
commercial quantities of petroleum. 
The advice offered by APPEA to the Australian government regarding the 
Cornea licences was that any resolution of the matter should embrace integrity, 
simplicity, and uniformity.1126 By disregarding the advice of APPEA, and 
enabling a company to maintain good standing through a discretionary decision, 
the Australian government has undermined the integrity of the work program 
bid system. No longer is there an assurance that the mandatory exploration 
under a winning work program bid will be completed. If the terms of the licence 
can be altered after the award of the acreage, then the system of award does not 
unambiguously and objectively award the licence to the highest bidder.1127 
 
1126David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 134.  
1127 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 1-2. 
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Rather, the licence is awarded to the company that bids the highest at the time 
of the award of licence, yet there is no assurance that this amount will be spent. 
This undermines the economic justification for use of WPB, which seeks to 
award a licence based on the most amount of money to be spent on exploration, 
and therefore be the most economically efficient.1128 In addition, the application 
of the good standing provisions is not uniform, as it relies on the discretion of 
the JA. There is also no uniformity in either the application of the provision or 
how the monetary value of the remaining work is agreed upon. This ultimately 
means the system of award of petroleum licences is complex, not at all simple 
or uniform as recommended by APPEA.  
An Australian national petroleum policy objective is to offer certainty to 
investors for petroleum exploitation, allowing companies to manage their risk in 
a regulatory framework that is predictable, transparent, equitable and timely.1129 
Yet the current method of allocation of licence under the WPB has a 
demonstrable element of discretion. Consequently, companies have neither 
transparency nor predictability in the licence allocation process. Instead, there is 
provision for the application of a discretionary administrative power by the JA. 
Rather than encourage exploration and investment in Australia’s petroleum 
industry, the current method of allocation is discouraging investment in 
Australia’s offshore petroleum industry. This may be demonstrated by a sharp 
downturn in the investment in Australian petroleum exploitation. Ten years ago, 
Australia’s attractiveness as an offshore petroleum exploration destination was 
second only to the United Kingdom.1130 Today, Australia is no longer attractive 
in prospective terms. In the ten-year period to 2002, 154 companies commenced 
 
1128 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 1-2. 
1129Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004) 51-3. 
1130 Warwick Parer, ‘Delivering National Prosperity’ (1998) Address to the 1998 APPEA Conference 9 March 
1998, Canberra. 38 APPEA Journal Part 2, 11.  
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or recommenced exploration operations in Australia, whilst 168 companies left 
Australia’s petroleum provinces in the same period.1131 
This downturn in exploration investment demonstrates that the WPB method of 
licence allocation in Australia is not fulfilling its national petroleum objective to 
attract international investment in a competitive environment to exploit the 
petroleum resources.1132 Furthermore, the method of allocation is not 
encouraging socio-economic sustainable development, since the current good-
standing provisions encourage companies such as Shell and Chevron to 
discount their designated investment in the offshore sector by up to 50%.1133  
Given the serious flaws of the work program bidding system in Australia, the 
use of this system for the allocation of petroleum licences in Australia should be 
reconsidered. In particular, the good standing provisions require some 
fundamental changes.  
One change is that rather than an agreed monetary value being used to 
determine the exploration expenditure to be spent in another area when a 
licence is cancelled, the companies should be required to spend the original 
value bid on exploration. This may act as a deterrent to companies seeking the 
cancellation of licences in the event of a poor prospect, since they will be 
required to spend the same amount of money, whether in the allocated acreage 
or another area. In addition, the defaulting company should be required to 
perform the exploratory work in a frontier area of the Australian continental 
shelf, and contribute the data generated to the Geoscience Australia Petroleum 
Database. This will ensure that the Australian government benefits through the 
 
1131 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of Government (2008), 36. 
1132 A policy objective stipulated in the 1999 petroleum policy. See Department of Industry, Science and Resources, 
Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy:  A Strategy to Promote Petroleum Exploration and Development in 
Australian Offshore Areas (1999).  
1133 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 137-8. 
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accumulation of pre-competitive data,1134 which has previously been identified 
as an area of serious weakness.1135 These provisions will at least ensure that the 
award of good standing is uniform and transparent for all participants. 
 
4.4 Discretionary allocation of petroleum licences  
4.4.1 Outline and objective of the discretionary system 
The discretionary system for the allocation of petroleum licences has been used 
in many jurisdictions, including Norway, the United Kingdom, and 
Denmark.1136 It is a flexible system of awarding exploration and production 
acreage on the basis of a committed work program set either by the oil company 
upon application for acreage, or by the State developing the resources.1137 It 
awards acreage to applicants on the basis of predetermined criteria. These 
criteria may include technical and financial competence and management 
capacity of the applicant.1138 However, typically the primary criterion for the 
allocation of the acreage is the level and type of work the applicant is prepared 
to undertake in an exploration.1139 It is important to note that there is much 
variation in the criteria stipulated by different States, and the criteria for award 
 
1134 Pre-competitive data refers to data that is available, usually free of charge, to ALL applicants for acreage on an 
equal and open basis. 
1135 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of Government (2008), 36.  
1136 Michael B Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007.  
1137 Michael B Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007. 
1138 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002) 87. 
1139 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000), 166. 
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of licence will differ according to the goals of the State in exploiting the 
petroleum resources.  
The objectives of the discretionary system are to provide States with the 
capacity to select the most appropriate companies to grant exploration and 
production rights to, enable the State to define the criteria for the award of 
licences according to the national petroleum objectives and field maturity, and 
to development of frontier areas where required.1140 Discretionary allocation 
enables a State to determine which factors will be used to select the licencee, 
rather than being confined to purely economic criteria. Under discretionary 
allocation, other factors can be used in selecting the winning applicant, and the 
selection criteria can be aligned with national petroleum objectives. Where 
sustainable petroleum development is a goal for the State, the discretionary 
method may be a valuable tool.  
Discretionary allocation can provide a State with a plethora of options in 
developing its petroleum resources.  It allows a government to rapidly explore 
their fields if so desired,1141 and promote timely and effective development of a 
field in the event of a commercial discovery.1142 Furthermore, it can be used as 
an effective tool to slow down exploration as a method of controlling 
production by limiting the number of licences that are granted to petroleum 
explorers.1143 It also enables the State to control or limit the number of foreign 
 
1140 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002) 87; Geoff Frewer, 
‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P Pearson (eds) The 
International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000), 166; Brent F Nelsen, The State 
Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991) and 
Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004. 
1141 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 19. 
1142 Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (1983), 15-16.  
1143 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What, How? (1976), 4. 
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oil companies that exploit oil within that State,1144 and can be used to obtain 
geological and geophysical information about a country’s oil reserves and 
potential.1145 It is able to respond to environmental and political change with 
greater sensitivity than auction systems.1146 This means that there may be 
differing terms for differing licencing rounds in any jurisdiction.1147 
Discretionary allocation also gives a State some control over the investment in 
its petroleum industry, since the government is able to determine which of the 
proposed programs for exploration are carried out.1148 With this control comes a 
need for the State to have sufficient human, financial and knowledge resources 
to be able to evaluate the proposals for exploration made by oil companies.1149 
Thus, this system vests the discretionary power to award a licence in the 
petroleum management body and tender evaluators, who consider the formal 
applications against the State-defined criteria which encompasses financial, 
technical and managerial aspects of the applicant.1150 This flexible system for 
the allocation of licences for exploration and production awards licences 
according to administratively or politically derived criteria, in order for the 
 
1144 Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (1983), 15-16.  
1145 Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (1983), 15-16. 
1146 Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All: Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Background Paper: BC Offshore: Potential and Problems a MASC Workshop for Lawyers, Dunismuir Lodge, 
Sidney BC, March 18-21, 2004, 5. 
1147 An excellent discussion of the differing conditions attached to early petroleum licencing rounds is found in 
Brent F Nelsen The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991). See also a description of the licencing rounds in Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
Annual Report, 1998 (1998). 
1148 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 166. 
1149 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 166. 
1150 Bunter, Michael, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009. 
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State to maximise the benefits to that State from the exploitation of the 
petroleum resources that the State owns.1151 
The use of discretion in the award of a petroleum licence is not an ‘all or 
nothing’ system. Rather, discretion is a continuum, ranging from total 
government control at one extreme, through various degrees of government 
discretion, to market-based award through auction at the other end.1152 This 
spectrum can range from the ‘discretionary’ discretionary allocation of 
petroleum licences, such as those allocated by the Norwegian government prior 
to 1994,1153 and the ‘objective’ discretionary allocation of licences, where 
licences are awarded under the discretionary method of allocation utilising 
objective and transparent criteria. The difficulty faced by governments therefore 
is not whether or not they should allocate acreage using the discretion system of 
allocation, but rather how far along the discretion continuum they should move 
in allocating licences, and how much control should remain with the State.1154 
The exercise of discretion along this spectrum enables the State to award 
licences to the applicant whose proposed exploration program is most likely to 
fit with national petroleum objectives.1155 These objectives may include growth 
of industry sectors, management of other natural resources, political or 
environmental objectives.1156 By allocating licences using discretion it is 
 
1151 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 4.  
1152 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 165. This 
spectrum can range from the award of a licence using advertised, objective criteria, to a government decision to 
award the licence based on apparent non-sensical criteria that are neither open, nor transparent. 
1153 For example the allocation of licences in Norway that specified that any licencees awarded licences on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf were required to use Norwegian Labour and companies wherever possible. For a 
discussion on this see section 5.5.2 below. 
1154 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 165. 
1155 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 168. 
1156 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 168. 
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possible to determine, define and publicise the criteria for the award of licences 
based on those national objectives. Such criteria may encompass experience, 
technical knowledge, financial capacity or nationality. In addition, where the 
selection criteria is determined and advertised by the State during the licencing 
round, it enables a State to attract companies that satisfy the criteria upon which 
the award of licence will be based, rather than only attracting companies with 
the financial capacity to pay the highest bid up front.  
Often discretion enables the State to exert control over the activities of the 
licencee in petroleum activities. Frewster notes that the greater the level of 
control exhibited by the State in the award of licences, the greater the level of 
influence a State is able to exert over the activities of the oil company in the 
exploration and production of petroleum.1157 This is demonstrated in Norway 
where the level of control exerted by the State in the use of discretion in the 
award of petroleum licences corresponds to the control exerted over petroleum 
activities, as well as inducing the economic diversification of Norway. 
However, it is important to note that this level of control may also be 
attributable to the amount of control that a State exerts in the development of a 
field, rather than the conditions of award alone. The level of control exerted by 
a State in field development, and its contribution to sustainable development is 
considered in Chapter five below. 
4.4.2 Use of the discretionary system in the North Sea 
Use of discretion on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) 
The UK government initially debated the merits of using a discretionary versus 
an auction system in the 1960s, ultimately rejecting the auction system since it 
‘did not permit the same range of detailed control that discretionary licencing 
 
1157 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000), 168. 
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systems do.’1158 This choice of discretionary allocation enabled the UK 
Ministry of Power to allocate licences to companies that were willing to carry 
out the wishes of the UK government for the rapid development of the resources 
on the UKCS. 
In the early licencing rounds the UK government encouraged, through its 
discretionary award of licences, the rapid and thorough exploitation of UKCS, 
in order to exploit the petroleum resources for their economic worth.1159 The 
UK argued that the allocation of licences using discretion with weighting on the 
work program was required because such emphasis promoted rapid and 
thorough exploration and exploitation of its North Sea oil resources.1160 Oil 
companies proposed a work program, and entered into negotiations with the UK 
government regarding the required work program. When agreement was 
reached on the terms of the licence, the companies committed to a minimum 
program of work on the UKCS in a specified period of time. Hence, there was 
not only an element of work program bidding, but also negotiation with the UK 
government to determine the most suitable applicant for that licence area. 
Today, licences on the UKCS continue to be awarded through discretionary 
allocation, with applicants required to propose a work program prior to 
allocation of licence. All applicants are assessed using a general policy 
objective of encouraging expeditious, thorough and efficient exploration of the 
UK continental shelf to identify all oil and gas resources, as well as the 
proposed work program.1161 Applications are evaluated on the basis of a 
 
1158 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 19.  
1159 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 19. 
1160 Select Committee in Energy, Third Report Session 1981-2, North Sea Oil Depletion Policy (1982) [55], in 
Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Overcapitalisation in Licencing Systems Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1993) 19 (4) 
Resources Policy, 299, 299. 
1161 United Kingdom Department of Trade and Energy, The Energy Report (‘The Brown Book’) (1998). 
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number of criteria, including proposed work program, exploration and 
development record of the applicant on the UKCS, and the financial and 
technical ability of the company to implement the proposed work program,1162 
with weighting on the technical capacity of the applicant, proposed exploration 
program, and environmental considerations.1163 The company must also submit 
a minimum number of wells that it will complete if awarded the acreage.1164  
An important objective of the UK licencing system has been protectionism, 
seeking to guard against the possibility that companies might invest at a level 
considered too small once the licence has been awarded.1165 However, it is 
argued that there are costs associated with the use of a discretionary licencing 
system, since many oil companies must compete to fulfil the government’s 
criteria of work program when applying for acreage, resulting in 
overcapitalisation in order to be awarded a particular lease. This occurs when 
companies propose work programs that are above their optimal levels of capital 
investment.1166 This overcapitalisation is exacerbated where there is an increase 
in the number of companies competing for licences, and cost-price ratios 
decrease.1167 
 
1162 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Overcapitalisation in Licencing Systems Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1993) 19 
(4) Resources Policy, 299, 299. 
1163 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000), 169. 
1164 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 18-22. 
1165 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Overcapitalisation in Licencing Systems Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1993) 19 
(4) Resources Policy, 299, 310.  
1166 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Overcapitalisation in Licencing Systems Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1993) 19 
(4) Resources Policy, 299, 310. 
1167 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Overcapitalisation in Licencing Systems Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1993) 19 
(4) Resources Policy, 299. 
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The UK explored the use of the cash bid system for the allocation of some 
licences in the fourth licencing round in 1971.1168 Fifteen blocks were 
auctioned, with a further 267 blocks allocated by the usual discretionary basis of 
licence allocation.1169  Altogether, 31 bids were received for the 15 blocks, with 
winning bids providing £37 million on government revenue. In comparison, the 
other 267 blocks only realised revenue of £2.7 million.1170 
A number of academics have examined this licencing allocation experiment by 
the UK, with Kenneth Dam concluding that the ‘discretionary system turned out 
to be the most expensive subsidy.’1171 Dam arrived at this conclusion based on 
an analysis of the income received.1172 However, this analysis compares only 
the initial payments made by the oil companies that bid for the licences under 
the discretion and auction system. Whilst the auction system did provide an 
initial income of £37 million, compared to only £2.7 million for the 
discretionary licences, the licences awarded through discretion also contributed 
over £200 million in minimum work programs.1173 The income analysis by 
Dam fails to incorporate income realised from the calculation of resource rent 
tax and other special taxation on the income realised from the licences awarded 
using discretion. As such, it is not possible to conclude that the income received 
was higher from the award of licences by cash bid rather than through 
discretionary methods, since not all income from licences awarded by discretion 
was included in the calculations, only initial income. Rather, it is only possible 
 
1168 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal  1, 5. 
1169 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 5. 
1170 Walter Mead, in Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 
Resources Policy 3, 5. 
1171 Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 39. 
1172 See Kenneth Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 38, for income received from the allocation of 
licences using the bid and discretion methods in the licencing rounds. 
1173 House of Commons, first Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, North Sea Oil and Gas, Session 1972-3, 
at 45 (1973) in Kenneth W Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 38. 
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to conclude that bidding provided greater ‘up front’ revenue, an expected 
outcome from the auctioning of petroleum licences. 
The UK government reintroduced cash auctioning as one of the methods of 
allocating licences in the seventh licencing round in 1980/1, whilst still 
retaining the right to allocate licences using discretion, and to reject the highest 
cash bid.1174 The rationale for the reintroduction was that it would realise large 
sums of money without slowing offshore exploration, rather than an ideological 
argument relating to free markets.1175 During this period the UK economy was 
facing numerous structural problems, including high inflation, wage inflation, 
trade union strikes and high levels of government debt.1176 The UK government 
sought to reduce the government deficit by raising taxes, decreasing 
government spending and reducing interest rates. The effect of these actions 
was to cause economic recession in the UK.1177 Coupled with this were the 
effects of the appreciation of the pound sterling, particularly affecting the 
economy through income received from the export of oil. As part of the overall 
monetary strategy, the government sought a cash injection into the economy 
through the cash auctioning of these blocks. Forty two blocks from the UKCS 
mature province were auctioned, realising £210 million.1178 The eighth and 
ninth rounds each auctioned off fifteen blocks (8% of total number of blocks 
offered), with the return disappointing.1179 The eighth round raised only £33 
 
1174 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 92. 
1175 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 92. 
1176 UK Economy Under Mrs Thatcher 1979 – 1984 http://www.economicshelp.org/2007/03/uk-economy-under-
mrs-thatcher-1979-1984.html at 19 January 2009. 
1177 UK Economy Under Mrs Thatcher 1979 – 1984 http://www.economicshelp.org/2007/03/uk-economy-under-
mrs-thatcher-1979-1984.html at 19 January 2009. 
1178 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 92. 
1179 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 92. 
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million through auction, although the ninth round was more successful, raising 
£121 million.1180 
The tenth licencing round in 1987 saw a return to the discretionary allocation of 
both mature and frontier blocks. This coincided with a change in the fiscal 
policy of the Thatcher government, since Treasury no longer required the 
injection of cash that would have been realised in the auctioning of the 
acreage.1181 In all, the auctioning of British acreage was not motivated by the 
economic desire to extract the greatest resource rent from the acreage, but to 
raise revenue. Using auction as a revenue raising exercise seriously undermines 
the value of the auction system, which is predicated on the notion of extracting 
the highest resource rent. The use of auction by the British as a revenue raising 
tool rather than as a tool to capture the greatest amount of economic rent 
undervalued the resources, and enabled bidders the opportunity to bid not for 
what the acreage was worth, but for what the British government was likely to 
accept for the acreage. 
This argument is supported by data on the frequency of drilling of second wells 
on auctioned and discretionary blocks from the eighth and ninth licencing 
rounds. In the eighth round, 86% of discretionary and 60% of auctioned block 
had second wells drilled.1182 In the ninth round 63% of discretionary and 33% 
of auction acreage had second wells drilled.1183 This demonstrates that 
obligations undertaken on acreage awarded by discretion have led the 
participants to seek out additional prospects on the allocated block when the 
 
1180 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 92. 
1181 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 92. 
1182 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 171. 
1183 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 171. 
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first well failed, whereas in auction blocks, an initial failure has tended to focus 
the participant to more favourable areas or other obligations.1184 Furthermore, 
there was little difference in exploration drilling between discretionary and 
auction blocks, although there was more appraisal wells drilled on auction 
blocks.1185 
The evidence from the UK demonstrates that the use of auction for the 
allocation of petroleum licences was an effective way to allocate acreage and 
realise up front resource rent, but there were serious concerns regarding the 
competitive nature of the process. 1186 These concerns arose since there were 
very few bidders, a consequence of the formation of joint ventures in petroleum 
activities which spread risk and results in a smaller pool of possible bidders. 
This suggests that an auction may not be the most economically efficient way to 
allocate licences.1187 
The UK initially chose the discretionary system since it allowed the government 
to speed up exploration in unknown areas of the UKCS, as well as favouring 
UK companies.1188 Today, it continues to use the discretionary system even 
though auctioning licences to the highest bidder may generate greater up front 
revenue. The discretionary system continues to meet the primary petroleum 
 
1184 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 171. 
1185 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 171. 
1186 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 172. 
1187 Geoff Frewer, ‘Auctions vs. Discretion in the Licencing of Oil and Gas Acreage’ in G MacKerron and P 
Pearson (eds) The International Energy Experience: Markets, Regulation and the Environment (2000) 168. 
1188 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 19. 
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objectives of the UK, particularly the national objective of speedy development 
of domestic petroleum resources.1189 
Award of licences on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) 
Exploration licences in Norway are conferred under chapter 2 of the Petroleum 
Activities Act 1996 (Norway) (PAA) to either a legal person or a natural person 
domiciled within an EEA/EU State.1190 The exploration licence confers non-
exclusive exploration rights,1191 with the award of a production licence 
conferring exclusive rights for exploration and production activities.1192 The 
production licence confers a discretionary right upon the State to issue 
regulations relating to the contents of a licence application, including the scope 
of the licences, further conditions of the licence, and requirements for the 
development of the field.1193 Similar to the award of exploration licences in 
Australia, as illustrated in figure 5 above, the acreage must have been released 
in a licencing round, and appropriately advertised.1194 This usually occurs after 
the environmental, economic and social impact of such operations on other 
industries and adjacent regions has been assessed.1195 An application for a 
production licence may be lodged with the Norwegian government upon the 
release of acreage in a licencing round,1196 which must be advertised in the 
 
1189 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 19. 
1190 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s2-1. 
1191 Petroleum Activities Regulations 1997 (Norway), s4. 
1192 Petroleum Activities Regulations 1997 (Norway), 3-3 and 3-4. It is important to note that the Norwegian 
petroleum licence confers the same rights as the Australian exploration licence, and therefore will be seen as 
equivalent in each jurisdiction. Therefore, this thesis will assess the award of the production licence in Norway with 
the award of a Exploration licence in Australia.  
1193 See Chapter 4 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
1194 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) s3-1 advertising requirements under Petroleum Activities Act 1996 
(Norway), and EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations 
for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994). 
1195 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-1.  
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Norwegian Gazette and the Official Journal of the European Communities, in 
order to comply with Norwegian laws1197 and the EC Directive 
requirements.1198 
Production licences are normally awarded only through licencing rounds 
(except for Awards in Predefined Area), where the Norwegian State invites 
applications for a certain number of blocks (acreage).1199 When acreage is 
announced and released in licencing rounds, companies can apply individually 
or in groups. The announcement specifies the terms and criteria that will 
determine the award of a licence. Petroleum licences are usually awarded for a 
period of ten years,1200 with the ability to extend up to thirty years.1201  
After the close of the licencing round, the State assesses the applications 
received and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) shortlists a group of 
companies based on the criteria for selection.1202 The licences are then awarded, 
based on the non-discriminatory, objective, published criteria, and announced 
publicly.1203 These criteria are outlined in section 10 of the PR, and include the 
technical competence and financial capacity of the applicant and the applicant’s 
plan for exploration and production in the area for which a production licence is 
sought.1204 If the applicant is or has been a licencee according to an exploration 
licence, the Ministry may also take into consideration any form of inadequate 
1196 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-5. 
1197 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-5. 
1198 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994). 
1199 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) s3-5. 
1200 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-9. 
1201 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-9. 
1202 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2001: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2001), 59. 
1203 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-5. 
1204 Petroleum Regulations 1996 (Norway), s10. 
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efficiency or inadequate responsibility that may have been demonstrated by the 
applicant as a licencee.Where there are cooperation agreements entered into for 
application for a production licence, these agreements are submitted to the MPE 
for veto and approval. The Minister reserves the right to alter the agreement if 
required.1205 The MPE selects the operator,1206 thus conferring upon the 
operator the responsibility for the daily conduct of petroleum operations in 
accordance with the terms of the licence. 1207 
State control is exerted through the granting of production licences in licencing 
rounds. This award of a production licence confers upon the licencee the right to 
explore for and produce petroleum for periods of up to 30 years.1208 This 
encourages companies to have a long-term perspective in managing their interests 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). In addition, the State has the 
discretion to determine if, and at what level, the Norwegian State will participate 
in petroleum activities.1209 Furthermore, as part of the award of production 
licences, the State may impose a specific work obligation on the licencee for the 
area specified within the licence.1210 A production licence can be surrendered, 
either in its entirety within the first three months of the grant of the production 
licence, or at the end of the calendar year, with three months notice.1211 
The grant of a licence in Norway is based on the licencee fulfilling the 
conditions of the award of licence. When a licencing round is announced, the 
duties of the licencee are outlined to prospective applicants, usually as a guide 
 
1205 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s3-4. 
1206 In accordance with Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) s3-7. 
1207 Joint Operating Agreement (Norway), Art. 3.1. 
1208 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s1-2. 
1209 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-6. 
1210 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-8. 
1211 Within three months of the grant of the production licence – see Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-15 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
287
                                             
to the applicant.1212 Duties are stipulated in the Norwegian Invitation to Apply 
for Petroleum Production Licence, and include the requirement for an applicant 
to be registered in Norway or the EEA, and that conditions of the award will be 
stipulated at the time of the licence.1213 Conditions pertaining to the grant of a 
licence are also outlined in section 11 of the Petroleum Regulations 1997 
(Norway) (PR). The grant of a petroleum licence is granted based on the need to 
ensure that petroleum activities are carried out in a proper manner.1214 Standard 
conditions include the preservation of public health and safety, environmental 
protection, protection of biology and national treasures, and safety of employees 
and facilities. The grant of a licence also requires the systematic management of 
resources, including production rate, optimisation of production activities, and 
the need to ensure fiscal revenues.1215 In addition, the licencee is required to 
have an organisation ‘which is capable of managing independently the 
petroleum activities from Norway’.1216 In practice this means that the 
Norwegian government has the right to specify requirements of the organisation 
and capital of the company, and the licencee may be ordered by the Norwegian 
government to base the company in Norway or use a company that is based in 
Norway.1217 
 
1212 For example the Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence published by the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate and part of the package of information provided to applicants. See 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/2%20-
%20Topics/%5BLicence%20awards%5D/Invitation%20to%20apply%20for%20petroleum%20production%20licen
ce.pdf at 13 December 2009. 
1213 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence, (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/2%20-
%20Topics/%5BLicence%20awards%5D/Invitation%20to%20apply%20for%20petroleum%20production%20licen
ce.pdf at 13 December 2009, v. 
1214 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s11, para 1.  
1215 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s11 para 2. 
1216 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s10-2. 
1217 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s10-2 para 2. 
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As part of the award of the discretionary award of licence in Norway, 
companies are not required to apply for acreage in a pre-arranged consortium. 
Rather, each company applies individually for the blocks on offer, indicating 
their preference for blocks.1218 The MPE, in consultation with the NPD and 
individual companies, selects a number of companies and assembles a JV for 
each licence area, as well as designating the operator for that acreage.1219 The 
MPE then stipulates as a condition of the grant of a licence that the licencees are 
to enter into agreements with specified contents with one another.1220 This JV 
then enters into a contractual arrangement with each other through the JOA.1221  
The grant of a production licence confers the right to exclusive exploration 
activities, including the drilling of test wells. It does not automatically confer 
the right for production. Rather, similar to the requirements for Australia, 
production rests upon the approval of a Plan for Development and Operations 
(PDO).1222 When a new deposit is to be developed, the oil company must 
submit a PDO for approval.  An important part of the PDO is an environmental 
impact assessment which interested parties are given the opportunity to 
comment upon in a hearing round.  The environmental impact assessment 
describes the development’s expected impact on the environment, any trans-
boundary environmental effects, and effect on natural resources, fisheries and 
society in general.1223 The governmental consideration of this assessment and 
 
1218 See Chapter 3 of Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
1219 Brent F Nelsen,, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 94. 
1220 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-3. 
1221 The JOA is a mandatory part of the licencing framework, as defined under s 3-3.  Petroleum Activities Act 1996 
(Norway). A company is not able to participate in the exploitation of petroleum resources on Norwegian 
Continental Shelf unless it enters into the JOA.  
1222 Petroleum Activities Regulation 1997 (Norway) sections 20-24.  
1223 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2007: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector  (2007), Chapter four. 
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development plan ensures a prudent project in terms of resources, as well as 
acceptable consequences for other matters of public interest. 
Petroleum activities in Norway must be conducted in accordance with prudent 
production, technologies and sound economic principles, to ensure that 
petroleum resources are not wasted,1224 and the production is for the benefit of 
the Norwegian people. To that end, the PDO must contain an account of the 
economic, resource, technical, commercial and environmental aspects of the 
production, as well as decommissioning and disposal of the installation once 
production has ceased.1225 Where production is planned in two or more stages, 
the plan must, as far as possible, comprise a total development plan rather than 
a stage development plan.1226 Production cannot commence until the Minister 
has approved the plan,1227 and where there has been significant deviation from 
the original production plan, the Ministry may require a new or amended plan to 
be submitted and approved.1228 
The Ministry also has to approve the expected production schedule, which can 
only be altered if warranted by resource management or other significant social 
considerations.1229 The Ministry will stipulate for periods of time, the quantity 
of petroleum that may be produced, injected or cold vented at any time, and 
stipulates that burning of petroleum is not allowed without Ministry 
approval.1230 On all other production matters, the Ministry has discretion 
 
1224 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-1. 
1225 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2. 
1226 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2. 
1227 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2. 
1228 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2. 
1229 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-4. 
1230 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-4. 
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regarding preparation, commencement, and continuation of production,1231 and 
the use of production facilities by others, where deemed necessary for efficient 
operation or for the benefit of society.1232 
4.4.3 Discretionary allocation of petroleum licences and 
national petroleum objectives 
Discretion is at the core of the Norwegian petroleum licencing allocation 
system, as noted by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate: 
‘[The Norwegian licencing] system differs from the approach 
taken in many other countries in that licences go to the 
companies which are best qualified for the job, rather than those 
making the highest bid in an auction.’1233 
Unlike the UK government, the Norwegian government has exclusively used 
the discretionary system for the allocation of petroleum licences since the 
commencement of petroleum exploration and production.1234 The Norwegian 
State uses discretion in the allocation of licences as a method to stabilise 
offshore exploration rather than control production.1235 It was attracted to the 
use of discretion since it afforded the State a greater degree of control over 
offshore activities,1236 allowing the Norwegian government to implement its 
petroleum policy objectives. These policy objectives include slower rates of 
 
1231 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-6. 
1232 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-8. 
1233 Johannes Kjøde, in Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘A Long Road to Travel: How Norway Hands out 
Petroleum Acreage’ (2007) 2007 (1) Norwegian Continental Shelf 24, 24.   
1234 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 23. 
1235 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 95. 
1236  Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 23. 
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exploration, development of Norwegian oil companies and encouraging 
Norwegian industries to develop sufficient capacity to play a major role in the 
development of Norwegian Petroleum resources.1237 
An important reason for the use of discretion in the award of licence in Norway 
is the high regard for other natural resource sectors, particularly fishing. 
Petroleum production is seen as one of the many natural resources that are 
available for exploitation by the Norwegian State,1238 although there have been 
rather strong political conflicts, resulting in legal and political discussions on 
this question, especially in the 1980s, that lead to the current regulation. The 
question of whether the rich fisheries in Lofoten should be opened for 
petroleum activity is currently causing strong political struggle within the 
coalition government. Before any decision occurs, an analysis of economic and 
environmental impact of petroleum activity in the area is carried out. When the 
Ministry selects acreage for production licences, resource and exploration 
considerations are of particular importance, and special emphasis is placed on 
environmental concerns and issues related to fisheries.1239 As such, if there is a 
clash in the exploitation of petroleum and other natural resources, the State has 
the right to delay or suspend petroleum activities.1240 This is easier to 
accomplish in a system with discretionary selection of licencees than in a 
system where the companies has paid for the licence. The importance of other 
natural resources are also reflected in the liability requirements for petroleum 
 
1237  Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 62.  
1238 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-13. 
1239 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Newsletter No. 15, October 1998 (1998) 
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/npetrres/newsletter/no1598/default.htm#Ekofisk%20IOR at 22 June 2008. 
1240 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-13. 
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operations, where a licencee is liable regardless of fault, for financial losses 
incurred as a result of pollution and waste from petroleum activities.1241 
The use of discretion in the allocation of petroleum licences is defined in the 
PAA.1242 The State has the right to grant a production licence, which confers 
exclusive rights to exploration and production in the areas covered by the 
licence.1243  The announcement of a licencing round and the criteria for the 
award of a licence are required by both EU1244 and Norwegian Law1245 to be 
advertised to ensure all potential applicants are notified.1246 The criteria used to 
assess the applications for acreage are outlined in s10 of the Petroleum 
Regulations 1997 (Norway) and the guide for applicants of each licencing 
round.1247 The criteria is set on the basis of providing the best possible 
petroleum resources management, and an award of licence is based on the 
technical competence and financial capacity of the applicant, and the applicant’s 
plan for exploration and production in the area for which a production licence is 
sought.1248  
 
1241 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 8-3. 
1242 See The Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-3. A production licence is granted on condition by the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, who has the discretion to stipulate conditions for the granting of production 
licences. 
1243 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-3. 
1244 See EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006. 
1245 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-5. 
1246 The Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-5 stipulates that the announcement shall be made in the 
Norwegian Gazette (Norsk Lysingsblad), and the Official Journal of the European Communities at least three 
months prior to the closure date for applications. 
1247 For example the outline in the invitation to apply for the 20th licencing round. See Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence, (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/2%20-
%20Topics/%5BLicence%20awards%5D/Invitation%20to%20apply%20for%20petroleum%20production%20licen
ce.pdf at 13 December 2009. 
1248 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway) s10. 
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Discretion is used to select the companies most suitable for petroleum activities 
in the acreage offered, with weight given to the technical capacity of the 
applicant and the willingness and ability of the applicant to pursue operations in 
a prudent manner.1249 If the applicant is or has been a licencee on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, the Ministry may also take into consideration any 
form of inadequate efficiency or inadequate responsibility that an applicant may 
have demonstrated as a licencee.1250 
The granting of a production licence is done on the basis of factual and 
objective criteria,1251 and the State retains the right to not grant a licence based 
on the criteria stipulated.1252 As part of the award of licence, the State has the 
right to determine if, and at what level, the Norwegian State will participate in 
petroleum activities.1253 There is also the right for the State to regulate matters 
relating to a production licence. This regulation can include, but is not confined 
to, the imposition of a specific work program,1254 prudent production of 
petroleum resources,1255 and the approval and ongoing assessment of field 
development plans and operations.1256 The right to regulate matters relating to 
 
1249 See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, A Long Road To Travel: How Norway Hands out Petroleum Acreage 
(2008) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Emner/Ressursforvaltning/Undersokelse_og_leting/19.9.2007+Ein+grundig+prosess.ht
m?print=true at 22 June 2008. Prudent production is a requirement of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), 
s4-1. 
1250 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway) s10.  
1251 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-5. It is important to note that the discretionary allocation of 
petroleum licences using objective criteria (objective discretionary allocation of licences) has not always occurred 
in Norway. Until the entry of Norway into the EEA, and therefore requirements for Norway to be bound by EC 
Directives, Norway would allocate licences based on the ability for a company to contribute to the development of 
the Norwegian petroleum industry, including the transfer of skills and knowledge to Norwegian companies and 
mandatory R&D requirements. This was particularly crucial in the ‘entrepreneurial’ phase (1970-1976) and 
consolidation.  
1252 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-5. 
1253 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-6. 
1254 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-8. 
1255 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-1 and 10-1. 
1256 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2.  
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the production of petroleum is reserved by the State to assist it in achieving its 
national petroleum objectives. 
The reasoning for the allocation of consortia partners and selection of the 
operator by the Norwegian State is twofold. Firstly, it allows the Norwegian 
government to assemble a consortia tailored to the unique qualities and nuances 
of that acreage, allowing the State to select the company with the best experience 
technology and skills for that particular acreage. Secondly, it enables the State, as 
owner of the petroleum resources, to retain control over who participates in the 
exploitation of acreage. Together this allows the Norwegian State to address the 
economic and commercial challenges it faces as it seeks to sustainably develop 
its petroleum resources. 
 
4.5 Method of allocation and sustainable development  
4.5.1 Introduction 
The allocation of a petroleum licence is crucial in encouraging sustainable 
petroleum development. As John Strongman of the World Bank noted, in order 
to translate natural capital1257 into societal capital,1258 you need the right 
policies and good implementation capacity from the allocation of exploration 
 
1257 Natural capital is defined as aassets in their role of providing natural resource inputs and environmental services 
for economic production. It is generally considered to comprise three principal categories: natural resource stocks, 
land and ecosystems. All are considered essential to the long-term sustainability of development for their provision 
of “functions” to the economy, as well as to mankind outside the economy and other living beings. See 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Glossary of Statistical Terms (2007) 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1730 at 13 December 2009. 
1258 Societal capital may be seen as a form of social capital, which is defined as the norms and social relations 
embedded in the social structures of societies that enable people to co-ordinate action to achieve desired goals. The 
term social capital has found its way into economic analysis only recently, and there is no consensus on which 
aspects of interaction and organisation merit the label of social capital, nor on how to measure it and how to 
determine empirically its contribution to economic growth and development. See Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Glossary of Statistical Terms (2007) 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3560 at 13 December 2009. 
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rights to how governments spend their revenue.1259 Hence, the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources starts with the allocation of the petroleum 
licence. The difficulty lies in determining which method of allocation is most 
likely to encourage sustainable development.   
4.5.2 Risk and award of petroleum licences 
When a company bids for a petroleum licence in a desired acreage, its aim is to 
position the bid to win against a range of competing bids.1260 In doing so, there 
are a number of risks. The first is the risk of not being the winning bidder.1261 In 
this instance, the time cost and effort put into preparing the winning bid is 
wasted. Another is that that the winning bidder finds out after the award of the 
licence that the value of the acreage is lower than the price paid.1262 This may 
possibly be mitigated by pre-bid exploration, which may alter the optimal bid in 
auction allocation of licences.1263 However pre-bid exploration is not costless, 
and may carry the risk that if the bid is not won, the costs associated with 
exploration are wasted.1264  
Exploration risk in the bid system is transferred from the State to the oil 
company, a place where a number of academics believe the risk should lie.1265 
 
1259 John Strongman, Sustaining the Social License: Enduring Challenges, Evolving Solutions (2009) Paper 
presented at the Sustainable Development 2009 Conference (SD09), Mineral Council of Australia, Adelaide, South 
Australia, 26-28 October, 2009, slide 28. 
1260 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Exploration Prior to Oil Lease Allocation: A Comparison of Auction Licencing and 
Allocations Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1994) 20 (4) Resources Policy, 235, 238. 
1261 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 15. 
1262 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 15. 
1263 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Exploration Prior to Oil Lease Allocation: A Comparison of Auction Licencing and 
Allocations Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1994) 20 (4) Resources Policy, 235, 236. 
1264 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Exploration Prior to Oil Lease Allocation: A Comparison of Auction Licencing and 
Allocations Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1994) 20 (4) Resources Policy, 235, 236. 
1265 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Offshore Acreage (2002), 96-7.   
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This is because a core component of an oil companies business is assuming, 
assessing and mitigating the risk associated with the exploration, development 
and production of petroleum.1266 The expertise of the company and their 
willingness to assume risk is one of the reasons that governments engage oil 
companies to exploit their petroleum resources.1267 This transfer of risk ensures 
that typically risk adverse host governments and their citizens are not exposed 
to high levels of risk.  
Under the discretionary system of licence award, the State shares the 
exploration risk, since the State will only gain a reward when and if a discovery 
is made.1268 This has been described as the ‘beauty parade system’, since the 
government only gains reward through revenue from taxation on profit when 
commercial discoveries are made and the field is producing.1269 This has been 
criticised as a weakness of the discretionary system, since it effectively invites 
the government to assume the exploration risk without gaining a reward by 
gaining a share in the equity of the resource.1270 Moreover, it encourages the 
government to assume the attendant project commercial viability risk.1271 
This weakness of the discretionary system was historically mitigated in Norway 
by the use of the ‘carried interest’ system. On this basis, the State awarded itself 
a predetermined interest in each licence, but required the consortium 
participants to ‘carry’ the State’s share during exploration.1272 Where a 
 
1266 Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Exploration Prior to Oil Lease Allocation: A Comparison of Auction Licencing and 
Allocations Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1994) 20 (4) Resources Policy, 23, 236, 236-7. 
1267 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Offshore Acreage (2002), 96-7. 
1268 Michael B Bunter, ‘A New Approach To Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007 
1269 Michael B Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 96. 
1270 Michael B Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 96. 
1271 Michael B Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 96. 
1272 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 38. 
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discovery was declared commercial, the State opted to activate its carried 
interest or withdraw from the consortium. Upon activation, the State was 
required to contribute its share of the development costs, although it was 
accorded the rights of a contributing partner throughout the exploration 
process.1273 This use of carried interest enabled the State during the 
entrepreneurial phase of exploration and production on the NCS to shift the 
exploration risk back to the oil companies.1274 In doing so, the Norwegian State 
only assumed the investment and production risk after commercial reserves had 
been proven, rather than during the high risk exploration phase. Although the 
carried interest system is no longer used, it provided Norway with the means to 
develop its research and development capacity as well as develop the requisite 
skills and knowledge required to ensure that petroleum resources were 
sustainably developed.1275   
4.5.3 The award of petroleum licence and economic 
diversification  
Economic diversification1276 is essential in the sustainable development of 
petroleum resources, since it enables a State to develop and utilise industrial 
activities required for the extraction of non-renewable petroleum resources for 
other industrial activities.1277  This enables skills, knowledge and competence 
 
1273 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 38. 
1274 See Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and 
Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991) 38; and Ole Andreas Engen, The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum 
Innovation System: A Historical Overview (2007)TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No. 20070605. 
1275 Refer to Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), chapters 3 an 4 which confers many rights to the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, but not the capacity for a carried interest. 
1276 Economic diversification is generally taken as the process in which a growing range of economic outputs is 
produced. It can also refer to the diversification of markets for exports or the diversification of income sources. See 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/sbsta_agenda_item_adaptation/items/3994.php at 17 March 2009. 
1277 An excellent example of this is the creation and development of the Norwegian diving industry. Olav Wicken, 
The Layers of National Innovation Systems: The Historical Evolution of a National Innovation System in Norway 
(2007) TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No. 20070601, 57. 
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that was gained for the development of petroleum resources to be utilised for 
other industrial activities, thereby building a broad industrial base the State can 
utilise for other industrial activities after the petroleum resources have been 
exhausted. Generally, the development of petroleum resources in an economy has 
the danger of causing a ‘resource curse’, since high levels of petroleum 
exploration and production create a huge influx of labour, knowledge, skills, and 
money into a State.  
The principle of economic diversification is premised on the notion that when 
petroleum is extracted, there is a value for the State not only from the petroleum 
itself, but also through the exploitation of the petroleum (production cost 
spending). If domestic industries can be developed that provide goods and 
services for the exploitation of petroleum, then that country can capture the 
production cost spending. Norway sought to use its petroleum licencing 
framework, particularly the award of licence and the JOA, as a way to 
implement economic diversification. 
The production of petroleum generates high levels of short-term revenue through 
petroleum taxation. Aside from the possible politically destabilising effects of 
this revenue,1278 there is a temptation by many States to utilise the revenue for the 
short-term, in order to create a ‘better’ society by improving those amenities in 
society that are favoured by the population, including roads, health, and schools. 
However, all of these societal resources require maintenance after they have been 
created. Once the petroleum revenue has ceased, the affected State needs to find a 
source of income in which to maintain these now essential services. But if all of 
the resources have been depleted, there is no source of wealth. Economic 
diversification is a vital tool in sustainable development of petroleum resources, 
since it assists a State in converting resource endowments and revenue into 
 
1278 For an excellent account of the effects of petroleum revenue on political stability and instability, refer to 
Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007). 
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industrial activities, knowledge and goods that can be utilised by other industries 
long after the resources have gone.  
The production of petroleum creates a huge demand for industrial and technical 
efforts in order to cope with the demands of a burgeoning oil industry.1279 In the 
absence of domestic petroleum support industries, the supply of goods, services, 
technical expertise and machinery requires importing and re-exporting once the 
task is over, with no benefit to the State.1280 Thus, a fundamental premise of 
economic diversification policy is to ensure that auxiliary services and industries 
are developed concurrently with the petroleum resources of a nation in order to 
attempt to avoid resource curse.1281 If a nation is able to direct economic 
diversification to develop competent industries that can be utilised after the 
petroleum resources have been exhausted, then that State has been able to 
sustainably develop its petroleum resources, since it has harnessed the petroleum 
industries needs, while utilising these needs to create a domestic industrial base.  
Economic diversification in Norway 
In the UK during the 1970s and 1980s, State ownership of petroleum resources 
and the use of the discretionary system of licence allocation were utilised to 
overcome perceived barriers to domestic economic activity, such as the adverse 
effects of unfettered competition between private companies who possesses or 
could access the necessary technology for exploration.1282 The UK employed a 
method of allocation of licences that enabled discrimination in favour of British 
 
1279 M Devaraj, ‘Government Policies Concerning the Discovery and Development of New Offshore Oil Provinces, 
with Focus on India and the North Sea’ (1983) 8 Ocean Management 251, 270. 
1280 M Devaraj, ‘Government Policies Concerning the Discovery and Development of New Offshore Oil Provinces, 
with Focus on India and the North Sea’ (1983) 8 Ocean Management 251, 270-1. 
1281 Auty, Richard M, Sustaining Development in Mineral Resource Economies: The Resources Curse Thesis 
(1993), Chapter two. 
1282 Terence Daintith and Geoffrey Willoughby, Manual of United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law (1984), 20-1. 
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applicants.1283 Regulations in force until 1976 required applicants to be British 
citizens of the UK or colonies, or oil companies incorporated in the United 
Kingdom.1284 This enabled the UK government to secure the maximum share of 
the resource rent for the State as an additional source of revenue, as well as 
regulating the presence of international oil companies into North Sea 
activities.1285 
Similarly, since the commencement of petroleum activities in Norway, the State 
has played a significant role in the regulation of the Norwegian petroleum 
sector,1286 being involved in many aspects of the management and development 
of not only petroleum resources but also associated industries. The result of this 
sustained State role in developing the petroleum industry in Norway has been 
the development of a global petroleum cluster, including a global supply 
industry, drilling and subsea technologies, competent research institutions, 
world renowned shipping, and strong banking and finance institutions.1287 This 
is demonstrated by international sales from the petroleum supply industry, 
which have tripled since 1995.1288 This is remarkable given that anti-
discrimination provisions of the 1994 EC Directive1289 effectively ended the 
 
1283 Terence Daintith and Geoffrey Willoughby, Manual of United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law (1984), 20-1. 
1284 Terence Daintith and Geoffrey Willoughby, Manual of United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law (1984), 20-1. 
1285 Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (1983), 69-78. 
1286 INTSOK – Norwegian Oil and Gas Partners, Government Role (2004) 
http://www.intsok.no/PHP/index.php?id=79 at 22 December 2006. 
1287 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
1288 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience speech given at 
Mexico-Norway Meeting given on cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007. 
1289 EC Directive 92/13 EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 February 1992 Coordinating 
The Laws, Regulation and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Application Of Community Rules on the 
Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport, and Telecommunications Sectors 
(1992) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1992L0013:20070101:EN:PDF at 12 
December 2008. 
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capacity of the Norwegian State to favour Norwegian companies in the supply 
of goods and services for petroleum operations. 
Prior to the early 1960s, Norway had no oil industry, and no thought of 
developing petroleum resources, as it believed they did not exist.1290 It did 
possess a well developed manufacturing base, comparatively strong economic 
growth, full employment and a current account surplus.1291 After petroleum was 
found in the North Sea in 1969, the Norwegian government sought to develop 
and implement policies that not only exploited the petroleum but also developed 
new industries through economic diversification.  
Socio-economic benefits from the development of Norwegian petroleum 
resources have been generated by successful economic diversification by 
Norway since the 1960s. The discretionary allocation of petroleum licences by 
the Norwegian State has implemented Norwegian petroleum policy objectives. 
These include economic diversification to develop associated industries, the 
transfer of skills and technology to increase knowledge and competence in the 
petroleum industry, the development of technological excellence in industry, 
and investment in infrastructure and human capital.1292  
Since 1970, Norwegian governments have regarded it as essential to promote 
competition in the oil industry while at the same time actively promoting the 
business opportunities for Norwegian industry, thereby achieving success in 
obtaining high local content in activities.1293 This policy was formally declared 
in 1972 by the Royal Decree of 8 December 1972, and implemented through 
conditions attached to the granting of licences from the third petroleum 
 
1290 Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), 15. 
1291 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2001: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2001). 
1292 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009. 
1293 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
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licencing round.1294 This decree encouraged the economic diversification of 
Norwegian industry and Norwegian companies through conditions attached to 
the allocation of petroleum licences. It required, amongst other things, all 
licencees to use Norwegian offshore suppliers where the Norwegian company 
was competitive in quality, service, schedule of delivery, and price.1295  
Local content provisions were incorporated to encourage and promote the 
development of infant petroleum industries. The licencing conditions stipulated 
strict control over actual supplies of goods and services to the development and 
production activities, securing Norwegian companies an active part in the 
competition for deliveries.1296 During the awarding of supply contracts, the 
operator was required to inform the MPE of its recommended supplier and 
Norwegian content, with the MPE then ensured that the Norwegian bidder was 
awarded the contract.1297 This preferential treatment for Norwegian companies 
was applied to all licencees on all fields, resulting in Norwegian companies 
contracting and supplying 50-70% of goods and services during this period.1298 
To enforce this procurement policy, a Goods and Services Office was created in 
1972, to enforce the contracting and procurement requirements of the licencing 
rounds.1299 During the awarding of contracts, the Norwegian applicant was 
 
1294 This round occurred in 1974, therefore it was the first official use implementation of the procurement policy fro 
the 1972 Decree. However there had been some development of local industry prior to this official decree. For an 
outline of all of the early licencing rounds see Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Annual Report, 1998 (1998), 114-
115. 
1295 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 71. 
1296 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Speech by the State Secretary Bjorg Sandal, in Baku, Azerbaijan 5 June 
2000. http://www.odin.no/odinarkiv/english/stoltenberg_I/oed/026031-090011/dok-bn.html at 23 December 2006. 
1297 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006.   
1298 Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009. 
1299Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009. 
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calculated as value added, (in manpower and monetary terms), and Norwegian 
bidders were awarded contracts.1300 The linking of petroleum sector licencing 
and the development of Norwegian industries, services and skills under 
advantageous procurement law has been fundamental in the success of the 
Norwegian petroleum industry, both in a domestic sense, as well as on an 
international scale. This protectionist policy as a tool for economic 
diversification of the Norwegian industrial sector was implemented since the 
Norwegian government felt that market forces alone were insufficient to 
promote economic diversification, therefore the Norwegian government saw the 
need for government intervention.1301 
The linking of economic and social benefits to the granting of natural resource 
concessions was not unfamiliar to the Norwegian State. The development of 
water resources for hydroelectric power in the early 1900s generated an 
unprecedented wave of protectionist and nationalist sentiment in Norway.1302 
This was particularly focused in the Norwegian rural sector, and directed at 
foreign penetration into Norwegian industry.1303 This is not surprising, given that 
the union between Norway and Sweden was dissolved in 1905. Increasingly anti-
capitalist views came to dominate in the period 1906-7, leading to the 
implementation of the first temporary restrictions on foreign investment in 
Norwegian hydropower concessions 1907.1304 Permanent regulation of waterfalls 
for the generation of hydropower was implemented in the 1909 Concession 
 
1300Michael Bunter, ‘A New Approach to Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
<http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm> at 19 September 2009. 
1301 Øystein Noreng with Farshad Tehrani, The Norwegian Experience of Economic Diversification in Relation to 
Petroleum Industry and the Relevance to Iran (2005) the 10th Institute for International Energy Studies (IIES) 
Conference Tehran 4-5 December 2005, 3. 
1302 Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 311. 
1303 Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 311. 
1304 Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 311. 
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Laws.1305 These laws stipulated that only public bodies (the State and 
Kommunes) could exercise the right of free disposal of waterfalls above 
1000hp.1306  All other bodies were obliged to seek a licence (or concession) to 
generate hydropower.1307 These concessions were only given for a limited period 
(for example up to eighty years), with ownership then reverting to the State. Once 
the concession was granted, the majority of the stock had to be located in 
Norway. In addition, Norwegian workers and materials were also given 
preference.1308  These concession laws decreed that all gains from the 
development of water resources should be socialised for the benefit of all 
Norwegians.1309 Furthermore, the Norwegian government bought over a dozen 
waterfalls in competition with private investors between 1907-1920, with a view 
to develop these waterfalls in the interest of public good.1310  
When establishing a suitable petroleum licencing concession system in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the Norwegian government drew on this previous 
experience of granting concessions to private companies to not only control the 
development of its natural resources, but to ensure that the benefits of the 
developments were shared with all Norwegians. A common feature of the 
granting of both hydropower and petroleum licences was a desire to attract 
foreign capital, but in a manner that could be controlled and directed to serve the 
interests of Norwegian society.1311 In both of these licencing regimes, the 
objectives of Norwegian national policy was to use the allocation of licences to 
 
1305 Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 311. 
1306 Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 312. 
1307 Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 312. 
1308Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 312. 
1309 Fritz Hodne, An Economic History of Norway 1815-1970 (1975), 314. 
1310 Johan Vogt, Elektrisitetslandet Norge Fra Norsk Vassdrags og Elektrisitetsvesens Historie (1971), 62-9. 
1311 Ole Andreas Engen, The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A Historical Overview 
(2007) TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No 20070605, 3. 
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create incentives for integrating new innovation systems into Norwegian 
society.1312 These incentives were partly derived from the discretionary allocation 
of licences, which required that Norwegian subcontractors be engaged as a 
condition of granting the licence.1313 However, the incentives were also derived 
from the discretionary authority granted to Norwegian government agencies to 
distribute rights to companies and bodies it considered would serve Norwegian 
interests.1314 
The allocation of petroleum licences was used to implement the Norwegian ten 
oil commandments.1315 This ensured that the Norwegian State supervised and 
controlled all aspects of the Norwegian petroleum industry.  This included the 
coordination of Norwegian interests, and the creation of an integrated Norwegian 
oil community.1316 The enactment of the commandments through the allocation 
of licences also ensured that there was fair consideration of social, economic, 
political and environmental factors in the development of the petroleum 
resources.1317  
The Norwegian government used the discretionary allocation of petroleum 
licences to pursue national interests. Industrial and regional development, as well 
as national control of petroleum activities, was established through the licencing 
system. In diversifying their industrial base, Norway made a number of important 
decisions that have had a profound effect on the economic diversification of 
Norway. Importantly, Norway built on existing strengths in the industrial sector. 
 
1312 Ole Andreas Engen, The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A Historical Overview 
(2007) TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No 20070605, 3. 
1313 Ole Andreas Engen, The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A Historical Overview 
(2007) TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No 20070605, 3. 
1314 Ole Andreas Engen, The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A Historical Overview 
(2007) TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No 20070605, 3. 
1315 These ten oil commandments are discussed in detail in Chaptert wo above. 
1316 See in particular commandments 1, 7 and 8. 
1317 See in particular commandments 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. 
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As a nation with existing strengths in the maritime industry, Norway demanded 
that logistical support for the platforms be provided from a Norwegian 
harbour.1318 This provided advantages to Norwegian marine construction 
industries and supply companies. Combined with this was the requirement that 
foreign companies operating in Norwegian territory were required to use 
Norwegian safety, salary and income tax regulations.1319 In addition, in a manner 
similar to the hydro concessions of the early 20th Century, international petroleum 
companies were required to establish a Norwegian company that was subject to 
Norwegian jurisdiction.1320  
Since 1994, Norway has been a signatory to the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement,1321 and a member of the EEA, requiring Norway to implement EU 
legislation relating to the award of petroleum licences.1322 As such, Norway’s 
award of licences must be non-discriminatory, based on open, competitive 
bidding for the licences without favour to Norwegian companies. Therefore, 
since 1994, Norway has not been able to favour domestic companies through 
conditions attached to the award of licences. However, the policies that were 
implemented in 1972 and continued until 1994 led to the effective development 
of a Norwegian knowledge base and competence throughout the value chain. 
The result of this sustained State role in developing the petroleum industry has 
been the development of a world class petroleum cluster, consisting of national 
 
1318 Erik Vatne, Global Markets – Local competence? Internationalisation of the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
(2000)Working Paper 78/00, SNF Project No 4225, Research Council of Norway, PETROPOL Program, Bergen, 3. 
1319 Erik Vatne, Global Markets – Local competence? Internationalisation of the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
(2000)Working Paper 78/00, SNF Project No 4225, Research Council of Norway, PETROPOL Program, Bergen, 3. 
1320 Erik Vatne, Global Markets – Local competence? Internationalisation of the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
(2000)Working Paper 78/00, SNF Project No 4225, Research Council of Norway, PETROPOL Program, Bergen, 3. 
This requirement is articulated in s3-3 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
1321 World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Government Procurement (1996) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm at 14 December 2009. 
1322 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006. 
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oil companies, strong supply industry, industry leader in drilling and subsea 
technologies, strong research institutions, world renowned shipping, and strong 
banking and finance institutions.1323 This is demonstrated by international sales 
within the petroleum supply industry, which have tripled since 1995,1324 and 
Norwegian goods and service account for approximately 50% of the Norwegian 
petroleum sector.1325 This is a remarkable feat given that the anti-discrimination 
provisions in a number of EC Directives effectively ended this protectionist 
policy. 1326  
As a consequence of its policy of mandatory economic diversification policy, 
Norway has developed a number of internationally operating engineering, 
construction and shipbuilding companies. The policy of economic diversification 
resulted in the conscious selection of designs that emphasized and utilised 
existing technologies. This has resulted in an increase in Norwegian exports in 
machinery, specialised equipment, metals and chemicals. Norway also imports 
some machinery and equipment, but largely produces and exports specialised 
equipment. The Norwegian State used the discretionary method of allocation of 
petroleum licences to develop local industries from the outset, creating industrial 
capabilities.1327 Today, these capabilities are demonstrated in Norwegian strength 
 
1323 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006.   
1324 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
1325 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2008: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2008), 14-22. 
1326 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, and EC 
Directive 92/13 EEC European Parliament and of the Council of 25 February 1992 Coordinating The Laws, 
Regulation And Administrative Provisions Relating to the Application of Community Rules on the Procurement 
Procedures of Entities Operating in The Water, Energy, Transport, and Telecommunications Sectors (1992) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1992L0013:20070101:EN:PDF  at 12 
December 2008. 
1327 The objective of the Norwegian government today continues to be to promote the efficient use of the countries 
overall resources within a sustainable framework, managing non-renewable resources in a manner that takes 
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in deep-sea diving, cold steel technology, and concrete technology, as well as 
several leading seismic surveying and drilling companies.1328 
The success of Norway’s economic diversification is partly attributable to 
Norway capitalising on its strong technical and commercial position.1329 At the 
commencement of diversification in 1972, Norway had a strong technological 
and commercial position in marine operations, including shipping, ship design 
and ship construction, controlling the fourth largest merchant navy, and a 
proven history of innovative design in shipping.1330 However, the primary 
reason for the Norwegian success was due to the requirement for international 
oil companies to support local industries through mandatory requirement for 
‘local content’ as part of the award of a petroleum licence.1331 The experience 
of Norway demonstrates that market forces are not enough to encourage the 
sustainable development of petroleum resources through the diversification of 
industries. Rather, the development of an internationally competitive industrial 
sector needs to be driven by the State. In Norway’s experience, the State used 
the allocation of petroleum licences to encourage the necessary economic 
diversification to ensure the sustainable socioeconomic development of its 
petroleum resources. 
accounts of impacts on national wealth. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway’s Action Plan for Sustainable 
Development (2004) UN Commission on Sustainable Development, 12th Session, New York, 23 April 2004. 
1328 Olav Wicken, The Layers of National Innovation Systems: The Historical Evolution of a National Innovation 
System in Norway (2007) TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies No. 20070601, 57.   
1329 Erik Vatne, Global Markets – Local competence? Internationalisation of the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
(2000) Working Paper 78/00, SNF Project No 4225, Research Council of Norway, PETROPOL Program, Bergen, 
4. 
1330 Erik Vatne, Global Markets – Local competence? Internationalisation of the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
(2000) Working Paper 78/00, SNF Project No 4225, Research Council of Norway, PETROPOL Program, Bergen, 
4. 
1331 This mandatory requirement essentially amounted to industry protection and enabled the Norwegian firms to 
become competitive within the marketplace. 
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Economic diversification through the allocation of licences in 
Australia: lessons from Norway 
Since the allocation of petroleum licences in Australia is made using the WPB 
method of allocation, there are no requirements for applicants to support the 
economic diversification of Australian industries as a condition of the award of 
the licence. Certainly, the allocation of a petroleum licence using the WPB 
method encourages exploration of the Australian continental shelf. However, 
there are no conditions attached to the award of the licence, rather economic 
forces are left to operate in the selection of the applicant. 
However, there has been an identified need for an enhanced State role in 
encouraging economic diversification. The need for Australia to diversify was 
identified in the late 1980’s, with the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee report The North West Shelf: Sea of Lost Opportunities?1332 This 
report argued that major natural resource projects which exploit natural resources 
should contribute to the economy in more ways than simply through direct 
revenue, royalty and taxes.1333 
The government at the time agreed with the aims of the report, however it 
disagreed with the emphasis on government intervention,1334 stating that it was 
 ‘firmly committed to the view that the primary responsibility for 
ensuring industry participation in resource development projects rests 
with the business sector. Our general approach to industry policy is to 
 
1332 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, The Northwest Shelf: A Sea 
of Lost Opportunities (1989). 
1333 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Sea of Indifference: 
Australian Industry Participation in the North West Shelf Project (1998), Appendix V – Summary of Conclusions 
and Recommendations of the 1989 report The Northwest Shelf: A Sea of Lost Opportunities, 89-90. 
1334 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Sea of Indifference: 
Australian Industry Participation in the North West Shelf Project (1998), xiv. 
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encourage an internationally competitive and outward looking industrial 
sector.’1335 
A second parliamentary report, A Sea of Indifference: Australian Industry 
Participation in the North West Shelf Project, was completed in 1998,1336 
reaffirming the view from The North West Shelf: A Sea of Lost Opportunities 
report that there was a need for local content. It recommended the development 
of a marine centre that ‘provides common-use facilities, and partnering of 
government and the private sector to meet the industry, technological and skilling 
needs of marine and resource industries. This resulted in the creation of the 
Australian Marine Complex (AMC) in 2003, a 200 hectare marine industrial hub 
comprising shipbuilding, technology, support and fabrication industries for the 
marine, defence, petroleum and resource industries.1337 This complex has 
contributed significantly to the development of local industries supporting 
petroleum and gas resource development.1338 The Sea of Indifference report also 
recommended to the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy that the 
Department should require those seeking exploration permits or licences if their 
project proceeds to production to commit to maximizing opportunities for local 
industry involvement and providing details on how this should be achieved.1339 
 
1335  Government response to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Science, Industry and Technology, 
The North West Shelf: A Sea of Lost Opportunities (1989), in House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Industry, Science and Resources, The Northwest Shelf: A Sea of Lost Opportunities (1989), 5. 
1336 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Sea of Indifference: 
Australian Industry Participation in the North West Shelf Project (1998). 
1337 AMC is a marine industrial hub located south of Perth. It serves as a maritime training institute, common use 
business facility for marine and industrial projects, centre of technological excellence, shipbuilding centre, as well 
as providing support industries. See Australian Marine Complex, Overview of Henderson 
http://www.australianmarinecomplex.com.au/facilprec/precsup/precsupoverview at 15 October 2009. 
1338 Australian Marine Complex, Overview of Henderson 
http://www.australianmarinecomplex.com.au/facilprec/precsup/precsupoverview at 15 October 2009. 
1339 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, The Northwest Shelf: A Sea 
of Lost Opportunities (1989), xvii.  
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Essentially, the Sea of Indifference report recommended that Australia should 
require licencees to enhance the development of local content as part of the 
licence application process. The Australian government argued in its response to 
the 1989 report, and affirmed its response in its petroleum policy review of 1999 
that it would leave the development of local content and local industries to 
market forces. The government argued that it was committed to encouraging an 
internationally competitive industry.1340 
The result of the Australian government’s failure to take a guiding hand in 
diversifying Australia’s industrial base, as part of its development of petroleum 
resources, has been that domestic industry diversification in Australia has not 
progressed as it has in Norway. This is demonstrated today by a comparison of 
the relative exports between Australia and Norway. Australia’s primary exports 
include raw materials including iron ore, bauxite and coal, as well as agricultural 
products.1341 Primary imports include machinery and transport equipment, 
computers, telecommunication products and crude oil/petroleum products. 1342 
This differs to the diversified portfolio of exports for Norway, including 
petroleum and gas, machinery and equipment, metals, chemicals, ships, and fish 
products.1343 Imported commodities primarily comprise chemicals, metals and 
foodstuffs.1344  
 
1340 For this commitment see the Australian petroleum policy in Department of Industry, Science and Resources, 
Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy:  A Strategy to Promote Petroleum Exploration and Development in 
Australian Offshore Areas (1999), as well as a discussion on the commitment to industry in House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, The Northwest Shelf: A Sea of Lost 
Opportunities (1989).  
1341 CIA Fact Book, Australia (2009) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html at 
12 October 2009. 
1342 CIA Fact Book, Australia (2009) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html at 
12 October 2009. 
1343 CIA Fact Book, Norway (2009) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html at 12 
October 2009. 
1344 CIA Fact Book, Norway (2009) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html at 12 
October 2009. 
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Australia was in a similar position to Norway in the 1960s when oil and gas was 
discovered in Bass Strait. Australia’s economy, like most developed western 
countries, boomed in the post war era. In the 1950s and 1960s, Australian 
manufacturing was assisted by protectionist policies, discouraging foreign 
investors who noted Australia’s lack of competitiveness in the international 
manufacturing sector.1345 This prompted a decline in investment in the 
manufacturing sector. This did not hamper the Australian economy, since the 
development of mining initiatives to exploit Australia’s natural resources 
underpinned economic expansion in the post war period to 1974.1346 
Australia’s manufacturing decline in the 1950s and 1960s, and the role of 
protectionist policies was addressed in the Crawford Report.1347 Australia 
retained high levels of tariff protection until 1973, when the first tariff cuts 
occurred.1348 The Crawford report identified tariff barriers as having a substantial 
detrimental effect on the Australian economy.  Furthermore, it concluded that 
assistance through tariffs and quotas should be reduced in order to stimulate 
change in the industry sector and encourage specialisation, whilst at the same 
time generating increased social welfare for the nation as a whole.1349 
Furthermore, the report recommended that general tariff reductions should be 
accompanied by industry specific policies for highly protected industries 
providing specific incentives to redirect productive activities.1350 Further 
 
1345 Stephen Bell, Australian Manufacturing and the State: The Politics of Industrial Policy in the Post-War Era 
(1993), 24-5. 
1346 Stephen Bell, Australian Manufacturing and the State: The Politics of Industrial Policy in the Post-War Era 
(1993), 24-5. 
1347 Australian Government, Study Group on Structural Adjustment (Australia). Report March 1979 (The Crawford 
Report) (1979). 
1348 Andrew Leigh, ‘Trade Liberalisation and the Australian Labor Party’ (2002) 48 (2) Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 487, 488. 
1349 Onko Kingma and Paul Volker, ‘Structural Adjustment in the Manufacturing Sector: A Review of the Crawford 
Report’ (1980) 5 (1/2) Australian Journal of Management 1, 3. 
1350 Onko Kingma and Paul Volker, ‘Structural Adjustment in the Manufacturing Sector: A Review of the Crawford 
Report’ (1980) 5 (1/2) Australian Journal of Management 1, 4. 
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significant tariff cuts occurred in 1988 and 1991, with an effective reduction of 
manufacturing industry assistance from 1970 – 2001 from 35% to 5%.1351 
These high levels of tariffs which created industry protection had a substantial 
impact on the Australian economy, with Australian merchandise exports 
comprising only 9.5% of Australia’s GDP in 1973.1352  The economic position in 
Australia, like much of the world, changed dramatically, triggered by the increase 
in world oil prices in the early 1970’s. The Australian manufacturing sector 
experienced substantial decline in employment levels between 1973 and 1980, 
with over 80,000 jobs lost in this period, and the industry’s share of employment 
falling from 25% in 1970 to 18% in 1985. As well its proportion of total GDP fell 
from a high of 29% in 1960 to 18% in 1985.1353 This decline continued, with 
manufacturing’s contribution to GDP falling from 17% in 1980 to 13% in 
1997.1354 This contrasted markedly with manufacturing's virtually unchanged 
share of the United States GDP (19%), and the slight increase in Japan - from 
25% to 27% - over the same period. In total, the contribution of manufacturing to 
the GDP of all industrialised countries fell by only 2%, from 24% in 1980 to 22% 
in 1997.  
This differs to the decline in Australia, led by decline in heavy industries, 
particularly the steel industry. Today, the Australian manufacturing industry is 
generally in decline, although there are a number of areas that have retained some 
strength, or been enhanced, particularly the maritime manufacturing and 
 
1351 Andrew Leigh, ‘Trade Liberalisation and the Australian Labor Party’ (2002) 48 (2) Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 487, 487. 
1352 Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, Globalization and History (1999), 30. 
1353 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Yearbook Australia 2001: Manufacturing From Settlement to the Start of the 
New Century (2001) 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/ABS@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article382001?opendocument&ta
bname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2001&num=&view=  at 18 May 2009. 
1354 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Yearbook Australia 2001: Manufacturing From Settlement to the Start of the 
New Century (2001) 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/ABS@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article382001?opendocument&ta
bname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2001&num=&view=  at 18 May 2009. 
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fabrication industry. Australia has the capacity to build and maintain defence 
ships,1355 as evidenced by the Department of Defence developing Australia’s ship 
building capability in Australia.1356 The continued development of defence 
shipbuilding and repair capacity in NSW, Queensland and Victoria has created 
the necessary skills, resources and infrastructure that are required for ship 
building in Australia.1357 Australia continues to develop physical and human 
capital for the economic diversification into maritime industries through defence 
shipbuilding.  
The requirements of the offshore petroleum industry can be utilised to assist in 
the further development of Australia’s shipbuilding industries. The industry itself 
notes that there are challenges in expanding its LNG capacity due to shortages of 
LNG shipping vessels.1358 This demand will need to be predominantly met by the 
construction of new ships in a global ship construction market that is struggling 
to keep up with demand.1359 Given the skills, infrastructure and assessed capacity 
to construct large ships with high local content,1360 Australia has the capacity to 
share in the construction of LNG Ships. Ultimately, economic diversification into 
areas of shortage could place Australia in a position to capitalise on its limited 
industrial strength. This may ultimately lead to the capacity to build large ships in 
Australian shipyards, as the demand for LNG and other vessels increases. Like 
Norway, Australia has the capacity to diversify in regional areas, providing 
 
1355  Independent Review of Australian Shipping, A Blueprint for Australian Shipping (2003), 8. 
1356 This has included the replenishment of HMAS Success, construction of two Oliver Hazary Perry Class FFG’s, 
ten ANZAC Frigates, six Collins Class submarines, six Huon Class mine hunters, fourteen Armidale Class 
patrolboats, and the refit of two frigates (HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla). See Deloittes, Australia’s 
Capacity to Build the LHD Ships (2007), 12. 
1357 Deloittes, Australia’s Capacity to Build the LHD Ships (2007), 9. 
1358 APPEA, Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry: A Platform For Prosperity (2006) 12. 
1359 APPEA, Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry: A Platform For Prosperity (2006) 12. 
1360 The Assessment of Deloittes for the construction of five large warships is that Australia has the capacity to 
provide 40% of the total project as local content, providing an additional 800 million dollars, and divided between 
design (10%), metal fabrication (50%) and systems (40%) industries. 
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employment and regional diversification in areas where traditional manufacturing 
industries have declined.1361 
This economic diversification has an important part to play in the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources. This has been demonstrated in the 
economic diversification of Norwegian industries. There, resource endowment 
‘both spurred and facilitated industrial policies concerning petroleum.’1362  
Australia too has the opportunity to utilise petroleum exploration and production 
as an opportunity to diversify its industrial activities in a manner similar to 
Norway.  
For the last four decades, economic diversification has occurred through the 
exertion of market forces. In the same period, Norwegian industry has grown 
under the guiding hand of government policy, implemented through conditions 
attached to the allocation of petroleum licences, whilst the Australian industrial 
experience during the same period under market conditions demonstrates 
industrial decline in manufacturing and shipping sectors. This may be attributable 
to market forces, a lack of government control, or a combination of numerous 
factors.  
Whilst it is difficult to determine why Australia has failed to economically 
diversify, and the root causes are outside the confines of this thesis, it is clear that 
Australia is now at a crossroads. It has the capacity and capability to utilise the 
experience of the AMC in Western Australia as well as the example of 
Norwegian industrial diversification to develop a petroleum sector-driven 
industrial base in Australia. By investing in the human capital and physical 
infrastructure, Australia is sustainably developing its petroleum resources. With 
concentrated effort through defence department procurement and materials 
 
1361 Independent Review of Australian Shipping, A Blueprint for Australian Shipping (2003). 
1362 Øystein Noreng with Farshad Tehrani, The Norwegian Experience of Economic Diversification in Relation to 
Petroleum Industry and the Relevance to Iran (2005) the 10th Institute for International Energy Studies (IIES) 
Conference Tehran 4-5 December 2005, 5. 
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policies, the Australian shipbuilding industry has been salvaged. By utilising the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources to build industrial capabilities, Australia 
has the capacity to encourage sustainable development of petroleum resources for 
present and future Australian generations.  
By implementing a number of the recommendations from the Sea of 
Indifference report relating to a need for economic diversification, it is possible 
that Australia may be able to address the economic challenges associated with 
the development of petroleum. Some of these recommendations include 
maximising opportunities for local industry involvement and providing details 
of how this will be achieved, providing data which will allow analysis of value 
added in Australia, maximising the transfer of skills and technology to 
Australians, and undertaking research, development and design in Australia to 
the maximum extent possible.1363 
The award of petroleum licences, as a method of encouraging economic 
diversification is difficult under the WPB system, since the premise of the WPB 
system is that the bidder that offers the highest bid is the most efficient company. 
The implementation of policies other than encouraging investment is difficult 
under the WPB system, since it is based on purely economic imperatives to 
encourage overseas companies, resulting in over 150 petroleum exploration 
companies, many of which are non-Australian, exploring for and producing 
petroleum from the Australian offshore region.1364 If Australia were to require 
local content investment as part of the award of petroleum licencing, as 
recommended in the Sea of Indifference report, it is likely that there would be a 
greater diversification and investment in local industry.1365 
 
1363 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Sea of Indifference: 
Australian Industry Participation in the North West Shelf Project (1998), xvii. 
1364 Trevor Powell, Discovering Australia’s Future Petroleum Resources: The Strategic Geoscience Information 
Role of Government (2008), 9-13. 
1365 It is important to note that some diversification has occurred as a result of the establishment of the Australian 
Marine Complex in Western Australia. 
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Role of the Australian government in utilising the award of licences 
to encourage economic diversification 
At present Australia is a natural resource dependent nation. It is dependent upon 
agricultural resources and mining resources to fuel economic growth.1366 Some of 
these resources, such as agricultural resources, are renewable, ensuring that 
Australia will enjoy a steady income stream from these resources. However, 
Australia’s mineral resources are non-renewable and so there is an imperative to 
ensure that when these resources are developed, they are developed in a 
sustainable manner, to ensure that future generations, and not just present 
generations, will benefit from the exploitation of these resources. 
The Norwegian experience has illustrated that the State can utilise the 
discretionary allocation of petroleum licences to ensure that petroleum resources 
are sustainably developed to encourage economic security for present and future 
generations. For Australia to encourage the sustainable development of its 
petroleum resources, it needs to allocate petroleum licences in a manner that 
encourages economic diversification, similar to the demonstrably successful 
Norwegian licencing system. 
It is important to note that government led resource security is not new in 
Australia. The Australian government has previously ensured the economic 
sustainability of Australia's resources through the Snowy Mountains Scheme.1367 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority, a 
federal government body, developed, constructed and managed the Snowy 
Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme. This scheme is an integrated water and hydro-
electric power scheme, which dams numerous east-flowing rivers, turning them 
 
1366 Dr Peter Lilly, CSIRO’s Minerals Down Under (2009) Keynote Address at the 6th Annual Australian Mining 
Prospect Awards, 13 November 2009. 
1367  Snowy Hydro, Snowy Mountains Scheme, (2008) 
http://www.snowyhydro.com.au/levelTwo.asp?pageID=66&parentID=4 at 15 December 2009. 
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westwards to provide valuable irrigation water for the inland agricultural regions 
of Australia.1368 The scheme was crucial in Australia’s post war economic 
development, creating secure water supplies for previously ephemeral waterways, 
thus providing new agricultural areas for Australia's economy and contributing 
around 3.5% of power to mainland Australia’s power grid.1369  
Previous Australian experience in natural resource management, as well as that in 
Norway, demonstrates that government-lead diversification of existing local 
industries provides countries with the opportunity to decrease its dependence on 
non-renewable natural resources, a dependence that can lead to economic 
inefficiencies and economic distortion. By encouraging sustainable development 
of petroleum resources through economic diversification and industry building, 
Australia can build its industrial capacity in a manner similar to Norway in the 
last four decades. However, as the experience at the AMC in Western Australia 
has demonstrated, the guiding hand of government is required to encourage 
industrial diversification.  
The Australian petroleum licencing system has the capacity to direct economic 
diversification of Australian industries. In its present form, the licencing system 
cannot encourage economic diversification. A shift to the use of a discretionary 
system of allocation, with clearly established award criteria, would give the 
Australian State the capacity to stipulate economic diversification in the form of 
greater use of local content, as first suggested in The North West Shelf: A Sea of 
Lost Opportunities.1370 By encouraging an increase in local content, economic 
diversification is encouraged, therefore encouraging sustainable development of 
petroleum resources. Therefore the Commonwealth should review its method of 
 
1368 Snowy Hydro, Snowy Mountains Scheme, (2008) 
http://www.snowyhydro.com.au/levelTwo.asp?pageID=66&parentID=4 at 15 December 2009. 
1369 Snowy Hydro, Snowy Mountains Scheme, (2008) 
http://www.snowyhydro.com.au/levelTwo.asp?pageID=66&parentID=4 at 15 December 2009. 
1370 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, The Northwest Shelf: A Sea 
of Lost Opportunities (1989). 
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allocation of petroleum licences. The allocation of petroleum licences should 
still retain a large emphasis on work program, particularly in the first three 
years. However, the allocation of licences should also encompass objective 
criteria that meet Australia’s petroleum objectives of increasing international 
investment as well as encouraging sustainable development.  
4.5.4 Transparency, discretion and sustainable development 
One of the central tenets of Australian petroleum policy is that the exploitation 
of petroleum resources occurs within a framework that is predictable, 
transparent, equitable and timely.1371 This requires that there is transparency in 
how a government interacts with companies, the process of the petroleum 
licences, the contracts formed between the parties, the revenue received by the 
parties and the amount of natural resources produced.1372 By ensuring that 
transparency is an integral part of the licencing process, the parties involved are 
more likely to realise the full economic value for the natural resources being 
exploited.1373 
Lack of transparency tends not to be an issue in the cash bid system, since the 
licence is awarded to the bid that offers the highest amount of money. This 
forces transparency into the allocation process, since the criteria for the 
selection of the winning bid is clear to all applicants and potential applicants 
prior to the award of the licence.1374 
 
1371 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004) 51-3. 
1372 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Making Natural Resources into a Blessing Rather a Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya 
Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development (2005), 16.  
1373 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Making Natural Resources into a Blessing Rather a Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya 
Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development (2005), 16. 
1374 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 6.  
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A major criticism levelled at the discretionary award of licences is that the 
criteria for selection of winning bids are not transparent. The system is seen as 
uncertain and unpredictable, since applicants do not know what exploration 
work or other requirements the State is seeking in a licencing round. This means 
that the applicants often have to try and guess what the State requires in the 
licencing round.1375 
The issue of transparency is addressed by the Norwegian licencing system, both 
within the legal framework,1376 and guidelines issued by the NPD, which 
outlines the selection criteria for applicants for companies applying for 
petroleum licences.1377 This ensures certainty and transparency in the award of 
petroleum licences.1378 Norway awards licences on the basis of objective and 
non-discriminatory criteria, including the technical and financial capacity of the 
applicants, the way in which the applicants propose to explore the acreage, and 
the previous activities of the applicant.1379 Since joining the EEA in 1994, 
Norway is subject to EC Directive 94/22/EC,1380 which requires open, 
transparent and non-discriminatory criteria in the award of petroleum licences, 
including open advertising for formal licencing rounds.1381 Whilst Norway 
 
1375 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 3-6. 
1376 See Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s10, and the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), 3-5. 
1377 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence, (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/2%20-
%20Topics/%5BLicence%20awards%5D/Invitation%20to%20apply%20for%20petroleum%20production%20licen
ce.pdf at 13 December 2009. 
1378 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s10. 
1379 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, Art. 5. 
1380 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006. 
1381 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006. 
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retains the right to determine the areas to be made available for petroleum 
activities,1382 there is a requirement that no participant is discriminated 
against.1383 
Satisfying the EC Directive requirements, the criteria for the award of acreage 
in Norway are clearly outlined in the PR.1384 The award of a petroleum licence 
is made ‘in the interest of furthering the best possible resource 
management’,1385 considering the technical capacity and work plan for the 
field.1386 The regulations also stipulate that the criteria should be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with s3-5 of the PAA, and EC 
Directive 94/22/EC.  
As part of the announcement of each licencing round, the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD) provides an Invitation to Apply for a Petroleum Production 
Lease.1387 In this documentation, the NPD clearly stipulates the conditions 
associated with the grant of a licence. This includes the requirement to enter 
into a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA), form a joint venture with other 
participants, and the possible participation by the State.1388 Importantly, the 
documentation sets out the award criteria for the licencing round.1389 
 
1382 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, Art 2 (1). 
1383 EC Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations for the 
Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML at 24 December 2006, Art. 2 (2). 
1384 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s10. 
1385 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway) s10. 
1386 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s10. 
1387 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence, (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/2%20-
%20Topics/%5BLicence%20awards%5D/Invitation%20to%20apply%20for%20petroleum%20production%20licen
ce.pdf at 13 December 2009. 
1388 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence, (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/2%20-
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Together the JOA, legislation and guidance documents from the NPD provide 
an applicant for licence in Norway with high levels of information and certainty 
about the criteria for the award of a production licence, and the conditions for 
the award of the licence. This ensures certainty and predictability for all 
participants. In addition, they establish an open, transparent framework under 
which licences are awarded to applicants based on defined criteria. Informing 
the applicants of the award criteria within the legislation, the Norwegian 
government has established a transparent discretionary system of award of 
licence. This system could serve as a useful guideline for other governments 
seeking to utilise discretion in the award of petroleum licences, since this 
system ensures the process is transparent and certain for all participants. 
The transparency of the petroleum licences in Australia using work program 
bidding is problematic. Ostensibly, the licences are awarded to the highest 
bidder of work program after the Joint Authority (JA) has had regard to the 
criteria made publicly available.1390 There is an expectation that a system of 
award on the basis of competitive work program bidding would be transparent 
and objective since the licence is awarded to the highest bidder according to 
criteria available to all applicants in the publicly released Guidance Notes for 
Applicants.1391 
%20Topics/%5BLicence%20awards%5D/Invitation%20to%20apply%20for%20petroleum%20production%20licen
ce.pdf at 13 December 2009, 2. 
1389 For the 20th Licencing Round in 2008, this information includes promoting good resource management, rapid 
and efficient exploration on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, including the composition of the production licences; 
relevant financial and technical expertise of the applicants; applicants geological understanding of the area offered 
for licencing and experience on  the continental shelf. These are outlined in Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
Invitation to Apply for Petroleum Production Licence, (2008) http://www.npd.no/Global/Engelsk/2%20-
%20Topics/%5BLicence%20awards%5D/Invitation%20to%20apply%20for%20petroleum%20production%20licen
ce.pdf at 13 December 2009, 3. 
1390 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s106 (3). 
1391 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Offshore Acreage Release 2008: Guide Notes for Applicants 
(2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2008/site/documents/GuidanceNotesForApplicants20
08.pdf at 11 September 2008. 
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However, an examination of the statutory requirements for the award of a 
licence under OPAGGSA identifies disturbing discretionary provisions. In 
selecting the winning bid, the JA is to select ‘whichever applicant in the Joint 
Authority’s opinion is the most deserving of the grant of the exploration 
permit.’1392 In making this decision, the JA is required to ‘have regard to’ the 
publicly available selection criteria.1393 
These statutory requirements in sections 106 (2) and s106 (3) of OPAGGSA 
provides the JA with the discretion to choose the applicant that it sees as most 
suitable. No longer is the decision to award a licence made on the highest work 
program bid submitted by a consortium. Now the decision is discretionary, 
made on the basis of the JAs opinion of the most deserving applicant.1394 
Furthermore, these provisions require the JA to merely ‘have regard to’ the 
published criteria,1395 rather than mandatory application of the criteria. This 
effectively removes the objectivity in the award of licence where there are 
multiple applicants. Rather than the licence being awarded to the highest work 
program bidder, as in any bid system, subjective, non-published criteria for the 
decision-making have been introduced.  
This discretion in decision-making raises the issue of transparency. The 
criterion the JA uses to make a decision based on its ‘opinion’ is not publicly 
available, and the JA uses a subjective ‘opinion’ to award a licence on the basis 
of the published criteria. Furthermore, the JA is only required to ‘have regard 
to’ the published criteria.  
 
1392 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s106 (2). 
1393 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s106 (3).  
1394 As stipulated in Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 106 (2). 
1395 As required in Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 106 (3). 
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The cumulative effect of these two provisions is that the award of licences in 
Australia is a discretionary administrative decision rather than an economic 
decision based on the winning bidder. No longer is the decision predicated on 
the economic theory that the one that is willing to pay the most to do the job is 
the best suited to the work. Instead, there are subjective elements introduced to 
the award process, reducing transparency and compromising the economic basis 
of the award of licence upon which this bid system is based on. Furthermore, 
the PSLA Review committee recommended that the PSLA should be amended 
to remove the discretionary powers to intervene in technical matters.1396 To 
address the current discretionary capacity in the Australian petroleum 
legislation, the commonwealth should consider incorporating objective criteria 
for the award of petroleum licences into the OPAGGSR to ensure that the 
process of award of petroleum licences is made using factual, transparent and 
current criteria. This will enable the JA to exercise its discretionary powers in a 
transparent manner.  
 
4.6 Allocation of licences and sustainable 
development: bid or discretion? 
Where the aim of the State is to maximise revenue from oil resources, then 
licences should be awarded to those companies which value the resource 
highest, demonstrated by the company with the lowest costs and/or the 
company that has the most information on the value of the resources present. 
The auction system captures the economic rent for the State, rather than leaving 
it in the hands of the oil company.1397 Furthermore, the auction system provides 
 
1396 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Review Committee, National Competition Policy Review of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Legislation: Exposure Draft (2000), 9. 
1397 Kenneth W Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 7. 
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the government both with better information about a company’s perception of 
the value of the resource tract and with the potential for considerable higher 
revenue from its licencing.1398 In addition, because the licence is awarded using 
strict economic criteria, the economic value of the commodity is found, since 
the true value of a commodity is the price it fetches in a cash up-front fully 
competitive market.1399 
A drawback with the auction system is that it is not able to extract all of the 
economic rent, since the value of the resources cannot be known in advance. 
However, what the auction can do is extract the ‘expected’ economic rent, as 
predicted by individual bidders.1400 Indeed, the actual economic rent may be 
more than the expected economic rent, or may be less. This discrepancy is not a 
weakness of the method, since it may be seen that the two possibilities balance 
each other out.1401 Furthermore, if the bidder were not permitted to keep the 
economic rent realised in excess of his bid, the licencee would not be prepared 
to bid the full amount of the expected economic rent.1402 Therefore, the return to 
the licencee may be defined as the following equation: 
Return to Licencee = AEE – EER 
Where AEE is actual economic rent obtained; and EER is economic rent 
expected to be realised through the bid.1403 
 
1398 Rob Fraser, ‘Licencing Resource Tracts: A Comparison of Auction and Discretionary Systems’ (1991) 17 (4) 
Resources Policy 271, 271; Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ 
(2000) 26 Resources Policy 3, 15. 
1399 Michael B Bunter, ‘A New Approach To Petroleum Licencing’ (2002) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007, 10. 
1400 Kenneth W Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 6. 
1401 Kenneth W Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 6. 
1402 Kenneth W Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 6. 
1403 Compiled by author. 
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However, there may be instances where the actual economic rent obtained far 
exceeds the expected economic rent, causing the government to have lost vast 
sums of money had the economic rent been captured through cash bidding 
allocation of licence rather than discretionary allocation. This is the main 
political objection to the cash bid system of the allocation of petroleum licences. 
If far more oil is found than is anticipated, the government may be embarrassed 
by under-collection of resource economic rent.1404 
Such an example is the award of production licence 018 over block 2/4 (North 
Sea). The licence was granted to Phillips in 1965, in the first licencing round 
under the discretionary system of allocation. This licence resulted in the 
discovery of the huge Ekofisk field, which has so far produced 4 billion barrels 
of oil since the commencement of production in 1972.1405 Conservatively, this 
field alone has earned the Norwegian government US$40 billion to date,1406 
equivalent to US$6.1 billion in 1965 terms,1407 when the licence was awarded.  
Given the unknown prospectivity of the North Sea and the NCS at the time of 
the award of the licence, it is unlikely that the Phillips consortium would have 
paid anywhere near the US$6.1 billion (adjusted 1965 dollars) that the field has 
yielded to the Norwegian government to date as captured economic rent. 
Furthermore, Ekofisk has remaining reserves of at least 1.5 billion barrels of 
oil,1408 likely to earn the Norwegian government at least another US$15 billion 
dollars in 2008 prices. For the Ekofisk field, and many other similarly high 
 
1404 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 5. 
1405 Statistics calculated to November 2008. Production figures from NPD, Fact Pages: Ekofisk  (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/index.htm at 19 January 2009.  
1406 This conservative value has been calculated by assuming that each barrel of oil has earned the Norwegian 
government US$10 in taxes, dividends from Statoil and SDFI. 
1407 This amount was calculated at an average rate of 4.55% per annum for the period 1965-2008. See 
http://dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm at 19 January 2009. 
1408 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Fact Pages: Ekofisk  (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/index.htm at 19 January 2009. 
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yielding fields, it is unlikely that any company would pay the amount required 
to capture the economic rent. 
Although the aim of the auction system is to attempt to capture the economic 
rent of petroleum for the State, there are different auction designs, with 
differing capacity to capture the economic rent for a State. The design of an 
auction contributes to its successful capture of resource rent. The use of sealed 
bid auction is one means to successfully capture the maximum amount of 
economic rent, since the bid will correlate with the value of the resource being 
leased. Simultaneous ascending auctions are also useful, and can be used as a 
tool for the collection of economic rent, either alone or in combination with 
PRRT.1409 
Often the value of the resource to the State is not only monetary. For some 
States, the presence of petroleum resources provides an impetus to develop 
local industries, and develop skills and technologies, as articulated in their 
petroleum policies. For those States, the exploitation of petroleum resources is 
not just about realising the maximum economic rent and net present value. It is 
about sustainably exploiting the resources to develop long term, permanent 
changes to the economic and social fabric of the State.1410 
 
 
1409 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 15. 
1410 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Making Natural Resources into a Blessing rather a Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya 
Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development (2005), 16. 
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4.7 Conclusion: which system of licence allocation has 
the capacity to implement Australia’s petroleum 
policy objectives? 
Successful sustainable development of petroleum resources has been 
demonstrated by Norway. For over forty years, Norway has focussed on 
implementing its policy of developing its petroleum resources for the benefit of 
the Norwegian society as a whole, ensuring that resource management enhances 
the welfare, trade, industry and industrial development of the country.1411 
Norway has awarded petroleum licences under a discretionary system to be able 
to stipulate the conditions of the award of licence. Initially conditions were 
stipulated by Norway when awarding petroleum licences (using ‘discretionary’ 
discretionary allocation to ensure benefits for Norway), to enable Norway to 
engage in a process of economic diversification of industry, and to control 
petroleum production. Today Norway uses an ‘objective’ discretionary system 
of award of petroleum licences, with the criteria clearly outlined in the PR, in 
accordance with the requirements of the PAA and EC Directives. 
For States that wish to develop local industries and companies, the cash bid 
system of licence allocation may hamper sustainable development of its 
petroleum resources, since small companies are often unable to provide large 
up-front payments that are required under the cash bid system,1412 although this 
may be mitigated by the formation of joint ventures.1413 Cash bidding may also 
hamper sustainable development of petroleum resources since a licence is 
awarded on the criteria of the highest bidder, where all applicants have the 
 
1411 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) s1-2. 
1412 Tim Warman and Lauren Goldblatt, ‘The Work Program Bidding System For Exploration Permits Under the 
Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act 1967 (Cth) (2008) 27 Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 178, 179. 
1413 Michael B Bunter, ‘A New Approach To Petroleum Licencing’ (2002) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007, 11. 
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requisite financial and technical capabilities. The State has no capacity to 
stipulate the conditions of the licence as part of the allocation of the licence. 
This effectively provides the company with the capability to control the 
exploration program and process, in order to meet its own objectives rather than 
the objectives of the State. Usually the objectives of a company do not include 
the economic diversification of the State unless there is an economic benefit for 
the shareholders of the company.1414 
As noted above, a number of petroleum economists and scholars1415 have argued 
that the discretionary allocation of licences is inefficient and unjustified, since the 
government regulation of the conditions of award interferes with market 
forces.1416 Moreover, many academics are uncomfortable with the notion of the 
discretionary allocation of licences using a set of politically or economically 
derived criteria.1417 They also assert that the licence is ‘given away’ under a 
discretionary system, since the terms of the licence do not capture for the State 
the economic rent implicit in the licencing of the resource.1418 Yet the 
discretionary award of licence enables a State to select the companies that are 
most suited to that particular acreage.1419 Governments generally favour the 
discretionary system of allocation, as it provides greater flexibility and control in 
the allocation of petroleum licences, and encourages exploration.1420 These 
 
1414 Evidence of the operations of multinational oil companies in petroleum producing provinces indicates that 
companies are likely to use their preferred suppliers and import skilled labour. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic 
Quest for Oil, Money and Power (1991).  
1415 Including Kenneth Dam, Kjell Sunnevåg, Walter Mead, and Knud Sinding. 
1416 Michael B Bunter, ‘A New Approach To Petroleum Licencing’ (2003) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007. 
1417 Knud Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licencing (1999) CEPMLP - CP 1/99, 1-3. 
1418 Kenneth W Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? (1976), 5. 
1419 Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (1983), 55.  
1420 This includes the Norwegian and the UK governments. See Kenneth W Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What 
How? (1976), 4-5 and Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British 
and Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 19-22. 
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arguments have a commonality of public interest and public good, where the 
allocation of a licence occurs after the consideration of economic, political, social 
and other factors. Should Australia desire to encourage investment in its 
petroleum industry, ensure transparency, and sustainably develop its petroleum 
resources, it needs to consider a method of allocation beyond work program 
bidding. 
The cash bid system is capable of accomplishing well-defined policies of 
government revenue maximisation.1421 Furthermore, it has been demonstrated 
that the bid system is a more efficient and objective alternative to some of the 
other methods of award. If the aim of the Australian government is maximise 
their revenue from the exploitation of the petroleum resources, then the auction 
system of allocation of petroleum licences is useful.1422 However, Australia has 
articulated that its petroleum objectives are two fold: to increase international 
investment and to sustainably develop the petroleum resources. Australia 
acknowledges that the WPB system of allocating petroleum licences is less than 
perfect.1423 Furthermore, there is a realisation that there is a need for future 
research to determine the auction design that best meets the dual aims of 
ensuring appropriate bids for individual areas and an appropriate spread of 
productive exploration over both mature and frontier areas.1424 There is also an 
acknowledged need for research analysis relating to the extent which 
competitive work program bidding leads to excessive bids in some Australian 
 
1421 Knud Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licencing (1999) CEPMLP - CP 1/99, 35. 
1422Knud Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licencing (1999) CEPMLP - CP 1/99, 35; 
Ursula M H Kretzer, ‘Exploration Prior to Oil Lease Allocation: A Comparison of Auction Licencing and 
Allocations Based on Size of Work Programme’ (1994) 20 (4) Resources Policy, 235, 243. 
1423 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 16.  
1424 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 16. 
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basins.1425 Finally, there is an identified need to assess whether the loss of a bid 
leads to a loss of potential exploration dollars, and why companies only bid 
sporadically.1426 
Australia’s petroleum objectives are to encourage international investment, 
particularly in frontier areas, and to sustainably develop its petroleum resources. 
The discretion system is most suitable for pursuing petroleum policies that 
emphasise policy objectives other than economic efficiency and maximisation 
of taxable petroleum rent.1427 In addition, the discretion system is valuable for a 
State when there is prospective acreage of limited or unknown prospectivity,1428 
demonstrated by Norway’s experience in allocating a licence for the Ekofisk 
field.  
Australia acknowledges there are huge areas of frontier acreage requiring 
exploration. The use of discretionary allocation would enable the government to 
accumulate data of the fields and assemble knowledge about the prospectivity of 
these areas. Whilst WPB could accomplish these objectives, the serious flaws 
associated of Australia’s WPB system are less likely to attract the international 
investment needed to explore these areas. The use of discretionary allocation of 
licences according to predefined and advertised criteria would be an effective 
way to explore Australia’s petroleum provinces and meet Australia’s petroleum 
policy goals.  
 
1425 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 16. 
1426 Athol Maritz, Work Program Bidding in Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 1985 – 1999 (2003) 
ABARE Report 03.14, Prepared for the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_03/er03_work_program.pdf at 12 December 2007, 16. 
1427 Knud Sinding, Auctions and Discretion in Oil and Natural Gas Licencing (1999) CEPMLP - CP 1/99, 16. 
1428 Michael B Bunter, ‘A New Approach To Petroleum Licencing’ (2002) 1 (1) Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/roundup_15.htm#anchor06 at 10 March 2007, 10. 
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The cash bid system used to allocate petroleum licences is appropriate in States 
where the primary objective of the State is to realise the greatest amount of 
economic rent. In the free market economy of the USA the use of cash bidding 
tends to dominate, and is accepted as a method of allocation since it relies on 
the application of strict economic criteria to meet an economic objective. In 
Australia, the State has the objective of attracting international investment to 
sustainably exploit Australia’s petroleum resources. In attracting international 
investment, Australia seeks to provide a stable, transparent and predictable 
regulatory framework for participants. However, an analysis of the current 
legislative provisions for the award of licence using work program bidding has 
illustrated a number of provisions that create uncertainty and inhibit 
predictability and transparency. In particular, sections 106 (2) and 106 (3) of 
OPAGGSA enable the JA to award a licence to a bidder using discretion. 
Although the Act aims to award licences based on objective criteria announced 
in the annual Guide for Applicants,1429 the provisions of the Act enable the 
discretionary award of licence based on the opinion1430 of the JA. In addition, 
the JA is only required to have regard to1431 the advertised criteria, rather than it 
being a mandatory requirement. Together these provisions enable the JA to 
award a licence based on criteria other than advertised objective criteria.  
An element of discretion has also been introduced through the good standing 
provisions. These provisions enable an oil company to negotiate with the State 
for the abandonment of a mandatory work program. They also allow a company 
to negotiate a lower value of exploration work than that originally bid in the 
work program bid. This has the effect of not only creating uncertainty for 
 
1429 For example, Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Release of Offshore Petroleum Exploration Areas 
Australia 2008: An Overview for Applicants (2008) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/Documents/acreagereleases/2008/site/page2.htm at 12 June 2008. 
1430 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s106 (2). 
1431 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s106 (3). 
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bidders, but effectively undermining the economic basis upon which the work 
program bidding system is based.  
The effect of the legislative provisions and the good standing provisions is that 
the system of award of licences is no longer transparent. Nor is it predictable. 
Although the Australian government seeks to award petroleum licences using 
work program bidding to provide predictability, transparency and certainty to 
applicants, it fails. Should Australia seek to achieve national petroleum 
objectives of attracting overseas investment to sustainably exploit Australia’s 
petroleum resources, the method of allocation of petroleum licences in Australia 
needs to be reassessed. 
 If Australia wishes to maintain the use of work program bidding, the current 
good standing provisions should be revoked. In addition, there need to be 
legislative amendments that remove the current legislative discretion available 
to the JA in the award of licences. Only then might the design of the WPB 
system be appropriate to capture the economic rent. 
Australia needs to consider allocating petroleum licences using the discretionary 
method of allocation, which is demonstrably suited to accomplishing national 
petroleum objectives that encompass more than capturing economic rent, such 
as in Australia. The discretionary allocation of licences in Norway demonstrates 
that this method can be particularly effective to accomplish national petroleum 
objectives if it is implemented in a manner that assures transparency. 
In Norway, although the government allocates licences using its discretion, the 
criteria for the selection of a licence is provided to applicants prior to the award 
of licence through petroleum regulations and administrative guidelines. All 
applicants are aware of the conditions of the allocation of the licence, 
particularly the role that the State will play in the exploitation of petroleum. In 
addition, the use of the discretionary system for the allocation of petroleum 
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licences enables a State to determine the relationship it will have with the oil 
companies it engages to exploit the resources it owns.  
This use of discretion in Norway has enabled the State to define its relationship 
with the oil companies, as well as accomplish its objectives in exploiting its 
petroleum resources by setting conditions on the award of a licence. The 
government stipulation that all fields will be developed sustainably meets 
national petroleum objectives. In applying for the licences under these criteria, 
companies acquiesce to the conditions. These conditions of the award of licence 
enable the State to negotiate with the oil companies in a balanced relationship. 
The Norwegian State has abundant petroleum reserves that oil companies wish 
to access, but the State wishes to exploit for the long-term benefit of all 
Norwegians. Therefore, the State is willing to provide access to its resource on 
fair terms ensuring that companies will realise an adequate profit. However, the 
company must comply with the conditions stipulated upon the grant of licence, 
which ensure that Norway’s petroleum objectives of sustainable development of 
its petroleum resources are met.  
Australia’s relationship with oil companies differs to the symbiotic relationship 
that Norway has developed with oil companies through the allocation of 
petroleum licences. Since Australia allocates its licences under the WPB 
system, there is an emphasis on encouraging companies with ‘deep pockets’ to 
continue to exploit Australia’s petroleum resources. The good standing 
provisions introduced by the Australian government have had serious 
repercussions on its relationship with international oil companies. Evidence 
suggests that the Australian government may have favoured some oil majors by 
cancelling work programs and reducing the monetary value of work 
requirements. This has created a power imbalance in the relationship, giving 
some oil companies an advantage. The Australian State has given the 
impression that it has favoured majors because it ‘needs’ these large companies 
in order to meet its petroleum objectives of increasing international investment 
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to exploit its resources. In the long term this may affect Australia’s capacity to 
attract other international investors, since there may be a perception that some 
more established companies are favoured.  
The Australian government possesses a resource that oil companies need access 
to in order for the companies to survive. If oil companies are not granted access 
to oil they cannot continue their core business of exploiting oil resources. If 
Australia used the discretion system of allocation but stipulated the criteria prior 
to award of licence, it may be able to establish an equal relationship with the oil 
companies that seek to exploit its resources.  
In order to sustainably develop its petroleum resources, Australia needs to be 
able to stipulate requirements for the development of its resources Similar to 
Norway, Australia could use the allocation of petroleum licences to stipulate 
particular work or qualities required from applicants in each licencing round. 
This may include exploration in frontier areas, contribution of data, minimal 
work programs, or particular exploration of production techniques. All of the 
criteria should be transparent, and be formulated to achieve policy objectives. 
This would allow Australia the scope to award a licence to the most appropriate 
company with the particular capabilities required, rather than the highest bidder. 
In doing so, Australia would be able to fulfil its national objectives and 
sustainably exploit its petroleum resources. 
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5. Regulating Petroleum Extraction for 
Sustainable Development 
5.1 Introduction 
Sustainable development of petroleum necessarily requires that as much 
petroleum as possible is extracted from the field that is being developed in an 
efficient manner in order to reduce costs. In this chapter I consider whether State 
regulation of the rate and method of petroleum extraction is necessary to achieve 
the sustainable development of petroleum resources, or whether the regulation of 
rate and method of extraction is best left to the companies which specialise in the 
extraction of petroleum. 
The question of regulation of petroleum depletion can be divided in two main 
questions. One is the question of the overall regulation of the production rate in 
order to achieve sustainable development for the society as a whole. Another 
question is regulation of the depletion of petroleum from individual fields in 
order to secure optimal recovery of petroleum from the fields in production. I will 
address the first question in section 5.2 and the second in section 5.3. 
The main issue I address in this chapter is the role of government control in the 
extraction of petroleum. In analysing the validity and utility of government 
regulation in the sustainable development of petroleum resources, I will consider 
whether the divergence between State and company objectives exists and, if so, 
whether these divergences influence the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources. By examining States where the government has regulated petroleum 
extraction and depletion, and the incentive structure in those States, it is possible 
to determine whether State regulation of petroleum extraction is likely to 
contribute to the sustainable development of Australia’s petroleum resources. 
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5.2 Regulation of rate of depletion of oil resources 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Depletion rate is the rate at which the petroleum is extracted from a field. 
Control over field depletion can occur when the State intervenes in the rate of 
production of petroleum. Depletion policy is a fundamental component of oil 
policy, since depletion rates affect a plethora of economic activities related to 
petroleum extraction, including employment, government revenue, and 
company profits.1432 Furthermore, governments that choose a high rate of 
depletion are often more exposed to the needs of private companies controlling 
the relevant technology compared to a government that opts for a low rate of 
extraction.1433  
5.2.2 State interests in regulation of the rate of depletion? 
Value in the ground versus out of ground 
When establishing a regulatory framework for the exploitation of petroleum, the 
State as the petroleum regulator must determine what is the optimal rate of 
depletion of its non-renewable resources. Unlike renewable resources, there is not 
a clear optimum rate of use of exhaustible resources, since the very use of the 
resource depletes the resource.1434 The challenge then for regulators is to find a 
rate of extraction and consumption of the exhaustible resource, coupled with the 
rate of foreign borrowing/lending, that maximises the present value of the total 
economic and social welfare gained from the extraction of the resource.1435  
 
1432 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 28.  
1433 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 112. 
1434 David Pearce and R. Kerry Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment (1990) 271. 
1435 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Consumption in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552, 553. 
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When a State develops their petroleum resources, it seeks to sustainably develop 
its petroleum resource by maximising the net present value (NPV)1436 of the 
economic rent of the petroleum resource.1437 This can be accomplished by 
essentially enlarging the ‘size of the cake’ through an increase in the percentage 
of oil recovered from a licence area.1438 A State is likely to increase the recovery 
of oil when it selects the most efficient and effective licencees with the greatest 
ability to recover petroleum from that field, rather than the licencee that can pay 
the most for the licence.1439 Whether the licencee most capable of increasing the 
NPV will be the company that bids the highest for the acreage (and is therefore 
the most efficient economically), or whether it is the operator chosen by State 
against a predetermined set of criteria are regulatory and policy questions. It is 
possible to maximise the NPV through the allocation of licence to the licencee 
with the greatest capacity to extract the petroleum most effectively, and the 
allocation of petroleum licences is considered in Chapter four.1440  
The question of whether the State should exert control over the method of 
extraction in order to increase NPV has been considered by a number of 
petroleum producing countries, including Australia, Norway, the UK and 
Canada. However, the question arises whether the rate and method of extraction 
from the field should be determined by the oil company that is developing the 
 
1436 The Net Present Value (NPV) represents the present day value of the future income discounted for a time 
preference (see definition at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article401997?opendocument&
tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=1997&num=&view at 12 December 2009). It is defined as the sum of 
the of the present value of the net benefits accruing from a natural resource. The NPV of a resource can be 
expanded during the life of a field when a greater percentage of the oil is recovered than expected. It can also 
increase doe to further discoveries or technologies that delineate the margins of the field to be larger than originally 
calculated.  
1437 Walter Mead, 'Towards an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System' (1994) 15 (4) Energy Journal 1, 3. 
1438 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 4. 
1439 Kjell J Sunnevåg, ‘Designing Auctions for Offshore Petroleum Lease Allocation’ (2000) 26 Resources Policy 
3, 4. 
1440 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘Recovering Progress on IOR’ (2008) 2 Norwegian Continental Shelf 9, 9-
10. 
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field, or directed by the State that owns the petroleum resources. This question is 
particularly pertinent for the Australian State as it seeks to sustainably develop its 
petroleum resources.  
The challenge for regulators of petroleum exploitation is determining the optimal 
timing for the exploitation of natural resources to ensure wealth generation and 
economic sustainability for the State. The regulation of the exploitation of 
petroleum is essential for the measured, controlled consumption of the resource 
to ensure intergenerational equity and sustainability.1441 Not all academics agree 
with this view, with Radetski noting that generally, early exploitation of a finite 
mineral endowment is preferable unless there is an unequivocal rising price 
trend.1442 
Another issue that must be considered is that the optimal level of production for 
an oil company will be different to the optimal rate for the State.1443 Generally, if 
left unfettered, the oil companies would choose to produce at a much higher level 
than the State would wish them to.1444 This is attributable to commercial 
considerations dictating the need for rapid extraction of large quantities of 
petroleum, whilst socio-economic conditions may call for a lower depletion 
rate.1445 Therefore, the regulation of petroleum by the State should balance the 
optimal rate of extraction desired by the State with a rate of extraction that is 
attractive to industry and maintains a State’s competitiveness in the international 
commercial petroleum sector.  
 
1441 See John E Tilton, Éxhaustible Resources and Sustainable Development´(1996) 22 (1-2) Resources Policy 91, 
91-2, and also Marian Radetzki, , ‘Economic Development and the Timing of Exploitation: A Critical Review of 
Some Conventional Wisdoms’ in Tilton, John (ed), Mineral Wealth and Economic Development (1992), 38-9. 
1442 Marian Radetzki, , ‘Economic Development and the Timing of Exploitation: A Critical Review of Some 
Conventional Wisdoms’ in Tilton, John (ed), Mineral Wealth and Economic Development (1992), 39. 
1443 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 34. 
1444 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 34. 
1445 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen and Dagfinn Nygard, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita  Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 899. 
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The rate of optimal extraction was modelled by Aarrestad, who concluded that 
some extraction policies are always going to be non-optimal, such as extraction at 
less than maximal rate in a resource-exporting economy with no international 
borrowing restrictions.1446 However, he noted that when the rate of growth in the 
price of the petroleum is greater than the rate of interest on the financial claims, it 
pays to keep the resource in the ground as long as possible.1447 Conversely, when 
the rate of growth in the price of the resource is less than the rate of return on 
financial assets, it pays to shift the resource into financial assets as fast as 
possible.1448 
The exploitation of a natural resource leads to a decrease in the amount of that 
resource available. At the same time, given the increased consumption of the 
resource, there is generally a rise in the price of that resource over time.1449 This 
is demonstrated by the Hotelling’s Rule, which aims to maximise the net present 
value of resource benefits.1450  
This rule states that in equilibrium, the marginal productivity of a resource must 
equal the marginal productivity of capital, expressed in terms of the market 
interest rate on capital.1451 Hotelling’s Rule generates a number of basic 
implications regarding how the finite nature of an exhaustible resource affects the 
resource price and the extraction path of the resources, since a non-renewable 
 
1446 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Consumption in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552, 560-563. 
1447 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Consumption in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552, 560-563. 
1448 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Consumption in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552, 560-563. 
1449 Rognvaldur Hannesson, ‘Saving Petroleum Wealth: Tales of Three Jurisdictions’ in Solveig Glomsrod and 
Petter Osmundsen, Petroleum Industry Regulation Within Stable States (2005), 113 
1450 Robert Harting and Willibald Kofler, Resource Economics (2006), 4. 
1451 Robert Harting and Willibald Kofler, Resource Economics (2006), 4. 
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resource can be likened to an asset that generates a return over time.1452 
Essentially, Hotelling’s Rule predicts that exhaustible resources’ prices increase 
at an exponential rate equal to the exchange rate.1453 This means that 
economically, the resource that remains in the ground has the same significance 
and value as a bond. Consequently, in many ways, petroleum in the ground is 
interchangeable with bonds.1454  
According to Hotelling’s Rule, as the exhaustible resource is depleted, the price 
increases, therefore the demand, and hence the consumed quantity, falls. 
Meanwhile, the resources remaining in the ground continues to be depleted. 
This cycle of price rise/falling demand continues until a price is reached (the 
backstop price) where alternative technology (the ‘backstop technology’) or a 
substitute resource (either natural or synthetic) will be made available.1455 Upon 
reaching the backstop price, the resource is blocked and production ceases. At 
this point, the resource is said to be economically exhausted, even though some 
of the resource remains in the ground. As there is generally always a ‘backstop 
technology’ at a sufficiently high price, no exhaustible resource is ever 
‘completely’ extracted.1456 
 
1452 Jeffrey Kraukraemer, ‘Non-Renewable Resource Scarcity’ (1998) XXVI Journal of Economic Literature 2065, 
2065. 
1453 Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural 
Lecture for the Habilitation degree, University of Mainz, Germany, June 21 2000 Extraction of Exhaustible 
Resources: Economic Theory http://www.mpch-mainz.mpg.de/~jesnow/MineralEcon/habil/econ/econ.htm at 14 
November 2007. 
1454 Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural 
Lecture for the Habilitation degree, University of Mainz, Germany, June 21 2000 Extraction of Exhaustible 
Resources: Economic Theory http://www.mpch-mainz.mpg.de/~jesnow/MineralEcon/habil/econ/econ.htm at 14 
November 2007. 
1455 Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural 
Lecture for the Habilitation degree, University of Mainz, Germany, June 21 2000 Extraction of Exhaustible 
Resources: Economic Theory http://www.mpch-mainz.mpg.de/~jesnow/MineralEcon/habil/econ/econ.htm at 14 
November 2007. 
1456 Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural 
Lecture for the Habilitation degree, University of Mainz, Germany, June 21 2000 Extraction of Exhaustible 
Resources: Economic Theory http://www.mpch-mainz.mpg.de/~jesnow/MineralEcon/habil/econ/econ.htm at 14 
November 2007. 
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The challenge for a State is when to extract the petroleum. Under Hotelling’s 
Rule, the owner of a mineral resource (the State) would not leave it in the ground 
unless it got a return from waiting equal to the return from exploiting the resource 
and investing the money in the financial markets in order to gain the highest 
return. Extraction only occurs when the price of the resource rises along a path 
denoted by Hotelling’s Rule equation. At that time, the extraction rate is 
indeterminate.1457 Yet if prices rise more rapidly than the calculated path during a 
time period, then it would be less profitable to extract the resource during the 
period, and economically viable to wait until the end of the time period.1458 
Where the price rises slower than the calculated path, then it is more profitable to 
extract the resource at the beginning of the time period rather than waiting until 
the end of the time period. 1459 
Whilst Hotelling’s Rule is useful for basic depletion rates, it fails to consider 
variables such as new finds and technological progress, especially when 
considering intergenerational equity. Consequently, more sophisticated 
theoretical models are required to address the variables ignored by Hotelling’s 
Rule.1460 
When considering intergenerational equity, and its utilitarian approach of 
resource development, arguably Hartwick’s Rule is the most suitable model to 
use.1461 Under this Rule a constant sustained consumption path requires the 
 
1457 Alan Kneese and James Sweeney (eds), Handbook of Natural Resources and Energy Economics: Volume III 
(1993)781-2. 
1458 Alan Kneese and James Sweeney (eds), Handbook of Natural Resources and Energy Economics: Volume III 
(1993)781-2 
1459 Alan Kneese and James Sweeney (eds), Handbook of Natural Resources and Energy Economics: Volume III 
(1993)781-2. 
1460 Alan Kneese and James Sweeney (eds), Handbook of Natural Resources and Energy Economics: Volume III 
(1993), 847. 
1461 Robert M Solow, ‘On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources’ (1986) 88 (1) Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 141,144-5. 
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investment of Hotelling Resource Rents.1462 Hartwick’s Rule defines the amount 
of produced capital investment required to offset the declining stocks of non-
renewable resources, to ensure that the standard of living does not decline as 
society moves into its indefinite future.1463 
In considering Hartwick’s Rule, Solow demonstrates that given this degree of 
substitutability between produced capital and natural resources, a way to design a 
sustainable consumption program to ensure intergenerational equity is to 
accumulate produced capital sufficiently rapidly so that the effects of non-
renewable resource depletion are countered by services from enlarged produced 
capital stock.1464 Hence, it is necessary for a nation to invest all the rent currently 
earned from exhaustible resources in reproducible capital to provide the 
maximum return to the resource owners - a policy that Solow sees as the ‘right’ 
policy.1465 
Similar to other physical capital such as stock, a stock of natural resource is an 
asset to the owner, with the value of this asset related to the rate of return it is 
expected to yield to the owner.1466 The rate of this return is comprised of the flow 
of product generated by the marginal unit of the asset (the dividend rate), the 
alteration of the asset’s physical characteristic over time (which may or may not 
 
1462 Vincent Martinet and L Doyen, ‘Sustainability of an Economy with an Exhaustible Resource: A Viable Control 
Approach’ (2006) Resource and Energy 17, 19. 
1463 John M Hartwick, ‘Intergenerational Equity and the Investing of Rents from Exhaustible Resources’ ((1977) 67 
(5) The American Economic Review 972, 972. 
1464 Robert M Solow, ‘On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources’ (1986) 88 (1) Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 141, 144. 
1465 Robert M Solow, ‘On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources’ (1986) 88 (1) Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 141, 148. 
1466 Gerard Gaudet, Natural Resource Economics under the Rule of Hotelling (2007) Presidential address delivered 
at the 41st meeting of the Canadian Economics Association, Halifax, June 2007, 3. 
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depend on the use being made of the resource, or the size of the resource stock) 
and the rate at which the asset’s market value alters over time.1467 
It is however, possible for a non-renewable resource to provide a return whilst 
remaining in the ground where the net price of the resource rises as the resource 
becomes scarcer, or supply is perceived to be reduced. Hence, a natural resource 
can rise in value over time as it becomes increasingly scarce.1468 Arguably, where 
resource markets are competitive, the State will deplete the non-renewable 
resource at a socially optimal rate, requiring intervention in the resource market 
where the markets are not competitive if there are externalities from resource 
use.1469   
Another issue that confronts resource regulators is the rate of optimal use of non-
renewable resources. Unlike renewable resources, there is no optimal rate of use 
of an exhaustible resource, since the very use of the resource depletes the 
resource.1470 The challenge is to find a path of rate of extraction and consumption 
of an exhaustible resource, coupled with the rate of foreign borrowing/lending so 
that the present value of total social welfare is maximised.1471  
The logical question for regulators of natural resource exploitation that arises 
from a consideration of resource exploitation theory is when is the optimal time 
and timing for the exploitation of natural resources to ensure wealth generation 
and economic sustainability for the State? The rate of optimal extraction was 
modelled by Aarrestad, who concluded that some extraction rates are always 
 
1467 Gerard Gaudet, Natural Resource Economics under the Rule of Hotelling (2007) Presidential address delivered 
at the 41st meeting of the Canadian Economics Association, Halifax, June 2007, 3. 
1468 Gerard Gaudet, Natural Resource Economics under the Rule of Hotelling (2007) Presidential address delivered 
at the 41st meeting of the Canadian Economics Association, Halifax, June 2007, 3. 
1469 David Pearce and R. Kerry Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment (1990) 285. 
1470 David Pearce and R. Kerry Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment (1990) 271. 
1471 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Consumption in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552, 553. 
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going to be non-optimal.1472 He also made the observation that when the rate of 
growth in the price of the resource is greater than the rate of interest, it pays to 
keep the resource in the ground as long as possible. Also, when the rate of growth 
in the price of the resource is less than the rate of return on financial assets, it 
pays to shift the resource into financial assets as fast as possible.1473 Not all 
academics agree with this view, and Radetski notes that generally, early 
exploitation of a finite mineral endowment is preferable unless there is an 
unequivocally rising price trend.1474  
The timing of resource extraction is essential for wealth generation. By adopting 
a controlled approach to petroleum exploitation using Hotelling’s Rule of 
exploitation, it is possible to gain maximum wealth from the exploitation of 
petroleum resources.1475  
Appropriate policies can consider the rate of depletion, and factor this into the 
regulatory framework to control the rate of depletion of petroleum resources. 
Where the government chooses a high depletion rate, they are likely to be 
exposed to the demands and needs of an oil company that controls the relevant 
technology, compared to a government opting for a low rate of extraction.1476   
A regulatory regime that addresses the rate of depletion of petroleum needs to 
incorporate policy, economic analysis, and an appropriate taxation framework to 
ensure optimal extraction of petroleum for the sustainable development of 
 
1472 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Consumption in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552, 553. 
1473 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Consumption in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552,560-563. 
1474  Marian Radetzki, ‘Economic Development and the Timing of Exploitation: A Critical Review of Some 
Conventional Wisdoms’ in John Tilton (ed), Mineral Wealth and Economic Development (1992), 39. 
1475 Jeffrey Kraukraemer, ‘Non-Renewable Resource Scarcity’ (1998) XXVI Journal of Economic Literature 2065, 
2065. 
1476 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen and Dagfinn Nygard, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 899. 
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petroleum resources in a State. The legal regime regulating resource exploitation 
is crucial in managing and sustaining economic growth in a resource-endowed 
State, including the ability of that State to maintain its economic position when 
the resources have been depleted. A regulatory regime should attempt to establish 
the optimal depletion path for that resource, for the benefit of the community.1477 
Ideally, the regulatory framework should regulate the granting of licences and 
concessions for the development of that resource.  
Social rate of return (SRR) 
The relationship between the rate of return from oil production and the expected 
increase in the price of oil is an important factor in determining the depletion 
rate for a State.1478 This relationship is known as the social rate of return (SRR), 
and reflects the total value of all benefits associated with investment that accrue 
to members of a society. Since the SRR is often lower than the private rate of 
return, preferred rates of extraction often differ between private and public 
interests in the same petroleum-producing province.1479 
In some petroleum-producing developed nations, the SRR has been an influence 
in determining the rate of production.  This was particularly true in the North 
Sea.  In the United Kingdom during the 1970’s both the Conservative and Labor 
governments opted for a higher rate of extraction, with the government 
concluding that a relatively higher SRR exists as a consequence of the 
countries’ poor economic and financial situation.1480 Conversely, the 
Norwegian government perceived a low rate of SSR, as a consequence of the 
 
1477 Allen K Kneese, ‘The Economics of Natural Resources’ (1988) 14 Population and Development Review 281, 
285. 
1478 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 113. 
1479 An example of this is where the expected rate of increase in the price of oil is between the private rate of return 
and the social rate of return. In this scenario, it would be rational for private companies to accelerate production, but 
it would be rational for governments to keep the oil in the ground. See Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and 
Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 113 for this example. 
1480 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 113-4. 
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limited absorptive capacity of the smaller Norwegian economy, prompting the 
implementation of lower petroleum production rates.1481 
Reducing the risk of resource curse and Dutch disease 
As noted above, there are two major challenges to the State when exploiting 
petroleum and other non-renewable resources. First is the non-renewable nature 
of the resource.1482 Once the resource is exhausted, it cannot be replaced, and 
there is no ongoing revenue stream. Thus, these resources need to be exploited 
in a manner that provides financial benefits to both the oil companies and the 
State during petroleum production, otherwise oil companies will not want to 
exploit the resources. Consequently, it requires a petroleum regulatory 
framework that encourages oil companies to continue to participate in 
petroleum exploitation, whilst regulating the exploitation of these resources in a 
sustainable manner that ensures an appropriate return to current and future 
generations.1483  
One impetus to control the rate of production is to lessen the effects of 
increased oil revenue on a State’s economy.1484 One of the greatest economic 
challenges a State faces in the exploitation of its petroleum resources is 
avoiding lasting economic setbacks that have befallen many States that are well 
 
1481 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 113-4. 
1482 Natural Resources are defined as naturally occurring substances that are considered valuable in their natural 
form: see E F Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (1973). Therefore, natural resources encompass minerals, petroleum, 
fisheries and forestry. Non- Renewable (or exhaustible) natural resources are those that do not regenerate (such as 
oil or iron ore). Though the geologic processes that created most types of non-renewable resources in the past are 
still operating today, the time frames are too long compared with their rates of use to be considered renewable. See 
Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural Lecture 
for the Habilitation degree, University of Mainz, Germany, June 21 2000. http://www.mpch-
mainz.mpg.de/~jesnow/MineralEcon/habil/index.html at 14 November 2007. 
1483 A detailed consideration of the economic challenges associated with non-renewable resource exploitation, and 
in particular resource curse and Dutch disease is found in section 1.2.1 above.  
1484 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs 
and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007). 
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endowed with petroleum resources.1485 In theory, by controlling the rate of 
production to ensure there is a production ceiling, a State could limit the 
revenue flowing into the economy.1486 By limiting the sudden wealth in a State 
it may be possible to stem the effects of resource curse and Dutch disease, both 
of which originate from the sudden influx of money from the extraction and sale 
of the non-renewable resources.1487  
Where the development of a natural resource displaces other industries, there is 
a negative effect on the competitive position of these industries, causing 
currency appreciation.1488 Dutch disease is intricately linked to a factor moving 
effect (the reallocation of factors of production such as capital and labour from 
other activities to resource extraction), spending effect (arising from the 
increased aggregate demand created by resource receipts, which if created to 
domestic currency, can cause periods of excess demand in the economy), and a 
spill over loss effect (the loss of positive externalities associated with the 
negative effect on the competitive position of the non-resource traded 
sector).1489  
It has been postulated that Australia is affected by resource curse and Dutch 
disease.1490 Concomitant with a meteoric resource boom in Australia has been a 
 
1485 Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Introduction, What is the Problem With Natural 
Resource Wealth?’ in Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007), 1.  
1486 Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Introduction, What is the Problem With Natural 
Resource Wealth?’ in Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007), chapter 1. 
1487 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, 
Research Department, 6. 
1488 George Soros, ‘Foreword’, in Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the 
Resource Curse (2007). 
1489 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up 
With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, 
Research Department, 5. 
1490 James Goodman and David Worth, ‘The Mineral Resources Boom and Australia’s Resources Curse’ (2008) 61 
Journal of Political Economy 201, 201. 
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decline in the manufacturing industry, with the boom of recent years creating a 
slow strangulation of many manufacturers through import competition, 
increased cost of inputs, and high interest rates.1491 By itself, this decline in 
manufactured goods is not necessarily alarming, although an assessment of the 
manufacturing sector notes that the overwhelming effect of the commodity 
boom was negative for manufacturing.1492 
However, the onset of resource dependency or exacerbation of resource 
dependency occurs through a resource boom where the economy effectively 
regears itself to the influence of resource-based investment, creating 
inflationary pressure.1493 Indeed, excessive inflationary pressure has occurred in 
Australia, leading the IMF to conclude that inflation in Australia is a challenge 
associated with the commodity boom, causing infrastructure and other capacity 
constraints, especially in the mining and housing sector.1494 
Whilst a detailed economic analysis of the presence of resource curse and Dutch 
disease in Australia is outside the confines of this thesis and best left to 
economists, this overview of Australia’s economy suggests that resource curse 
and Dutch disease appears to have taken a foothold in Australia.1495 This is 
evidenced by socio-economic displacement and de-industrialisation, and 
deepening socio-spatial divides at local, interstate and international levels.1496 
 
1491 Access Economics, Business Outlook, December 2008: Batten down the Hatches (2009) 
www.accesseconomics.com.au at 9 November 2009, 38. 
1492 Access Economics, Business Outlook, December 2008: Batten down the Hatches (2009) 
www.accesseconomics.com.au at 9 November 2009, 38. 
1493 James Goodman and David Worth, ‘The Mineral Resources Boom and Australia’s Resources Curse’ (2008) 61 
Journal of Political Economy 201, 201.  
1494 International Monetary Fund, Australia – 2008: Article IV Consultation: Concluding Statement (2008) 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2008/070108.htm at 10 September 2009. 
1495 James Goodman and David Worth, ‘The Mineral Resources Boom and Australia’s Resources Curse’ (2008) 61 
Journal of Political Economy 201, 201. 
1496 James Goodman and David Worth, ‘The Mineral Resources Boom and Australia’s Resources Curse’ (2008) 61 
Journal of Political Economy 201, 201. 
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The resource curse that appears to have infected Australia provides the 
Australian government with a new impetus for greater reform in the petroleum 
and mineral resources sector. Certainly, petroleum production is a small 
component of Australia’s resources sector. However, reform in the regulation of 
petroleum production to encourage socio-economic sustainable development 
can be used as an impetus and perhaps even a template for reform in other parts 
of Australia’s resources sector. 
5.2.3 How can the rate of depletion be regulated? 
One method for encouraging the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources is through government control on the rate and method of petroleum 
production. The efficiency and effectiveness of this has been tested by a number 
of countries, most notably Norway,1497 but also Malaysia.1498  
There are a number of ways to control petroleum production, including 
production rate ceilings, the number of exploration and/or production licences 
awarded, and the number of fields approved for development. Some states opt 
for ‘go slow’ policies for depletion,1499 whilst others opt for maximum 
exploration and production.1500 For some States, such as Norway, the regulation 
 
1497 There is a plethora of literature that outlines the policy of Norway and its impact. See for example Øystein 
Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980); International Energy Agency, Energy 
Policies of IEA Countries (2004); Bernard Taverne, Petroleum Industries and Governments: A Study of the 
Involvement of Industry and Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd ed. 2008); Brent F Nelsen, 
The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental Shelves 
(1991); Jerome Davis, Does One Size Fit All? Reflecting on Governance and North Sea Licensing Systems (2004) 
Paper given at BC Offshore: Potential and Problems: A MASC Workshop for Lawyers March 18-21, 2004. British 
Columbia; and M Devaraj, ‘Government Policies Concerning the Discovery and Development of New Offshore Oil 
Provinces, with Focus on India and the North Sea’ (1983) 8 Ocean Management 251.  
1498 Jeffrey R Vincent, ‘Resource Depletion and Economic Sustainability in Malaysia’ (1997) 2 Environment and 
Development Economics 19. 
1499 This is signified by the Norwegian approach to petroleum production particularly in the 1970’s. See  Chapter 2 
for an outline of the development of Norwegian Petroleum Policy, and Chapter three for a discussion on how 
Norway’s petroleum policy has been successful in encouraging sustainable petroleum development. See Brent F. 
Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian Continental 
Shelves (1991) for a discussion of depletion policy.  
1500 This was apparent in the UK during the 1970’s and 1980’s, where rapid exploration and development was the 
mandate of the British government.  
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of the rate of petroleum production has varied over the last four decades, as the 
State strives to find a method to control production. It must be remembered that 
while a State may establish a policy that limits the rate of production, the 
implementation of such a policy may be difficult.1501 This may be attributable to 
geophysical factors related to the petroleum fields, economic constraints, or 
socio-political issues where the State may possess the ability to restrict 
production but declines to exercise that power.1502 
Australia, in line with its petroleum policy objectives, has embarked on a free 
market philosophy where the government does not expressly set the rate of 
production. Rather, the role of the government is confined to establishing 
macroeconomic policy, reducing commercial risk, and removing impediments 
to industry competitiveness.1503 Whilst there is no government depletion policy 
relating to overall annual production rates or production rates for individual 
fields, there is the capacity for regulation of production. One of the primary 
means of regulating the depletion rate is through the licences awarded to 
petroleum companies.1504 
Government control over the award of petroleum licences gives an implied 
regulation over production rate. Australia conducts annual petroleum licencing 
rounds,1505 where a mix of mature, under-explored and frontier regions are 
released.1506 By providing a mix of acreage in differing phases of exploration, 
 
1501 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 28. 
1502 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 28 
1503 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Release of Offshore Petroleum Exploration Areas Australia 
2008: An Overview for Applicants (2008) http://www.ret.gov.au/Documents/acreagereleases/2008/site/page2.htm at 
12 June 2008, 10. 
1504 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 28. 
1505 For a detailed outline and analysis of the award of licences in Australia, see Chapter five.  
1506 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, A Guide for Applicants (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/GuidanceNotesForApplicants.pdf at 21 August 
2009, 3. 
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the State is effectively staggering the number of fields that are likely to 
commence production, hence influencing the rate of production from Australian 
petroleum fields.  
The Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (OPAGGSA) 
provides the legislative capacity to regulate the rate of depletion of petroleum 
fields in Australia. Section 189 of OPAGGSA enables the Joint Authority (JA) 
to direct rate of extraction so long as not contrary to good oilfield practice.1507 
In particular, s189 (1) enables the JA to direct the licencee to take all necessary 
and practical steps to increase or reduce the rate of petroleum recovery.1508  
In the early 1960’s, the US oil major Phillips1509 requested what the Norwegian 
government perceived as exclusive rights over exploration of the North Sea. 
The Norwegian government responded by delineating a clear position on the 
exploitation of its petroleum – handing over the natural resources on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) to a single company was out of the 
question.1510 From the outset, the Norwegian approach to petroleum production 
has been to control exploitation of petroleum. Under the Royal Decree of 9 
April 1965 relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Submarine Petroleum 
Resources (the 1965 Decree), the parliament had the right to ‘issue regulations 
concerning the exploration for and exploitation of submarine resources.’1511 The 
parliament also laid down rules for exploratory drilling and exploitation of 
petroleum resources under the North Sea.1512  
 
1507 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2009), XXXVIII.  
1508 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s189. 
1509 Now US oil major Conoco-Phillips.  
1510 Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), 18. 
1511 The Royal Decree of 9 April 1965 relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Submarine Petroleum 
Resources (Norway).  
1512 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 39. 
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The policy of government regulation of the rate of petroleum production in 
Norway was outlined in the 1974 Report to the Storting (the Norwegian 
Parliament) on petroleum production in Norway.1513 In its report to the Storting, 
the Norwegian Department of Finance outlined the need for government control 
over petroleum production, noting that  
‘… democratically elected institutions must have full control over 
all important aspects of petroleum policy: exploration, rate of 
extraction safety measures and localisation… It is important to have 
public direction and control of the exploitation of petroleum 
resources’.1514  
However, the Ministry also concluded that the rate of depletion should not be 
controlled once production had commenced, but rather by delaying the 
development of fields. The reasoning for this view was that ‘… the harsh 
climatic conditions on the shelf mean that individual fields must be exploited at 
a relatively rapid pace, before the installed equipment has to be renewed.’1515 
The staggering of production from fields is facilitated by State regulation over 
petroleum activities, and participation in petroleum activities.1516 Throughout 
the 1970s, and to a lesser extent the 1980s, the Norwegian government used the 
award of licences in licencing rounds as a method for controlling production 
rates. This was especially implemented in the 1970s where there were only 
three licencing rounds in the decade.1517 As noted by Norway’s Prime Minister, 
‘professors and so-called experts from other countries ask us to speed up oil 
 
1513 Ministry of Finance, Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society (1974) Storting Report No. 25, 1973-4. 
1514 Ministry of Finance, Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society (1974) Storting Report No. 25, 1973-4, 10. 
1515 Ministry of Finance, Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society (1974) Storting Report No. 25, 1973-4, 10. 
1516 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 31. 
1517 The third licencing round occurred in 1974, the fourth in 1978 and the fifth in 1979. See Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, Annual Report, 1998 (1998), 114-5. 
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production, but we don’t want it. The point is to be sensible and be careful.’1518 
Today, this view is reflected in the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway) 
(PAA), where ‘prudent production’ is required when conducting petroleum 
activities.1519 
The control of exploration through the award of licence in the first two decades 
of Norwegian petroleum production was neither satisfactory nor successful in 
limiting petroleum production to the stipulated 90 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (toe) per annum.1520 However, the Norwegian government felt that 
the rate of production needed to be limited and evaluated, particularly on the 
basis of the Norwegian labour industry, regional policies, concerns for the 
environment, patterns of settlement, the energy situation in Norway and the rest 
of the world, and, importantly, what serves Norwegian society as a whole.1521 
The 1980s saw the Norwegian government control rates of petroleum 
production through means other than the award of licences. The government 
attempted to implement a flexible approach to depletion through the regulation 
of investment in offshore activities rather than production levels.1522 This was 
facilitated by clauses in the petroleum laws that included the right to postpone 
the development of a petroleum field.1523 
This flexible approach to petroleum production attempted to maintain a 
moderate tempo of production. Ultimately, the policy of regulation of 
investment of offshore activities was not successful, partly as a result of intense 
 
1518 Norwegian Prime Minister Trygve Bratelli to the New York Times in 1975. See Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of 
Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002), 19-21. 
1519 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s4-1.  
1520 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 118-119. 
1521 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 38.  
1522 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 118. 
1523 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 39. 
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political jockeying for the right to develop a field.1524 These polices did not 
succeed in maintaining the rate of petroleum production below 90 million 
tonnes oil equivalent. Total petroleum production has hovered around 250 
million standard cubic metres per annum since the 1990s,1525 when the 
production ceiling was lifted, although oil production is gradually decreasing as 
reservoirs age. 
Today, Norway still exerts control over the rate of production from its 
Continental Shelf. However, rather than imposing a production ceiling,1526 this 
control over production rate is exerted through a combination of the conditions 
of the award of a licence and the development of the field as a method for 
controlling production. The PAA enables the Ministry to require the ‘prudent 
production’ of petroleum resources,1527 including the capacity to stipulate a 
production schedule1528 other that those stipulated or approved upon the 
approval of the Plan for Development and Operation (PDO).1529 In addition, the 
Norwegian State has the right to set conditions for the granting of petroleum 
production licence and for conducting petroleum activities based solely on the 
need to ensure that petroleum activities are carried out in a proper manner.1530 
This specifically includes the right to stipulate a production schedule or vary the 
 
1524 This difficulty was illustrated by the intense politicization of the development of the Haltenbacken fields 
(including Snorre, Brage, Oseberg North, Heidrun and Draugen fields). See Nelsen, 121-2 for a detailed discussion 
of the events, and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Annual Report, 1998 (1998) for a discussion of the 
Haltenbacken resources. 
1525 Svein Gjedrum, From Oil and Gas to Financial Assets – Norway’s government Pension Fun (2008) Speech 
Given at the Commodities, the Economy and Money conference in Calgary, Canada 20 June 2008, 
http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____70345.aspx qat 26 January 2009, 1. 
1526 Production ceiling was stipulated in the 1970’s and 1980’s, but was almost impossible to enforce due to 
economic, social and geophysical reasons. See Svein Gjedrum, From Oil and Gas to Financial Assets – Norway’s 
government Pension Fun (2008) Speech Given at the Commodities, the Economy and Money conference in 
Calgary, Canada 20 June 2008, http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____70345.aspx at 26 January 2009. 
1527 The Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s4-1. 
1528 The Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s4-4. 
1529 The PDO is required under s 4-2 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), and is discussed in detail in 
section 6.3.2 below. 
1530 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s11.  
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production rate,1531 in order to ensure that the petroleum resources are exploited 
in a manner that considers the long-term perspective of Norwegian society. 
5.2.4 Regulation of depletion rate as tool for sustainable 
development of petroleum resources 
The Norwegian experience has illustrated that the implementation of policies to 
reduce the rate of production were not as successful as desired. The reason for 
this included the international recession during much of the 1980s, the 
disintegration of the Norway’s national incomes policy, and a failure to 
restructure the Norwegian industrial sector during this period.1532 As a 
consequence, the Norwegian strategy of regulation of production to control the 
influx of resource revenue and the potential effects of that revenue through a 
production ceiling of 90 million standard cubic metres of petroleum per annum 
was abandoned in the 1980s.1533 
In its place, the Norwegian State implemented a number of strategies to absorb 
the influx of huge volumes of petroleum revenue into the Norwegian economy, 
and reduce the risk of resource curse and Dutch disease.1534 One of the most 
important was the creation of a sovereign wealth fund in 1990,1535 as a tool to 
assist the Norwegian economy in coping with the influx of petroleum revenue, 
 
1531 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s11. 
1532 T Lind and G Mackay, Norwegian Oil Policies (1980), 41. 
1533 Svein Gjedrum, From Oil and Gas to Financial Assets – Norway’s Government Pension Fund (2008) Speech 
Given at the Commodities, the Economy and Money conference in Calgary, Canada 20 June 2008, 
http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____70345.aspx qat 26 January 20091. 
1534 These strategies are comprehensively analysed in Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and 
Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion 
Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research Department. 
1535 This sovereign wealth fund is known as the Government Pension Fund – Global. It was formerly know as the 
Norwegian Petroleum Fund. For a discussion on the history of the fund see Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 
Norway (2009) http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/norway.php at 12 April 2009, and Tore Eriksen, The Norwegian 
Petroleum Sector and the Government Pension Fund – Global (2006). 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/The_Norwegian_Petroleum_Sector_te.pdf at 7 
November 2009.  
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particularly in times of high oil market prices.1536 This succeeded and today the 
fund is also is used to shield the non-oil portion of the economy from oil price 
fluctuations.1537 
Another strategy is to regulate petroleum production from the fields on a 
macroeconomic scale, through the use of PDO’s and the conditions of the award 
of licence.1538 This is mainly to enable the State to optimise depletion of the 
fields in accordance with the government’s policy of prudent production and 
wealth creation for Norwegian society.1539 Given the unsuccessful Norwegian 
experience for the first fifteen years of petroleum recovery, it appears that 
regulation of the rate of petroleum recovery does little to contribute to the 
sustainable development of petroleum resources. Furthermore, strategies 
implemented by the Norwegian State over the last fifteen years, particularly a 
sovereign wealth fund, seem to have been successful in reducing the risk of 
resource curse and Dutch disease.1540  
The Norwegian experience, combined with reluctance by the Australian State to 
engage in regulation of petroleum extraction rates, indicates that State 
regulation of the rate of petroleum extraction would not encourage sustainable 
socio-economic development of Australia’s offshore petroleum resources. 
Therefore, Australian government should not contemplate the use of State 
control over the rate of petroleum production as a tool for the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources. 
 
1536 Tore Eriksen, The Norwegian Petroleum Sector and the Government Pension Fund – Global (2006) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/The_Norwegian_Petroleum_Sector_te.pdf at 7 
November 2009, 16. 
1537 Svein Gjedrum, From Oil and Gas to Financial Assets – Norway’s Government Pension Fund (2008) Speech 
Given at the Commodities, the Economy and Money conference in Calgary, Canada 20 June 2008.  
1538 See Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
1539 The management of petroleum extraction using PDOs is considered in section 6.3 below.  
1540 As analysed in Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resources Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway 
Caught Up With and Forged Ahead of its Neighbors (2004) Discussion Papers No. 377, May 2004, Statistics 
Norway, Research Department. 
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5.3 State regulation of petroleum extraction for 
sustainable development 
5.3.1 Why should field production be regulated by the State? 
1. Peak oil  
The finite nature of petroleum resources has an impact on the recovery of 
petroleum from any field or geological province. Given the increased global 
demand for petroleum, and the corresponding increase in global production,1541 
as well as the looming spectre of a possible peak oil scenario, it is sensible for 
both States and oil companies alike to recover the greatest amount of petroleum 
from producing fields.  
The geologist Hubbert1542 long ago claimed that petroleum exploitation is finite, 
and follows a bell curve. Initially it rises, then flattens out, and finally 
declines.1543 He termed this exploitation path ‘peak oil’, defining it as ‘the 
maximum rate of the production of oil in any area under consideration, 
recognising that it is a natural resource, subject to depletion.1544 Hubbert 
predicted that United States oil hegemony would cease in 1970, as petroleum 
demand surpassed production.1545 Although many colleagues ridiculed this 
 
1541 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy: June 2009 (2009), 4-8. 
1542 M King Hubbert, see http://www.hubbertpeak.com/Hubbert/  at 12 December 2009. 
1543 M King Hubbert, Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels (1956) Presented before the Spring Meeting of the 
Southern District Division of Production, American Petroleum Institute, Plaza Hotel, San Antonio, Texas, March 7-
9, 1956 http://www.hubbertpeak.com/Hubbert/1956/1956.pdf at 14 December 2009,  8-11. 
1544 Colin Campbell, What is Peak Oil? (2006) Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas 
http://www.peakoil.net/ at 8 November 2006.  
1545 M King Hubbert, Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels (1956) Publication No. 95, Shell Development 
Company, Exploration and Research Division http://www.energybulletin.net/print.php?id=13630 at 4 December 
2006. 
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concept, Hubbert’s predictions proved accurate, with US demand exceeding 
declining US production in 1973, thereby becoming and remaining a net 
petroleum importer.1546  Furthermore, Hubbert predicted there would come a time 
where the world would have used 50% of its proved reserves, and begin the 
steady decline in production.1547 His prediction was that a global oil peak would 
occur between 1995 and 2000, and it is possible that without the oil shocks in the 
last few decades of the 20th century, this would have occurred.  
Whether global oil reserves are running out, and we are approaching or have 
arrived at peak oil is the subject of much controversy. Peak oil is a theory that is 
difficult to prove until it has occurred, since the peaking of oil cannot be 
predicted accurately, with the event only becoming clear through a ‘rear-view 
mirror.’ By then, an alternative or solution is too late.1548 The relevance of peak 
oil theory is that it defines, to both governments and oil companies alike, the 
global importance of a resource that is finite in nature - finite in individual fields, 
petroleum regions, and globally. Certainly oil production from many fields, 
including Norwegian fields,1549 demonstrates that oil recovery is flattening out 
and relatively few new fields are being found.1550  
 
1546 Matthew Simmons, Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? (2003) Proc. 2nd International Workshop on Oil 
Depletion, Paris, France, May 26-27 2003. 
1547Matthew Simmons, Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? (2003) Proc. 2nd International Workshop on Oil 
Depletion, Paris, France, May 26-27 2003. 
1548 Matthew Simmons, Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? (2003) Proc. 2nd International Workshop on Oil 
Depletion, Paris, France, May 26-27 2003. 
1549 Oil production has been declining from Norwegian fields for several years. Refer to production figures from 
Norwegian fields at http://www.npd.no/en/news/Production-figures/ at 12 February 2010. 
1550 For statistics on world resources refer to BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 (2009) 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energ
y_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2009.pd
f at 12 February 2010. 
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2. Field sterilisation  
Companies extract petroleum from individual fields, often with little knowledge 
of the overall aquifer or regional field structure, or rates of recovery from nearby 
fields. Extraction from one portion of a reservoir typically affects other sections 
of the reservoir. Therefore, it is necessary for a coordinated approach to reservoir 
depletion, to ensure maximum recovery.1551 This regional view is essential to 
ensure that reservoir development is coordinated by a body that has the regional 
data and technical knowledge to assess the development, as well as the authority 
to implement changes where required.1552  
Resource sterilisation occurs when individual companies develop fields on an 
individual basis, but the combined effect is to strand some petroleum in the 
reservoir.1553 This petroleum is unable to be developed due to reservoir geology 
(often due to subsistence), access to the field, or access to facilities for 
development.1554 Sterilised fields are challenging, requiring timely development 
of fields if it is to be avoided.1555 If small discoveries and fields are located in 
existing production areas with large installations, it is possible that these small 
fields may be profitably produced. However, fields and installations have a ‘shelf 
life’. In particular, installations generally only have a field operating life of 20-30 
 
1551 I refer to the excellent example provided by the West Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum in their 
submission to the Productivity Commission’s. See Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum 
(WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department 
of Mines and Petroleum (2009) www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009. 
1552 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum  at 29 January 2009. 
1553 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
86. 
1554 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report  at 6 May 2009, 
86. 
1555 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 17. 
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years, after which they need to be decommissioned and removed.1556 In mature 
provinces, the fields and installations are towards the end of their life. If the 
development of small and stranded fields is to occur, it needs to take place whilst 
existing infrastructure is still functional. Otherwise, the infrastructure will be 
removed, and it will not be cost effective to develop small or stranded fields if 
new installations have to be constructed. If facilities are shared between 
participants with a common interest of extracting petroleum, the result is cost 
savings and increased earnings for companies since these small fields are 
produced at a profit. This also results in higher government revenue through 
taxes, thereby maximising the value of petroleum resources.1557 
3. The State as owner and regulator of petroleum resources  
The State as resource owner has the right and obligation to regulate its petroleum 
resources for petroleum development. Therefore, the Australian government, as 
owner of Australia’s petroleum resources is responsible for the management of 
Australia’s petroleum resources in accordance with national interests.1558 This 
management comprises many functions, including the allocation of secure title, 
managing timing and method of extraction, and ensuring appropriate return to the 
community for extracting non-renewable resources to the community through an 
appropriate taxation system.1559 
Although resource management is not defined in Australian petroleum 
legislation, the basis for State management of Australia’s non-renewable 
 
1556 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 17. 
1557 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen and Dagfinn Nygard, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita  Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 911. 
1558 These national interests are articulated in Australia’s petroleum policy, which is discussed in chapter 3. 
1559 Australia Productivity Commission, Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and 
Gas) Sector - Draft Report (2008), 70.  
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resources arises from two sources.1560 The first is the concept of sustainable 
development.1561 The second is a set of guidelines outlined by the Australian 
government in the annual Overview for Applicants: Release of Offshore 
Petroleum Exploration Areas, and the accompanying Guidance Notes for 
Applicants: Release of Offshore Petroleum Exploration Areas.1562 In the 
guidance notes for the grant of a production licence, the Australian State 
recognises that its sovereign rights over offshore petroleum resources confers a 
responsibility to ensure that present and future generations of Australians derive 
optimal benefit from the petroleum resources of the seabed beneath the 
Commonwealth’s marine jurisdiction.1563 In addition, the 2002 report Managing 
Australian Mineral Wealth for Sustainable Economic Development1564 provides 
an analysis of how the Australian government needs to manage non-renewable 
resources in order to achieve sustainable development of those resources and 
Australian society in general.1565  
The Western Australian Department of Minerals and Petroleum (DMP) notes that 
the key reason for government management of petroleum resources is for the 
long-term benefit of the community, and not just private commercial benefit.1566 
The DMP includes efficient and equitable intergenerational benefit as key 
 
1560 A discussion on Australia’s petroleum regulation and the use of administrative guidelines can be found in 
Chapter three.  
1561 Australia’s policy relating to the sustainable development of its petroleum resources is outlined in Chapter two. 
1562 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, A Guide for Applicants (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/GuidanceNotesForApplicants.pdf at 21 August 
2009, Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, An Overview for Applicants (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/OverviewForApplicants.pdf at 25 August 2009. 
1563 Department of Industry, Resources and Tourism, Offshore Petroleum Guidelines for a Grant of a Production 
Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002), 7. 
1564 Ken Willett, Managing Australian Mineral Wealth for Sustainable Economic Development (2002). 
1565 Ken Willett, Managing Australian Mineral Wealth for Sustainable Economic Development (2002). 
1566 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009. 3. 
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requirements in the extraction of petroleum.1567 Furthermore, the Western 
Australian government reiterates that the State has a mandate to ensure that the 
return from diminishing natural resources is optimised. This means balancing the 
outcomes between the public interest by maximising ultimate recovery to provide 
significant income through value creation, with industry’s interests in maximising 
the net present value of Australia’s petroleum resources and maximisation of 
profit.1568   
The resource management policy position of the DMP is analogous to that of the 
Norwegian government. Both see the role of the State as one of stewardship. 
What differs are the legal tools that are available to implement this stewardship 
role. Norway has a general legal competence to implement it’s manage field 
development. This particularly arises under the prudent production requirements 
of s4-1 of the PAA, as well as the capacity for the State to direct either joint 
petroleum activities,1569 or direct companies to allow third parties to access or use 
their facilities to enable optimal production to occur.1570 The Australian 
Commonwealth government has the legislative capacity to encourage joint 
production under a unit development agreement,1571 and the legislative capacity 
to direct third party access to infrastructure for the purpose of greenhouse gas 
activities.1572 However, there is no general legislative or administrative capacity 
for the Commonwealth to compel a company to provide third party access to 
facilities to increase petroleum recovery. 
 
1567 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009, 3. 
1568 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009, 3. 
1569 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway),s4-7. 
1570 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-8. 
1571 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s191. 
1572 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s194. 
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4. Conflict between State and company goals 
The relationship between the State that owns the petroleum resources and the 
private oil companies that have been awarded the proprietary rights to exploit 
those resources is difficult since each has different goals in the development of 
the petroleum,1573 yet requires the participation of the other to accomplish their 
goals.1574 Therefore the State balances the need to maximise the benefit to society 
from the development of those resources with the need to establish a regulatory 
framework that will enable the oil companies to realise their commercial goals. 
Economic theorists support the view that government intervention is necessary 
for the development of petroleum resources. Economist Stiglitz notes that the 
most successful approaches to the management of natural resources has been 
where a State has decided to regulate the resource depletion, as well as participate 
in the extraction of the resources.1575 These countries have learned the requisite 
skills from a range of oil companies, and used the knowledge to maximise the 
development of the petroleum for the benefit of the country.1576 Furthermore, his 
analysis demonstrates that full privatisation has seen governments get the worst 
deal in realising the real value of the oil.1577 In particular he notes that ‘Norway’s 
story is important, because it destroys the shibboleth that efficiency and welfare 
maximisation can be obtained only through privatization.’1578 Control over 
extraction of a national asset (the petroleum) is given to a profit-maximising 
 
1573 The differences in the goals of the State and companies is considered in section 1.5.2 above. 
1574 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 19. 
1575 Joseph Stiglitz, ’What is the Role of the State’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 43. 
1576 Joseph E Stiglitz, ’What is the Role of the State’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 43. 
1577 Joseph E Stiglitz, ’What is the Role of the State’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 43. 
1578 Joseph Stiglitz, ’What is the Role of the State’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 30. 
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private enterprise that seeks to minimise what they give the government for the 
right to extract the State’s petroleum, returning the maximum to the shareholders 
in that private enterprise.1579 This has the capacity to cause tension between the 
State and oil companies in the exploitation of petroleum. If the objective of the 
private oil companies is not being realised, or threatened in any way, it is possible 
that the oil company will withdraw from petroleum activities in that jurisdiction.  
This creates difficulty for Australia since it has an active policy to attract 
international investment, and seeks to encourage and retain investment from 
international oil companies. Therefore, the goal of State regulation of field 
production should be to implement State petroleum policy objectives, and to 
achieve desired outcomes. It must be remembered that regulation is not just about 
realizing economic incentives. If one examines the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
that commenced in 2008, it is apparent that the lack of State regulation of 
banking and finance that was seen as economically efficient created havoc in the 
financial system.1580  
If the government were to extract the petroleum itself, without the assistance of 
oil companies, the government would regulate the extraction, as it would regulate 
any other government activity.1581 However, the government is compelled to 
utilise oil companies for the development of the resources, since it lacks the 
competence and necessary skills to develop the resources, and is reluctant to 
invest public capital into high-risk exploration ventures.1582 This desire to attract 
international oil companies is demonstrated by the Joint Authority’s response to 
 
1579 Joseph Stiglitz, ’What is the Role of the State’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 29-34. 
1580 United States Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan For Regulatory 
Reform (2009) http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf at 12 October 2009. 
1581 For example the regulation of media and broadcasting in Australia under the Telecommunications Act 1997 
(Cth) and the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth), where the State participates as owner of the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission (ABC). 
1582 Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (1980), 19.  
 © Tina Hunter 
 
366
                                             
the default on the Cornea field by a Shell-Chevron Joint Venture (‘Shell’) in 
1997.1583 Shell took operatorship over blocks WA-265-P and WA-266-P in 
Western Australia, contiguous to the Shell-held Cornea structure in block WA-
241-P.1584 When the consortium defaulted on the primary work program, Shell 
and Chevron, in separate negotiations, concluded agreements with the then 
Australian government to maintain its good standing with the Commonwealth 
and West Australian governments, despite the cancellation of the licences. These 
agreements were subject to the completion of exploration work in areas not taken 
up in recent releases.1585 The outcome of these negotiations then became 
embodied in legislation as part of an amendment to the PSLA in 2000. These 
legislative amendments enabled the JA to rank multiple applicants based on its 
opinion, and could exclude an applicant that is not deserving of the grant of an 
exploration permit.1586 Both the acquiescence of the Australian government in 
enabling the Shell consortium to cancel the work program, and the legislative 
legitimisation of the good standing provisions, demonstrate the capacity of the 
Australian government as petroleum regulator to alter the regulatory framework 
to encourage commercial investment by international oil companies.   
An effective regulatory framework is one that unites the divergent interests of the 
participants, creating a balanced relationship where each of the parties is able to 
fulfil their objectives. The divergent interests of these two parties are reconciled 
through the legal regulatory framework, which is established by the State to 
implement the policy objectives for the exploitation of petroleum. For Australia, 
that means that the regulatory framework should assist the government in the 
sustainable development of the petroleum resources whilst attracting overseas 
 
1583 For a detailed analysis of the Cornea field see section 4.3.2 above. 
1584 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 129. 
1585 David Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127. 
1586 Now embodied in s106 (2) of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
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investment. For the oil companies, the regulatory framework should assist in 
maximising profits.  
It is important for States to periodically assess the effectiveness of the framework 
that manages the petroleum resources. Even countries such as Norway, which 
direct petroleum extraction from offshore fields, has evaluated and adjusted its 
system of regulation for petroleum resources.1587 The State must be prepared to 
re-evaluate policies and regulatory framework to create the right incentives for 
enhanced resource development. As noted by the Norwegian MPE in 2002, 
‘governments must be willing to consider whether established principles and the 
prevailing policy framework create the right incentives for enhanced value 
creation, and possibly adapt policies to ensure resources are not wasted’.1588  
The capacity of State regulation of petroleum extraction to maximise the socio-
economic benefits from extraction has been modelled by the Norwegian 
government in its Storting report Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the 
Storting (2001-2).  In this report the Norwegian government modelled the likely 
recovery of petroleum from the NCS based on alternative scenarios, as illustrated 
in figure 6 below. 
 
1587 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 19. 
1588 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 19. 
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Figure 6: Two possible scenarios for the development of remaining 
petroleum resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Source: 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 
38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial English Translation (2002), 9). 
 
The decline scenario models the likely recovery of petroleum from the NCS 
utilising current trends in the regulation of petroleum activities on the NCS, 
where the extraction of petroleum is regulated by the activities and decisions of 
petroleum companies and the Norwegian State relies on current technological 
developments and regulatory framework. Both parties reap the returns made from 
investment, although there is a relatively rapid (20 years) decline of petroleum 
resources on the NCS, resulting in some sectors of the petroleum industry phased 
out during this period.1589 A second scenario, the long-term scenario, models the 
likely petroleum recovery from the NCS under an aggressive, State regulated 
                                              
1589 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8.  
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framework of petroleum resource development governed by technological 
developments, skilling and enhanced expertise.1590 This option requires the 
support of, and significant contributions from, companies and government, with 
both parties committed to efficient exploration of the remaining petroleum 
resources.1591 In addition, it relies on the development of future technologies to 
increase the recovery from fields, and to maximise the recovery from all 
reservoirs, ensuring that no field sterilisation occurs.1592 
The Norwegian government has embraced the long-term scenario. The principle 
behind this scenario is that major petroleum assets would otherwise be lost to the 
community if the government fails to exploit them while they have them.1593 
Economic modelling by the Norwegian government suggested that if the fields 
currently on stream on the NCS cease production in line with current Plan for 
Development and Operations (PDO), more than 31 billion barrels of oil will be 
left behind.1594  The Norwegian State reiterates that these resources can be 
recovered through the development of new recovery techniques and the State 
directed requirement of the use of IOR techniques should occur. Furthermore, the 
Norwegian State has directed all participants that maximum recovery from the 
use of IOR techniques is required as part of each fields’ PDO.1595 
The Norwegian government sees its role as driving the recovery of the resources 
it owns through an extraction policy that is premised on sustainable extraction, 
 
1590 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8. 
1591 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8. 
1592 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8. 
1593 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 9. 
1594 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘Recovering Progress on IOR’ (2008) 2 Norwegian Continental Shelf 9, 10. 
1595 For an example of this refer to the development plans for  Ekofisk II (1997) and Ekofisk Growth (2003 ) 
available at http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/field/all/43506.htm at 12 November 2009. 
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where the most petroleum possible is extracted from a field, rather than what is 
commercially viable for an oil company. This enhanced recovery has both policy 
perspectives as well as practical applications, including technology, field 
development and market conditions. This assessment of alternative development 
scenarios undertaken by Norway demonstrates that it is profitable for the State to 
control the extraction of petroleum. In monetary terms, the difference between 
revenue derived from the value creation from the long-term scenario and the 
decline scenario has been estimated to be 2000 billion NOK.1596  The realisation 
of the improved oil recovery scenario is difficult and expensive, requiring the 
development and use of new technologies, with the partnership between 
government and industry crucial.1597  
Should the Australian government wish to accomplish its stated policy goals of 
creating a policy framework to expand Australia’s resource base’1598 it needs to 
direct the method of extraction. The net benefit will be the greater recovery of 
petroleum resources that will provide revenue for the government and oil 
companies alike. It will cost money to realise these resources, however evidence 
from the NCS shows that it will also provide net benefits. The key reason for loss 
of revenue, Stiglitz notes, is because governments rely on private sector 
companies to extract their resources.1599 These companies have the goal to 
maximise their revenues, and to minimise those accruing to the country. This 
results in an inevitable conflict of interest. Furthermore, Gao notes that 
international petroleum agreements are the product of a single-minded pursuit of 
narrow commercial interests. They are not designed to encourage sustainable 
 
1596 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8. Note that 2000 billion NOK converts to approximately AU$550 billion. 
1597 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8. 
1598 As articulated in Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy:  A 
Strategy to Promote Petroleum Exploration and Development in Australian Offshore Areas (1999). 
1599 Joseph Stiglitz, ’What is the Role of the State’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (2007), 23. 
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development, but rather to rapidly exploit the petroleum resources.1600 Hence, the 
challenge for the Australian government is to attract and retain oil companies to 
exploit petroleum resources, but also maximise its return. 
5.3.2 How can field depletion be regulated for sustainable 
development? 
State control over reservoir depletion and coordination of aquifer 
development 
A major challenge in mature areas is that the expected sizes of discoveries are 
declining.1601 Some jurisdictions with mature areas have identified not only the 
importance of discovering and developing the petroleum resources in these areas 
before existing infrastructure in connection to other fields is shut down, but also 
see a need for government coordination of the development of mature petroleum 
fields.1602 Government coordination in these areas is especially important, since 
small discoveries often cannot justify a standalone development, but can be 
profitable with a tie-in to existing facilities. Therefore, government coordination 
is required to tie these developments to major installations, including auxiliary 
resources such as pipelines, storage facilities and land-based terminals.1603 Third 
part access to facilities and tie- in of production has been a feature of many fields 
on the NCS. In particular, the northern North Sea fields of Gullfaks A, B, and C, 
 
1600  Zhiguo Gao, ‘International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: A Comprehensive 
Environmental Appraisal’ (1994) 12 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 240, 248. 
1601 Oil Voice, Norwegian Government Announces APA 2009 Awards (2010) 
http://www.oilvoice.com/n/Norwegian_Government_Announces_APA_2009_Awards/5a49b6c49.aspx at 24 
February 2010. 
1602 For instance in Norway. See the discussion regarding State control and access to third party facilities for oil and 
gas production in Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen and Dagfinn Nygard, ‘Energy 
Law in Europe’, in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita  Rønne (eds), Energy 
Law in Europe: National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 909-912. 
1603 Similar to what is being required by the Norwegian Government as its Norwegian Continental Shelf fields 
mature. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). 
Unofficial English Translation (2002). 17-18. See also the legislative requirements for third party access to 
production facilities: Petroleum Activities Act 4-8. 
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Gullfaks Sør and Gimle have integrated processing and accommodation facilities, 
and are also involved in production and transport of petroleum from the Tordis, 
Vigdis and Visund fields.1604 
Mature fields and declining production is a well-recognised problem in the 
mature provinces of the NCS, where over half of the known oil reserves have 
been extracted from the NCS.1605 This decline in resources and production 
creates the likelihood that field sterilisation or production from these fields will 
be phased out unless special measures are adopted.1606 These measures are both 
technical and administrative, since the Norwegian government sees itself as 
playing a pivotal role in the solution to resource sterilisation. In particular, the 
Norwegian government sees the need to harmonise and coordinate the use of 
existing facilities to ensure third party access to required facilities for the 
development of small or stranded fields.1607  To facilitate third party access, the 
NPD regulates access to facilities.1608 One of the major problems with petroleum 
production is that some fields, which were developed in the 1970s – 1990s, have 
ceased production but still have substantial resources remaining that were not 
able to be recovered at the time the field was developed. Improvements in 
petroleum recovery technology mean that additional petroleum can now be 
recovered from a field. 
 
1604 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 107. 
1605 To the end of 2009 the total sum of production from the Norwegian Continental Shelf  5.3 billion Sm3 oil 
equivalents (o.e.) have been produced. 82 discoveries and almost 289 projects for increased recovery from fields in 
production, along with approved projects, results in a portfolio of 4.8 billion Sm3 o.e. of remaining, proven 
resources. See http://www.npd.no/en/news/News/2010/The-shelf-in-2009/The-shelf-in-2009---The-resource-
accounts/ at 24 February 2010. 
1606 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 19. 
1607 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, On the Petroleum Activity: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2004). Unofficial 
English Translation (2004), 5.  
1608 Third party access to facilities is regulated by the Regulations Relating To The Use Of Facilities By Others. 
Laid Down By The Ministry Of Petroleum and Energy On 20 December 2005 Pursuant to Section 10-18, First 
Paragraph, and Section 4-8 of the Act of 29 November 1996 No. 72 Relating to Petroleum Activities and Section 86 
of the Regulations of 27 June 1997 No. 653 to The Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). See 
http://www.npd.no/en/regulations/regulations/facilities---use-by-others/ at 19 February 2010.  
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The Norwegian State has determined that access to larger parts of mature areas 
is critical, so that time-critical resources1609 can be rapidly explored and 
produced.1610 To facilitate the extraction of oil in these provinces, the 
Norwegian Government implemented a policy shift regarding licencing in 
mature areas, introducing in 2003 a scheme for the annual award of production 
licences in predefined areas (APA) in mature areas of the NCS.1611 The system 
is based on the designation of large, predefined exploration areas that 
encompass all mature areas on the NCS, and these areas will continue to be 
expanded as more areas on the NCS mature.1612 The APA system enables the 
award of a licence over a mature province (either old oil fields or small stranded 
fields in the province) that has already produced petroleum, using existing 
infrastructure while it still remains - sort of an oily ‘picking over the bones.’1613 
This is to ensure that areas close to existing and planned infrastructure are fully 
developed,1614 by utilising existing infrastructure and ensuring production from 
time-critical acreage in mature areas. This contributes to sound utilisation of 
production and transport capacity of the NCS whilst at the same time ensuring 
that the recovery from these mature fields is optimised by utilising existing 
facilities and infrastructure.1615 
 
1609 Time critical resources are those that require imminent development before existing facilities are 
decommissioned. 
1610 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 33. 
1611 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, On the Petroleum Activity: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2004). Unofficial 
English Translation (2004). 
1612 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 33. 
1613 The purpose of the APA-rounds is to enhance exploration activities in mature areas, where expectations are 
smaller discoveries that cannot justify an independent development. It is therefore good resource management to 
discover and develop these resources before existing infrastructure in connection to other fields are shut down. 
APA-rounds are also considered important to enhance exploration activities and employment in the industry and 
supply industry.  
1614 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Production Licence – Licence to Explore, Discover and Produce (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Emner/Ressursforvaltning/Undersokelse_og_leting/Konsesjonsrunder/2008_10_17_Utv
inningsloyve.htm at 26 January 2009.  
1615 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen and Dagfinn Nygard, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita  Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 899. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
374
                                             
Some Australian regulators claim the need for government intervention in field 
extraction. The Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (DMP) 
is one such regulator,1616 clearly articulating what it sees as the role of the 
regulator in the regulation of field development:   
In particular, the aquifer depletion example demonstrates that 
while industry may well have superior technical resources, 
Government agencies are better placed in terms of regional 
technical knowledge with unlimited access to regional data 
needed to regulate matters on a wide geographic basis. This 
enables Government to appropriately manage resources to 
encapsulate potential public good spillovers or externalities. Such 
issues are beyond the individual operator’s control or interest.1617 
Aquifer depletion has occurred in a number of mature oil producing regions 
including the Dampier and Barrow Sub-Basins in Western Australia, the 
Northern Territory and Victoria. As these aquifers finite, their depletion can lead 
to a drop in pressure in a region, with a subsequent loss of oil in yet to be 
discovered or developed hydrocarbon fields.1618 The view of DMP is that the 
government role as regulator needs to coordinate aquifer depletion, since aquifer 
management is beyond an individual operator’s control. DMP has been a pioneer 
in this issue, initiating and commissioning three studies on the Dampier and 
Barrow Sub-Basins to quantify the oil loss in Western Australian Basins. These 
studies have shown that in Western Australia, up to 770 million barrels of oil and 
around four billion dollars in royalties could be foregone by 2030 if aquifer 
 
 1616 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009, 3-4. 
1617 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009, 4. 
1618 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009, 4. 
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depletion continues unabated. The issue has also been specifically raised by the 
Western Australian and Commonwealth governments in relation to the impact 
that the Pluto development will have on the neighbouring Wheatstone gas field, 
as both share the same aquifer.1619 Whilst there have been a number of studies 
relating to the likely loss due to the need for aquifer regulation, there has been 
little legislative response by Western Australia, since the regulation of petroleum 
activities in these basins occurs through OPAGGSA, and requires 
Commonwealth legislative change to direct field depletion.  
The Western Australian government has also noted that condensate production 
from an offshore Western Australia LNG project will lose 24 million barrels of 
condensate without government intervention, due to the method of recovery of 
the gas, and reservoir pressure.1620 Not only will this encourage field sterilisation 
and less than optimal recovery, but represents a loss of State resources valued at 
between $1 billion and $2 billion, depending on oil prices.1621 The DMP 
recognises that State intervention in the regulation of petroleum production is 
critical to ensure the sustainable development of Australia’s petroleum resources. 
Contribution of geological data 
One of the major difficulties in State regulation of petroleum fields to maximise 
the recovery of petroleum is the collation and analysis of petroleum data. 
Regulation of petroleum field production is reliant upon an analysis and 
interpretation of data from the petroleum fields.  In Norway, all data is provided 
 
1619 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009, 4-5. 
1620 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009, 3. 
1621 Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (WADMP), Productivity Commission Draft Research 
Report: Comments from the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2009) 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum at 29 January 2009 4. 
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to the NPD,1622 which collates and analyses field data to determine the 
condition of a field and then recommend a method of recovery or plan of action 
for the aquifer. All companies are required to submit an Annual Status Report 
(ASR) for fields in production to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) 
by 1 November of each year, in accordance with section 47 of the PR and 
Section 29 of the Resource Regulations 199 7(Norway).1623 The ASR forms the 
basis for the NPD’s evaluation of whether a field is operated in accordance with 
the preconditions in the regulations.1624 These preconditions stipulate that 
production must taking place in such a way that the maximum volume of 
petroleum in the deposits is produced, ensure production conforms to prudent 
technical and financial principles, and ensure recovery is accomplished so as to 
avoid the loss of petroleum or reservoir energy as required under section 4-1 of 
the PAA.1625 The report is required to describe relevant plans and possible 
measures for optimal recovery during the remaining lifetime of the field.1626  
The present regulatory framework in Australia for the reporting of production 
data for the regulation of field production is shared between Commonwealth and 
state bodies. This split of regulatory functions between the states and the 
Commonwealth creates regulatory burden,1627 and duplicates reporting 
 
1622 The NPD has this capacity as one of it main objectives. See http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/Collaboration-
projects/ at 12 February 2010. 
1623 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Guidelines for Annual Status Report for Fields in Production (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/Reporting/Production/ at 22 February 2010, 1. 
1624  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Guidelines for Annual Status Report for Fields in Production (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/Reporting/Production/ at 22 February 2010, 1. 
1625 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Guidelines for Annual Status Report for Fields in Production (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/Reporting/Production/ at 22 February 2010, 1. 
1626 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Guidelines for Annual Status Report for Fields in Production (2009) 
http://www.npd.no/en/Reporting/Production/ at 22 February 2010, 1 
1627 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Research Report (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/upstreampetroleum/report at 6 May 2009, 
227-269. 
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requirements.1628 Not only are oil companies required to report field production 
data to multiple agencies,1629 but there is no one centralised agency which 
collates and analyses this production data. In order for government regulation of 
petroleum resources to occur in Australia, there would be a need for a single 
national offshore petroleum regulator that would collate all data relating to field 
production.1630 
A single regulatory body would not only reduce duplication of regulation but 
could also undertake the analysis of data from petroleum producing fields in 
Australia. The establishment of a new national regulator should incorporate a 
PIAF–type system1631 of field data accumulation and analysis. This would allow 
the State the capacity to analyse recovery rates from fields and direct IOR 
techniques to those fields with lower recovery rates or difficult geology. The 
Australian government is in a unique position as resource owner and regulator. 
They have the regional knowledge (through the Geoscience Australia petroleum 
geology database), expertise, incentive and the authority to coordinate the efforts 
of individual companies to optimise the recovery of oil resources.  
 
1628 This has issue of duplication of reporting has been identified by major oil companies and the peak industry 
body APPEA in response to the productivity Commission’s request for submissions. For example Woodside, 
Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and 
Gas) Sector (2008) Submission 11 http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/85985/subdr011.pdf at 17 
October 2008, 2. 
1629 For example Woodside was required to report field data to Federal, State and Northern Territory governments 
for 2007 and 2008 seismic data. See Woodside, Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of the 
Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (2008) Submission 11 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/85985/subdr011.pdf at 17 October 2008, 2.  
1630 This issue of a central administrative body for sustainable socio-economic development of Australian petroleum 
is addressed in section 3.4 above. 
1631 A PIAF-type system sets performance indicators analysis for fields (PIAF), and then uses this accumulated 
field data to analyse the recovery of oil fields. For a consideration of the PIAF system in Norway see Gunnar Berge, 
The Working Relationship Between the Authorities and the Industry (2007) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Norwegian%20model/Norwegian_model_GUNNAR_BERGE.pd
f at 12 November 2009, and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector 
(2009), 43. 
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Appointment of the operator  
The role of the operator is crucial in the development of oil and gas resources. An 
important condition in the award of petroleum licences in Norway is the capacity 
of the State to appoint or approve the operator of the Joint Venture Agreement 
(JVA).1632 The operator has a legal obligation under the JOA to act on behalf of 
the other participants of the joint venture to ensure that all necessary consents, 
approvals, and licences are obtained for the petroleum activities undertaken. The 
operator not only carries out the day to day management of the field,1633 but 
prepares and submits all necessary logs, reports and records. In addition, the 
operator has the right and obligation to obtain all necessary consents, approvals 
and licences, and to enter into requisite agreements in the name and on behalf of 
the JV for the purposes of the petroleum activity.1634 The operator has a duty to 
act on behalf of the other parties without gaining a profit from his 
operatorship.1635 Generally, but not always, the operator has a substantial 
percentage interest in the licence.1636  
The operator is selected by the State because of the companies’ demonstrated 
capacity to lead the exploration and production of petroleum from that particular 
field. The State selects the operator based on what is best for the interests of the 
Norwegian society rather than for the best interests of the company, since the 
operator on a Norwegian field is expected to not only conduct the joint operations 
that have been approved by the management committee, but also to take the 
 
1632 As stipulated in section 3-7 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
1633 Art. 3.1, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway). 
1634 Art. 3.2 of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway)  
1635 Art. 3.2, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway). 
1636 Michael B Taylor and Sally M Tyne, Taylor and Windsor on Joint Operating Agreements (1993), 1. 
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initiative in proposing the operations to be carried out.1637 The State also has to 
approve a change of operator, or to change the operator.1638 
By selecting the composition of the joint venture and selecting the operator, the 
Norwegian State is able to unite technical capabilities and skills with financial 
backing to develop the field. This is also important since no two petroleum fields 
are the same, each having a unique geology and presenting challenges in 
maximising production. The State utilises the technical expertise of smaller 
specialised companies but also the economic security of majors companies in 
order to accomplish the optimal extraction of petroleum for that field. This is 
important, since some fields may require exceptionally specialised extraction 
methods or technologies that only certain companies can provide. The technical 
challenges of the unusual chalky reservoirs of Ekofisk provide a clear example of 
how unique geologies require unique engineering solutions to ensure maximum 
recovery of petroleum from the reservoir.1639  
The operatorship of a field also provides many benefits for a company. Given the 
expectation that the operator will show initiative in extracting as much petroleum 
as possible, it provides the operating company with the capacity to develop and 
test new technologies that will enhance the recovery of petroleum. This 
effectively provides a company with extremely cheap research and development 
opportunities, since all expenses relating to the joint venture are paid by the joint 
venturers on a pro rata basis according to their participating interest.1640 
Effectively, the selection or approval of the operator by the State assists a State in 
meeting the technological and commercial challenges associated with the 
 
1637 Michael B Taylor and Sally M Tyne, Taylor and Windsor on Joint Operating Agreements (1993), 3. 
1638 As stipulated in section 3-7 of the Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway). 
1639 T. B Jensen, K J Harpole and A Oosthus, EOR Screening for Ekofisk’ (2000) Society of Petroleum Engineers 
Paper SPE 65124, 1-2. 
1640 See Art. 8.1, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway). 
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sustainable development of petroleum resources in two ways. Firstly, it ensures 
that the company best suited to developing the field is appointed as operator so 
that the technical expertise can be effectively utilised. Secondly, it encourages 
technological innovation and skilling, since the operator is not required to 
develop new or requisite technology from its own coffers. Rather, as operator, the 
research and development (R&D) costs are largely covered by all of the JV 
parties where the expenses are for the petroleum activities in that field.1641  
State regulation of petroleum extraction  
At a minimum, the State exerts legislative control over the development of a field 
through the award of a production licences. In most jurisdictions, including 
Australia, the USA, the United Kingdom, the State exerts control over field 
development by ensuring that the licencee has met all statutory requirements for 
environmental and other considerations.1642  
For many petroleum producing countries, such as Australia, that is where State 
control ends. Production licences are granted subject to appropriate conditions 
relative to safety, resource management, protection of the environment and native 
title.1643 An applicant for a production licence is required to submit a notice 
outlining the nature of the proposed development, the method of operation and its 
environmental impact as part of the field development plan.1644 The field 
development plan provides a production overview of the plan for production, 
describing the essential features of the proposed development, including reservoir 
 
1641 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Joint Operating Agreement (Norway). 
1642 Other considerations may include navigation and maritime safety, heritage protection, fishing activities, defence 
activities submarine telecommunication cables and insurance requirements. 
1643 Western Australian Department of Industry and Resources, Petroleum and Royalties Division, Administration 
of Petroleum Titles in Western Australia and Adjacent Offshore Areas (2008)  
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/documents/Admin_of_Pet_Titles_WA_Adjacent_Offshore.pdf at 27 October 2008. 
1644 Western Australian Department of Industry and Resources, Petroleum and Royalties Division, Administration 
of Petroleum Titles in Western Australia and Adjacent Offshore Areas (2008)  
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/documents/Admin_of_Pet_Titles_WA_Adjacent_Offshore.pdf at 27 October 2008. 
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information and modelling, drilling methods, project schedule and reservoir 
management and development.1645 Once the petroleum licence has been granted, 
the oil companies have full control over the depletion of the field. Furthermore, 
once production has commenced the State has the legislative capacity to regulate 
production only in relation to environmental matters.1646   
Petroleum production in Australia is regulated by Part 2.4 of the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPAGGSA) as 
associated regulations. Together, these stipulate how production licences can be 
granted, the period of the production licence, and the renewal of production 
licences.1647 Recovery of petroleum from a field is regulated by sections 189 and 
190 of OPAGGSA. Section 189 enables the JA to direct a licencee to recover 
petroleum from a production licence area.1648 This direction can occur at the 
commencement of production,1649 essentially establishing the right of the State to 
direct the licencee to take all necessary and practical steps to recover the 
petroleum.1650 There is also the provision under s189 (2) of the OPAGGSA for 
the Commonwealth to direct the licencee to take steps the JA thinks necessary 
and practicable for, or in relation to, the recovery of petroleum in the licence 
area.1651 This further direction can only be given where there is a direction in 
force from the outset, and the JA is not satisfied with the steps taken by the 
licencee to recover the petroleum.1652 
 
1645 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Resources Division, Offshore Petroleum Guideline for Grant 
of a Production Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002), 22-26. 
1646 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s161. 
1647 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) 
1648 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s189  (1).  
1649 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s189. 
1650 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s189. 
1651 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s189 (2). 
1652 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s189 (2). 
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In practice, the JA does not stipulate petroleum recovery from the outset. Rather, 
offshore petroleum in Australia is recovered using good oilfield practice (GOP) 
as a guide of how the recovery of the petroleum should proceed. Broadly, GOP is 
defined as ‘practices that are generally accepted in the international oil industry 
as being good, safe and efficient in the carrying out of exploration, or as the case 
may be, development operations that an experienced reasonable and prudent 
operator engaged in similar activity under similar circumstances would use.’1653 
Bunter notes that definition of GOP is ambiguous and is somewhat negative in 
application.1654 He points out that it is hard to determine what practices do 
conform to GOP. Furthermore, Bunter sees a need for rigorous standards to 
determine what GOP is and promote GOP in oilfield operations.1655 
Good oilfield practice is defined in OPAGGSA1656 to be ‘all those things that are 
generally accepted as good and safe in the carrying on or exploration for 
petroleum or petroleum recovery operations.’1657 In the context of OPAGGSA, 
GOP is concerned with all things ‘good and safe’ for the operation of petroleum 
operations. It fails to encompass optimal resource extraction for value creation for 
a community and the optimisation of petroleum production to ensure the 
sustainable development of a State’s resources. Rather, it is concerned with the 
physical aspects of production – the process of extracting the resource safely and 
without damage to the environment in the most economically efficient manner.  
The Commonwealth has a role in regulating the management of the resources to 
ensure that the recovery of petroleum is carried out in accordance with good 
oilfield practice, in a way that is compatible with the long-term recovery of the 
 
1653 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 309. 
1654 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 309. 
1655 Michael Bunter, The Promotion and Licencing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage (2002), 309. 
1656 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s6. 
1657 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s7. 
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resource.1658 To fulfil these roles, the definition of good oilfield practice in 
section 7 of OPAGGSA needs to be expanded to encompass field recovery rates 
and optimize recovery for the benefit of the community. At present the definition 
of GOP only covers good and safe operations rather than the optimisation of 
recovery of petroleum from fields. Until this occurs, GOP as a yardstick for 
resource management will fail to assist Australia in meeting national petroleum 
objectives.  
Australia has the legislative provision to direct the recovery of petroleum1659 to 
satisfy its objectives of sustainably producing its petroleum reserves. Yet it 
chooses not to, instead relying upon the vague qualification of GOP to direct oil 
companies in the production of petroleum. Why the JA chooses not to direct the 
companies to perform certain activities, rather relying on GOP to determine the 
recovery of petroleum by oil companies is perhaps attributable to historic 
attitudes of minimal State regulation of company activities.  
For some jurisdictions, such as Norway, the State regulates all matters related to 
the production of petroleum to enable the State to accomplish its petroleum 
policy objectives. Although the award of a petroleum licence confers rights upon 
the licencee, the subsequent activities of the licencee are subject to government 
regulation and control,1660 since the PAA confers upon the State a broad capacity 
to control all important aspects of the development under the ‘prudent 
production’ requirement.1661 In addition, the petroleum regulations relating to the 
 
1658 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Report on the Consolidation of Regulations under the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (2007), 24. 
1659 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s189 (2).  
1660 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 890. 
1661 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-1.  
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mandatory PDO contain extensive requirements as to the contents of the Plan,1662 
ensuring the State is able to control the recovery of the petroleum, particularly the 
method of recovery.1663  
The legislative capacity of the Norwegian government to direct petroleum 
operations is conferred under the PAA and the Petroleum Regulations 1997 
(Norway) (PR). Section 1-2 of the PAA stipulates that the management of 
Norwegian petroleum resources be in a long-term perspective for the benefit of 
the Norwegian society as a whole. This broad legislative requirement is coupled 
with the prudent production requirements of s4-1 of the PAA. Together these 
give the State a wide scope and high level of discretion to direct petroleum 
activities to ensure that petroleum production occurs for the best interests of the 
State. Furthermore, express legislative provisions enable the State to regulate 
production schedule,1664 postpone development of a field,1665 and direct third 
party access to facilities.1666  
These legislative provisions are supported by broad petroleum regulations, 
especially section 11 of the PR. Under these regulations, the conditions for 
granting a licence and conducting petroleum activities are based solely on the 
need to ensure that petroleum activities are carried out in a proper manner. This 
proper manner provision includes considerations for national security, public 
order, public health, transport, safety, protection of biological resources and 
 
1662 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 890, and Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s16-30. 
1663 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen, and Nygard Dagfinn, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 890. 
1664 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s4-4. 
1665 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-5. 
1666 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-8. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
385
                                             
national treasures, systematic resource management or the need to ensure fiscal 
revenues.1667  
In both the Australian and Norwegian jurisdictions, the production of petroleum 
requires the approval of a field development plan (FDP). This plan is essentially 
an outline of the licencees plan for the development of a petroleum field, and is 
used in both the Australian and Norwegian jurisdiction for that purpose.  
In Australia, the operator is required under OPAGGSA1668 to apply for a 
production licence for the commercial production of petroleum.1669 The licencee 
is required to produce a preliminary field development plan as part of the 
consultative process for the JAs approval of the production licence and associated 
infrastructure requirements.1670 After approval of the preliminary field 
development plan, and in consultation with the government, a finalised field 
development plan is submitted to facilitate formal field approval requirements. 
The granting of the production licence confers production rights on the 
licencee.1671 If a licencee wishes to change a FDP, it is required to seek the 
approval of the relevant bodies in accordance with OPAGGSA.1672  
Government regulation of petroleum extraction in Australia is essentially a linear 
process. Upon approval of a FDP and the commencement of petroleum 
extraction, the JA has no statutory authority or contractual capacity to alter the 
 
1667 Petroleum Activities Regulations, 1997 (Norway), s 11. 
1668 Required under s169 of Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
1669 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s169.  
1670 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Offshore Petroleum Guidelines for a Grant of a Production 
Licence and Grant of an Infrastructure Licence (2002), 8.  
1671 See s170 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth).  
1672 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s168 (4) and (5) 
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terms of the FDP.1673 Essentially, this means that once a FDP has been negotiated 
and approved, and the production licence conferred, the oil company has total 
control over the method of extraction of petroleum from the field, presuming it 
complies with environmental requirements and operates within the conditions of 
the grant of a production licence. Government intervention only occurs if the oil 
company fails to comply with the statutory requirements relating to defence, 
shipping and the environment. 
In Norway, the grant of a production licence confers the right to exclusive 
exploration activities, including the drilling of test well. It does not automatically 
confer the right for production (similar to the Australian exploration licence). The 
commencement of production rests upon the approval of a PDO.1674 
When a new deposit is to be developed, the oil company must submit a PDO for 
approval. 1675 Petroleum production must be conducted in accordance with the 
prudent production concept, encompassing the use of appropriate technologies 
and sound economic principles, to ensure that as much of the petroleum resources 
are recovered.1676 To that end, the PDO must contain an account of the economic, 
resource, technical, commercial and environmental aspects of the production, as 
well as decommissioning and disposal of the installation once production has 
ceased.1677 Where production is planned in two or more stages, the plan must, as 
 
1673 Section 189-90 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth)  are only available to 
the JA to regulate the recovery if petroleum where the JA has made an initial direction for the recovery of 
petroleum.  
1674 Petroleum Activities Regulation 1997 (Norway), s20-24.  
1675 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Guidelines To Plan For Development And Operation Of A Petroleum 
Deposit (PDO) And Plan For Installation And Operation Of Facilities For Transport And Utilisation Of Petroleum 
(PIO).2000 (2000) http://www.npd.no/regelverk/r2002/frame_e.htm  at 22 March 2009.  
1676 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-1 
1677 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2. 
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far as possible, comprise a total development plan rather than a stage 
development plan.1678  
Production cannot commence until the Ministry for Petroleum and Energy (MPE) 
has approved the plan.1679 Where there has been significant deviation from the 
original production plan, the MPE may require a new or amended plan to be 
submitted and approved.1680 An important part of the PDO is an environmental 
impact assessment which interested parties are given the opportunity to comment 
upon in a hearing round.1681  The impact assessment describes the development’s 
expected impact on the environment, any trans-boundary environmental effects, 
and affect on natural resources, fisheries and society in general.1682  The 
government’s consideration of this assessment and development plan ensures a 
prudent project in terms of resources, as well as acceptable consequences for 
other matters of public interest. 
The Ministry also has to approve the expected production schedule, which can 
only be altered if warranted by resource management or other significant social 
considerations.1683 The Ministry can stipulate for periods of time, the quantity of 
petroleum that may be produced, injected or cold vented at any time, and 
stipulates that burning of petroleum is not allowed without Ministry approval.1684 
The regulation of depletion is not for the purpose of controlling overall 
production output. Rather, it is to ensure the effective and efficient production 
from the field and to protect the reservoir. On all production matters, the Ministry 
 
1678 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2 
1679 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2 
1680 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-2. 
1681 Petroleum Regulations 1997 (Norway), s22 and s22a. 
1682 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2007: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector  (2007), Chapter four. 
1683 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-4. 
1684 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-4. 
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has discretion to, when warranted by substantial socio-economic related 
considerations, require that production be prepared, commenced, continued or 
intensified.1685 In addition, the Ministry is able to order the use of production 
facilities by others (third party access), where deemed necessary for efficient 
operation or for the benefit of society.1686 
The requirement of the PDO in Norway is to ensure that there is an efficient 
evaluation of the development of the petroleum resources. However, the 
requirement for a PDO extends beyond the physical and economic production 
requirements of the field. It reflects a blend of commercial and socio-economic 
considerations,1687 to ensure that the value added for the Norwegian society at 
large is maximised and there is a qualitative government approval process.1688 
The information that the State receives in the PDO is used for multiple reasons, 
not just for the development of that particular field. Rather, the information is 
used to enable the State to obtain and maintain an overall view of production on 
the NCS as a whole, enabling strategic planning of field depletion, production 
and use of facilities.1689 
The PDO is also used by the State to maximise petroleum extraction by 
controlling the operations of participating oil companies.1690 As part of the 
 
1685 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-6. See also Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut 
Kaasen and Dagfinn Nygard, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del 
Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 
900. 
1686 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 4-8. 
1687 Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut Kaasen and Dagfinn Nygard, ‘Energy Law in Europe’, 
in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del Guayo and Anita Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe: 
National, EU and International Regulation (2nd ed. 2007), 900. 
1688 Jan Bygdevoll, Field Development Plan, NPD (2006) 
http://www.ccop.or.th/ppm/document/PHEXV5/PHEXV5DOC03_bygdevoll.pdf at 12 March 2009, 5. 
1689 Jan Bygdevoll, Field Development Plan, NPD (2006) 
http://www.ccop.or.th/ppm/document/PHEXV5/PHEXV5DOC03_bygdevoll.pdf at 12 March 2009, 5. 
1690 Jan Bygdevoll, Field Development Plan, NPD (2006) 
http://www.ccop.or.th/ppm/document/PHE,XV5/PHEXV5DOC03_bygdevoll.pdf at 12 March 2009, 7-8. 
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approval of the PDO, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) focuses on the 
areas in the PDO where there are differences between what is optimal for 
Norwegian society, and what is optimal for the licencees.1691 The NPD 
assessment of the PDO seeks to establish a development plan that optimises the 
needs of all participants, making recommendations to the Parliament and 
Ministry of the best possible path of development for the parties. Thus, the PDO 
is used to not only approve the physical requirements to develop a field, but also 
to achieve the society interests in petroleum production. Rather than leave the 
evaluation of the field and its production capacity to the operator and joint 
venture, the NPD does its own analysis of the planned development in order to 
ensure that the differences between the companies interest and the State’s interest 
are minimised.1692 This analysis not only provides a solid foundation for the 
decision on whether to allow production on a field from a physical point of view, 
but also ensures that the development of Norwegian petroleum resources is 
sustainable for Norwegian society.  
In order to ensure the optimal development of petroleum resources for Norwegian 
society, the PDO is a circular process. This means that once a field has been 
approved for production, decisions affecting the recovery of petroleum are not 
solely left to the licencee. Rather, the State continues to monitor the field,1693 
requiring technical innovation for fields where there is the capacity to increase 
the rate of recovery from the field. The State has the capacity to mandate the oil 
 
1691 Jan Bygdevoll, Field Development Plan, NPD (2006) 
http://www.ccop.or.th/ppm/document/PHEXV5/PHEXV5DOC03_bygdevoll.pdf at 112 March 2009, 11. 
1692 Jan Bygdevoll, Field Development Plan, NPD (2006) 
http://www.ccop.or.th/ppm/document/PHEXV5/PHEXV5DOC03_bygdevoll.pdf at 112 March 2009, 12. 
1693 Alongside the development of technology for the recovery of petroleum has been the development of the ability 
to collate and process large volumes of information. The Norwegian Performance indicator analysis for fields 
(PIAF) is a new approach to systemising large volumes of data from fields. Collected and then used to analyse the 
condition of Norwegian petroleum fields on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. This assists the government identify 
fields which pose challenges in the recovery of petroleum, allowing remedial actions to be taken to ensure optimal 
recovery of petroleum from that field. PIAF not only provides an overview of the Norwegian fields from a port 
folio sense, but also allows trends to be identified, including delays in drilling, less or more field injection and 
lower than expected recovery rates. 
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company to review the recovery technique in order to meet revised recovery 
targets. It does this for value creation in Norwegian society, sustainably 
extracting petroleum for present and future generations. 
A consideration of the Ekofisk field in the North Sea demonstrates that continued 
State analysis of petroleum recovery from a field assists the State in recovering 
far greater amounts of petroleum than if petroleum recovery from a field is 
decided wholly by the commercial imperatives of the oil companies. When oil 
was initially discovered in the Ekofisk area in 1969, the field’s lifetime was 
estimated to be 25 years.1694 The original Ekofisk PDO in 1971 estimated the 
total recovery of petroleum from the field to be 17%, because of the complex 
chalk formations in the field.1695 Predictions for recovery from the field in 1988 
were that only 20-30% of the field would be recovered.1696  In the early 1990s, 
there were concerns regarding the safety of Ekofisk due to subsidence and poor 
maintenance, with Phillips seeking to decommission parts of the Ekofisk field 
due to falling production and subsistence in the production facilities.1697 However 
the NPD directed Phillips to submit a revised PDO in 1994, resulting in the 
redevelopment of Ekofisk production facilities and the use of increased recovery 
techniques.1698 Today, IOR technology means that the revised recovery for 
Ekofisk at the end of its production life will be closer to 50%.1699 The legislative 
capacity of the Norwegian State to compel Conoco-Phillips to continue 
 
1694 DNV, Ekofisk,- Ageing with Pride (2004), 1. 
1695 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Fact Pages: Ekofisk  (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/index.htm at 19 January 2009. 
1696 Stig S Kvendseth, Ekofisk The First 20 Years (1991), 194. 
1697 Phillips, Norway Reach Agreement on New Platform, Extend Licence´ (1994) The Journal Record 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-5655454.html at 12 December 2009.  
1698 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Fact Pages: Ekofisk  (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/index.htm at 19 January 2009, and Phillips, Norway Reach Agreement on 
New Platform, Extend Licence´ (1994) The Journal Record http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-5655454.html at 
12 December 2009.  
1699 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Fact Pages: Ekofisk  (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/index.htm at 19 January 2009. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
391
                                             
production and improve recovery in Ekofisk illustrates the circular regulator 
process in effect - although Conoco-Phillips wished to close the field, 
government review of the field prevented the closure. Instead, the State directed 
Conoco-Phillips to employ IOR techniques1700 to maximise the recovery of 
petroleum from the field.  
The experience of Norway in the extraction of petroleum from Ekofisk highlights 
the early position of the Norwegian State in the development of its petroleum 
resources: however inexperienced the Norwegian government was in exploiting 
petroleum resources, the State would still exert control over the exploitation over 
the resources it owned. Whilst the Norwegian government had little experience in 
the exploitation of petroleum resources, it had previously capably managed the 
development of water resources.1701 This experience provided the precedent for 
the government to reject the North American system of minimal intervention in 
the exploitation of petroleum resources, preferring instead a highly regulatory and 
participatory approach to petroleum exploration. 
The decision by the Australian government to allow Shell to abandon its 
mandatory work program in licence area WP-255-P and WP-266-P demonstrates 
the imbalance of power that may exist in the relationship between the State and 
oil companies. In this instance, although the Minister stated that ‘maintaining the 
integrity of the work program bidding system, with fairness to all companies 
exploring offshore, is the overriding concern of the Government’1702, Shell and 
Chevron were able to negotiate special conditions and abandon their work 
program. Effectively, this placed Shell and Chevron, two of the ‘Seven 
 
1700 The specific techniques included pressure injection and directional drilling. See Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, Fact Pages: Ekofisk  (2008) http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/index.htm at 19 January 2009. 
1701 For a discussion of the Norwegian use of the Concession system for the development of water resources, refer 
to section 1.5above. 
1702 Senator the Honourable Nick Minchin, Federal Minister for Industry, Science and Resources, in David 
Maloney, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural Resources 
127, 136. 
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Sisters’,1703 in a position of favour and dominance, demonstrating the Australian 
government’s willingness to enable them to abandon their mandatory work 
program. The message that it sent to oil companies was that the Australian 
government, although it has a regulatory framework in place for the award of 
licences, it is willing to waive it for large and powerful corporations.  
If the Ekofisk field had been located in the Australian jurisdiction, it would have 
been closed when the operator chose to do so. This is because the Australian 
offshore petroleum regulatory framework confers field recovery decisions solely 
on the company, since the petroleum regulators assume that the oil companies 
will act in the best interests of the field.1704 This is not necessarily true, as 
illustrated by Ekofisk. Analysis of the remaining known reserves on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf shows that if recovery was left solely to oil 
companies, then petroleum resources will be exhausted within 20 years.1705 The 
scenario for government driven petroleum recovery is a much different scenario, 
depicting a recovery of an extra 31 billion barrels of oil.1706 
The Norwegian approach to regulating the recovery of petroleum can assist 
Australia in recovering a far greater percentage of petroleum from its fields. To 
do so would require Australia to make changes to its present petroleum 
regulatory framework. There is a need to confer legislative capacity on the State 
to assess and review field production. This is possible through existing legislative 
provisions in sections 189-190 of OPAGGSA. By directing the initial recovery of 
 
1703 The ‘Seven Sisters’ refers to the seven most powerful oil companies in the world. See Anthony Sampson, The 
Seven Sisters (1976). 
1704 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2008), 81-2. 
1705 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8-9. 
1706 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial 
English Translation (2002), 8-9. 
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petroleum prior to production,1707 the JA can invoke section 189 (2) of 
OPAGGSA during the life of the field, altering recovery where necessary to 
ensure sustainable extraction of petroleum.  
It is not just a change in the legislative capacity that is required in order for 
Australian State to regulate petroleum recovery. There also needs to be a shift in 
the policy framework, establishing a greater regulatory role for the State in the 
recovery of petroleum in Australia. Given the sustainable development policy 
platform of the recently elected Australian government, it is possible the State 
may mandate a greater State role in the regulation of petroleum extraction. A 
change in policy, together with a review of the petroleum regulatory framework 
could enable the State to assume a greater role in the regulation of petroleum 
recovery to ensure the sustainable extraction of petroleum. 
Conditions of allocation of a petroleum licence 
The auction system of licence allocation provides the government with better 
information about a company’s perception of the value of the acreage area 
offered for licence and encourages a potential for higher revenue upfront.1708 
However, this focus on price fails to consider the overall package that may be 
offered by bidders, including skill, technology, or specialisation in the geology 
that is present in a formation. This focus on price and value may lead to a 
maximisation of resource rent, but may not result in the most efficient 
exploration for and recovery of petroleum resources for the licence area.1709 
Whether an oil company or the State determines the exploration work program 
raises the question of which party is most capable of exploiting the petroleum 
 
1707 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s189. 
1708 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 30. 
1709 Tim Warman and Lauren Goldblatt, ‘The Work Program Bidding System For Exploration Permits Under the 
Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act 1967 (Cth) (2008) 27 Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 178, 179. 
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resources – the State as owner of the resources, or the oil companies who are 
awarded propriety rights to the resources. The issue of whether the State or the oil 
company should control the work program is illustrated by the exploration in the 
Ekofisk field.1710 Prior to the discovery of the Ekofisk field, Trygve Lie of the 
Norwegian Department of Industry declared to Phillips in 1962 that ‘I believe 
you are mistaken. Norway has neither oil nor gas.’1711 Phillips persisted, gaining 
exploration rights under conditions that required mandatory work program. As 
part of the conditions stipulated in North Sea Exploration Licence 018 awarded to 
Phillips Petroleum, the Norwegian government stipulated a requirement for a 
mandatory amount of exploration wells. In fulfilling their work program 
obligations, Phillips had spudded a number of dry holes. When drilling a 
mandatory well, they encountered technical difficulties and attempted to abandon 
the drilling program.1712 Norwegian petroleum authorities insisted that the 
mandatory work program be carried out, and reluctantly Phillips spudded a new 
well, 300 metres from the abandoned well.1713 This well struck the giant oil field 
subsequently named Ekofisk, with estimated recoverable reserves of 4.5 billion 
barrels of oil.1714 
This insistence of the Norwegian State to control petroleum activities as a 
condition of the award of a petroleum licence, even though it was sceptical of the 
existence of petroleum resources and with a limited knowledge of petroleum 
 
1710 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 30. 
1711 Tryve Lie in Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and 
Norwegian Continental Shelves (1991), 15.  
1712 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 30. 
1713 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 30. 
1714As at October 2008. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, NPD’s Fact Pages Field: Ekofisk (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/field/all/43506.htm at 12 December 2008. 
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activities, demonstrates the importance of fulfilling work program obligations.1715 
Had the Norwegian government allowed Phillips to abandon the work program, 
Ekofisk may not have been found. In addition, it is likely that petroleum 
exploration on the NCS would have been abandoned, since the thirty two 
previously spudded wells had been dry, and oil companies that had been awarded 
licences on the shelf were poised to cease exploration activities.1716 
In Australia, although there are mandatory work program requirements as part of 
fulfilling the work program bid for award of licence, there is also the capacity to 
abandon the work program under the good standing provisions. As such there is 
no necessity or imperative for an oil company to fulfil its work program 
requirements, as demonstrated by the abandonment of work program drilling by 
the Shell Consortium on the Cornea Field.1717  
If Phillips engaged in petroleum exploration under a licence granted under the 
Australian system of work program bidding, it is questionable whether Phillips 
would have found Ekofisk. Had there been the capacity for Phillips to abandon its 
remaining work program and still be awarded exploration licences, would they 
have abandoned their exploration activities in licence area 018, thereby failing to 
find the Ekofisk field? This question remains unanswered because the Norwegian 
government forced Phillips to complete its work program, which resulted in the 
Ekofisk field being found. Under current Australian good standing provisions, 
given the Ekofisk scenario, the work program would have almost certainly been 
abandoned, similar to the abandonment of the work program by Shell in WP-255-
P and WP-266-P. If the Ekofisk licence was subject to the current good standing 
provisions in Australia, it is unlikely that Phillips would have been forced to 
 
1715 Brent F Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves (1991), 30. 
1716 Stig S Kvendseth, Ekofisk The First 20 Years (1991). 
1717 Maloney, David, 'Australia's Offshore Petroleum Work Program Bidding System' (2008) 21 Journal of Natural 
Resources 127, 129-131. 
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conclude the work program, and Ekofisk would not have been found at that time. 
If the Shell consortium was forced to continue the proposed work program, in the 
Cornea field, petroleum may have been found in the licence areas WA-265-P and 
WA-266-P. Since petroleum exploration in the licence areas was abandoned 
under the current good standing provisions, the area has not been fully explored.  
The JA has an unusual amount of discretionary power to relax aspects of the 
offshore petroleum regulatory regime where required.1718 The conferral of 
discretion in the administration of offshore petroleum in Australia means that 
there is an area of decision left to the administering authority in some 
circumstances.1719 There has been a general trend towards the reduction of 
discretion in Australian offshore petroleum over the last few decades. This has 
occurred as a result of the removal of some JA/DA power and the introduction of 
procedural or substantive restriction on the exercise of existing powers.1720 In 
addition, the government’s discretionary power that the government has defined 
and disseminated through published guidelines.1721 Whilst some measure of 
discretion is necessary for petroleum regulators to ensure that petroleum activities 
are carried out to reliably promote public interest, it also cannot be fully 
prescriptive, stipulating all controls in minute detail.1722   
A consideration of Australia’s current offshore petroleum regulatory framework 
highlights the relationship between the State and oil companies. The State in 
Australia currently engages in a minimalist role in petroleum exploitation. It is 
 
1718 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study (2005), xvi. 
1719 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study (2005), xvi. 
1720 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study (2005), xvi 
1721 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study (2005), xvi. 
For guidelines in the award of petroleum exploration licences, see Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 
Guidelines for Applicants 2009 (2009) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/acreage_releases/2009/GuidanceNotesForApplicants.pdf at 12 July 
2009.  
1722 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study (2005), xvi. 
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content to confine itself to the allocation of licences and ensures that field 
development complies with environmental and safety regulatory requirements. 
By doing so, the State allows oil companies to utilise their knowledge of oil 
exploration and production to control the exploitation of petroleum activities. 
This may be attributed to a lack of knowledge by the Australian regulatory 
authorities. This lack of knowledge has been identified as an issue in some 
regulatory bodies, and has contributed to unnecessary regulatory burdens in the 
upstream petroleum sector.1723 
An important consideration is whether information pertaining to geological 
formations and the mandatory field work programs should be assessed by the 
State, or left to the exploring oil company. This is a dilemma, since as owner of 
the resource, the State should have control and input into how its resources are to 
be explored and developed. However, oil companies argue that governments do 
not have the requisite knowledge to assess the information, whereas the core 
business of the oil companies is to assess geological information and explore for 
oil. The discretion the Australian government has to award acreage based on its 
opinion under s106 (2) of OPAGGSA is seen by some to supplant the knowledge 
of the companies who specialise in the exploration, development and production 
of petroleum.1724 The discretionary power of the government in allocating 
licences bestows upon the government the right to award a licence based on the 
State’s assessment of the geological and geophysical capacity of the field, and the 
capacity of the proposed work program to explore that field. Yet the State enters 
into a relationship with the oil companies because of its need for the expertise and 
knowledge oil companies generate and possess as part of their core business of 
petroleum exploitation. Consequently, the State allocates petroleum licences 
based on administrative decisions that have been reached through its knowledge 
 
1723 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2008), 81-2. 
1724 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream (Petroleum and Gas) 
Sector – Draft Report (2008), 82. 
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of petroleum geology, even though the government invites oil companies to 
explore for petroleum because of their superior knowledge skills and technical 
competence in petroleum exploration. 
Use of technology to increase recovery of petroleum 
It is the recovery of oil that provides income, rather than petroleum exploration 
and field development.1725 Therefore, one of the most important challenges to 
companies is to profitably obtain as much oil and gas from a field as possible.1726  
The optimal extraction rate for any oil field is 100% extraction. This rate of 
extraction does not occur, as a consequence of reservoir structure.1727 Generally, 
oil recovery rates are a function of the recovery techniques used. Recovery rates 
from fields are not a function of the recovery methods that the companies choose. 
Rather, they are a function of the recovery methods that companies do not 
choose. Typically, oil recovery occurs in two stages. Primary production occurs 
where oil flows out under its own pressure.1728 Secondary production occurs 
where oil recovery is assisted. 1729 Together these two methods of extraction 
typically realise one third of the oil in the field.1730 Moreover, these methods use 
well-defined techniques that are industry standard and relatively cheap.  
 
1725 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Petroleum Resources of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005 (2006)  
http://www.npd.no/NR/rdonlyres/B0B16455-11DD-44D7-A554-6B83C49B4641/0/ResourceReport2005.pdf at 21 
December 2006, 6.  
1726 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Petroleum Resources of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005 (2006)  
http://www.npd.no/NR/rdonlyres/B0B16455-11DD-44D7-A554-6B83C49B4641/0/ResourceReport2005.pdf at 21 
December 2006, 6.  
1727 D. K Larue and Yunjun Yue, ´How Stratigraphy Influences Oil Recovery´ (2003) 22 (4) Leading Edge 333, 
333. 
1728 ´Primary Recovery Methods´(2010) Schlumberger 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=primary%20recovery%20method at 24 February 2010. 
1729 `Secondary Recovery´(2010) Sclumberger 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=secondary%20recovery  at 24 February 2010.  
1730 National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), Exploration and Production Technologies: Improved 
Recovery: EOR (2008) www.doe.gov at 2 February 2009. 
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However, as fields mature, improved oil recovery techniques (IOR) are required 
to maintain levels of production from the field,1731 substantially increasing 
production costs. In addition, unit costs for oil recovery are rising, costing more 
to produce each barrel of oil, and operating costs for oil installations constitute an 
increasing share of total costs.1732 Techniques for IOR are expensive due to the 
high research and development costs associated with developing techniques to 
optimise field yields and a reliance on the development of specialist technologies 
and expertise.1733  
It is unlikely that companies are going to implement expensive, specialised 
technologies that are likely to recover only a further few percent of petroleum. 
Rather, companies tend employ traditional techniques to recover a reasonable 
percentage of easy oil, abandoning a field when it becomes economically 
marginal.1734 Consequently, decreased recovery may lead to the field becoming 
economically marginal, as a result of field geology and structure, field 
sterilisation, or a combination of the two. Furthermore, the likelihood of the use 
of IOR is a function of global oil prices, where the lower the price, the less likely 
that IOR techniques are going to be employed, since there is much less profit to 
be realised.  
Yet it can be profitable for oil companies to extract the maximum petroleum. The 
maximum extraction of petroleum can provide financial benefits to all parties, 
since the oil companies recover more oil to sell and the State can gain revenue 
 
1731 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Petroleum Resources of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005 (2006)  
http://www.npd.no/NR/rdonlyres/B0B16455-11DD-44D7-A554-6B83C49B4641/0/ResourceReport2005.pdf  at 21 
December 2006, 6.  
1732 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Petroleum Resources of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005 (2006)  
http://www.npd.no/NR/rdonlyres/B0B16455-11DD-44D7-A554-6B83C49B4641/0/ResourceReport2005.pdf  at 21 
December 2006, 6.  
1733 Department of Energy, Enhanced Oil Recovery/CO2 Injection (2010) 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/eor/index.html at 24 February 2010. 
1734 Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Making Natural Resources into a Blessing Rather a Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya 
Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development (2005), Chapter one. 
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from the taxation of the oil produced. However, if oil companies are left 
undirected in the requirements for method of oil recovery, the decisions for 
extraction will be governed by the cost of extraction method and world oil prices. 
Therefore it is likely that a company will choose the extraction methods that will 
lead to high production and low extraction cost. Furthermore, it is likely that 
companies will not employ additional extraction rates necessary to maximise 
resource extraction unless directed to by the resource owner. As such, companies 
are likely to declare fields as economically marginal and abandon the fields, even 
though recoverable petroleum remains. 
Role of the State in developing technology, research and knowledge 
It is through the use of technology that petroleum recovery rates can be 
optimised. To optimise the recovery of petroleum, it is often necessary to employ 
a range of IOR techniques. These techniques include microbial solutions,1735 
combined foam and gas injection, water/surfactant solutions and directional 
drilling.1736 This strategy has been used successfully on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS), where stringent requirements for enhanced oil recovery 
has forced companies to engage in research in oil recovery in partnership with the 
State, and led to the development of field specific techniques for enhanced 
petroleum recovery. 
Norwegian excellence in optimising petroleum extraction from fields arose from 
a program of oil skills, knowledge and technology which commenced in the 
1970s. This program mandated interaction between the companies, government 
and research institutions driving and directing national competence in the oil and 
gas industry.1737 The cornerstone of this development was the transfer of skills, 
 
1735 As employed on the Snorre field in Norway. 
1736Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘Big Assets in Small Pores’ (2008) 1 Norwegian Continental Shelf 7-8. A 
range of IOR techniques have been developed in Norway, leading to some of the highest recovery rates in the 
world. 
1737 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
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expertise and technology from international oil companies through contractual 
conditions and obligations, attracting the best of international expertise, and the 
promotion of cooperation between international and national oil companies.1738 
Utilising the licencing framework, the Norwegian State established knowledge 
and technology transfer agreements with international oil companies.1739 This 
transfer of expertise from international oil companies and the development of 
necessary technology, as a legislative requirement or condition of the grant of a 
licence through the JOA has been the key to the development of the Norwegian 
petroleum industry and national industry competence.1740 
Prior to the 1960s, Norway had no oil industry, but with the discovery of Ekofisk 
in 1969, the Norwegian government realised that it needed to rapidly increase its 
knowledge of petroleum resource management and recovery.1741 This required 
the acquisition of new knowledge, and applying the knowledge and skills learnt 
to develop new ideas and designs to meet the demands of these new conditions. 
The Norwegian government sought to learn as much as possible about the oil 
industry through the active cooperation with private oil companies.1742 In order to 
find and develop Norwegian petroleum resources in a manner that generated the 
greatest possible benefit to Norwegian society by maximising the rate of 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
1738 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
1739 This transfer occurred form the third licencing round in 1974. 
1740 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
1741 Øystein Noreng‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006.  
1742 Øystein Noreng‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006.  
 © Tina Hunter 
 
402
                                             
depletion, the Norwegian government encouraged multiple company 
participation in exploration development and production.1743 
Today, the Norwegian petroleum industry has a need and a responsibility to 
continue to engage in research and development, in order to develop effective 
technologies to maximise the extraction of petroleum from varying geological 
provinces and greater water depths. Consequently, the challenge for a State is 
whether participating oil companies should be left to engage in improved oil 
recovery, technological research and development (hereafter known as TRD) at 
their own behest, or whether the government should intervene, directing and 
guiding the development of a research strategy and implementing it as part of the 
petroleum licencing framework.  
A possible solution to this challenge lies in an analysis of the development of 
TRD in Norway. Furthermore, it is possible to analyse the role that knowledge 
and skills transfer has played in the development of TRD competence in Norway. 
Continuous development of technology in partnership with foreign companies 
and a clear focus on safety and the environment have been key elements of 
Norwegian petroleum policy and petroleum activities on the NCS. The policy 
objectives of the Norwegian government, as enunciated in the ten oil 
commandments,1744 was to develop a new industry on the basis of petroleum,1745 
with the State coordinating Norwegian interests at all levels to create an 
integrated Norwegian oil community.1746 The lynchpin of this was the use of 
TRD to increase competitiveness in areas such as IOR, floating production 
 
1743 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Speech by the State Secretary Bjorg Sandal, in Baku, Azerbaijan 5 June 
2000. http://www.odin.no/odinarkiv/english/stoltenberg_I/oed/026031-090011/dok-bn.html at 23 December 2006. 
1744 For an outline of the tem oil commandments refer to section 2.6.5 above. 
1745 Commandment 2.  
1746 Commandment 7.  
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platform design and construction, subsea systems, drilling equipment, project 
management and engineering.1747 
Norwegian companies gained much of their knowledge from foreign operators in 
the early years, as a result of the licencing agreements that forced the foreign 
operators to develop their R&D in Norway using Norwegian research institutions 
and companies.1748 Utilising the petroleum regulatory framework, the Norwegian 
State established skills and technology transfer agreements with international oil 
companies, ensuring technology and knowledge was transferred to Norway.1749 
The third licencing round saw the introduction of mandatory technical 
competence transfer, with the fourth licencing round in 1979 introducing 
provisions for technology development between foreign oil companies and 
Norwegian research institutions.1750 In addition, cooperation agreements forced 
the oil companies to provide funding, insight and expertise, contributing to the 
development of petroleum and associated technologies in Norway.1751 As a part 
of this goal of acquisition of knowledge and skills, the State-owned oil company 
Statoil was established, with a goal of rapidly training staff in order to assume the 
operatorship of fields as quickly as possible.1752 The international oil companies 
were utilised for staff training through staff exchanges, and integrated project 
teams assisted in developing national competency in petroleum technology and 
knowledge. The State also implemented targeted research and development to 
 
1747 Odd Roger Enoksen, Capabilities of the Norwegian Oil and Gas Industries: How Can We Increase 
Cooperation Between India and Norway (2006) Speech given at the Indo-Norwegian Business Cooperation in the 
Oil and Gas and Maritime Sector. Mumbai, India, 30 October 2006. 
1748 Vatne, Erik, Global Markets – Local competence? Internationalisation of the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
(2000) Working Paper 78/00, SNF Project No 4225, Research Council of Norway, PETROPOL Program, Bergen. 
1749 Øystein Noreng‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
1750 Øystein Noreng‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
1751 Øystein Noreng‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006. 
1752Bjørn Vidar Lerøen, Drops of Black Gold: Statoil 1972-2002 (2002). 
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assist in overcoming the technical barriers encountered in natural resource 
exploitation.1753 Norwegian companies were then able to take this newly acquired 
knowledge to develop solutions to the unique NCS geological challenges. 
Today recovery rates on the Norwegian Continental Shelf are among the best in 
world, with the average field recovery currently around 46%.1754 This means that 
more than half of the oil will be left in the ground, unless the recovery rate is 
improved.1755 The NPD believes that maximum recovery from current producing 
fields for as long as it is prudent, from a socioeconomic and safety perspective, is 
one of the most important tasks.1756 The Norwegian government seeks to increase 
this recovery rate to at least 50%, although even that is not adequate, as 50% of 
the oil remains in the reservoir.1757 To accomplish this goal, oil companies, the 
State, and the Norwegian supply industry have been encouraged to develop 
technology to increase output from the producing fields, and to make extraction 
of smaller deposits around larger fields (stranded deposits) profitable, with a 
target recovery rate of 55% oil, and 75% gas.1758 
The Norwegian State recognises that it is expensive for companies to develop the 
technologies and innovation they require to satisfy Norwegian policy objectives 
 
1753 Odd Roger Enoksen, Building a Sustainable Petroleum Industry: The Norwegian Experience (2007) Speech 
given at Mexico-Norway Meeting on Cooperation in the Energy Sector 22 March 2007 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/tidligere_statsraader/Minister-of-Petroleum-and-Energy/Speeches-and-
articles/2007/Building-a-sustainable-petroleum-industr.html?id=460505 at 10 December 2007. 
1754 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, More Focus on Improved Oil Recovery (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Aktuelt/Nyheter/2008_11_12_mer_trykk.htm at 12 March 2009.  
1755 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, More Focus on Improved Oil Recovery (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Aktuelt/Nyheter/2008_11_12_mer_trykk.htm at 12 March 2009. 
1756 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, More Focus on Improved Oil Recovery (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Aktuelt/Nyheter/2008_11_12_mer_trykk.htm at 12 March 2009. 
1757 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, More Focus on Improved Oil Recovery (2008) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Aktuelt/Nyheter/2008_11_12_mer_trykk.htm at 12 March 2009. 
1758 Odd Roger Enoksen, [mention that he was minister for oil and energy] Capabilities of the Norwegian Oil and 
Gas Industries: How Can We Increase Cooperation Between India and Norway (2006) Speech given at the Indo-
Norwegian Business Cooperation in the Oil and Gas and Maritime Sector, Mumbai, India, 30 October 2006.  
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of value creation and resource maximisation.1759 Consequently, since it is the 
State that requires the optimisation of oil recovery, then the State sees its role as 
the driver of research in that area.1760 In earlier petroleum licencing rounds, the 
Norwegian government attached research conditions to the award of licences, in 
order to achieve research strategies. Today, this State driven research acts as a 
‘push’ effect. The government develops new techniques in conjunction with 
industry, and ‘pushes’ the resultant techniques onto operators as part of the 
overall Norwegian Continental Shelf management strategy. This effectively 
forces licence applicants to utilise the existing technology to develop new and 
existing fields (the ‘pull’ effect). The sum of the ‘push-pull effect’ is that the 
Norwegian government plays a leading role in developing technology that 
maximises production on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, encouraging 
companies to utilise the technology if they wish to remain competitive in the 
award of production licences. The result of this sustained State role in developing 
the petroleum industry has been the development of a world class petroleum 
cluster, consisting of national oil companies, strong supply industry, industry 
leadership in drilling and subsea technologies, strong research institutions, world 
renowned shipping, and strong banking and finance institutions.1761 
To continue to strengthen the competitiveness of both the NCS and the 
Norwegian supply and service industry, a number of research groups have been 
initiated, including INTSOK, to promote the internationalisation of the 
 
1759 As the Norwegian government notes … ‘development of the remaining resources base must be based to a great 
extent on technologies which are not available today and which have to be created. That will make it possible to 
produce oil and gas from ever more challenging fields…As the resource owner, the government has a substantial 
interest in ensuring the maximum value creation from the industry in the future. The resource base provides the 
greatest opportunities, but these require that major technologies and expertise related challenges in developing oil 
and gas resources are resolved.’ See Ministry of Petroleum and Energy,  Oil and Gas Activities: Report no. 38 to 
the Storting (2001-2). Unofficial English Translation (2002).14-15. 
1760 This was articulated in Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, Climate for Research: Report no. 30 to 
the Storting (2008-9). Unofficial English Translation (2009), 2, which underlined the importance of research in the 
energy sector   
1761 Øystein Noreng, ‘Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry’ (2004) XLVII (45) Middle 
East Economic Survey http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm at 23 December 2006.   
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Norwegian oil and gas industry.1762 This is accomplished through the monitoring 
of global market conditions to coordinate marketing activities, guidance and 
advice to small-medium sized partner companies to access international 
markets.1763 OG21, the national R&D strategy for the oil and gas sector has been 
established to strengthen Norway’s competitiveness in the international arena 
with world-class competence, a leading global industry and the most innovative 
offshore province in the world.1764 Other strategies include the establishment of 
KonKraft, where the NPD works with the Norwegian oil and gas industry to 
strengthen competitiveness on the NCS and outside of Norway.1765 In addition, 
PETROMAKS has been established with the sole function of developing 
programs to optimise the recovery of petroleum from the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. 1766 
The success of the Norwegian State in sustainably extracting its petroleum is 
attributable to the development and use of technology. The petroleum activities 
on the Norwegian continental shelf are in a technologically new area, with new 
challenges because of increased depth of water, field pressure and temperature, 
differing geologies, and harsh environmental conditions. These factors required 
the development of new, innovative solutions merging petroleum and marine 
 
1762 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2009: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2009), 57. 
1763  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Why Norway: The Norwegian Oil and Gas Clusters (200?) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Emner/Ressursforvaltning/Promotering/whynorway_oil_gas_cluster.htm at 22 
December 2006. 
1764 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Why Norway: The Norwegian Oil and Gas Clusters (200?) 
http://www.npd.no/English/Emner/Ressursforvaltning/Promotering/whynorway_oil_gas_cluster.htm at 22 
December 2006 
1765 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Facts 2006: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector (2006) 
http://www.odin.no/filarkiv/278568/Fakta-eng2.pdf at 21 December 2006, 19; Kjell-Arne Oppeboen, KonKraft: A 
Cooperation Process to Strengthen The Oil and Gas Business in Norway 20 October 2004 (2004) Speech given at 
Rio Oil and Gas Conference, 2004.  
1766 The Research Council of Norway, Petromaks – Petroleum Research in Norway: Large Scale Programme 
Optimal Management of Petroleum Resources - Petromaks (2007) 
http://www.forskningsradet.no/servlet/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername
1=Content-
Disposition%3A&blobheadervalue1=+attachment%3B+filename%3DPETROMAKSenglish%2C0.pdf&blobkey=i
d&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1232250148713&ssbinary=true at 12 February 2010. 
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knowledge and competencies.1767 Australia faces similar challenges, with 
exploration and drilling occurring in some deep waters in a range of diverse 
environments that are challenged by annual cyclones,1768 fierce winds and high 
seas.1769 The importance of IOR has been recognised in the Australian petroleum 
industry, which notes that enhanced oil recovery from existing fields would 
contribute to the replacement of reserves in the offshore petroleum fields.1770  
The Australian petroleum industry acknowledges that there are technological 
barriers to assist in maximising the recovery from existing oil fields. In particular, 
the industry notes the example of the Norwegian government initiating a billion 
dollar research and development program in conjunction with oil companies, 
research institutes and service companies with the aim of maximising oil 
recovery from existing Norwegian fields.1771 Furthermore, in a House of 
Representatives Standing Committee inquiry into resource exploration 
impediments,1772 evidence was given to the House that the use of Norwegian IOR 
recovery techniques could prove valuable in resource recovery on both the North-
West Shelf and in Bass Strait.1773 In particular, evidence was tendered that the 
use of CO2 geosequestration could substantially improve recovery of 
petroleum.1774   
 
1767 Vatne, Erik, Global Markets – Local competence? Internationalisation of the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
(2000) Working Paper 78/00, SNF Project No 4225, Research Council of Norway, PETROPOL Program, Bergen.  
1768 Particularly in the North Western Australian offshore fields in the Indian Ocean and the Timor Sea. 
1769 Particularly in Bass Strait, the Tasman Sea and the Great Australian Bight region. 
1770 APPEA, Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry: Platform for Prosperity (2006),10. 
1771 APPEA, Australia’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry: Platform for Prosperity (2006),14 
1772 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Enquiry into Resource Exploration 
Impediments (2003), I&R 465. 
1773 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Enquiry into Resource Exploration 
Impediments (2003), I&R 465. 
1774 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Enquiry into Resource Exploration 
Impediments (2003), I&R 465. 
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There is no legislative provision in the Australian petroleum framework that 
compels a company to develop technology or invest in Australia’s industries.1775  
However, by establishing the legislative capacity for the State to regulate the 
method of extraction of petroleum, require greater recovery of petroleum through 
IOR, or require companies to utilise IOR to increase oil recovery, the Australian 
government could encourage greater recovery of offshore petroleum resources. 
Otherwise, companies will continue to extract the ‘easy oil’, that is oil that can be 
easily recovered using primary and secondary oil recovery techniques, which 
typically require less investment. By encouraging IOR, and assisting oil 
companies to develop technologies to achieve greater oil recovery, the Australian 
government can encourage the sustainable extraction of petroleum 
5.4 Conclusion 
The regulation of the rate and method of recovery of petroleum from fields has 
been applied as a method for the regulation of petroleum activities to meet 
national petroleum policy objectives in varying degrees, in a number of 
jurisdictions, for the last 40 years. The success of such regulation has been mixed.  
In Norway, there were initial attempts to limit the rate of production from North 
Sea fields to less than 90 million tonnes oil equivalent. However, the experience 
of Norway illustrates that attempts to limit field production has been unsuccessful 
in encouraging sustainable development of petroleum resources. Based on this 
experience, it is recommended that Australia does not regulate the rate of 
production to encourage sustainable petroleum production. 
Sustainable development of petroleum resources in Norway is encouraged 
through the legislative requirements for prudent petroleum production that 
encourages the development of Norwegian petroleum resources by ensuring that 
 
1775 Productivity Commission, Review of the Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector: 
Draft Research Report (2008), XXVIII. 
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as much of each field is required to be produced. The major tool utilised by the 
Norwegian State to encourage sustainable petroleum development is the PAA 
and the PR which require a PDO for all petroleum activities. This gives the 
capacity for the State to continually evaluate the method of extraction to ensure 
that optimal depletion occurs. As part of the PDO, the Norwegian State works in 
partnership with industry and research organisations to develop technologies to 
maximise the recovery of petroleum from offshore fields.    
The Australian government also requires the use of a field development plan. 
However, the use of this plan is confined to obtaining all of the necessary 
regulatory requirements for the granting of a petroleum licence. The view of the 
Australian State is that while new discoveries and technological progress 
continue to offset the effects of depletion of petroleum resources, these actions 
should satisfy the reasonable requirements for intergenerational equity.1776 
However, there is a question as to how long that trend will continue.1777 Already 
we have seen Australia move from a self-sufficient petroleum producer to a net 
petroleum importer, where petroleum resources account for over 6% total 
imports. Furthermore, there is evidence from Western Australia that government 
regulation of field depletion is required to ensure that field sterilisation does not 
occur. 
 Australia has identified the need to develop oil recovery techniques through 
research and development. The industry peak body APPEA recognises the 
advantages of the Norwegian innovation system, and evidence tendered to the 
House of Representatives acknowledges that IOR techniques would assist in 
greater recovery from Australian offshore oil fields. Given these identified 
requirements and the success of the Norwegian experience, the sustainable 
development of Australian petroleum resources is more likely to be encouraged 
 
1776 Ken Willett, Managing Australian Mineral Wealth for Sustainable Economic Development (2002) 12. 
1777 Ken Willett, Managing Australian Mineral Wealth for Sustainable Economic Development (2002) 11. 
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from State regulation of petroleum extraction, and the development of oil 
recovery techniques that will contribute to optimal extraction of depletion from 
fields. 
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6. Summary, Reflections and Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction, hypothesis and research questions 
In this thesis I have discussed how a State like Australia can meet some of the 
central challenges linked to exploitation of petroleum through legal regulation. 
My main focus has been how Australia can use its legal framework regulating 
petroleum resources as a basis for sustainable development and to develop 
Australia´s industrial and technological base. 
The unique role of petroleum in the global economy and world energy, and the 
dependence of most States upon products derived from petroleum, influences 
geopolitics, and global economics. It creates a political as well as economic need 
for good management of the limited petroleum resources, by those States that 
have petroleum resources in their territory. This fact, as well as economic 
considerations, makes it necessary for petroleum-producing States to consider 
how they will regulate the exploitation of their petroleum resources in order to 
maximise its value so that the State benefits from the sustainable development of 
this non-renewable resources.  
An important part of the legal framework that is utilised to regulate petroleum 
activities is the regulation of the allocation of petroleum licences and the 
regulation of petroleum production from a field. Once petroleum is produced, a 
concern for any petroleum endowed State is how the revenue that is realised from 
the extraction of petroleum should be integrated into a petroleum producing 
economy, in a manner that is least likely to have profound economic effects on 
the producing country. If resources are developed too quickly, without measures 
to manage the revenue, too much money may be released into a national 
economy. If this occurs, a State runs the risk of developing resource curse and 
will not benefit from the resource revenue.  
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 When seeking to solve these economic challenges, a State needs to balance the 
needs of oil companies with its national petroleum policy objectives, in order to 
ensure that companies continue to invest in the petroleum province. This requires 
States to establish and maintain a legal regulatory framework that addresses these 
challenges in a manner that encourages sustainable development.  
My hypothesis in this thesis has been that there are aspects of the Australian 
petroleum legal regulatory framework that presently does not encourage the 
sustainable development of Australia’s offshore petroleum resources. In testing 
this hypothesis, I critically analysed the capacity of the current Australian 
petroleum regulatory framework to encourage the sustainable socio-economic 
development of Australia’s offshore petroleum resources, utilising a critical 
functional analysis.  
In assessing Australia’s current capacity to sustainable develop its offshore 
petroleum resources, I analysed a number of petroleum functions, including 
petroleum policy, regulatory legislative frameworks, the award of licences, and 
the regulation of petroleum field development. I did not focus on a detailed 
evaluation of the rules regulating petroleum functions. Rather I focused on the 
principles and policies relating to the overall principle of sustainable development 
of Australia’s offshore petroleum resources. I have instead focussed my analysis 
of sustainable social and economic development of petroleum on the legal 
regulation of petroleum activities to optimise the extraction of petroleum from a 
field. Whilst I acknowledge that the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources necessarily requires the conversion of natural resource wealth to other 
forms of wealth, an analysis of such conversion is outside the confines of this 
thesis. Rather, I have focussed on the economic and regulatory challenges 
confronting States the sustainable extraction of petroleum, analysing the 
regulatory framework encourages sustainable extraction. 
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My hypothesis raised two research questions. Firstly, is the current Australian 
offshore petroleum regulatory framework effective in encouraging the sustainable 
development of Australia’s petroleum resources? Secondly, if the Australian 
regulatory framework is inadequate for sustainable development, is there a more 
effective way the Australian regulatory framework could manage the 
development of petroleum resources to encourage the sustainable development of 
these resources?  
In this chapter, I present a summary of my research findings. In addressing the 
research questions, I have critically analysed the capacity of the Australian 
offshore petroleum regulatory system to regulate the extraction of offshore 
petroleum resources to maximise the value of these resources for the benefit of all 
Australians, considering a number of legal regulatory tools. The regulatory tools I 
have analysed are the petroleum policy, the regulatory legislative framework, the 
award of petroleum licences by the State, and regulation of the rate and method 
of petroleum extraction from petroleum fields. I consider whether these tools 
encourage the sustainable development of Australia’s offshore petroleum 
resources. I compared how these tools have encouraged sustainable extraction of 
petroleum in Australia and Norway.  I have utilised the analysis of the legal 
regulatory frameworks of these jurisdictions to not only analyse the current 
capacity of the Australian petroleum legal regulatory framework to encourage 
sustainable development, but to also evaluate options for change to the Australian 
system of regulation to engender greater sustainable development of petroleum.  
 
6.2 Sustainable petroleum development and petroleum 
policy 
In Chapter two I analysed Australia’s offshore petroleum policy, to determine if 
the current policy encourages sustainable development of petroleum resources. 
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This analysis demonstrated that petroleum policy is crucial in the development of 
petroleum resources. Without sound policies, resource development becomes ad 
hoc, uncontrolled and is not likely to benefit the State or its people, Experience in 
Norway had demonstrated that high levels of government control and regulation 
on petroleum exploitation by oil companies and the revenue generated 
encourages sustainable development of the resources for the benefit of present 
and future generations. The policy combination of government control and 
participation, strong institutions and regulatory framework, responsiveness to 
change through regulatory discretion, and appropriate fiscal policy for the 
generation of wealth has created a policy framework in Norway that is conducive 
to generating wealth for the benefit of all participants.  
An analysis of Australia’s policy framework demonstrates that petroleum policy 
has been revaluated and altered since the discovery of petroleum in Bass Strait in 
the 1960s. In the 1990s there were several policy reviews, with petroleum policy 
in the last ten years focused on commercial exploitation and attraction of 
investment to the Australian petroleum industry. Australian policy is directed 
toward industry dominance of the petroleum industry, with the Australian 
government reliant on the Australian petroleum industry to achieve petroleum 
resource exploitation.  
Currently, the major beneficiary of Australia’s petroleum policy appears to be the 
petroleum industry. Australian petroleum policy established in 1998 focuses on 
encouraging overseas investors to exploit Australian petroleum resources. As a 
consequence, Australia’s petroleum policies favour oil companies rather than the 
sustainable development of petroleum. However, a change in government in 2007 
has altered the focus of Australia’s national petroleum objectives. Today, the 
Australia State is focussed on creating a petroleum regulatory framework that 
expands Australia’s resources base and addresses regulatory burden within a 
framework of sustainable development. To date, the Australian petroleum policy 
does not reflect these aims. Rather it is an aspiration of the Australian 
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government to create a policy framework that achieves the sustainable 
development of Australia’s resources base.  
To generate options for the sustainable development of Australia’s petroleum 
resources, I examined the Norwegian petroleum policy framework, which 
focuses on the sustainable development of petroleum resources. Since the 
discovery of petroleum on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the late 1960’s, 
the Norwegian State has developed a cohesive petroleum policy with State 
control and participation for the benefit of its people as the lynchpin. From the 
beginning, Norwegian petroleum policy was formulated with a focus on State 
participation and control to ensure benefit for the people. Whilst there have been 
reviews of Norway’s petroleum policy, the focus on the benefit for the people has 
remained constant. The regulatory and fiscal policies that have developed 
continue to focus on State control and participation for the benefit of the State 
and its community.  
Petroleum policy is crucial in the development of petroleum resources. Without 
sound policies, resource development becomes ad hoc, uncontrolled and is not 
likely to benefit the State or its people, Furthermore, experience in Norway had 
demonstrated that high levels of government control and regulation on petroleum 
exploitation by oil companies and the revenue generated encourages sustainable 
development of the resources for the benefit of present and future generations. 
The Norwegian policy strategies of government control and participation, strong 
institutions and regulatory framework, responsiveness to change through 
regulatory discretion and appropriate fiscal policy for the generation of wealth 
has created a policy framework that is conducive to generating wealth for the 
benefit of the all of the participants.  
Australia, petroleum policy in the last ten years has focused on the commercial 
exploitation and attraction of investment to the Australian petroleum industry. It 
is primarily is directed toward industry control of the petroleum industry, with the 
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Australian government and the Australian petroleum industry working in close 
cooperation to achieve petroleum resource exploitation. However the election of 
the Rudd government in 2007 has refocused Australian petroleum policy, 
establishing a goal to develop a policy framework where Australia’s petroleum 
resource base is increased and resources are developed utilising the principles of 
sustainable development. 
To generate options for the sustainable development of Australia’s petroleum 
resources, the Norwegian petroleum policy framework is almost universally 
recognised as a successful policy framework for the development of petroleum 
resources. Since the discovery of petroleum on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
in the late 1960s, the Norwegian State has developed a cohesive petroleum policy 
with State control and participation for the benefit of its people as the lynchpin. 
From the beginning, Norwegian petroleum policy was formulated with a focus on 
State participation and control to ensure benefit for the people. Whilst there have 
been reviews of Norway’s petroleum policy, the focus on the benefit for the 
people has remained constant. The regulatory and fiscal policies in Norway today 
continue to focus on State control and participation for the benefit of the State 
and its community.  
My analysis of Australian and Norwegian petroleum policy concludes that in 
order to sustainable develop its petroleum resources, Australia requires a 
substantial re-examination of its petroleum policy framework. Rather than the 
policy being solely directed toward commercial development, Australian policy 
needs to focus on the development of this State-owned resource for the benefit 
of the community. Furthermore, in developing its petroleum policy objectives, 
Australia should assert the role of the State in developing the people’s resource 
for the benefit of all generations.  
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6.3 Legislation and sustainable petroleum 
development 
In Chapter three I considered whether the current offshore petroleum regulatory 
legislative framework that the Australian government (as owner of the petroleum) 
uses to regulate petroleum activities, is appropriate for the sustainable 
development of its petroleum resources.  
The World Bank views short, thorough, broad, generic petroleum legislation as 
the cornerstone of effective petroleum legislative framework. Furthermore, the 
World Bank stipulates that this broad legislation should be not overly detailed, 
and should be accompanied by enabling regulations to give both parties a clear 
legal framework to develop petroleum resources. The current Australian 
petroleum legislative framework comprises the large (over 850 pages) 
prescriptive, rule based Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2006 (Cth), which creates unnecessary regulatory burden with economic and 
social costs. This regulatory burden arises as a consequence of the minutiae of 
regulatory detail contained in the Act. Furthermore, the brief (15 pages) Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 1985 (Cth), that regulates 
the fees to be paid and forms required for well discoveries, does little to assist in 
creating a regulatory framework that encourages sustainable development. This 
framework falls short of the criteria defined by the World Bank as an effective 
legislative regulatory framework, generates regulatory burden, and fails to 
encourage the sustainable development of Australia’s offshore petroleum 
resources. 
My analysis of the regulatory legislative frameworks from other jurisdictions 
demonstrates the capacity of the legal regulatory framework to encourage the 
sustainable development of petroleum resources. The petroleum legislative 
framework for onshore petroleum development in South Australia indicates that 
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its objective based legislative framework, with broad enabling legislation and 
complementary regulation, reduces regulatory burden.  
The value of principle and objective based regulatory legislative framework is 
confirmed by the capacity of the Norwegian petroleum regulatory framework, 
which encourages the State and oil companies to develop the petroleum 
resources to meet the interests of the State whilst still realising a profit for the 
participating oil companies. Through its regulatory framework and participation 
in petroleum activities, the Norwegian State has established and maintained a 
regulatory legislative framework that encourages the development of 
Norwegian petroleum resources for the benefit of both the Norwegian State and 
oil companies alike, whilst enabling the Norwegian State to establish and 
maintain control over petroleum activities. The State as resource owner acts as 
the regulatory and administrative body, establishing policies, framework 
conditions and decisions relating to petroleum activities. In addition, the State 
also participates directly in petroleum activities through Petoro, particularly in 
major fields. 
The regulatory framework of Norway and South Australia has found favour with 
the Australian petroleum industry. It is possible that if legislative reform to were 
to occur in Australia, the principle-based legislation that has been implemented in 
South Australia, and demonstrated in Norway to be effective in sustainably 
developing petroleum resources, could serve as a useful model of a regulatory 
legislative framework that encourages sustainable development of petroleum. 
Furthermore, it is likely that a principle based legislative framework would be 
embraced by the Australian industry.  
As part of an effective legislative framework for the exploitation of petroleum, 
the World Bank notes the importance of a single regulatory authority. However, 
at present, petroleum exploitation in Australia occurs under the regulation of the 
Joint Authority and a Designated Authority. The Australian Productivity 
Commission has demonstrated that this dual regulatory structure creates 
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regulatory overlap and inhibits effective petroleum development. The current 
administrative structure fails to encourage sustainable development of 
Australia’s petroleum resources. This is because the regulation of petroleum is 
undertaken by seven different governments, under two administrative bodies, 
with no clear objective focused on implementing national petroleum objectives. 
An analysis of the single petroleum regulatory body in Norway (the NPD) 
demonstrates that the creation of such a legal institution is capable of securing 
the legal and administrative competence to implement the Norwegian petroleum 
objective of sustainable petroleum development for the benefit of Norwegian 
society.  
The management of Australian offshore petroleum safety was similarly shared 
between multiple regulatory bodies until 2005, when a single administrative and 
regulatory authority (NOPSA) was created to regulate offshore petroleum 
safety. The establishment of NOPSA may serve as a model for a single 
administrative body for Australian offshore petroleum.  The creation of single 
offshore petroleum administrative body is not only constitutionally possible in 
Australia, it is necessary to sustainable develop Australia’s petroleum resources. 
The Australian Productivity Commission recommends that a single regulatory 
body should be established to ensure that effective resource management and 
development occurs.  
Model contracts, such as the model Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) that is 
mandatory in Norway, have been demonstrated by the World Bank to be 
effective in creating favourable contractual frameworks by stipulating 
regulatory and commercial conditions for petroleum activities. They also ensure 
that oil companies operate within a framework that allows the State to fulfil its 
goal of creating value creation, as well as enabling the companies to maximise 
their return.  
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Australia does not have a mandatory or model contract requirement for 
petroleum activities and participants. However, there are the provisions for 
State Agreements in Western Australia. Whilst these agreements are not 
mandatory, where used they encourage efficient and the effective development 
of resources, and have secured benefits for Western Australian communities. 
This is because they define the rights and obligations of the parties, establish a 
framework for an ongoing relationship between the companies and the State and 
ensure that infrastructure is created for the local community.  
Norway has utilised the JOA to regulate petroleum activities for the benefit of 
the Norwegian State. Firstly, as an external regulatory tool, the Norwegian State 
uses the provisions of the uniform contract to regulate the activities of the 
participants. In particular, by utilising the management committee provisions 
under article 1 of the JOA, the Norwegian State is able to ensure the active 
contribution of all participants. Secondly, as a participant in petroleum activities 
through direct State financial interest in petroleum fields, the Norwegian State 
utilises the JOA to ensure that its national petroleum objectives are met. The 
success of JOAs in Norway, and State Agreements in Western Australia in 
enabling the socio-economic benefits to accumulate to the State in the 
development of petroleum resources suggests that Australia should consider the 
mandatory use of contracts as a method of establishing regulatory efficiency 
and securing benefit for the State. This could be State agreements, or the use of 
a model form joint venture agreement. 
The Norwegian experience demonstrates that State participation in the 
petroleum sector, and a principle based regulatory legislative framework 
contributes to sustainable development of petroleum, enabling the government 
to have a wide discretionary role to implement its national petroleum policies of 
maximising the value of petroleum resource development for the benefit of 
Norwegian society. It also enables the Norwegian State as a participant to direct 
petroleum activities to encourage sustainable development. By closely 
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regulating and administrating petroleum activities, the Norwegian government 
supervises the conditions of production and resource development, to ensure 
that the activities of petroleum companies are aligned to State interests. Thus, 
the regulatory legislative framework and administration of petroleum activities 
that has been implemented by the Norwegian government demonstrates to 
Australian regulators the capacity to utilise the petroleum regulatory legislative 
framework to encourage sustainable development of petroleum resources. 
 
6.4 The award of licences and sustainable petroleum 
development 
In analysing the award of petroleum licences in chapter four, I assessed whether 
the allocation of petroleum licences in Australia encourages the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources.   
My analysis of the bid system of allocation demonstrates that the award of 
petroleum licences using bidding (cash or work program) is appropriate in 
States where the primary objective of the State is to realise the greatest amount 
of economic rent. In the free market economy of the USA, the use of cash 
bidding tends to dominate, and is accepted as a method of allocation since it 
relies on the application of strict economic criteria to meet an economic 
objective. If the Australian government sought only to maximise its revenue 
from the exploitation of the petroleum resources, then the bid system of 
allocation of petroleum licences is ideal. However, in Australia, the State has 
the objective of attracting international investment to sustainably exploit 
Australia’s petroleum resources. In attracting international investment, Australia 
seeks to provide a stable, transparent and predictable regulatory framework for 
participants. Yet my analysis of the current legislative provisions for the award 
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of licence using work program bidding (WPB) highlights a number of 
provisions that create uncertainty and inhibit predictability and transparency.  
In particular, the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 
(Cth) (OPAGGSA) enables the JA to award a licence to a bidder using 
discretion. Although OPAGGSA aims to award licences based on objective 
criteria, the provisions of the Act enable the discretionary award of licence 
based on the opinion of the JA after having regard to the advertised criteria, 
rather than it being a mandatory requirement. Together these provisions enable 
the JA to award a licence based on criteria other than advertised, objective 
criteria.  
An element of discretion has also been introduced through the good standing 
provisions. These provisions enable an oil company to negotiate with the State 
for the abandonment of a mandatory work program. They also allow a company 
to negotiate a lower value of exploration work than that originally bid in the 
work program bid. This has the effect of not only creating uncertainty for 
bidders, but effectively undermining the economic basis upon which the work 
program bidding system is based.  
The effect of the legislative provisions and the good standing provisions is that 
the system of award of licences is no longer transparent. Nor is it predictable. 
Although the Australian government seeks to award petroleum licences using 
work program bidding to provide predictability, transparency and certainty to 
applicants, it fails. Should Australia seek to achieve national petroleum 
objectives of attracting overseas investment to sustainably exploit Australia’s 
petroleum resources, the method of allocation of petroleum licences in Australia 
needs to be reassessed.  
Australia’s relationship with oil companies differs to the balanced relationship 
that Norway has developed with oil companies through the discretionary 
allocation of petroleum licences. Since Australia allocates its licences on a work 
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bid system, there is an emphasis on encouraging companies with ‘deep pockets’ 
to continue to exploit Australia’s petroleum resources. The good standing 
provisions introduced by the Australian government have had serious 
repercussions on its relationship with international oil companies. Evidence 
suggests that the Australian government may have favoured some oil majors by 
cancelling work programs and reducing the monetary value of work 
requirements. This has created a power imbalance in the relationship between 
companies and the State, giving some oil companies an advantage. The 
Australian State has given the impression that it has favoured some oil majors 
because it ‘needs’ these large companies in order to meet its petroleum 
objectives of increasing international investment to exploit its resources. In the 
long term this may affect Australia’s capacity to attract other international 
investors, since there may be a perception that some more established 
companies are favoured.  
My analysis of the current method of allocation of petroleum licences indicates 
that if Australia wishes to maintain the use of WPB, the current good standing 
provisions should be revoked. In addition, there needs to be legislative 
amendments that remove the current legislative discretion available to the JA in 
the award of licences. Only then would the design of the WPB system be 
appropriate to capture the economic rent.  
In Norway, although the government allocates licences using its discretion, the 
criteria for the selection of a licence is provided to applicants prior to the award 
of licence through petroleum regulations and administrative guidelines. All 
applicants are aware of the conditions of the allocation of the licence, 
particularly the role that the State will play in the exploitation of petroleum. In 
addition, the use of the discretionary system for the allocation of petroleum 
licences enables a State to determine the relationship it will have with the oil 
companies it engages to exploit the resources it owns.  
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This use of discretion in Norway has enabled the State to define its relationship 
with the oil companies, as well as accomplish its objectives in exploiting its 
petroleum resources by setting conditions on the award of a licence. The 
government stipulation that all fields will be developed sustainably meets 
national petroleum objectives. In applying for the licences under these criteria, 
companies acquiesce to the conditions. These conditions of the award of licence 
enable the State to negotiate with the oil companies in a balanced relationship. 
The Norwegian State has abundant reserves of petroleum that oil companies 
wish to access, but it also wishes to exploit these resources for the long-term 
benefit of all Norwegians. Therefore, the State is willing to provide access to its 
resource on fair terms, ensuring that companies will realise an adequate profit. 
However, the companies must comply with the conditions stipulated upon the 
grant of licence, which ensure that Norway’s petroleum objectives of 
sustainable development of its petroleum resources are met.  
In order to sustainably develop its petroleum resources, Australia needs to be 
able to stipulate requirements for the development of its resources Similar to 
Norway, Australia could use the allocation of petroleum licences to stipulate 
particular conditions, work or qualities required from applicants in each 
licencing round. These conditions may include exploration in frontier areas, 
contribution of data, minimal work programs, or particular exploration of 
production techniques. All of the criteria should be transparent, and be 
formulated to achieve policy objectives. This would allow Australia the scope 
to award a licence to the most appropriate company with the particular 
capabilities required, rather than the highest bidder. In doing so, Australia 
would be able to fulfil its national petroleum goals and sustainably exploit its 
petroleum resources.  
Australia acknowledges that the WPB system of allocating petroleum licences 
is less than perfect, and may not be the most effective system of licence 
allocation to accomplish sustainable development of petroleum resources. 
 © Tina Hunter 
 
425
Furthermore, Australia acknowledges a need for research pertaining to the 
extent competitive work program bidding leads to excessive bids in some 
Australian basins. My analysis of the Australian WPB system of petroleum 
licence allocation demonstrates that Australia needs to consider allocating 
petroleum licences using the discretionary method of allocation, which is suited 
to accomplishing national petroleum objectives that encompass more than 
capturing economic rent. The Norway experience with the discretionary 
allocation of licences demonstrates that this method can be particularly effective 
to accomplish national petroleum objectives if it is implemented in a manner 
that assures transparency. The use of such transparent discretionary allocation 
of licences according to predefined and advertised criteria would be an effective 
way to explore Australia’s petroleum provinces and meet Australia’s petroleum 
policy goals. 
In reviewing its method its method of allocating petroleum licences the 
commonwealth should still retain a large emphasis on the work program, 
similar to Norway. However, the allocation of licences should also encompass 
objective criteria that meet Australia’s petroleum objectives of encouraging 
sustainable development increasing as well as international investment. The 
commonwealth could incorporate these objective criteria into the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 1985 (Cth) to ensure that 
the process of award of petroleum licences is made using factual, transparent 
and current criteria. This will enable the JA to exercise its discretionary powers 
in a transparent manner. Furthermore, the current discretionary powers of the 
State under the WPB system that enable oil companies to abandon their 
primary work program on the basis of poor results in the first three years should 
be reviewed. This should be replaced with provisions for the discretionary 
allocation of petroleum licences using pre-determined criteria outlined in the 
petroleum regulations. 
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6.5 The impact of State regulation of petroleum 
production on sustainable petroleum development 
In this thesis I examined whether government control over the method and timing 
of petroleum depletion is effective in the sustainable development of petroleum 
resources.  I focused on State regulation of the method and rate of extraction of 
petroleum, considering whether this contributes to the sustainable development of 
petroleum resources. 
The regulation of the rate and method of recovery of petroleum from fields has 
been applied in varying degrees in a number of jurisdictions in the last 40 years, 
as a method for the regulation of petroleum activities to meet national 
petroleum policy objectives. The success of such regulation has been mixed. In 
Norway, there were initial attempts to limit the rate of production from North 
Sea fields to less than 90 million tonnes oil equivalent. However, attempts to 
limit field production were unsuccessful in encouraging sustainable 
development of petroleum resources. Based on this experience, it is 
recommended that Australia does not regulate the rate of production to 
encourage sustainable petroleum production. 
Sustainable extraction of petroleum from Norwegian fields is encouraged 
through legislative requirements for prudent petroleum production. This 
encourages sustainable extraction by ensuring that as much of each field as 
possible is produced, and is reviewed continually to ensure that the maximum 
recovery is accomplished. The major tool utilised by the Norwegian State to 
encourage sustainable petroleum development is the Plan for Development of 
Operations (PDO). This gives the capacity for the State to continually evaluate 
the method of extraction, and the petroleum province as a whole, to ensure that 
optimal depletion occurs. As part of the PDO, the Norwegian State works in 
partnership with industry and research organisations to develop technologies to 
maximise the recovery of petroleum from offshore fields.    
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The Australian government also requires the use of a field development plan 
(FDP). However, the role of the FDP is to obtain the necessary regulatory 
requirements for the granting of a petroleum licence. The view of the Australian 
State is that while new discoveries and technological progress continue to offset 
the effects of depletion of petroleum resources, then the State need not be 
concerned with the regulation of levels of depletion from petroleum fields. 
However, there is a question as to how long that trend will continue. Already 
Australia has moved from a self-sufficient petroleum producer in the late 20th 
century to a net petroleum importer. Furthermore, there is evidence from 
Western Australia and Norway that government regulation of field depletion is 
required to ensure that field sterilisation does not occur. 
Australia’s peak petroleum body APPEA has identified the need increase 
research and development to develop oil recovery techniques through research 
and development. APPEA recognises the advantages of the Norwegian 
innovation system, and evidence tendered to the House of Representatives 
acknowledges that Norwegian developed IOR techniques would assist in greater 
recovery from Australian offshore oil fields. Given these identified needs and 
the success of the Norwegian experience, the sustainable development of 
Australian petroleum resources is more likely to be encouraged from continued 
State regulation of petroleum extraction and the development of oil recovery 
techniques that will contribute to optimal extraction of depletion from fields. 
To encourage the sustainable extraction of petroleum from a field, the Australian 
government should not contemplate the use of State control over the rate of 
petroleum. Rather, there should be the legislative capacity for the State to direct 
changes to field depletion methods to optimise recovery from offshore petroleum 
fields. There should also be a requirement for State and industry research into, 
and development of, oil recovery techniques that will assist in optimising the 
amount of oil recovered from Australian fields. In addition, field development 
plan (FDP) requirements in Australia should be altered to enable the review of 
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the recovery process and rate during the life of a field. Rather than the FDP only 
conferring start-up rights, the FDP should also include provision for State 
review.  
To enable sustainable petroleum field extraction in Australia, the ‘good oilfield 
practice’ provisions of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2006 (Cth) should be amended to incorporate not just ‘all things accepted as 
good and safe’, but to also encompass a capacity for the State to regulate 
activities to optimise recovery, including the capacity to order third party access 
to facilities and tie-in agreements.  Furthermore, the current legislative 
provisions regulating recovery of petroleum from a field should be amended to 
enable the administrative authority to direct a licencee in the recovery of 
petroleum at any stage of the petroleum production process, not just at the 
commencement of petroleum production.  
6.6 Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I have demonstrated that there are aspects of the Australian 
petroleum regulatory framework that fails to encourage the sustainable extraction 
of Australia’s offshore petroleum resources. By critically analysing a number of 
petroleum regulatory functions, I have demonstrated that in the areas of upstream 
offshore petroleum policy, legislative framework, allocation of licences, and field 
extraction, the current Australian offshore petroleum regulatory framework is not 
effective in encouraging the sustainable development of Australia’s petroleum 
resources.  
By including an analysis of a number of other petroleum regulatory frameworks, 
particularly the Norwegian regulatory framework, I have also demonstrated that 
there is a more effective way Australia could regulate the development of its 
petroleum resources to encourage sustainable development. My comparative 
analysis has demonstrated that the Norwegian approach to petroleum resource 
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development has enabled Norway to balance the needs of Norwegian society 
with the need to remain attractive to oil companies to ensure the sustainable 
development of petroleum. The Norwegian approach to petroleum exploitation is 
premised on the sustainable development of petroleum resources, accomplished 
through an integrated approach to petroleum regulation.  
The use of regulatory tools by Norway to sustainably recover petroleum provides 
an example of how the regulation of petroleum extraction is capable of 
encouraging sustainable development of petroleum extraction. Furthermore, my 
research and analysis demonstrates that it is possible to implement a number of 
changes in the Australian offshore petroleum regulatory framework to encourage 
greater sustainability in the extraction of petroleum resources in Australia.  
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